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Invitation
9The fabric of our personal memories is not consistent during our lifetime. In 
the beginning it is fine and delicate, sometimes almost intangible; it needs 
to be secured by stories that are woven into it by others. Our parents and 
grandparents often act as the loyal guardians of those fragile threads. They 
collect them carefully and gradually return them to us one by one in the form 
of family chronicles or anecdotes. That is why the memories of our early 
years remind us of sunlight flashes: quick, moving and seemingly without a 
clear pattern. In adulthood the fabric grows thicker and the pattern becomes 
more distinctive. We become capable of weaving various yarns at the same 
time, and we can use the memories of others to set off our own patterns. In 
those years we enjoy the gift of memory without paying much heed to it, 
presuming that it will last forever. As a later age approaches the cloth we 
made starts fraying out. Sometimes this is due to a lack of threads, which wear 
out or break. Sometimes it is because of our gradually reducing capacity to 
weave at the same pace. Meanwhile the circle of family members and friends 
who could help us to repair tears, inexorably narrows down. Gradually the 
fabric of our memory becomes thinner and may fall apart.  
As people become older this threat can evoke a feeling of melancholy, but 
it can also generate a spirit of creative resistance. People often start using 
various strategies in order to protect and to continue their lifetime work. They 
purposefully return to their memories in order to pick up the loose threads. 
To some extent they are forced to rely on the memories of others, using them 
to darn the tears in the fabric. They also tend to retell their stories, in the 
hope that they will become memories for somebody else, so their personal 
patterns will be woven into the fabrics of others. Those tactics are so familiar 
to us, that we either tend not to notice them anymore, or to comment on 
them in a somewhat superficial and generalized manner like: All old people 
like to talk about the past / like to reminisce / like to attract attention… . 
Personally I tend to shy away from generalizations. What interests me is not 
how often the elderly tell stories about their past, but what talking about past 
means to them.
***
Till the age of 16 I shared my bedroom with my grandmother from my 
mother’s side. Considering the lack of living space, this was not at all 
unusual in Soviet Russia. At the time I didn’t notice her telling me about 
her past. Now I can tell you quite a lot about her, being one of the seven 
surviving children in her family, about the star-shaped scar in the corner 
of her mouth, which she got from a wild horse that bit her once, about her 
very short marriage to a man who died of tuberculosis, about her life with 
my mother in a very small village, which was demolished to make place for 
a grandiose reconstruction project, about their surviving the war together. 
One of the most telling memories I have of her is that she sacrificed and sold 
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the samovar in order to support my mother’s decision to study medicine. 
Or… was it in fact my mother who told me about that? 
My mother and my grandmother are no longer with us, so those are my 
memories now. Both women bequeathed to me some precious threads of 
their lives which without even realising it I have already woven into my 
personal canvas. 
***
When my father celebrated his 75th birthday a couple of years ago, he finally 
decided to officially put an end to his 50-year long medical practice. He 
had made all sorts of plans for the coming years, one of which was to write 
down his reminiscences about the long path he had travelled, starting as a 
small village boy and developing into a widely-respected medical specialist 
in Southern Russia. He had prepared himself for the task thoroughly, by 
collecting notes he had made over the years, and by learning to work with 
a computer.  Then a year ago he suddenly and rapidly started to lose his 
eyesight. His former colleagues managed to slow down the process, but the 
damage was extensive. Now he can still read the newspaper headlines by 
using a powerful magnifying glass, but the finer job of deciphering his own 
notes or working with a computer screen is beyond his capacity now. He 
doesn’t complain about it, but I know he felt devastated. My brother and 
I tried to ease the situation by telling him that as long as his memories are 
clear, we might figure out another way to write them down. His reaction 
towards us was generous. He didn’t want to disappoint us and told us that 
we might try. His implicit despair however reflected the realisation that the 
loss was irreplaceable. Dozens of valuable threads from his past are stored 
in his notes, and he is the only person who could have picked them up and 
weaved them into the unique story of his life. 
Almost everybody has stories that are similar to the ones told above. Yet 
in the rush of our busy lives we do not dwell upon such questions as why 
remembering becomes so much more important to people as they become 
older. On the rare occasions when the question is raised, we often allow 
ourselves to make pseudo-thoughtful statements like ‘all the elderly like to 
reminisce because they have nothing else to do’, or ‘reminiscing keeps the elderly 
imprisoned within the past and away from the reality of life’.
The last couple of years have taught me something quite different. In my 
view remembering, understood as dwelling on the past, is not a feature that 
emerges just at a later age. Neither is it a faculty that can be used to keep the 
elderly busy. The meanings of remembering at a later age are both diverse 
and at the same time specific. An improved understanding of these meanings 
can be enlightening, and not just to people who have reached a certain age. 
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A study of remembering practices at a later age clearly requires bringing 
together the concepts of remembering and of ageing. I find it a challenging 
exercise, based upon a sophisticated distillation of the meanings that can 
take place. For me remembering is an ever evolving process. It is essentially 
temporal and at the same time spatially bound. It manifests itself in all kinds 
of practical situations, so various meanings can be assigned to it. The aim of 
this book is to closely investigate the ways in which the elderly generation 
looks back at the past and to understand what remembering practices entail 
for all persons involved in the present.
Remembering is always mediated. Everybody (and everything) that 
participates, stimulates, cooperates, listens and raises questions, which turns 
the remembering process into an on-going, lively and unpredictable event, 
will fall within the focus of the analysis. Remembering becomes meaningful 
during interaction and dialogues, wherein the other party can be a friend, 
a stranger, a family member, a professional of some sort, or perhaps even 
an object. There are no limitations here, though there are some marked 
differences in the way the interaction is built up.
There is one particular participant in the remembering process, without 
which this book could not have been written. This book is not about 
remembering in just any place. It is about remembering in a very specific 
setting, which is called the Reminiscence Museum. The Museum is located 
within the premises of an organisation called Humanitas in Rotterdam. 
This is a large institution that builds homes for the elderly. In combination 
with Humanitas, which created and houses the Museum, it has become 
much more than just a background decoration for nostalgic conversations. 
The Museum itself is an evolving and changing entity, which continuously 
and reciprocally influences and is influenced by its creators and its visitors. 
Because of its original and unique location, the remembering process that I 
am describing in this book has a strong spatial character. 
Humanitas works in the field of the (health)-care and well-being for the elderly 
in a continuously innovative manner. This organisation has developed the 
courage to reflect upon its own practices and to ask itself what can be done 
against the growing tendency for the social marginalisation of the elderly. 
Remembering, understood as a complex temporal and spatially bound 
phenomenon, is one of the faculties that can help us to meet this challenging 
situation. The general aim at Humanitas is to provide an opportunity 
for non-artificial social self-positioning of the older generation and as a 
consequence for an enhanced meaning of life at a later age. As we shall see, 
the Reminiscence Museum has become the place where those challenges are 
met in a both creative and inspiring way. 
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Different horizons
Introduction – The invitation of practice – The promise of philosophy – A possibility of dwelling – Tools, 
frame and horizon
Introduction
At the start of my research project three years ago I was presented with a 
complex research setting, which appeared to offer various lines of potential 
investigation. It was a challenging and at the same time unique opportunity. 
I call it unique for two very important reasons. Firstly, I was told at the 
very start that my observations about the practical situation did not need 
to be limited or narrowed down by a specific scientific hypothesis or task. 
Secondly, the ensuing freedom of choice in defining the framework of the 
research made me keenly aware of my responsibility for the outcome.
 
This book gives my personal account of the events that I have witnessed during 
the three years I worked for the research project concerning the Reminiscence 
Museum (henceforth referred to as ‘the Museum’) at Humanitas. Besides, 
this book is personal. In the beginning I felt like a newcomer within this large 
organisation, which operates across the entire Rotterdam region and makes 
use of an innovative vision as well as an unconventional organisational style 
to build and manage life-time homes for people at a later age. 
In my previous professional life I always dealt with the younger generation, 
usually students who were 20-25 years old, so the project required a 
considerable adjustment on my part. That did not take long though. The 
feeling of being a newcomer was not imposed on me. It reflected my own 
expectations, which were based on my own previous experience, as if I needed 
to be let in, in order to become part of the team. At that stage I didn’t know 
yet that Humanitas simply does not accept politics of exclusion or inclusion. 
Its ideology exclusively embraces inclusion. A visitor would look in vain for 
boundaries or imaginable waiting rooms, where a new colleague or a new 
resident should wait until he or she would be admitted and accepted by the 
staff or the residents of the organisation. With its yes-culture Humanitas has 
struck me as a place without any selection policy or ‘immigration’ frontiers. 
I was simply taken in, without even noticing it. 
The people with whom I worked, especially the curator and the volunteers 
of the Museum, at first looked at me with some curiosity. Of course they 
wanted to know who I was, where I came from and what I was planning 
to do in the Museum that had only just been founded. But after a couple of 
months, as if following some tacit agreement that was unknown to me, they 
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all started to inquire after the progress of my work. I had not expected that at 
all. The professional staff and the elderly people with whom I worked were 
probably unwittingly making me aware of my responsibility, while at the 
same time giving me their support and trust. I was deeply touched, realising 
that I was in fact not alone in this new project any more. All of them, mainly 
belonging to the generation of my parents or grandparents, became my 
extended family and I, rather homeless at that moment, gradually started 
feeling at home with them. 
All these personal experiences and thoughts have been of influence to the 
structure and the content of this book, and yet it would be erroneous to 
expect an auto-ethnographic description in the next chapters. When I speak 
about being personal in regard to this work, I am referring to my general 
understanding of the attitude towards theoretical research and to the feeling 
of responsibility that I have towards it. I do not believe in doing research 
without becoming personally involved in it as well. Research that binds 
theory and practice makes this personal involvement even more explicit. The 
study that will follow is socio-psychological by nature, which means that 
people and their relationships will be the focus of my attention. I was either 
an observer or a participant at each dialogue, conversation or occurrence, 
which are described in this book. My own voice will surely dominate the 
description and the analysis, but the reader should not confuse its strength 
with an unwillingness to consider differing views and explanations. My 
interpretations and conclusions mirror my convictions and my theoretical 
and methodological preferences, but they are also an invitation for discussion. 
I do not feel claustrophobic in any possible sense of the word, but by the 
same token I clearly do not favour enclosure, especially in scientific thinking. 
As a result, each time when I come to certain conclusions, this also means 
reaching out for a new opening, which I am inclined to conceive as a horizon. 
In that respect my own thought is profoundly influenced by process-
philosophy 1, with its ontology of becoming. Within its context, this study 
investigates only one of the possible ways to unfold a specific practical 
situation, by translating it into theoretical language, enriching it with 
philosophical thought and then returning it to the ongoing flux of life. The 
first two steps reflect what Henri Bergson would call ‘the work of intelligence’ 
(Bergson, 1946/2007). The final step of returning to the flux of life has 
a double aim. On the one hand, coupling is necessary if we are to bridge 
1   The term process philosophy has two basic meanings: the first one refers to the name and 
works of the English philosopher A. Whitehead, while the second one identifies a broader 
tendency within a philosophical thought, which origins go back to the works of Heraclitus. I 
shall be using the term in its second meaning. For more detailed references see e.g. Standford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/process-philosophy/ 
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the gap between the work of intelligence and the needs of life. Following 
Bergson, the philosopher to the thoughts of whom a major part of this book 
owes its inspiration, I believe that ‘science is the auxiliary of action. And 
action aims at a result’ (Bergson, 1946/2007: 103). In other words, my sincere 
hope is that this book will induce a difference by highlighting relevant issues 
that are connected with ageing and by translating them back into practice. 
The aim of bringing the analytically obtained results of research back into 
life has a deeper philosophical meaning. As we shall see later on, life can 
be understood as an uninterrupted process of becoming, which suggests 
that results that were obtained analytically, remain provisional and can only 
have value if they are mirrored against that verifying and counterbalancing 
movement. At that stage a new horizon can be opened and a new challenge 
can reveal itself for a daring mind. That is why I consider this book an 
invitation.
A justifiable question at this point could be why empirically-based research 
requires a philosophical embedding at all. The difficult part of this is that in 
order to obtain a satisfactory answer to this question, one has to make the 
effort of reading the book first. At the end I hope it will become clear how, by 
using both theoretical and philosophical insights, we can understand better 
and subsequently develop the practice that we investigated and observed. 
At the same time, as the person who invites the reader to take part in this 
journey, I am quite prepared to give some general directions and guidelines 
at the start.
This research is based upon the practices at Humanitas and in particular 
at the Reminiscence Museum, which was founded by this organisation. 
While describing those practices we shall be repeatedly turning to some 
quite demanding forms of philosophical thought. This movement between 
practical and philosophical dimensions will be reciprocal. I am well aware of 
the complications that this kind of approach presents to the researcher. I am 
also aware of the challenges, to which the outcome exposes the reader. Yet, 
my choice is not made at random. The practices I have observed are diverse 
and very complex. In the following chapters we shall be moving from a 
description of the multidimensional physical space where the observations 
have taken place, to an analysis of the ambiguous nature of the observed 
experiences. In order to do justice to the practices that are studied here, one 
needs to meet the complexity of the phenomena by applying some complex 
theories to them. There are various ways of doing this. The most direct 
way is to use a sophisticated description, which matches the intricacy of 
the described setting. That was what I started to do at the beginning, when 
the first data were collected, namely to develop a fitting analytical account, 
which could do justice to the practice. Yet, I ended up moving back and forth 
within three dimensions: practical, theoretical and philosophical. 
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At a certain point of the analysis it became clear that in order to grasp the 
nature of the practices we observed, we have to leave behind the practical 
dimension all together and instead look at the situation from the outside 
before returning to the setting again, enriched by the more complex and 
profound understanding that we have gained from that movement. The 
entire account will be built upon this reciprocal circular movement: from 
practice to theory, from theory to philosophy and then back to theory and 
practice again. At the end of the day the reader will hopefully see that this 
transitional movement makes good sense, since we shall start and also end 
with the practices which inspired the research and the initial impetus for this 
book. 
Philosophical context is mobilized and used not for the sake of philosophy 
itself, but in order to elucidate the particularities of the practices we studied. 
In order to understand this choice better, let us have a closer look at the 
already mentioned process-philosophy approach in relation to the practical 
situation we observed.
Understanding life as a process that cannot sustain any permanent enclosure 
challenges the classical task of theoretical framing. A possible way out is to 
try and look differently at the very concept of framing. The first time I started 
thinking about an unorthodox way towards organisational boundaries, 
was when I realised that the general approach at Humanitas does not 
demarcate a geographical or ideological territory for the organisation, but 
rather removes the notion of boundaries. The thought may seem to be a bit 
perplexing, considering the fact that Humanitas provides life-time homes 
and that, as we shall see later, an intrinsic feature of the notion of home is 
in fact its enclosure. But what seems to be a contradiction in terms actually 
contains a suggestion for a solution. This solution is not to close down on the 
object of the study, but to open it up, by replacing the notion of framing with 
that of horizon. That has not been a one-step decision, which is why I decided 
to keep the dynamics of the development intact, in order to take the reader 
with me through the various stages of the project, while at the same time 
showing how my theoretical thought was shaped and reshaped. The first 
and the last chapters together embrace the content of the book not as a frame 
but rather as a series of openings which meet each other as the earth and the 
sky do, sliding along each other, supplementing and contrasting each other, 
but never completing or terminating whatever can be found in-between. I 
do not know a better metaphor than a horizon, to define the framing of this 
book. Let me explain this in more detail.
The theoretical shaping of this research can be seen as multidimensional 
and multidirectional. By multidimensional I mean my choice to consider the 
interplay at different levels of the analysis, such as practical, theoretical and 
16
philosophical. By multidirectional I refer to the process character of both the 
described phenomena and their theoretical embedding. We shall shortly talk 
about the process approach in more detail. As for now let us concisely define 
that, when referring to the process approach, the emphasis is made on change 
and becoming. Both lines intersect in the analysis that will be conducted, 
which means that the division as it is given here must be seen as provisional, 
conditioned merely by my aspiration for clarity of the description.  
Let me start with a practical dimension, where the intersection of ideological 
openness and the practical pursuit of perfection, which is characteristic for 
Humanitas as an organisation, creates a paradox that needs to be solved 
by means of a theoretical embedding. My initial intuitive impression of 
Humanitas as an organisation that takes boundaries away was basically 
correct. It was strengthened by the innovative ideology of Humanitas which 
is based on four ‘core values’ (Becker, 2003, 2006):
1  Being in control – individual autonomy must be respected, even if it 
invites negative social judgements (e.g. being drunk at the bar). This 
is supported by ‘hands-behind-the-back-care’ where caregivers should 
resist the temptation to take over activities simply because they can 
accomplish them faster.
2  Active participation – clients are encouraged to retain control and 
involvement in their own daily care – e.g. cooking, cleaning, mending 
clothes – for as long as possible. The slogans ‘use it or lose it’ and 
‘too much care is as bad as too little care’ are often invoked to remind 
caregivers to facilitate self-care as far as possible.
3  Extended family approach – divisions between clients and staff are to be 
eroded. This can range from treating clients and their immediate family 
as ‘experts’ in their own care to providing clients with roles within the 
organisation itself (e.g. part-time attendants in the museum).
4  Yes-Culture – employed and voluntary staff at Humanitas are required 
to adopt a positive attitude to any request made at the home. These may 
mean entertaining non-standard or peculiar requests (e.g. to retain a 
number of pets) (see more in Bendien et al.: in press).
The implementation of each of those principles can lead to a new version of 
organisational care. The potential of the yes-culture is especially impressive. 
Its initiator Hans Becker explains this as rather an attitude than a principle 
or a method: ‘It provides a behavioural repertoire which, by learning to 
say ‘yes’, can be used as a tool to make the organisation more humane, 
more creative and more flexible. This consequently becomes an important 
tool for changing organisations in general and care in particular’  (Becker, 
2006: 2). In theory and in practice this innovative attitude, in spite of its 
seemingly idealistic character, allows for essential positive changes such as 
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the transparency of the organisational structure at Humanitas, the measure 
of involvement on the part of the management and staff and the way the 
clients at Humanitas share the responsibility for their common home. In 
order to preclude any naïve or simplified interpretation of this notion, let 
me point out that the yes-culture is not a synonym for anarchy or all-around 
permissiveness. Managerial yes cannot be used against the prevailing 
humanistic principles on which Humanitas was founded more than 60 years 
ago; it means that yes cannot be said to a potentially harmful or irresponsible 
request. Implementation of the yes-culture shows that while the yes-attitude 
has been prioritised, the necessity to say no has melted down impressively 
(Becker, 2006). This result, which was very much appreciated by most of 
the staff members and residents, demonstrates visible consequences of the 
attitude that led to it. Beside an obvious impact, the yes-culture has also 
exerted an implicit influence on the management style, the atmosphere, the 
internal and the external image of the organisation. Let us ponder on this 
attitude within the context of the previous discussion of boundaries. 
It is perhaps acceptable to visualise no by using the image of a wall, or a 
closed door, or another insuperable obstacle. At the content level each of 
those images can be associated with the idea of a boundary or frontier that 
has the effect of an absolute rule and therefore cannot be easily overcome. A 
visualisation of yes is not as easily conjured. By introducing the yes-culture, 
Humanitas has consistently and at various levels removed a familiar image of 
care organisations as built on hierarchy and submission. The disappearance 
of white clothing for example removes or at least reduces the artificial 
boundary between the professionals and the clients. The metamorphosis of 
the canteen, which is common in a nursing home, into a restaurant and bar, 
has reduced the boundary between the inside and the outside world, turning 
this usually rather boring place into a colourful and lively meeting point. The 
installation of the internet-café has erased not only the boundary between the 
neighbourhood and the premises of Humanitas, but is challenging one of the 
most unyielding boundaries, namely the gap that exists between different 
generations. 
While trying to understand the deeper meanings of the actions that are 
taken by the management of Humanitas, I continuously encounter this 
persistent idea of opening up, of change and of a constant challenge to the 
margins. Let me present you with one more example which, because of its 
unorthodox character, reflects the idea of Humanitas without boundaries quite 
explicitly. Humanitas has accumulated all kinds of collections, ranging from 
old music instruments to exotic busts of eastern gods, which have gradually 
become an integral part of its interior design. Close to the main entrance of 
the Humanitas head office there is a wonderful collection of old-fashioned 
wheel-chairs. Initially I was surprised by the number, shape and design of 
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these old-fashioned objects, the diversity of which I could not have imagined 
before. It was however the remark of a visiting friend that made me realise 
what this unusual display could actually mean for both the people who work 
or live in Humanitas and for those who are just visiting. My friend suggested 
that a wheel-chair is usually seen as an attribute of decline and impairment, 
so at a first glance it would seem to be quite an odd decision to exhibit a large 
number of wheel-chairs, especially in a place where people are sentenced 
to use them sooner or later. At the same time he found the collection quite 
impressive, an almost humorous bridge to acceptance and in fact totally free 
of any negative connotations towards the elderly people living in the home. I 
agreed with him, wondering 
at the same time what was 
happening there. A wheel-
chair is often seen as an 
attribute of old age. It bears 
the semantics of a boundary, 
of dependency and isolation 
to a much larger extent than 
its forerunners, such as a 
walking stick or a walking-
frame. Elderly people often 
resist using a wheel-chair, 
seeing it as a final loss 
of autonomy and feeling 
ashamed of such an explicit public revelation of their age and dependency. 
While containing and providing all kinds of wonders of technical progress 
(much less of aesthetic design, though), the modern wheel-chairs are usually 
carefully stored away in order to not disturb the pleasurable scenery of life. 
Allow me one comparison here. When visiting my 94-year old aunt who is 
living in a prestigious (non-Humanitas) complex of service-flats, I have to 
make a 3-4 minute walk along sterile empty corridors in order to reach her 
apartment, where a visitor will see no signs of a wheel-chair or walking-frame 
(or even life) whatsoever. In all likelihood this is due to a restriction imposed 
by the fire safety department, but to me there is clearly a boundary with the 
outer world. Then, after I have made the last turn and am approaching her 
apartment I finally see a welcoming sign of life again in the shape of her 
walking-frame, which she ‘disobediently’ pushed forward to greet me at her 
front door. 
One can only wonder what kind of measures the initiator at Humanitas 
has had to take, in order to obtain permission to place a large collection of 
(mostly wooden) wheel-chairs on the ground floor of its headquarters. One 
can also wonder why the organisation decided to go through all that trouble 
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at all. The strongest side of the borderless ideology at Humanitas lies in the 
way it refuses to accept and in fact challenges the social marginalisation of 
the older generation. The changes that old age often entails, cannot be used 
in order to defend or explain the unethical division into us, young, healthy, 
economically independent and powerful persons, and them, who are old, 
weak, institutionalised and silent. But in this particular case a weakness was 
evidently transformed into a strength, allowing the users of wheelchairs to 
feel normal, or at least not unusual. By lining up its impressive collection of 
wheel-chairs, Humanitas in a certain sense challenges the sombre image of 
the changes that people undergo later in life. By exhibiting the collection, the 
organisation removes the taboo of immobility and shows with courage and 
a sense of humour that there is no need for such artificial boundaries when 
we are talking about a natural process in life. 
My general orientation towards the situation is perhaps clear by now. 
Humanitas with its yes-culture has made me realise that its ideology can 
be better understood in terms of opening up and taking away boundaries, 
than in terms of traditional framing and enclosure. But as I have mentioned 
before, this conclusion seems to be in contradiction with the primary task of 
the organisation, which is to provide ‘normal’ living conditions for the older 
generation and in fact to give them life-time homes. 
Later on we shall have a detailed discussion around the notion of home. 
But even a quick peek into it now can perhaps be sufficient to notice the 
apparently conflicting interpretations of the ideology at Humanitas and the 
notion of home. Usually we expect our home to protect us, shelter us and 
give us a feeling of safety. This can hardly be achieved, unless we think about 
home in terms of boundaries or frontiers. With this aim for a warm shelter 
in mind, I see before me an organisation that daringly questions the existing 
margins within the care sector for the older generation and denies that there 
are frontiers between life in general and life in a life-time home. Theorizing 
this kind of practice is quite challenging, but there is still another dimension 
that I want to introduce here. 
Let us suppose that Humanitas defined its ideology successfully once and 
for all. In that case there should be little difference between its story and 
the usual ideological framing that every other organisation that cares about 
its own image presents to the market as its visiting card. In that case it 
would perhaps be possible to talk about a renewed framing, but as I see 
it Humanitas is challenging the concept of framing itself. Its ideology can 
rather be formulated as a continuous reframing, which reflects the tireless 
search for better answers to such an ambitious question as ‘how can we 
make people happier’. The practical implementation of the yes-culture can 
be an exemplary route to understanding the processual character of the 
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Humanitas organisation. The commitment to say yes to all kinds of proposals 
and changes entails a readiness to agree to questionable requests as well, 
which in turn unlocks a chain-like reaction of continuous readjustment. The 
challenge of the yes-culture consists not in the constant need to address an 
evolving practice. Its challenge is contained instead in the main principle of 
the ideology, which can be termed the ideology of being inconsistent. The 
only way to remain consistent within such an ideology is to keep moving 
between the new argumentation and adjusting it in practice all the time.  
Understanding life and every specific practical situation in terms of process, 
movement and change requires a philosophical frame of mind that can 
provide an adequate background for that kind of practice. The director of 
Humanitas, who is at the same time the initiator of its ideology, can be called 
a process practitioner. He and his team have inspired and put into practice a 
series of practical innovations, some of which have already been described 
here. But if we want to grasp the drive with which the changes are introduced 
in practice within this organisation, we must admit that while pondering on 
the situation as it is today or tomorrow, we will lag behind the developments 
that actually take place at Humanitas. 
Considering these contemplations, one can probably imagine what happened 
four years ago, when the director announced that Humanitas was going to 
found a Reminiscence Museum. The staff and the residents became curious, 
but they were hardly surprised. At that stage nobody could possibly have 
foreseen the consequences of this decision. This example allows us to return 
to our previous discussion about the yes-culture. As we have pointed out, 
the yes-culture means much more than a general positive attitude or even 
the possibility to take well-weighted risks. The yes-culture is an invitation to 
think without restrictions and limitations, especially when the improvement 
of people’s life conditions is at stake. Not only the yes-culture, but the entire 
ideology at Humanitas can be interpreted as an ideology of opening up. At 
the same time Humanitas is transmitting a feeling of confidence, trust and 
belonging to the people who work and live there. More than once in this 
book we shall be confronted with seemingly incompatible processes, which 
nevertheless jointly create novelty and secure ceaseless becoming. This is 
why I chose the notion of horizon to clarify the theoretical background of the 
study. This notion reconciles what seems to be irreconcilable. As a famous 
philosopher of the 20th century explains it, ‘a boundary is not that at which 
something stops but… the boundary is that from which something begins its 
presencing. That is why the concept is that of horismos, that is, the horizon, 
the boundary’ (Heidegger, 1951/1971: 152). Thus boundaries and horizon, 
closure and opening can be brought together, on condition that both are 
understood as processes and are interpreted within the context of a process-
oriented philosophy. If somebody tries to understand a horizon outside 
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any movement, then he or she will not come further than a description of 
a straight line. In life the horizon is always moving and at the same time it 
gives an impression of finitude. It looks like a boundary, but it continuously 
offers a new opening. It embraces both stability and changeability. It divides 
and unites at the same time. It bears a promise of a better chance and a better 
life, as an utopia, which awaits at the horizon, or right behind it.
 
***
This first short engagement of the reader with the practices of Humanitas can 
be compared with my own introduction there a couple of years ago, when the 
research approach and the theoretical headlines of the as yet unwritten book 
were starting to acquire a specific shape. It would be premature at this stage 
to go into a detailed description of the various philosophical and theoretical 
frameworks, which will be presented later. What is called for now is a road 
map, pointing out the three main directions (or horizons), along which the 
various plots of the book will be further developed. 
The first line is not just inspired by the practices at Humanitas, but reflects the 
practical dimension of this study. The ideological motto of Humanitas, which 
the organisation itself calls the art of living in old age, simultaneously provides 
a conceptual context for analysis and an opening for new interpretations of 
the practical setting. We shall look at it more specifically in a moment.
 
The second line is based on the process character of the activities, in which the 
Humanitas organisation is involved at all levels of its day-to-day practices. In 
order to unfold this line, two moves will be made: first selected data will be 
provided with a socio-psychological analysis, and then it will be set against 
a more profound philosophical line of thought, namely the philosophy of 
becoming with its central concept of duration. Those two moves together will 
enable us to approximate the complexity of what will be called a process 
practice. 
 
Just like the first two, the third line is thoroughly rooted in the practices of 
Humanitas and the Reminiscence Museum. Broadly speaking this line will 
touch upon notions as belonging and feeling at home. This line will develop 
along a similar multistage pattern. We shall depart by giving a description 
of the Museum and proceed through a socio-psychological analysis of 
experiences of being in the Museum, and at a broader level, of being in a place 
/ space of ageing. Finally we shall reach for the philosophical understanding 
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of being in its specific meaning, namely being in a certain place, or being as 
a form of dwelling.  
We shall proceed along each of those lines in turn, in order to allow for detailed 
explanation. Yet, any clear-cut separation of those lines would be rather 
artificial, because they will be developing simultaneously, complementing 
and enriching each other.  
  
The invitation of practice: Line 1
What is Humanitas actually? We are here for happiness… .
With these words professor Becker consistently starts his explanation about 
the ideology at Humanitas. When I heard it for the first time I frowned 
involuntarily. Is he using those words in a manner of speaking? Does he actually 
mean happiness, or perhaps just good care and well-being? Surely Humanitas 
doesn’t organise happiness or give a prescription for it? Is happiness obligatory 
at Humanitas and is everyone sentenced to that? 
I know that a lot of people who have heard Hans Becker speak once or twice 
have felt confronted by such questions as well. Most of them can reconcile 
themselves with the apparent simplicity of Becker’s statement, having made 
the effort to take a good look at the changes that were introduced at the 
practical side of this organisation. Those who are still frowning I kindly invite 
to follow the arguments of this book. 
In the previous paragraph I have tried to elucidate my first impression of 
Becker’s vision, which is based on an ideology that removes traditional 
organisational, psychological and social boundaries. I call the Humanitas 
experience a process practice, which together with the idea of boundaries, 
shapes the first theoretical perspective of this book. 
Becker’s introductory phrase about happiness, with which he greets all his 
visitors at Humanitas, is only a part of the organisational narrative that is 
used as an instrument in promoting his entire ideology. At the content level 
this narrative remains complex and emergent, while formally speaking it is 
constituted by the so-called simple guiding principles (Letiche, 2008), such as 
use it or lose it, self-management or extended family. It is probably that simplicity 
of expression which perplexes those who anticipate a more sophisticated 
theoretical clarification. An explanation seems to be in order here: the form of 
the presentation may be simple, but in practice it is not simplified at all, and 
the ideas behind it may be clear and easy to follow, but they are not simple-
minded. 
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When Becker promotes happiness he is actually talking about choices that each 
resident and client of Humanitas, regardless of his or her physical or mental 
condition, are still able to make. At the same time one should not overlook the 
beginning of Becker’s statement. While talking about ‘Humanitas’ and ‘we’, 
he emphasises the responsibility of the organisation, which should facilitate 
and secure this choice-making process. It is obvious that at a later age those 
choices become limited or even almost nonexistent, especially within the care-
providing facilities. The schedule, the food and the amount of care that each 
client receives, are approved by professionals and must be complied with. The 
boundary around the freedom to choose is not easily overcome, since the entire 
care system for the elderly is aimed at ensuring its consistency. Moreover most 
of the elderly people themselves cannot imagine that the freedom to change 
things could be an option.
In order to achieve a breakthrough in this almost change-proof way of 
thinking, Becker introduced the corporate narrative, which is neither simple 
in its theoretical clarification, nor in its practical implementation. But Becker 
is a practitioner and an entrepreneur at the same time. Together with his team 
he is continuously searching for ways to turn the idea of a few into a vision 
for many. By translating theoretical concepts into simple guiding principles, 
he removes the boundary between theory and practice and subsequently 
introduces these principles throughout the organisation. At the end of the day 
literally each professional working for Humanitas can tell you what the core 
values of the Humanitas ideology are. But this is only part of the story. On 
the one hand those principles still need to be translated into actions, and on 
the other hand, if the ideology itself should remain unchanged, it could soon 
turn into another kind of rigid code with rules, according to which everybody 
is obliged to smile and feel happy. Process-like thinking and a continued 
capability to accept change can be the answers to those challenges.
 
Personally speaking I find these last two aspects of the ideology at Humanitas 
(process-thinking and continuous change) more important than the guiding 
principles themselves. What does the idea of ‘making people happy’ mean to a 
first-line professional, who is supposed to ‘implement’ it on a day-to-day basis, 
constantly translating it into his or her practical work with the clients? You 
could make a list of ‘desirable’ actions, but we are all aware of their limitations. 
An ideology that is presented as a ready-made recipe with some examples 
for practical application, will surely not survive the trials of unpredictable 
and diverse situations in daily practice. It is clear that even the successful 
Humanitas formula must face the challenge of continuous change. A creative 
and emphatic style of work needs to be actively stimulated and trained. The 
clients and the residents have the right to make their own choices and must be 
given the opportunity to communicate those choices to the professionals. The 
management cannot afford to rest on its laurels, because today’s success could 
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turn into stagnation tomorrow. In other words, the frontiers of today have to 
be reassessed and probably removed again tomorrow. At this stage the entire 
Humanitas organisation has been tried out, the management, the staff and the 
clients as well. The professionals and the clients too are testing their boundaries, 
while the management team is following that same stream, sometimes ahead, 
sometimes just behind, in a tireless effort to notice patterns, to facilitate and 
foresee new needs, and to catch unique opportunities, which can offer a new 
opening. There is still a lot of work to be done, in fact Humanitas will never be 
finished, but it is certainly on the way to its new horizon. 
Ultimately Humanitas is about happiness, but on condition that there are no two 
identical ideas of happiness in this world. Talking about happiness within the 
context of care for the elderly is not simple at all, which probably explains why 
Becker titled his book The Art of Living in Old Age: Happiness-Promoting Care in 
an Ageing World. There is no recipe for universal happiness in the book; in fact 
Becker never intended to find one. It is rather his frame of mind and his extensive 
knowhow, which create real possibilities for people to feel well. To illustrate this 
let me tell you a story, which will bring us straight into the object of this study 2. 
One of Becker’s acquaintances told him once that she was doing reminiscence 
work. On her way to clients at a nursing home she would take a couple of 
old-fashioned objects with her. During her conversations with the clients she 
would use those objects in order to stimulate their memories and to enliven 
communication. Becker was quite direct about this. He found the reminiscence 
work approach not very impressive and also far too therapeutic. And yet, 
there was no harm in the idea as such. Further it turned out that Humanitas 
already had two staff members who were also doing some reminiscence work. 
Besides, it was not the style of Humanitas to lag behind in a somewhat trendy 
development. 
As an experienced manager Becker was not going to invest money into 
something that was abundantly available free of charge. So he asked his sister 
to bring along to Humanitas their mother’s old Singer sewing machine and an 
old-fashioned bean cutter. They were simply placed on the table in the Becker’s 
office, just for a while. But what happened then was quite surprising. Literally 
everybody who came to talk with the director found him/herself immediately 
distracted by the sight of those old-fashioned objects. Not only that, people 
started to talk, remembering things, telling stories, sharing experiences. The 
impact was quite amazing. 
2   The following account is based on the interview with H. Becker, recorded in March 2008.
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For those readers who are not familiar with the premises at Humanitas, a short 
explanation can be helpful here. The door of the director’s office is almost 
permanently open, so everybody can come in, even when the director is 
receiving visitors or talking with members of his staff. The wall that separates 
the office from the secretariat is made of glass, so everybody can see perfectly 
well what is going on inside. Becker always has heaps of visitors, who 
constantly bump into each other: scheduled business-like visits and visits from 
people who just pop in to say hello. This second group is mostly represented 
by residents or clients of the nursing home who enjoy the possibility of coming 
by for a chat. In other words, the director receives an impressive dual stream 
of visitors on a daily basis. So when Becker told me that all the people started 
talking, that really meant something. 
The people were not only enjoying a conversation about the past, but they 
began to bring along their own things, hoping that they could be of some use as 
well. Hans Becker was impressed, but at the same time he was analysing 
the process and trying to come to terms with a new development that was 
emerging in front of him. If he as a manager and a thinker could give it 
a right turn, then he had to be quick in order to stay a step ahead of this 
development. Just like his first reaction to the story of his acquaintance, the 
director was completely logical in his reasoning. He started by admitting 
that within the context of the ideology at Humanitas, which at a practical 
level often boils down to so-called ‘conversation pieces’, namely themes and 
subjects that the clients like to talk about, he had totally overlooked the value 
and the role that old-fashioned objects can play there. 
Becker found that the presence of those objects can not only trigger people to 
remember past situations and occurrences, but also creates an opportunity 
to share these memories with others and by doing this can further facilitate 
the feeling of belonging to a larger group, which is so important at a later age 
as well. According to him reminiscing can become a strengthening factor in 
the relations with family members, between different generations, including 
cases where the ability to remember has already been affected by the ageing 
process. Becker the professor and Becker the director were ready to make a 
new decision. And as Hans Becker the person put it: ‘We decided to do it then 
of course, but we were going to do it differently, not like the others. Not in a medical 
or therapeutic way. Of course those lines have been taken into consideration. But 
what counts most in Humanitas: for happiness. Which means to do things together, 
to feel good, to feel like somebody who counts, who knows things. That is the most 
important thing 3.’
3   Quoted from the interview with H.Becker, recorded in March 2008. 
26
That was how the decision to found the Reminiscence Museum came into 
effect. By retelling the director’s story we are given the opportunity to 
observe very closely how a promising idea found its way into practice. There 
are several points in the story that show how a new turn in thinking has been 
taken. This occurs the first time when Becker, in spite of his already formulated 
theoretical vision regarding Humanitas and his obvious lack of interest 
towards traditionally executed reminiscence work, nevertheless decides to 
give it a try by placing a couple of old-fashioned objects in his office. Various 
factors have played a role here: the intuition of entrepreneur, the influence of 
the yes-culture and maybe even simple curiosity. But one thing is clear to me: 
the vision at Humanitas is not a set of theoretical ideas, that are fixed once 
and forever. It was born in living practice and it has been adjusted, tuned and 
reformulated ever since, in order to keep up with recent developments and 
emerging needs and to lead them at the same time. This aspect of adjustment 
became perfectly clear when the reactions of the visitors convinced the 
director that almost unwittingly he had struck gold. The capacity to think 
independently within our moving and changing reality is a rare feature. Not 
that reality has ever been different, but our natural inclination is to step out 
of its movement in order to think more clearly. Yet, when the director took a 
following step by deciding to commence a large reminiscence project, he was 
already ahead of the situation that was emerging. 
The comparison of the Museum with a goldmine should not be misinterpreted. 
Humanitas does not generate any income with the Museum, but the people 
who work, live or simply visit Humanitas do benefit immensely from its 
existence. This I shall describe in the following chapters. As for now it would 
seem that yet another boundary has been challenged by Humanitas, namely 
that invisible division between the past and the present. In order to properly 
assess this challenge, we require a much broader horizon, which is why I 
shall now leave the practical dimension for what it is and look at the object 
of the study from a different angle.
The promise of philosophy: Line 2
The theoretical embedding I am looking for is supposed to offer a vision that 
is broad enough to embrace the process nature of the practice that is under 
observation. But before I do that, let me remark on certain questions that arise 
each time empirical work is exposed to theoretical framing. The first question 
would be why the framing is necessary at all; the second, why we choose 
one particular framing and reject another. The generally recognised starting 
point, which I share, would be that the nature of the empirical data themselves 
does not explicitly or implicitly have any bias towards a particular framing. 
The issue of framing appears only when I as a researcher am confronted with 
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complex data or settings which appeal to me personally and which I want to 
understand or even intend to influence. In order to interpret or explain my 
research approach, I shall be looking around for relevant tools, for instance 
in the form of fitting concepts, methods and theories, sometimes going as far 
as creating new ones. 
So in fact various possibilities of framing can be legitimate as long as they are 
clarified. In my view there should be one pre-condition in that respect, namely the 
researcher’s ethical responsibility for it. That responsibility should be based on at 
least two principles. Firstly, the world neither has one single description for what 
it shows us, nor can it produce a description on its own; therefore my description 
will always make the world look in a certain way. In that sense the ethical way to 
engage oneself with the world is to take the position of an involved participant 
and not of a neutral observer. Secondly and consequently, one can only talk about 
an ethically sound participation if, as a direct result of that involvement, the field 
of study is expanded, new possibilities of engagement with it are revealed, and 
something new is added to the entire empirical setting. The theoretical choices 
that have been made for this study are all based on those two principles. 
As explained, the process of matching empirical data and their theoretical 
embedding, started with the complexity of the practical setting, which manifested 
itself in different forms. Let me give a few impressions of my first encounters 
with the Museum at that time. The space of the Museum, which was initially 
supposed to cover a couple of small sections of the basement, gradually expanded 
and is now spread out over fourteen rooms. Within that growing space all kinds 
of new developments emerged. For example, the at first unforeseeable presence 
of five washing machines, belonging to different periods, created one of the most 
popular sites of remembering at the Museum. Besides the gradually evolving 
character of the space, the Museum appears to have the power to generate an 
entire range of emotional responses amongst its visitors. One of them remarked 
thoughtfully that ‘the Museum gives the warmth of remembering’. Another visitor 
just wandered around the place dumbfound, muttering ‘O boy, o boy!’ from time 
to time and wiping his tears away shyly. Yet another one stated assertively that 
the first time she came to the Museum she ‘felt happy and satisfied’. 
There are many of these examples. They created a challenging starting point for 
theoretical analysis. But, as the analysis will show, the socio-psychological and 
discursive approaches only cut through the first layer of possible interpretation. 
Why did Humanitas allow the space of the Museum to spread far beyond the 
initial planning? What was so specific about the Museum space, which allowed the 
visitor to identify her feelings as warmth of remembering? Was that ‘o boy’ muttering 
about something in the past, about the present or about both at the same time? 
Why would somebody feel happy and satisfied, being surrounded by old-fashioned 
objects, which outside the Museum could easily be labelled as rubbish? 
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In the following chapters these kinds of questions will emerge continuously. 
It will also become clear that in order to meet the complexity of those 
simple questions, we shall need to leave the empirical and even the formal 
descriptive dimensions at rest for a while and use philosophical insights, 
which will help us to obtain a richer account of the experiences we observed. 
In a previous paragraph one of such philosophical approaches, namely 
process philosophy, was already mentioned. We shall reflect on that in more 
detail now, to find out whether empirical research has much to gain from 
that particular philosophical line of thought. 
Let me suggest that the propensity towards continuous change, which 
characterises the ideology at Humanitas, can be understood more profoundly if 
it is placed within the philosophical tradition which is called process philosophy. 
The basic postulates of this philosophy can be formulated as follows: firstly, 
‘natural existence consists in and is best understood in terms of processes rather 
than things — of modes of change rather than fixed stabilities,’ and secondly, 
‘what exists in nature is not just originated and sustained by processes but 
is in fact ongoingly and inexorably characterized by them’ (Rescher, 2002). In 
other words, by following the definition of process philosophy, we understand 
reality as a process and we interpret reality by means of processes. 
By translating this definition back into a practical dimension, one can 
discover the intersections of the practical and philosophical approaches. 
For example, the yes-culture, which constitutes the corner stone of the 
Humanitas ideology generates a physical and conceptual environment of 
inconsistency, change and continuous adjustment rather than a permanent 
and stable framework for the activities in which Humanitas is involved. 
Another example can be found in the way in which the management of the 
organisation copes with the ever-changing environment. At an early stage 
of its development the Museum needed more physical space than was 
anticipated, so the organisation applied process thinking to the situation that 
had emerged and allowed for a stretching of space in order to meet not only 
the Museum’s present but also its possible future spatial requirements.
Understanding life as a process is like looking at a horizon. It allows for a 
broad approach towards the most daring philosophical questions, including 
the question of being, which within process philosophy is understood in 
terms of duration and becoming. A prioritisation of processes-bound concepts 
means that every conceptualisation has a provisional character and remains 
subject to change. My claim is that in its general approach and style of 
management, Humanitas makes use of process-bound concepts, and that 
process philosophy in particular can be helpful in clarifying the complex 
nature of the practices that we are analysing. This claim cannot be sufficiently 
backed up yet at this stage of the description, but we shall come back to it 
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later, in the concluding chapter. As for a practical manifestation of process-
bound thinking, we can still give another example here.
 
Reminiscence work within the care sector for the elderly can be seen as 
a normatively fixed therapeutic activity. That explains why it was in first 
instance rejected by the director of Humanitas, whose personal propensity 
is to operate within and with changing reality. The situation that developed 
in his office altered Becker’s views on that seemingly rigid concept quite 
decisively. In the lively and emotionally charged interactions of his visitors 
he saw a new possibility to enhance the living conditions of the clients. 
What actually underpinned his decision was a merger of two processes: 
the remembering that the visitors were experiencing and the reflective and 
analytical thinking process on the part of the organisation. 
The ability to identify and use the merging power of various processes, 
can be called the art of management, to which Humanitas largely owes its 
success. In what way process thinking empowers the process practice will 
be described in the next chapters. In anticipation of the analysis I would 
like to make a preliminary supposition, that the philosophical notion of 
duration, understood as ‘unceasing creation, the uninterrupted up-surge of 
novelty 4’ (Bergson, 1946/2007: 7), can play the role of a master key towards 
understanding how the processes of life are translated into process practice 
at the Humanitas organisation. 
Another intersection between process philosophy and process practice at 
Humanitas is clearly the process-oriented follow-up of every innovation 
that takes place there. It is standard procedure at Humanitas, that while an 
innovation is implemented, it remains within the focus of the management 
team. It is closely followed and often becomes an explicit subject of discussion 
within the entire organisation. That allows for feedback, based on which 
necessary modifications can be made. In the following chapters we shall see 
several examples of this approach towards innovation. 
The core business at Humanitas is related to people and their well-being. It 
would be unnatural for an organisation that is founded on the principles of 
humanism, to regard people as objects, conceptualising them as target-groups, 
age-groups, patients-groups or sorting them out into other generalised 
faceless group categories. Process philosophy has similar difficulties in 
conceptualising people by regarding them as substances or things. Process 
thinking places an emphasis on the changing aspects of human personality 
and especially on the relational character of human life. 
4   The notion will be explained in more detail later on. 
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Process philosophy seems to provide the right theoretical setting to match the 
practical dimension of Humanitas. It challenges the traditional scientific way 
in which reality is interpreted, because it leaves room for unpredictability 
and novelty, which are conceived not as a chance but as an intrinsic part 
of the process-bound vision of the world. The French process-philosopher 
Henry Bergson warned against ‘underestimating the essentially spontaneous 
aspect of philosophical thought’ (Bergson, 1946/2007: 87):
The process by which philosophy seems to assimilate the results of positive science … 
is not a synthesis but an analysis. … The scientific intelligence asks itself … what will 
have to be done in order that a certain desired result be attained, or more generally, what 
conditions should obtain in order that certain phenomenon take place. It goes from an 
arrangement of things to a rearrangement, from a simultaneity to a simultaneity. Of 
necessity it neglects what happens in the interval … With methods meant to seize the 
ready-made, it cannot in general enter into what is being done, it cannot follow the 
moving reality, adopt the becoming which is the life of things. The last task belongs to 
philosophy (1946/2007: 103-104).  
Following Bergson we can see that there is an established tradition according 
to which theoretical thinking is accomplished by simply rearranging familiar 
concepts and making a new composite out of well-known components. But then, 
as Bergson suggests, the result will be that we shall have another composition, but 
not a creation. Process philosophy by definition comprises the ‘radically new and 
unforeseeable’ (1946/2007: 8). In comparison to science this kind of philosophy 
is characterised not by ‘a higher degree of generality’, but on the contrary, by its 
close approximation to life and by its ‘spirit of simplicity’. Bergson’s conclusion 
is that ‘the more we become imbued with this truth, the more we shall be 
inclined to take philosophy out of school and bring it into closer contact with 
life’(1946/2007: 104). The last part of this statement addresses the goal of this 
study. In order to better understand the practice that we observed, we shall use a 
process-philosophical approach, which will allow us to expand our engagement 
with the practice and to make suggestions for its development. 
These reflections support the choice for process philosophy, which can capture 
the living movement of the subject within our study. The approach we shall use 
fits with what can be called process thinking. To make this claim more specific, let 
us take the space of the Museum as an example. The space of the Museum can be 
first analysed as a physical environment; then it can be looked at as a social space 
where various forms of interaction take place. But in order to fully understand 
the uniqueness of that space in all its complexity, we need to move to another 
level of analysis and see how the concept of space can be transformed into the 
process of spacing or placing. This transformation will give us the possibility to 
engage with the space of the Museum at a different level, where its initial role as 
a permanent decoration for remembering practices will be replaced by the role 
of an interactive participant in conversation with the visitors. 
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Likewise remembering and its meaning to the elderly will in first instance 
be described in the context of both social and personal changes that the 
older generation has to endure. But theoretical analysis can give us only 
a first approximation to their interpretation. In order to obtain a deeper 
understanding of these changes, we shall have to step out of the socio-
psychological framing and look at the processes of remembering and ageing 
in a broader sense, where ultimately each process we describe can be held 
against or, better to say, set back within a universal creative movement called 
duration. This notion is pivotal for our study and we shall elaborate on it in 
detail later on. For now, let us refer to duration in its most common sense, namely 
as ‘experience of time passing’ (Middleton & Brown, 2005: 62). Summarizing, 
let us state that in this investigation we shall frequently be moving between 
the empirical, descriptive and philosophical planes of analysis, in order to 
cast more light upon the complexity of the practical setting. 
Thinking in that fashion brought me to the works of the philosopher Henry 
Bergson. Among the philosophers whose names are associated with process 
thinking, it was Bergson who, given the context of the empirical setting, 
was able to provide me with the most useful philosophical account of 
memory and the most inspiring approach to ageing. Evolutionary thought, 
memory, movement and change – all those notions are part and parcel of 
the Bergsonian philosophy. The pivotal notion within that philosophy, la 
durée, or duration, which underpins both remembering practices and my 
understanding of ageing, will be examined and applied to the various lines 
of the study in the following chapters. In this introduction I shall elaborate 
on the general significance of his philosophical thought for this research and 
explain my reasons for using and referring to his philosophy. 
Bergson’s philosophy has undergone a rather turbulent history. The following 
quote from a review by J. McLachlan pictures the influence that Bergson’s 
philosophical thought enjoyed at the beginning of the 20th century:
At the opening of the Twentieth century Bergson was considered the greatest philosopher 
of his time. William James called Bergsonism a second Copernican revolution in 
philosophy. Painters, writers, poets considered Bergsonism a saving alternative from 
the positivism of the 19th century. The theory of duration found its way into cubism, 
futurism, symbolism, and the stream of consciousness novel. Proust, Joyce, and Faulkner 
all were influenced by him in one way or another. Bergson’s lectures at the College de 
France were events filled to overcapacity by the Parisian society as well the intellectuals. 
Yet by the 1920s Bergsonism was dying and though its founder received the Nobel Prize 
in literature in 1928 philosophy had left him behind (McLachlan, 2005: 361).
Various explanations are possible regarding the disappearance of Bergson 
from the landscape of modern philosophy for almost half a century. It is not 
the ambition of this book to investigate the cause for that, but revitalisation of 
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Bergson’s philosophy is emerging and accelerating within the contemporary 
philosophical debate (Middleton & Brown, 2005). The turn came after 
the publication in 1966 of a book by Deleuze called Bergsonism. Since this 
publication various streams of scientific and philosophical thought sought 
its confirmation in, or were voluntarily challenged by the works of Bergson. 
The growing interest towards quantum physics revived the interest towards 
process philosophy in general and Bergsonian interpretation of time and 
duration in particular, and the rediscovery by Deleuze of multiplicity as 
described by Bergson inspired the development of the rhizomatic ontology 
of becoming (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988). 
As indicated above, this book makes use of two major lines of Bergson’s 
philosophy: the theory of memory and the theory of evolution when applied 
to the process of ageing. The first theme is presented and further developed 
in a number of books, the most important of which is Matter and Memory. The 
second theme is a derivative from Bergson’s unique account of evolutionary 
theory presented in his book Creative Evolution. Both lines of thought are 
based on the central notion of Bergson’s philosophy, i.e. duration. The 
horizon of Bergsonian philosophy will therefore support two central lines of 
this investigation. 
The third major line within this book concerns the description, analysis 
and interpretation of the Museum space and the interaction between that 
particular space and its users. Bergson’s position in relation to space is rather 
complicated and even contradictory. We shall come back to that in more 
detail later on. As for now, let me state that in order to do justice to the spatial 
organisation of the Museum, we will be better off by turning to very different 
philosophical concepts, which we shall treat in the next paragraph. 
As a process philosopher, even in his manner of writing, Bergson remains 
loyal to process-like thinking. Following him from book to book, we can 
see how he consistently develops and sharpens his terminological arsenal, 
while accepting with difficulty the restrictions which he believes human 
language imposes on our thoughts. Besides the gems of his philosophy, 
namely the notion of duration and the method of philosophical intuition, 
there is much more in Bergson’s philosophical heritage that can give us 
insight in the complexity of the phenomena which were observed in and 
around the Museum. In order to understand more profoundly the specific 
modes of remembering in which the visitors of the Museum engage, we shall 
turn to what Bergson calls the ‘cinematographical mechanism of thought’. 
When we ponder the role that remembering practices play in the life of the 
older generation, Bergson’s elaboration of the two aspects of the self will 
energise the discussion about the meanings of remembering at a later age. In 
fact almost each notion of Bergson’s philosophy will be called upon during 
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the analysis, in order to describe the practical setting in a way that can help 
us to better understand all the parties involved: a visitor, a professional, an 
observer and a policy-maker. To prevent any possible misinterpretation let 
me clearly state that Bergson’s philosophy will not usurp the forthcoming 
empirically based analysis, but will support and deepen our understanding 
and analysis of the practical setting in a subtle and sophisticated way. 
As this introduction indicates, the analysis will be conducted along various 
lines simultaneously. At the theoretical level concepts like space, memory 
and age will help to shape the analytic account of the Reminiscence Museum. 
At the empirical level the description will include a number of events that 
took place during Museum visits. Remembering practices, to which the 
visitors are introduced, and the role of the various parties who are directly or 
indirectly involved in those practices, will be given specific attention. What 
unites those lines of investigation is the possibility to describe each of them 
as processes. 
An issue that requires attention here is what kind of power could be 
said to unite those various processes. Because if there is no such uniting 
power, then we shall simply be  conducting a mechanical compilation of 
processes, which as Bergson points out will become a mere rearrangement of 
existing conceptions, each of which will keep its parity and stay outside the 
complexity of their actual juxtaposition. In that case we would not need any 
philosophical level of analysis at all, because that would only complicate the 
description, without providing an improved understanding of the subject at 
hand. 
A straightforward way to deal with our practical setting might be to take the 
processes one by one and describe each of them within a kind of a closed 
and trustworthy formal theoretical system. That way the Museum could 
be considered to be a certain material arrangement, which can be analysed 
within one of the traditional approaches of Museum Studies. Remembering 
practices could be described along the lines offered by cognitive psychology. 
The needs and choices of the elderly visitors could be grasped by means of 
the Gerontological science, while the goals of the organisation that founded 
the Museum could be analysed within the framework of Organisational 
Studies.
 
With that kind of description we would still be able to talk about various 
processes, but as a result the reader would be confronted with four different 
books, crammed into a volume for a geographical reason only: it all takes 
place at Humanitas in Rotterdam. A description like that could also deal 
with some of the externally identifiable features of the setting, but would 
never touch its deeper and often implicit complexity. It would not be able 
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to provide any useful answers to the question whether the Reminiscence 
Museum should be called a museum at all; whether there is a link between the 
dominant narrative of the Museum space and the way in which the visitors 
remember their past experiences; whether becoming old automatically 
increases our propensity for remembering (and if so, why that is happening); 
whether the Museum is only an example of  a creative practice within the 
care-sector for the elderly; and finally whether the meaning of remembering 
for the elderly is an issue that is heavily underestimated by the policy-makers 
and managers who are setting the tone within the sector? 
 
What I am trying to say here is that there is no way to answer all those 
questions by dealing with one process at a time. The problem with that kind 
of description would be the artificial separation of the processes, while my 
proposition is that it are their merging edges which offer challenging and 
promising zones of investigation. 
I think that an example can be helpful here. 
The Museum is open in the afternoons six days a week. When groups wish 
to visit the Museum before opening hours, they can make an appointment, 
in which case the Museum will be open for them in the morning. On one of 
such regular mornings a group from another nursing home came to see the 
exposition. Among the visitors there was a couple, father and son, whom 
I followed closely during their entire visit. The older man was in his mid-
eighties and his son was about sixty years old. Only once did I hear the father 
say no to a question his son has asked him. The rest of the time he was just 
sitting in his wheel-chair, apparently indifferent to whatever was happening 
around him. The son on the other hand enjoyed the visit immensely. He 
reacted to the exhibition with clear fascination, participated easily in the 
conversations with the Museum volunteers and with other visitors, and 
regularly addressed his father, trying to draw his attention to one or another 
familiar object. His memories were partly about his own past, but also about 
the past of his parents and his siblings. At the end of the day I knew quite 
a lot about the two men, whom I had never seen in my life before. I shall 
describe one small episode from their visit here.
At some point, when the two men were in the hobby-shed, two women, the 
curator of the Museum, who was busy arranging things and a volunteer, 
joined them. One of the women asked the younger man about the usage of 
an old-fashioned tool she could not recognise. The conversation unfolded 
as if the people had known each other for quite some time already. The son 
pointed to the old-fashioned saw and observed that he had one just like that 
in his barn. It was a two-hand long saw with large teeth. As he put it, the saw 
was simply hanging on the wall because it was ‘a piece of history’. He could 
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not remember the exact name of the saw and was a little bit puzzled by that. 
The curator of the Museum suggested that he should not throw away old 
nails and other small things he still had at home, since they could still be of 
use in the Museum. Then another woman told a story from her youth: she 
was with a group of young people and they had also taken a saw with them 
when they went to the river Maas, where they could use old railway sleepers 
and make a bonfire. Suddenly the son remembered. It was a band saw, he 
said. Both women tested the word by asking some questions and the man 
remembered the times when there were ‘those crazy musicians’ who could 
play on the saw by using 
violin bows. Everybody 
nodded laughing. Then the 
curator said that the story 
about the saw reminded 
her of the cold war winter, 
when her father together 
with a neighbour ‘secretly 
went down to saw down 
a tree’ and she carried the 
long saw to help them. Then 
it was the other woman’s 
turn, who remembered that 
they too had stolen wood. 
She told a story about her 
husband, who was the 
eldest of nine children and 
who went to fetch some 
wood together with his 
sister, and when a policeman 
showed up they pretended 
to be sweethearts. Then she 
added that the story dated 
back to 1910, from the time 
just before the First World War. Everybody pondered on the stories for a 
while. Then the curator mentioned how remarkable it was that more stories 
were remembered and told all the time. The other woman agreed and said 
that it was especially amazing, because people did not expect to remember 
so much and in such detail. Then the visit continued. What I have just retold 
here took about five minutes during a Museum visit which lasted for an hour 
and a half. 
This example is not special in the sense that interactions like that occur in the 
Museum every day. At the content level those interactions are never quite 
the same, but the level of complexity by which this specific kind of situation 
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can be characterised bears traces of a clear pattern. In order to understand 
what has happened in a situation like the one I described, we have to decide 
where to start first. For example, why would Humanitas, which has already 
gone to much trouble to facilitate the founding of the Museum, agree to go 
even further and consent to open the Museum during morning hours, which 
would of course mean even more work for the volunteers and for the curator 
of the Museum? We won’t be able to answer that question without observing 
what takes place at the Museum during such visits, because, as has already 
been stated before, the main goal for Humanitas is doing things for people. So 
let us then try and have a look at the Museum visit itself. The conversation, or 
better to say the chain of interactions and remembrances, started when one 
of the visitors pointed at the old-fashioned saw. But was that really so? The 
saw in the hobby-shed triggered the memories of the visitor, but it looks like 
the memories of the other two women were triggered by the conversation 
itself and not by the sight of the saw, which after all each of them had seen so 
many times already. The question remains whether it was the Museum space 
that incited the united effort of remembering, or the presence of the other 
interested party? Both lines could be investigated separately, but it seems 
as if only their intersection can help us to approximate the complexity of 
the situation. Even then we are not finished with the multilayered setting 
that has been described. Justifiable questions could be asked around 
whether the memories about the war, for example, can be seen as a positive 
experience, and further what that last reflective part of the conversation 
actually means? Moreover, we should not forget that there were four people 
present besides myself. The older man sat silently in his wheel-chair during 
the entire episode and his presence somehow influenced the entire setting 
too. In order to unfold this line of analysis one should probably consider the 
specific conditions which are required for people with restricted means of 
communication in order to remember or to participate in the remembering 
activities. Was this not the reason why Humanitas with its yes-culture, made 
the Museum accessible in the morning hours for groups of people who 
would benefit from a quiet environment? Probably, indeed, but as you have 
already expected, this is not the entire story. 
Let me rephrase the last reflections. All experiences around the Museum form 
a complex intersection, where an analysis at a certain level of abstraction 
can help to distinguish a number of organisational, psychological and social 
processes. In the first approximation of the empirical situation described here 
I moved from the intentions of the organisation to a description of actual 
experiences that certain visitors had during a Museum visit. If I stay at this 
level of analysis, then even without wanting it, I shall be forced to create 
an opposition between Humanitas as an organisation and the Museum, 
between the people and the place of the Museum, between the artefacts of 
the exhibition and the way people remember. But what I actually want to 
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do is to present a multi-angled description of the empirical situation, of the 
processes that are neatly spread across the entire setting, instead of neatly 
dividing the processes themselves. This is the main reason to switch levels at 
a certain point of the description and gradually shift from a descriptive to a 
philosophical interpretation of the data. 
To summarise, my choice is to describe the empirical situation in a certain 
way, by moving from what can be called a recognisable socio-psychological 
analysis, to philosophical accounts or more formally speaking from 
the psychological to the ontological level of interpretation. The socio-
psychological approach taken in the research follows in a tradition known 
as ‘social/collective remembering’ which has its roots in the sociology of 
Maurice Halbwachs and Pierre Nora5. Over the past two decades this 
sociological tradition has been influential in reformulating psychological 
approaches to memory (Draaisma, 2001, 2008; Welzer, 2010; Roediger, 2008). 
However it is in what is here referred to as socio-psychology (i.e. social 
psychology, cultural psychology, societal psychology, psychosocial research) 
that the most significant reformulation has occurred. In the work of James 
Wertsch (2002, 2009) and of David Middleton (1990) an approach has been 
developed which treats remembering as a social act that occurs through talk-
in-interaction. Remembering is an action-oriented social activity through 
which versions of the past are mobilised in the present to accomplish social 
acts. The present research is informed by and builds upon this approach (see 
Middleton & Edwards, 1990; Middleton & Brown, 2005 and Brown, 2008).
By philosophical accounts I mean a much more fundamental interpretation, 
where we shall look at the conditions, which underpin those various processes 
and in particular the experiences and conduct of all parties involved. This is 
where the process philosophy of Bergson and his important notion of duration 
can enrich and clarify the most complex issues of this study. A question that 
I have raised before is what all the various processes that characterise the 
empirical setting could have in common. As we have seen, they differ a 
lot from a theoretical point of view. A new possibility opens if we, using 
the terminology of Bergson, interpret those processes as various rhythms of 
duration. A definition in Bergson’s The Creative Mind, which has been used 
earlier on, describes duration as ‘unceasing creation, the uninterrupted 
up-surge of novelty’ (Bergson, 1946/2007: 7). Duration defined in terms of 
continuity and creation seems to catch the core meaning of any process and 
can therefore offer the necessary common understanding about all processes 
that we can focus on in this study. 
5  Their particular concern was with how individual acts of remembering are shaped and 
mediated by ‘collective frameworks’. These may take a wide variety of forms, such as sets of 
stories, formal narratives, authorised histories, monuments, place myths, urban designs etc.
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Another relevant question is whether that universal duration in its 
overwhelming movement does not erase the specificity of each individual 
process. If all processes can be held against that universal duration, then 
there is a possibility that their merger eliminates the prevailing differences; 
as a result we shall be left with a rather dull picture of the world. A wrongly 
understood concept could entail such a failure. Duration as proposed by 
Bergson, on the contrary, opens up possibilities and shows both the richness 
of each process and the complexity of their continuous interplay. In order 
to understand how this is possible we need to agree on the Bergsonian 
affirmation of ‘infinity of possible durations’ (1946/2007: 156). One of the 
best explanations for that we find in Deleuze6:
Bergson does indeed speak of a plurality of rhythms of duration; but in this context he 
makes it clear – in relation to durations that are more or less slow or fast – that each 
duration is an absolute, and that each rhythm is itself a duration (ref.7) In a key text 
from 19038, he insists on the progress made since Time and Free Will: Psychological 
duration, our duration, is now only one case among others, among an infinity of others, 
‘a certain well-defined tension, whose very definitiveness seems like a choice between 
an infinity of possible durations’. (ref.9) We can see that … psychology is now only an 
opening onto ontology, a springboard for an installation in Being. But no sooner are we 
installed, than we perceive that being is multiple, the very numerous duration, our own, 
caught between more dispersed durations and more taut.., more intense durations: ‘This 
being so one perceives any number of durations, all very different from one another…
’(Deleuze, 1990: 76-77).
 
I consider this quote to be the key to a proper understanding of how the 
empirical, theoretical and philosophical lines of this research merge in a 
creative effort to elucidate the object of the study. Let us therefore address 
and unfold one by one the ideas of Deleuze and Bergson, which were so 
far presented here in a clear-cut but very compressed form. By doing so 
we shall be able to better understand how an empirical setting can inspire 
philosophical thought and how ontology in return can enrich and deepen 
our interpretation of practice. 
6   There is some debate amongst scholars of Bergson and of Deleuze as to the extent to which 
Deleuze’s exposition of Bergson remains faithful to the original text or transforms Bergson’s 
work (see Ansell Pearson, 2002). Matters are complicated in that Deleuze subsequently noted 
that during this period of his work he sought to systematically reinvent the thinkers through 
whom he developed his own thought. Moreover one might argue that it is in the spirit of 
Bergson’s work, with its focus on continuous change and becoming, that the most fitting 
way to express his work is to allow to ‘become’ through elaborating it in new directions. I am 
aware of significant interpretative dilemmas in establishing precisely how concepts such as 
duration have been developed by Deleuze. In this thesis I am self-consciously participating 
in the process of becoming by attempting to articulate Bergsonian thought further through its 
encounter with the Reminiscence Museum and with ageing. 
7   Deleuze gives multiple references to Matter and Memory. 
8   Deleuze means The Creative Mind here.
9   Quote from The Creative Mind. 
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The first notion of the ‘plurality of durations’ is immediately challenged 
by another, namely that ‘each duration is absolute’. Are we really talking 
about a contradiction here or are we already, by simply raising this question, 
bringing together the socio-psychological and ontological accounts of our 
experiences? Let me explain it by using the already familiar example of the 
Museum visit. ‘How many’ durations besides my own can we ‘count’ if we go 
back to the given example: the one of the younger man, of the curator, of the 
volunteer, of the old man in the wheel-chair, and if I stretch the Bergsonian 
understanding a bit further, the duration of the artefacts, of the Museum space 
and even of the entire Humanitas organisation. But the question stands, by 
what kind of force are all those, let us say, psychological and social durations 
brought together? Bergson tells us that ‘strictly speaking, there might exist 
no other duration than our own’ (1946/2007: 157). Then it becomes clear that 
it is by the force of my own duration that the socio-psychological durations 
of others are brought together within a common social setting. 
Generally speaking there would be nothing against such an approach. The 
priority of my own duration, within which I shall ‘incorporate’ and ‘envelope’ 
(Middleton & Brown, 2005: 231) the durations of others, if understood as 
a theoretical ground for a certain research, can become a new and quite a 
challenging way to look at an auto-ethnographic kind of study. My final goal 
however is different. Neither my own duration, nor any other artificially 
separated duration will be the focus of this study. What the description 
actually aims at is a multi-layered intersection of various processes, or 
durations, which seems to define the empirical setting. That is why duration, 
if understood as a purely psychological or socio-psychological process, 
cannot satisfy this goal. In order to meet the all-encompassing complexity 
that we are aiming at, we must move to another level of description, where 
all that we have seen, the people, the things, the space, the remembering 
and even ageing, is happening at the same time, is merging into a complex 
process of becoming, which remains one and multiple at the same time. 
This very shift Deleuze calls ‘an opening onto ontology, a springboard for 
an installation in Being’, and because of the plurality of the durations he 
sees Being as ‘multiple’. In order to understand how remembering processes 
are evolving, we must take into consideration all the durations at the same 
time, which cannot be done in an absolute sense, but can be approximated by 
‘an effort of intuition’ (Bergson, 1946/2007: 156), which helps us to ‘install’ 
ourselves into Being. By doing this I shall not be trying to fit the durations 
of others within my own, but to catch the juxtaposed movement of various 
durations with their evolving power, which can, for example, revive the most 
unexpected memories and bring them back to life again. At an empirical and 
theoretical level we shall be still talking about the stimulating power of the 
Museum space and the artefacts of the exhibition, about the discursive, social 
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and interactive character of remembering, where one memory unavoidably 
triggers the next. Without the saw on the wall there would not have been a 
story about ‘a piece of history’; without that story there would not have been 
a next one about ‘crazy musicians; and without that one there would not 
have been a story about sawing down trees during the war.... 
At the ontological level we shall be looking for the conditions of remembering 
processes and for the meanings that each of the merging durations brings into 
the emerging flux of life. From this perspective a question that can be raised 
would be: what kind of tension has been building up between the totally silent 
father and his very open-minded son? Is the silence of the one compensated 
by the communicative capacity of the other, who suddenly feels responsible 
for both of them when it comes to the memories and experiences of the past 
and their actualisation in the present? By replying to this question I shall be 
coming close to the research question of the study, about the meanings of 
remembering at a later age. In order to address the question I would need to 
catch this tension between the two men. There is no purely theoretical way to 
describe that move, but there is a method of philosophical intuition, which 
allows me to move between two durations, the father’s and the son’s, by 
feeling the rhythms of both of them, anticipating in the rhythm of the one 
the pulsation of the other, beginning to understand that the being of both of 
them is one and multiple at the same time. Interpretations like that are only 
possible if we can open the ontological horizon within the description. 
Bergson himself uses another example to clarify this issue. He proposes to 
think for a moment that there is no other colour in the world but orange 
(Bergson, 1946/2007: 157-158). But according to him, as soon as we think that 
we have caught the essential vibration of orange, the sensation of moving 
between red and yellow, and even broader, within the entire colour spectrum, 
will remind us that there is no separate vibration / duration in this world, 
because we exist within an infinite diversity of durations. 
What I am trying to explain here is how the ontology of becoming, which is 
what in Bergson’s theory can be equated to his understanding of being, will 
enlighten the forthcoming analysis. At the end of the day we shall make a full 
round and come back to the practice again, but this time we shall be armed 
with a more profound understanding and with potential tools to develop and 
improve the practice. Only then shall we be able to fully understand what the 
curator of the Museum meant by her reflective remark about the ceaseless 
stimulating influence of the Museum on its visitors and staff.  When she 
realised how powerful the merging streams of memory could become, even 
for those who invested their time and effort in founding of the Museum, she 
also came into contact with the complexity of the setting, which we shall try 
to explain at a different level.  Philosophy has the proper tools to undertake 
41
such a task. Using the duration-based approach towards the practice, we shall 
also be able to see how and why the process practice at Humanitas stimulates 
and envelopes the ‘durations’ of the Museum volunteers, so that in the end 
we can understand why the volunteer from our example agreed to give up 
her free morning in order to come and work at the Museum for a couple of 
extra hours. Finally, if we move to the ontological level and look at memory 
as something that changes continuously and at the same time constitutes an 
essential part of our being, then we shall be able to answer the question about 
the meanings of remembering, by for example, extracting it from a seemingly 
simple farewell from the younger man in our example: I really enjoyed it. 
(laugh). Right dad? (silence). This promise of philosophy will not disappoint us. 
A Possibility of Dwelling: Line 3
It is difficult to remember now, when I heard visitors talking about the 
Museum as a home for the first time. It is just as if you are back in your, in your 
parents’ house, isn’t it? Or Ah, it feels as if you are at home again. Or even more 
directly: It looks like my home! It happens so often that, for somebody who 
is present at the Museum regularly, it may seem to become a mere cliché. 
Yet, thinking like that would mean to seriously underestimate the response, 
which only appears like a simple recognition pattern. To discard the essential 
meaning that the visitors consistently give to the Museum exhibition, would 
mean to impoverish the interpretation of the setting, reducing it to a simple 
enumeration of the responses we observed. 
The recurrent reference to home is simple and complex at the same time. In 
first instance it refers to the spatial organisation of the Museum, which will 
be described in detail in the chapter on the Museum space. Yet, the notion of 
home is quite complex and at times even ambiguous. We all know that not 
every place where we live feels like home, while sometimes what we call 
home does not have a shape of a house at all. In his essay Building Dwelling 
Thinking M. Heidegger explores this difference in the following way:
The truck driver is at home on the highway, but he does not have his shelter there; the 
working woman is at home in the spinning mill, but does not have her dwelling place 
there; the chief engineer is at home in the power station, but he does not dwell there. 
These buildings house man. He inhabits them and yet does not dwell in them, when to 
dwell means merely that we take shelter in them (1951/1971: 152).
The thought that Heidegger introduces here is clear: having a shelter does 
not mean feeling at home, and feeling at home does not always require 
a house. A shelter is an external notion, while a home is an internal one, 
because it has an affinity with belonging. Obviously, when visitors enter the 
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Museum, they are impressed by its entity in such a specific way, that several 
of them instantly call it home. This identification is of course partly due to 
the carefully arranged artefacts, but there is much more to the recurrent 
confession of the visitors who proclaim that the Museum feels like home. 
In order to explain this ‘appropriation’ we can start with an analysis of the 
physical site of the Museum. But as we have seen in the previous paragraph, 
the establishing of a linear link between the objects on display and the 
memories of the visitors, will not take us much further than a statistic report 
on the type of object / type of memory index. This kind of account will assist 
us in achieving the appropriate level of understanding of the complexity of 
interaction and sense making which occurs in the Museum.  But if we wish to 
present a fair description of the Museum and an in-depth interpretation of the 
meanings that remembering practices evoke among the visitors, this requires 
us to step outside the discursive psychological analysis and look for a more 
profound reflection on the setting. Up until now the process-philosophical 
approach seems to suit the goals of such a description, but we should take 
into consideration two important side-remarks that have been made earlier on. 
Firstly, when talking about the borderless ideology of Humanitas, the change-
oriented practice, at least at a semantic level, seemed to be in contradiction with 
the core business of Humanitas, namely its function to provide people with a 
home. The contradiction is based on understanding home as something that by 
definition is based on the notion of boundaries that are supposed to shelter and 
protect its inhabitants. Heidegger’s definition that we quoted above, which 
describes boundaries as ‘that from which something begins its presencing’, can 
facilitate and clarify the philosophical interpretation of the setting. 
Secondly, Bergson’s approach towards process philosophy seems to be a 
good match for the complexity of the remembering and ageing processes. 
As for the interpretation of the spatial organisation of the Museum, there is 
no obvious straightforward link here. The interpretation of space in terms 
of processes is hampered by Bergson’s uncompromising prioritisation of 
time over space. His basic interpretation of extensionality (i.e. the spatial 
distribution of matter) in terms of homogeneity leads to an underestimation 
of the complexity of space (see more about ‘homogeneous space’ or space 
as ’the symbol of fixity and of infinite divisibility’ in Bergson, 1913/2008, 
1912/2004: 280, 289) while it is that very space of the Museum and the 
relation of the people towards it that will to a large extent be the focus of the 
analysis. Spatiality, as Bergson uses the term, is often equated with stability 
and immutability, which as we shall see later on, contradicts the practice that 
has been observed. Since every single piece of information for this study 
was collected within the Reminiscence Museum the space of the Museum 
can clearly not be ignored. So in order to articulate the complexity of that 
space, a different philosophical approach has to be found. The approach I 
43
am looking for has to be broad enough, enabling all kinds of features such as 
process character, interactivity and the home-likeness of the Museum to be 
expressed in a far reaching interpretation.  
The manner in which the visitors of the Reminiscence Museum remember 
their past, constantly linking it to the circumstances of their present-day life, 
the meaning that remembering practices have for people specifically at a later 
age, the confrontation that the older generation is facing as a result of physical, 
economic and social changes, all this inevitably evokes the question about 
their (well)-being. With a striking frequency many people who come to the 
Reminiscence Museum for the first time exclaim that they feel at home there. 
Their response is not just a recognising, caused by the external resemblance of 
the exposition to an abode. It is rather an expression of a complex interplay of 
revived memories, a re-evaluation of certain experiences in life, a realisation 
of irreversible changes that have taken place, and perhaps strongest of all, the 
acute desire of belonging and having their own place and a meaningful life. 
In anticipation of the empirical analysis we assume that the processes of 
remembering and ageing cannot be artificially separated without losing 
a part of their meanings. Correspondingly the complexity of the Museum 
space too must be given a chance for integral description, if we do not want 
to be left with a reduced version of it. The means for such a multidimensional 
description I have found in the philosophical thought of Heidegger in his 
understanding of dwelling. 
Heidegger is a philosopher who is famous for his life-long and tireless effort to 
bring back into philosophy the fundamental question of Being. This research 
will rely on one of the concepts that he developed and which finds its most 
complete elaboration in his later works. Yet, in a philosophy as complex as 
Heidegger’s, we cannot venture to draw some division lines and use just 
one of his concepts outside the context of his entire line of thought. Dwelling 
as explained by Heidegger should not be detached from the philosophy of 
Being. That is why a concise introduction is called for here. 
In introducing Heidegger’s philosophy after the discussion about the process 
thinking, we are moving toward a very different ontology. In his most 
famous book Being and Time, Heidegger presents his original understanding 
of ontology. He criticises traditional approaches to the ontological, which 
according to him substitute the description of ontic beings for real Being. In 
order to approximate Being he develops his famous notion Dasein, the being 
that is capable of asking the question about Being. On the one hand Heidegger 
brings this difficult philosophical question closer to life by introducing 
‘specific beings’, which we all are. On the other hand he demonstrates the 
complexity of the philosophical task, since the real meaning of Being escapes 
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our understanding, leaving us with ‘a purely external list of features and 
traits that have nothing to do with the being of Dasein’ (Harman, 2007: 59).
The distinctive feature of Heidegger’s version of ontology consists in the 
fact that he sees Being as temporal. This turn is especially interesting for our 
research, where temporal understanding of remembering and ageing forms 
our approach to those processes. In a sense Heidegger unfolds ontology 
by temporalising the meaning of Dasein, which is rooted in the past and 
simultaneously thrown and projected into the future. This is essentially 
what distinguishes Being as understood by Heidegger from the –in his 
time– traditional phenomenological interpretation of being, as reduced to its 
presence.
Heidegger’s theme of dwelling appears already in Being and Time, not as an 
independent topic, but as a part of the description of Dasein as being-in-
the-world. For our investigation one remark can be helpful here. It concerns 
the way in which Heidegger explains the meaning of ‘being-in’. The first 
approximation of the meaning refers to its spatial character, because ‘we are 
inclined to understand this Being-in as ‘Being in something’…as the water is 
‘in’ the glass’ (Heidegger, 1927/2008: 79). According to Heidegger Being-in 
has a much more profound ontological meaning of ‘inhood’ itself; ‘it does not 
refer to the spatial relation between two objectively present beings’ (Barbaza, 
2002: 17). To clarify this Heidegger retraces the etymology of the word ‘in’ 
and comes up with such meanings as ‘to reside’ and ‘to dwell’. In the final 
step of that analysis he states that being-in and dwelling near are affinitive 
terms (Heidegger, 1927/2008: 80). 
This conclusion will have important consequences for Heidegger’s later 
works. In regard to our research, and especially in relation to the spatial 
organisation of the Museum, its implications are also significant. The essence 
of its importance is well caught in the following quote:
The fact alone that the word ‘in’ primordially has to do more with dwelling … than with 
the category of spatial relations occurring between things that are objectively present, 
has rich implications. For one thing, it means that we human beings are not merely 
‘space’ occupiers, but dwellers … This could mean that even the way we situate things 
that are objectively present (where and how we build bridges and houses, churches, 
schools, what sort of things we assign to which places within our homes, etc.), the way 
we configure spaces and locations, and even our sense of farness and nearness – all 
these might just be ultimately and originally grounded on our primordial experience of 
‘being-in’ as dwelling (Barbaza, 2002: 16).
The strength of the quote consists in the clarity with which the author 
translates the complex philosophical notion into a practical dimension. Being-
in contains not only the possibility of understanding the spatial relations of 
beings. Being-in is the very mixture and interplay of all kinds of beings within 
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the world, and by trying to understand the being of a particular Dasein we 
inevitably anticipate the complexity of fundamental Being. 
Let us take a break for a moment and leave the philosophical domain, in 
order to see whether the ontological understanding of being-in can give us 
new insights into understanding the empirical setting. The external spatial 
arrangement of the already familiar example from the previous paragraph 
seems to be clear. The conversation between the two visitors, the curator of 
the Museum and the volunteer takes place in the hobby-shed within the 
Reminiscence Museum in Humanitas in Rotterdam. This matryoshka-like 
description gives us a linear idea of being in, which at best can specify the 
geographical or topographic location of the situation. The description is 
built on a series of objective presentations or oppositions, as for example 
people within the Museum or people versus the Museum exposition. 
Such a presentation of spatiality cannot bring us any further than a plain 
photographic account of the setting. If we are interested in the meanings of 
the situation, which is characterised by all kinds of spatial features, then a 
more profound understanding of being-in must be applied there. 
The way the Museum place in general and the hobby-shed in particular 
are arranged can tell us more than a simple enumeration of the objects that 
are displayed there because, as the quotation above states, the very way in 
which we organise our spaces already can tell how we live and dwell there. 
In order to discover that deeper meaning we need to look at the space in the 
example as a relational setting. At least one of the persons present, namely the 
curator of the Museum, played an important role arranging the exhibition. 
But it would be a simplification to suggest that it is her (or other volunteers’) 
personal style of dwelling, which is reflected in the final arrangement of the 
Museum rooms.  If that were the case, then the conversation we described 
could not possibly have taken place there. Moreover, it was not the saw on 
the wall in the Museum which gave impulse to her memories about the war, 
but rather the story of the visitor, which somehow opened a new dimension 
within the space where they had met each other. This is exactly the point 
where the concept of being-in can play a clarifying role. The physical space 
of the Museum becomes an intersection of totally different spatial locations, 
such as the visitor’s old barn at home and the scene of a joyful night with 
a bonfire on the riverside of the Maas, which the volunteer remembered 
and referred to. And then, just a moment later, the shape of the hobby-shed 
transforms again and opens into a scene from the cold winter at the end of 
the Second World War, which gradually fades away into a very different cold 
night almost a century ago, during which two young people are looking for 
wood to heat their abode. 
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All the spatial dimensions that were opened during that short conversation 
in the Museum, decisively changed the participants’ appropriation of the 
space where they had met each other. What was actually physically in 
that space, gave way to what was within the people, or better still, to what 
forms a constitutive part of their beings i.c. their memories. The example 
shows how the interplay between ‘farness and nearness’ works in practice, 
namely how things that seem to be far away are suddenly experienced as 
the present and much closer than the actual physical surroundings of the 
Museum room. The described ‘places’ and people cannot be understood in 
terms of a one-plus-one-plus-one person/remembered place formula. It is 
a complex and mutually influential intersection of our very different lives, 
styles and experiences, where in order to do justice to the experiences of 
the people, ‘in’ as a spatial conjunction is replaced by the constitutive ‘in’ 
in the Heideggerian sense of the word. That in can be understood as being 
involved and absorbed by the world together with others, and at the same 
time as a unique way of Dasein’s dwelling. 
Another important thing that is shown in the example is how by opening 
one dimension of experiences we can suddenly be confronted with a chain 
reaction that reveals the complexity of the relational space of the Museum. 
This kind of spatial understanding will give us the possibility in the 
following analysis to transcend the topographic description of the Museum 
space, in order to show what is happening at the topological level, whereby 
the meaning of the spatial organisation of the Museum will be unpacked by 
the philosophical notion of being-in or dwelling.
In the earlier Heidegger, the theme of dwelling is closely connected with his 
investigation of Dasein’s being. Eventually in his later writings the role of 
Dasein in its relation to Being will change, and consequently the notion of 
dwelling will receive a deeper and more complex meaning. In his Letter on 
Humanism Heidegger links the notion of dwelling to his new understanding 
of language: ‘Language is the house of Being. In its home man dwells’ 
(Heidegger, 1946/2008: 217). In order to explain the role that man can play 
in that house, Heidegger introduces his vision of humanism, according to 
which the goal of Dasein is not to lead us to Being but to safeguard it. This 
idea is expressed in Heidegger’s famous one-liner ‘man is the shepherd of 
Being’ (1946/2008: 234). The essence of a new understanding of humanism 
consists in the effort to restore ‘the proper dignity of man’ (1946/2008: 233), 
which depends on his relation to Being. In that relation to Being, man does 
not take the role of a ruling subject or a subordinate object. Rather, he is 
‘thrown’ from Being itself into the truth of Being’, his destiny is ‘to guard 
the truth of Being’, and ‘the house of the truth of Being’ (1946/2008: 234) is 
language. Those contemplations explain why Heidegger is so keen on the 
restoration of the original meaning of language, which was pushed away by 
47
the ‘dominance of the modern metaphysics of subjectivity’ (1946/2008: 223). 
We are used to interpret the meanings and structures of language in terms of 
subject-object, and by doing this we automatically extrapolate this structure 
to the understanding of our being. Consequently, as   P. Livingstone puts is:
When we think of man as subject, we think of his relation to beings as the relationship 
of subject to object.  The subject is set off against the object, and it becomes man’s goal 
to think of ever-new plans for the creation, manipulation, and control of material 
objects.  Heidegger wants us to see our way to a new thinking of man’s being, according 
to which he is not in this kind of relationship to other beings.  But this is only possible 
insofar as man is thought of, and thinks of himself, in his fundamental relationship to 
Being (2005).
Let us pause for a moment and allow this complex connection between 
language, dwelling and Being to imbue our thought. The idea that is 
elaborated in the last quote is in a sense a continuation of our previous 
conversation about being, which is absorbed and deeply involved with the 
world. If we start thinking analytically and create oppositions, our language 
translates those power-like relations into the hierarchy of a subject-object 
relation, unavoidably omitting the fundamental relation of man with Being. 
Back in the Museum rooms this would mean that we would only be able 
to see subdivisions and parts, while the depth of the picture would be 
permanently escaping us. We can therefore describe the physical space of 
the Museum on the one hand, and the reactions of the visitors on the other, 
or the intentions of the Museum staff on the one hand, and the changes of 
the display on the other. But dwelling as being and dwelling of a being does 
not occur in pairs or in cause-effect relations. The experiences of the visitors 
in the Museum should not be opposed to or understood separately from 
the spatial organisation of the Museum as a whole. So in fact it will not be 
the exposition of the Museum versus the memories of the visitors that will 
comprise the focus of our investigation, but dwelling as experienced by 
various visitors of the Museum, wherein thoughts, conversations, memories 
and surroundings constitute an entwined unity of their being. It is important 
to understand here that when Heidegger is talking about language as a 
house of Being where man dwells, he is not by definition referring to spoken 
language. Correspondingly, what was thought and not spoken aloud in the 
Museum during the episode that has been our guiding example, can also be 
taken into account in order to gauge the meaning of the events for everybody 
who was present, including the older man who has not spoken one single 
word. 
The notion of dwelling receives its most advanced and original elaboration in 
Heidegger’s later essays. We shall pay close attention to his lecture Building, 
Dwelling, Thinking in the following chapter. As for now we can conclude that 
the Heideggerian understanding of dwelling has made a full circle round 
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the most important notions of his philosophy: Being, language and thing. 
In Building, Dwelling, Thinking Heidegger writes: ‘Dwelling itself is always a 
staying with things’ (1951/1971: 149). This last statement links his thinking 
on dwelling directly to the discussion about the empirical setting in our 
study. It touches on the complex relations between human beings and the 
things that surround them during their lives, including the abode where they 
live. Remember how consistently many of the visitors compare the Museum 
with home or how the younger man in our example described the saw that 
he noticed in the hobby-shed. His generalised definition of it as ‘a piece of 
history’ is a telling example of how the intersection of his own being and the 
‘being’ of the artefact opens a new perspective on understanding dwelling 
as ‘staying with things’. 
In this context the material part of the Reminiscence Museum is not just a 
simple collection of things that were used in Dutch households some time 
ago. The things by themselves are not able to convey any personal narratives 
that are accumulated invisibly in the Museum. The things in the Museum can 
only speak to us when they relate to people who know them. By remembering 
the circumstances under which we used to live (or dwell), the importance of 
the material environment, like one’s home or home possessions, becomes 
alive again. An underestimation of the role that personal possessions 
or the places that we call our home, play in our lives, can lead to serious 
misunderstandings, not in the least if one aspires to meet the needs and 
facilitate the wellbeing of the older generation.
Apart from a definition of dwelling as staying with things, Heidegger gives 
us an entire spectrum of semantics, which can help us to understand what 
remembering practices can mean at an older age. In the following description 
those meanings will receive the necessary attention. In the meantime I would 
like to mark out three of them that are particularly important for this study: 
saving, caring for and cultivating. Those three meanings cannot be called 
synonyms; also each of them has its own significance in respect to later age. 
Saving or preserving as a part of human dwelling will be clearly followed 
in the study, starting with preserving things, memories and developing this 
idea into the sphere of relations, family life and even the future. 
Caring for touches upon our feelings of responsibility. A general understanding 
of caring can be seen in our attitude towards the past and the ability to accept 
the changes of ageing. Caring for will mean not only caring for another 
person, as is obviously the case for professionals, but also caring for yourself 
as it should be in the case of elderly people. This last aspect will be linked to 
the art of living in later life.
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Finally, the cultivating part contains a hint at the creative and life-affirming 
way of dwelling, which can be seen as an unfolding horizon of opportunities, 
instead of the registration of a narrowing scope of physical and mental 
abilities. This constructive part of dwelling is especially interesting, because 
it is implicitly directed at the future and can provide a steady ground for 
constructing and nurturing new possibilities for dwelling. 
Our short elaboration of Heidegger’s notion of dwelling shows us that 
within an analysis of the empirical setting it can supply us with insights 
on the spatial organisation of the Museum, providing an intricate relational 
connection, which emerges at the moments when the visitors are there. By 
using Heidegger’s interpretation of dwelling, which as we have seen is rooted 
in the ontology of being, we shall not be replacing the process approach, 
based on the ontology of becoming, but supplementing and expanding it. 
If the empirical setting can be compared with a puzzle, then two different 
ontologies will be meeting each other there like puzzle pieces from a drawing 
by Escher, totally different, but without a combination of which we shall 
never experience the fascination of the emerging picture. 
Tools, frame and horizon
Up to this point three very different sets of ideas have been introduced. 
Each of them entails an interesting but very complex discussion. The 
practical dimension is represented by the ‘process’ practitioner Becker. 
The empirical setting, which was initiated at Humanitas, will be matched 
by a socio-psychological analysis. And this analysis will be enriched by the 
insights from Bergson’s philosophy of becoming and Heidegger’s concept of 
dwelling. These theoretical and philosophical approaches are very different, 
so in the beginning we shall simply try to juxtapose them. Further on we shall 
be moving from one position to another, initially pointing at the differences 
rather than at the associations and affinities amongst them. In my view this 
combined approach will be an appropriate way to approximate the studied 
phenomena. We have already seen how the brief example that was provided 
as an illustration in the previous paragraphs, has claimed an impressive 
number of views, approaches, interpretations and contexts for analysis.
The ideas of the very different thinkers which will be used and referred 
to in this study will not be compared to each other here. Not only would 
that lie beyond my personal theoretical interest, it would also not help us 
to understand the empirical situation either. The reciprocal movement from 
practice to process and further on to understanding being as dwelling, will 
help us to find the links and connections amongst them. By using those 
juxtapositions we shall finally be able to see the empirical situation in all its 
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richness. This is at least what our framing is aimed at. Ultimately temporality, 
understood in terms of duration, will meet spatiality, conceived as dwelling, 
within the practical situation as it has been observed in the Reminiscence 
Museum. Within the interplay of ontologies of being and becoming we shall 
search for answers to questions raised by practice. I believe that only in a 
united effort towards those various perspectives, can the horizon of this 
study present us with a deeper understanding and new openings.
An extensive set of techniques has been used for the collection, description 
and elaboration of the empirical data. The collection of data started a couple 
of months before the Museum was officially opened and continued for 
approximately two years, during which I worked for the research project. 
There are two types of empirical material which will be used during the 
following description and there are two interconnected and yet very different 
approaches towards analysis of the data. 
The data were collected along the lines of traditional ethnographic work 
(Agar, 1980, 1986) and consist of recorded conversations during Museum 
visits as well as observations, notes and reflections, which I made at the time 
the events took place and also afterwards. The recorded conversations have 
been transcribed and extracts of those transcriptions in Dutch and English 
(translated) were used for further analysis. The observations and reflections 
have been made in the form of reports; parts of those will be ‘retold’ to 
illustrate certain points of the discussion. My own involvement in the recorded 
or reported conversations varies from the role of an active participant to 
a silent observer, or ‘professional stranger’, as Agar calls it. The collected 
data relates exclusively to spontaneous voluntary remembering practices and 
are therefore not based on interviews. The reported conversations with 
the Museum volunteers, staff and Humanitas professionals were informal 
and spontaneous as well; almost all those conversations took place in the 
Museum. 
The choice about the way that the data for this analysis were collected 
was determined by the propensity at Humanitas towards an in-depth self-
reflective study. As an organisation that is highly interested in the effects of 
its innovations on its customers, Humanitas actively supported the research 
approach, where the recipients of its care services were able to talk freely 
and tell their side of the story. At the Museum, participative observation was 
found to be an appropriate way to collect material regarding the effects of 
the remembering practices for the visitors, by letting them tell their stories 
and remember experiences from the past in a generally informal manner.
The aim of this book is to present an entire range of experiences at the 
Reminiscence Museum, capturing and highlighting the phenomenological 
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richness of the practice that was observed. On the one hand, the experiences 
will be formulated in a kind of neo- or post-phenomenological way10, which 
means describing the experiences as closely as possible to the way they were 
presented by the visitors. On the other hand, within the same description we 
shall be moving beyond the traditional phenomenological experience, shifting 
into a different kind of reporting, moving towards a socio-psychological 
analysis by using both discursive and non-discursive aspects of interactions, 
in order to catch the specific aspects of the situation, to magnify the most 
important part of the experiences and as a result providing a richer account 
of the setting that was observed. 
The decision to shift at times between the various registers of description 
was made because of the heterogeneity of the empirical setting. There is no 
clear separation here between people and space, or people and objects. By 
describing them together we in a sense expand the traditional understanding 
of the phenomenological description, adding to it the phenomenology of 
space and the phenomenology of things as well. As a result a more evocative 
account can be presented, instead of a simple cause-effect description of how 
old-fashioned objects trigger the memories of elderly people. 
There are two different turns I shall make in the following description 
which are worth mentioning specifically. Phenomenology provides us with 
refined tools for a description of the visitor’s experiences. But it does not 
cover the complexity of the phenomenon itself. We can refer to a physical 
or a psychological state of a person, but social phenomena and interactions 
between visitors play an important role as well. In the first approximation 
we have already seen how various types of descriptions can be merged, 
producing a more in-depth account of the setting in comparison with what 
a traditional phenomenological, ethnographic or psychological account 
could have given us individually. In this context we can raise such issues 
as potentiality of the Museum space and of the objects that are displayed 
there. The introduction of this potentiality challenges the traditional 
phenomenological thought with an even more complex task. 
Another turn in the phenomenological description will be made in the direction 
of philosophical thought. First we shall try to catch the phenomenological 
10   A theoretical discussion on the traditional phenomenological approach remains beyond 
this study. The bibliography contains references to a number of works, which discuss 
those matters in detail. Both Bergson and Heidegger were contemporaries of E. Husserl, a 
philosopher, who is seen as the founder of phenomenology. The mutual influence of their 
works cannot be denied. However, their philosophical approaches towards the fundamental 
questions of being and time differ substantially. When talking about a post-phenomenological 
description in this study we refer to the contemporary methodological approach, as is for 
example presented in the work of E. Casey (1987). 
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intensity of the experience and then make a post-phenomenological turn 
with it by not reducing it to a psychological version of experience, but on 
the contrary by translating it into an expanded philosophical version of 
it. This second turn is made possible by what L. Lawlor calls Bergson’s 
‘challenge to phenomenology’ (Lawlor, 2003: ix). In practical terms it allows 
for an expansion of phenomenological experiences by means of a switch in 
the priorities between perception and memory. Bergson’s uncompromising 
priority of memory gives us the opportunity to expand the traditionally 
understood notion of experience, taking into account its rootedness in 
the past and its influence on the future. The consequences of such a post-
phenomenological understanding of experience can be immense. We shall 
dwell on this challenging thought in more detail when describing the 
remembering practices that are occurring in the Museum. 
To summarize, let us state that the chosen ways will represent the expanded 
version of the phenomenological description. This is done not for the sake of 
a new post-phenomenological approach, but in order to return the outcome of 
that account for further developments in practice. Once again we are talking 
about a circular movement between various dimensions of the description, 
where practice occupies both the starting point and the end of our journey. If we 
succeed in going far and deep in our reflection, then we can present an account 
of practice that will allow other practitioners to develop and improve it. 
The headlines of the book as they are presented in this introduction will be 
mirrored in the following chapters. The sequence however will be reversed 
in regard to the presentation that was given in this chapter. We shall start 
with the description of the Museum place, moving in a sense from space to 
time. At the end, we shall make a full circle and return to the practice, with 
the description of which we have started here.
The first descriptive chapter, titled Emplacement will deal with the spatial 
organisation of the Reminiscence Museum. The materiality of the place will 
be given the attention it deserves and further discussion about the spatiality of 
remembering will be prepared. The spatial arrangements of the Reminiscence 
Museum will be described through an account of its evolution as an on-going 
process. The concept of space will be treated here not as a shadow of time 
but as an open, developing and relational phenomenon. We shall look at it 
within the perspective introduced by the thoughts of Heidegger. His insights 
on the essence of things and on dwelling will be indispensable in defining 
the role that the spatial arrangement of the Museum plays in determining 
the direction and the content of remembering.  
The second chapter Remembering continues the discussion about the Museum 
space by addressing the question whether the place, which is the focus of 
53
this study, can in fact be called a museum at all and what the alternatives 
are for its classification. Then we shall address the specific features of the 
remembering practices in the Museum. Bergson’s philosophy of duration 
will constitute the theoretical background of the analysis. After reflecting on 
the general significance and interdisciplinary character of remembering, the 
collected data will be addressed by using a socio-psychological and discursive 
analysis. The social element of remembering finds its clarification in different 
approaches, but ultimately it will be Bergson’s interpretation of the plurality 
of durations that will give us the key to understanding the described practices.
 
The third chapter called Ageing, represents an intersection of theoretical 
and practical ideas, where ageing will be approached in the context of 
process philosophy. The aim of this chapter is to address the importance of 
remembering at a later age and see how this will comply with the empirical 
setting. The description and analysis will bring us back to the ideology of 
Becker and the practices at Humanitas. This time however we shall reflect on 
those practices, using the insights with which various lines of theoretical and 
philosophical thought provided us during the previous analysis.
The last chapter of the book is called Dwelling. In a traditional sense it can be 
seen as a conclusive part, which helps to unite all the perspectives that were 
used within the description. My personal position towards this is slightly 
different. As with the notion of framing, I would rather think about that 
chapter in terms of disclosure than enclosure.
 
I have read that ‘a frame not only marks the boundary between inside and 
outside but also moves forward, has a trajectory’ (Hopfl, 2006:14). Of course 
this reminds us of the passage from Heidegger’s essay that we already 
quoted. Thinking about framing my study in this way, I decided to call it a 
horizon. At the same time, as the quoted comment shows, whatever name we 
choose, by defining a frame or horizon a delineation is already taking place, 
and it ‘distorts the meaning of the process and may usurp that meaning to 
become the definition of what it contains’ (Hopfl, 2006: 14). 
Hopefully the notion of horizon will enable me to reduce this limitation. 
In any case, I am conscious of paying this toll by introducing this research, 
but I am also eager to think that by presenting it as a horizon, the accent of 
its importance is shifted from the conclusions that were reached towards 
new challenging openings for further investigation, and from theoretical 
embedment into life itself. The stars of my horizon are not Bergson and 
Heidegger. The stars of my horizon are people, whom I met, who inspired 
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Becoming
The decision to found a Reminiscence Museum was made and the space 
where the Museum could be situated was decided upon. Within a matter 
of weeks the renovation of the premises started. At the same time an 
advertisement was placed in a local newspaper, inviting people to donate 
old-fashioned objects that they did not need any more. 
The first time I saw the location for the future Reminiscence Museum, it was 
still under construction. The space covered a number of rooms in the basement 
of Humanitas, which were originally meant for administrative purposes. To 
me it looked rather like a non-place, a space with clear physical boundaries 
but with an undefined identity. It would take a few months before the objects 
were arranged in a manner that would reflect the setting and atmosphere 
of an abode, before the name Reminiscence Museum was chosen and before 
the first visitors came. As the preparation work was progressing the place 
was somehow changing as well, acquiring an identity of its own. By then it 
had already become my working place. Gradually I developed a special and 
probably spatial relationship with it.
The process of becoming did not take long and it did not follow a predictable 
linear development. At first there were some piles of old-fashioned things 
lying around in the basement. The number and volume of the piles grew. 
After a few months it became obvious that the rooms which were initially 
allocated to house the Museum collection would not provide enough space 
to accommodate the number and the scope of the objects that had already 
been accumulated there, not to speak of the things that were still being 
brought in daily. Something quite unexpected was happening, as if the navel 
string between the Museum and its parent organisation Humanitas had been 
cut off, whereby ‘the child’ proved to be healthy and strong enough, not only 
to survive but also to state its first demands. 
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At that stage the space for the Museum could still have been limited to just 
a couple of rooms, but the decision was made in favour of expansion. One 
could consider that development to be an example of the prevailing yes-
culture at Humanitas, but in order to avoid any idealisation of absolutism, 
let me repeat that every yes-decision only honours a reasonable yes-request, 
which should provide explicit or at least potential added value, either to 
the entire organisation or to an individual person within it. In this case, 
the dozens of articles that were awaiting their destiny in the basement of 
Humanitas possessed a kind of resounding muteness. From the moment they 
were being piled up in the long hallways, as if in a waiting room, nobody 
could ignore them. Like orphans that had been gathered throughout the 
region, long ignored, in many cases broken and almost forgotten, all kinds 
of objects from mundane domestic life were standing there in line for final 
destruction or a second chance, i.c. for a new home. Their presence alone was 
already making an impact. The space of the basement was being distorted 
and the waves that this disorder caused had a far-reaching and divergent 
effect within the entire Humanitas organisation. Administrative employees, 
the finance department, maintenance staff, the public relations and research 
departments, each of them felt the tremors that were being transmitted from 
the epicentre in the basement. And yet it was just a bunch of old things that 
had been donated and then stored together. 
The space of the basement was jammed with things. The spatial distortion 
was expanding, creating folds and gulping the narratives of the ‘newcomer-
things’. The place did not look like a basement anymore, but it did not have 
the appearance of a Museum yet either. All the same the becoming was 
clearly inevitable. The things were there and in spite of all their different 
histories and stories, the theme, still very vague and ambiguous at first, 
began to acquire some contours and shape. 
By the time the physical space that was intended to house the Museum was 
ready, the rest seemed to be merely a matter of placing, arranging and naming 
(Hetherington, 1997c: 184). But it was not possible to make those moves one by 
one, just like it was not possible to look at all the things that were collected, as 
separate objects and to decide for each of them individually where they should 
be placed or whether they should be kept at all. The spatial tension that the 
materiality was causing could not yet be understood and dealt with by means 
of a linear spatial logic. To understand what was actually happening let us first 
take an example. 
Many things that were put in the hallways of the basement were ‘survivors’ of 
the old-fashioned kitchen entourage, including furniture, appliances, gadgets 
and even food. Initially the kitchen was not on the map of the future Museum, 
but an adjustment could still be made, provided there would be enough room 
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for it. And yet, why bother installing a kitchen at all? This easy question had an 
easy answer: the visitors will probably enjoy the site of an old-fashioned kitchen 
and have another lively subject to reminisce about. So the room was made and 
the kitchen began to acquire some shape. By the time it seemed that the site for 
the kitchen was more or less 
ready, there were still two 
more kitchen sinks waiting 
for their destiny, beautiful 
and unique in their veteran 
dignity. A kitchen space with 
three kitchen sinks in it would 
look rather strange, but the 
pieces were very appealing. 
Finally the space for the 
kitchen was stretched and the 
three sinks were all allowed 
in. It was the first but not the 
last time that such a stretching 
exercise was applied. Two kitchen tables and two sets of chairs won their places 
as well. The grandmother’s wooden cupboard also emerged as a champion out 
of the race and even the massive refrigerator finally managed to squeeze itself 
in somehow. The space stood firm, but this was not the end of it. There were 
numerous sets of pans, oil-stoves and cutlery, there were dozens of coffee mills, 
milk bottles, cake-forms, jars and kitchen towels. Whatever our kitchen-skilled 
imagination could come up 
with, everything was there, 
in plural. Some of the things 
were not at all attractive, but 
so utterly recognisable that 
they simply had to stay; other 
were quite special, so they 
had to stay as well. Some 
of them had their personal 
stories and histories, so it 
was fun to keep them; others 
were more trivial, but the 
people who brought them 
explicitly asked them to be 
displayed, so they stayed as well. The space could not be stretched indefinitely, 
but it could be folded. A showcase was placed in the middle of one of the rooms, 
filled with a large number of small items and tableware. The room became very 
tight. As soon as a central reference point seemed to have been determined, the 
stability disappeared again as new openings and ramifications occurred. The 
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objects were crammed in all 
over the place, sometimes 
blocking the view of other 
artefacts. Their presence 
made the space very specific. 
When the stretching had 
stopped and the space was 
allowed to obtain its true 
shape, it looked somewhat 
rumpled and cramped, but 
unbelievably recognisable. It 
looked like … home. 
Things and space, the material and social organisation of the Museum, those are 
the basic terms for the discussion we shall have about the Museum premises. 
Materiality and the objects in the Museum display seem to provide the most 
direct link to our understanding of home. In the physical sense home is rooted 
in materiality and thanks to that it emits stability and the necessary continuity 
for recognition. The carefully arranged physical space of the Museum meets 
those requirements. In the framework of the project, the connection between 
the physical space and the notion of home seems to be given. The Museum 
rooms together reflect the interior of a middle class Dutch house. In fact, during 
a Museum visit it is difficult to imagine that the place could ever been used for 
anything else. But as soon as one looks back in order to follow the development 
process of the Museum, that apparently close link between the Museum space 
and its exhibition gradually starts to weaken and finally it disappears altogether. 
After all, even if I should use my most vivid imagination, I cannot presume that 
a former basement of a healthcare organisation for the elderly had the hidden 
potential of becoming a museum. The Museum does not reflect the intrinsic 
function of the space which it occupies, nor is it necessarily a spatial ramification 
of Humanitas. The Museum does not even seem to fit the targets of the 
organisation, but it does have a certain impact on them. In order to understand 
that impact, we shall look at the Museum as a social space in general and at 
the objects of its display in particular from two different angles, which can be 
defined as topographic and topologic descriptions. In a few moments we shall 
determine them more specifically in the context of modern theories regarding 
social space, but one general remark can be helpful in advance. The description 
that follows brings together the material and social elements of the Museum 
space, but it is not based on the opposition material versus social. The direction 
of the analysis will develop from somewhat simple to much more complicated 
forms of spatiality, where material and social elements are rather engaged in the 
process of mutual production than that they are subordinated to one another. 
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Space as process
In what follows in this chapter we shall draw upon some of the modern 
sociological interpretations of materiality and space. Those interpretations 
will take turns with philosophical reflections on things, locations and more 
generally an abode, in order to match the complexity of the Museum space. 
I do not view space as a static and finite concept that is totally opposed to 
time. I understand space in terms of multidimensionality and openness, and 
this understanding requires an updated terminology. The contemporary 
approaches which support that understanding and facilitate the following 
description need to be briefly introduced here.
It is a well-accepted fact that time has been prioritised above space in 
scholarly reflection for quite some time (Massey, 2005). The interpretation 
of space as we can find it in the works of Bergson was not exceptional at 
the turn of the 20th century11. But half a century later the debate concerning 
the issues of space had already changed considerably. One of the major 
figures who promoted a new approach towards spatiality was M. Foucault. 
In his interview for the French Geography journal Hérodote he criticised the 
‘devaluation of space that has prevailed for generations’:
Did it start with Bergson, or before? Space was treated as the dead, the fixed, the 
undialectical, the immobile. Time, on the contrary, was richness, fecundity, life, dialectic 
(Foucault, 1972-77/2007: 177).
D. Massey, a contemporary advocate of the new approach towards space, 
calls Foucault’s statement ‘the classic recantation by Foucault of the long 
history of the denigration of space’ (Massey, 2005: 21). The rigidity of the 
former approach, which seems to be more or less obvious now, was not easy 
to overcome. There were many reasons for that. Foucault for example points 
out that for a long time ‘the use of spatial terms seems to have the air of 
an anti-history’ (Massey, 2005: 178). Massey sees one of the most important 
reasons for the underestimation of space in the ‘association between the 
spatial and the fixation of meaning’, namely in the fact that ‘representation…
has been conceived of as spatialisation’. Let us take those arguments one by 
one and see whether the critique by Foucault and Massey can help us to use 
a contemporary dynamic approach towards space in our description of the 
Museum. 
Almost ten years before the interview that is quoted above, Foucault used 
another opportunity to speak about space. Nowadays that text is known 
as the lecture called Of Other Spaces. At the beginning of the lecture he 
11   See our previous discussion on p. 42.
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addresses the issue of anti-historicity of space from two perspectives. He 
shows that space is a historical notion, and at the same time he reveals 
the dynamism of the notion itself. Foucault admits, that ‘the space which 
today appears to form the horizon of our concerns, our theory, our systems, 
is not an innovation; space itself has a history in Western experience’. He 
follows the development from the hierarchy of places in the Middle Ages 
that he summarises as the ‘space of emplacement’ and further on towards 
the ‘infinitely open space’, for which we can thank the ‘scandal of Galileo’s 
work’. Finally he reaches the present, when ‘the site has been substituted for 
extension’ (Foucault, 1967/1986: 22, 23). This last notion of extension seems 
to be the most interesting part for the following description, where we shall 
try to look at space in terms of process. Yet, Foucault provides us with a 
somewhat contradictory definition:
The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space. We are in the epoch of 
simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the 
side-by-side, of the dispersed. We are at a moment. I believe, when our experience of 
the world is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a network that 
connects points and intersects with its own skein (1967/1986:  22). 
What I call contradictory here are two perspectives, which coexist in his 
description. On the one hand, Foucault presents space as simultaneity, 
juxtaposition, a moment and a network. On the other hand, he is talking about 
connections and intersections. The first cluster of terms refers to complexity 
of space, but does not necessarily address its potential dynamics. The 
second group hints at the process character of the connections, which have 
been named before. It seems as if Foucault does not engage in the further 
clarification to which extent those two lines together can change our 
interpretation of space, but the combination is already remarkable in itself. 
A possible reconciliation of those terms is proposed by Massey, who thinks 
that ‘a dynamic simultaneity would be a conception quite different from a 
frozen instant’ (Massey, 2005: 23). But before we embark on a more detailed 
understanding of her position, let me make one general remark. As Foucault’s 
brief historical overview shows, space is a concept, which has repeatedly 
stimulated an unorthodox or even revolutionary theoretical thought. The 
fact remains however that space was treated as a shadow of time or even as a 
socialised form of representation of time. Bergson is one of the most consistent 
representatives of such an understanding, whose ‘overwhelming concern with 
time, and … desire to argue for its openness, turned out to have devastating 
consequences for the way he conceptualised space’ (Massey, 2005). The habit 
of thinking in that way has not disappeared up to this day. Nevertheless 
different dynamic-like approaches towards space found their way into 
contemporary thought. Foucault saw and reacted to the emerging changes 
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in the conceptualisation of space. In present-day literature it is often within 
geographic studies that we can hear a strong and original argument For Space12. 
In the analysis below I shall rely on at least two modern conceptualisations of 
space. One, which is presented by Massey, will give us a general understanding 
of space in its relation to time and movement, and more specifically will 
supply us with insight into the processes, which constitute social spaces. 
Another approach can be found in the works of Kevin Hetherington. Two 
directions in his research will be of importance for this study: his various 
‘readings’ of social spaces and the linkage between materiality and spatiality, 
especially as it presents itself in the museum’s spaces.  
Massey provides us with a very interesting and even impassioned 
interpretation of social space. In her analysis she shows that the submission 
of space to time or the identification of space with representation has always 
been one-sided. Massey’s definition of space is threefold. Firstly, she recognises 
‘space as product of interrelations’, by which she immediately attacks 
the opposition people versus spaces and shows intrinsic interdependences 
between them. In a fine one-liner she defines space as ‘the social dimension’: 
‘If time unfolds as change then space unfolds as interaction’ (2005: 61). 
Secondly, she understands space as ‘the existence of multiplicity’, ‘as the 
sphere in which distinct trajectories coexist; as the sphere … of coexisting 
heterogeneity’. By choosing this kind of approach she not only keeps at 
a distance from the homogeneous conceptualisation of space as a kind of 
ramification of time. She also shows that the heterogeneity of space has a 
dynamic character, where terms like coexistence and trajectory are an obvious 
step towards movement and becoming, in comparison with more structure-
oriented notions of juxtaposition and network. That orientation towards 
movement and change brings Massey to the third feature of space, which 
she defines as ‘always under construction’:
Precisely because space on this reading is a product of relations-between, relations which 
are necessarily embedded material practices which have to be carried out, it is always in 
the process of being made. It is never finished; never closed. Perhaps we could imagine 
space as simultaneity of stories-so-far (2005: 9).
This last feature, especially in the context of the empirical situation around 
the Museum, stresses the process character of social space, which is based 
on the plurality of unfinished, always developing relations. Besides, even if 
it does so unwittingly, the definition of Massey opens the possibility to look 
at space in terms of narrativity, which, as we shall see later, perfectly fits the 
social narrative character of the Museum space. 
12   This is the title of D. Massey’s book.
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The definition provided by Massey gives us a very clear and original frame for 
the discussion about the Museum space, which, as the introductory paragraph 
of this chapter has already shown, is never stable and never homogeneous in 
its self-ordering becoming. And that is even before we started to talk about 
the metamorphoses that take place in the presence of visitors. An interesting 
intersection with a more general philosophical outline, which was given in 
the previous chapter, can be obtained in the way Massey uses the durational 
approach of Bergson to expand her understanding and the interpretation of 
space. Her critique of Bergson (or better to say of Bergson’s conceptualisation 
of space) is well-balanced and very creative. When she cites one of his many 
statements where Bergson warns against ‘transferring to duration itself, in 
its continuous flow, the form of the instantaneous sections which we make 
in it’ (Bergson, 1911/1975: 193)13, she reacts to it by applying his idea to 
understanding space:
In its intent I applaud this argument; but I demur at its terms. Why can we not imbue 
these instantaneous sections with their own vital quality of duration? A dynamic 
simultaneity would be a conception quite different from a frozen instant 
(Massey, 2005: 23).
This point is quite crucial for Massey’s conception of space in general. 
Dynamic simultaneity catches the process character of space, which is always 
open and changing. Massey calls space ‘the dimension of multiplicity of 
durations’, which shows the possibility to see temporal and spatial durations 
as a merger instead of an opposition. As for the traditional association of 
space with representation, it still lies in ‘the old chain of meaning – space – 
representation – stasis’ (2005: 24), where, according to Massey the fact of a 
certain spatialisation of representation is unreasonably extrapolated to the 
understanding of space in general. Thus, understanding space as an openness 
and incompleteness brings us closer to the process-oriented philosophical 
line along which the entire analysis of this study is built.
My concern with the Museum in this chapter is bidirectional. The aim is 
to zoom into the particularities of the Museum space as well as into the 
materiality of the exhibition. The space of the Museum and the materiality 
of its display do not form relations of opposition or subordination. The 
integral analysis of their interrelations and mutual influences can enrich 
our understanding of the Museum’s impact on the visitors and the entire 
Humanitas organisation. Massey’s central concern is mostly with social 
space and its political implications. As for the nature and role of things, she 
makes a few short but very important comments, the most important of 
which concerns understanding things as processes:
13   Cited in Massey (2005).
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A reimagination of things as processes is necessary (and indeed now widely accepted) 
for the reconceptualisation of places in a way that might challenge exclusivist localisms 
based on claims of some eternal authenticity. Instead of things as pregiven discreet 
entities, there is now a move towards recognising the continuous becoming which is in 
the nature of their being (2005: 20-21).
Massey touches on several themes here, which will be important in our 
description of the Museum. Firstly, if we agree that things constitute the 
core of our understanding of materiality, then the interpretation of things 
as processes will decidedly change our general perception of materiality as 
something that is stable and immobile. Secondly, she purposefully criticizes 
the issue of (local) authenticity, which is rooted in the non-changeability 
of things. But if things do change, then either authenticity in its traditional 
sense does not exist, or it is subject to change itself. This second issue has an 
important ethical aspect which will be addressed in the next chapter. The 
first one on the other hand has important consequences for the analysis of 
the space and materiality of the Museum. Based on that the Museum will not 
only be seen as a live space, but also as a material entity, which is constituted 
by the ‘continuously becoming’ things. 
 
Thinking along traditional lines, where materiality and immobility are seen 
as mutually complementary terms, one can say that the physical space of 
the Museum is cut off from the space of Humanitas and is stabilized by 
the material objects of the exhibition. The role of materiality however is a 
much more challenging issue. It has often been said that the aim of care 
organisations such as Humanitas is to promote the happiness and well-being 
of the elderly. The relational and emotional aspects of the old people’s well-
being are addressed by introducing changes in the organisational structure of 
the healthcare institutions in order to make them function better. Materiality 
often plays a secondary role to the facilitation of certain ideological concepts. 
The idea of creating a place that is filled with old-fashioned household 
objects, where the visitors can remember and talk about their past, does 
not seem to be very different in that respect. What does make a difference 
however, is the shift that took place at some stage during the process of 
founding the Museum. As a result, the Museum now appears as an emerging 
force with accelerating physical growth, the development of an identity, all 
kinds of needs, a specific spatial and temporal order and even ambitions for 
recognition. 
Following Massey’s interpretation of things I shall talk about materiality 
in a broader sense than as an anchor of our feelings and our memories. I 
consider materiality to be a necessary variable within the process where 
an undetermined space can be turned into a place with an identity, but 
which nevertheless still remains mobile. Those ideas echo the work of 
K. Hetherington, whose main fields of interests (among others) include 
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spatial theory, materiality and museums. Hetherington’s ideas concerning 
materiality and the typology of spaces represent an original turn in the 
modern spatial theories. Based on the understanding of social space he 
writes that ‘turning a space into a place, giving it meaning, it has been 
assumed, is the act of human intervention’. But Hetherington does not stop 
here. He shifts the emphasis and asks a seemingly simple but yet unexpected 
question:
What, however, if we interrogate that muteness and let the objects speak of place? What 
if we let them move across that division between space and place? In doing so we have 
to leave behind both Euclidian geometry and hermeneutics and consider instead the 
issue of a more complex topology (1997c: 184). 
Several ideas from this quote can be fruitful for the following discussion. 
Hetherington speaks about a certain independency of materiality, which 
can tell us about itself. In terms of the situation at the Museum it means 
that both the objects of the display and the place of the Museum can tell us 
a story of their own. This would also mean that materiality can perform a 
social narrative function and at the same time that materiality possesses a 
certain tendency towards self-organisation. Another idea in Hetherington’s 
quote concerns the different levels of complexity from which any space can 
be perceived:
Spaces, like texts, are discursive. They can be read, and their effects … revealed. … 
Spaces … can be viewed in different ways, notably with varying degree of complexity. 
There are spaces constituted by fixed geometrical shapes, Euclidian spaces; there are 
discursive spaces that overlay these geometrical spaces, spaces that have some form 
of argument or narrativity; and there are also folded spaces, rhizomic and uncertain in 
their assemblage (1997a: 200).
Two sets of ideas need to be unpacked here: the classification of spaces, 
which, following Hetherington, we shall introduce in terms of topography 
and topology; and the terminology of rhizomic space, which Hetherington 
borrows from the works of Deleuze and Guattari and creatively applies in 
his own analysis. 
The classification proposed by Hetherington is rather multilayered itself. 
If read carefully, it suggests that one and the same space can be ‘read’ 
differently, which presupposes that complexity is an intrinsic feature of 
every socially identifiable space. The major subdivision that Hetherington 
makes, is threefold. He identifies geometrical (or topographic), discursive 
and topological spaces. Each type has its specific features. For example, 
geometrical spaces are measurable and have a more direct link with materiality 
than discursive ones, which are mostly the spaces of social relations. The last 
group is the most complex, because topological space implies some implicit 
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mobile structure of its own. While describing the space of the Museum we 
shall be moving from the more explicit topography to the social relational 
character of that space and further towards the hidden and ever changing 
dimension of its inner topological organisation. 
The idea of topological space as introduced by Hetherington has clear 
commonalities with Massey’s work. The features like heterogeneity and the 
constructive nature of space partly overlap with the term rhizomic space, which 
Hetherington uses in his definition. Instead of a flattened space he chooses to 
discuss an emergent multidirectional becoming. In his terminological choice 
of vocabulary Hetherington draws on the works of Deleuze and  Guattari 
(1988/2004) and a number of other challenging interdisciplinary studies (e.g. 
Doel, 1996). The essential understanding of space as presented by Deleuze 
& Guattari is based on the notion rhizome. Rhizome as a notion introduces a 
highly original and in a sense revolutionary understanding of systems that 
can be translated into our understanding of space. The enumeration of the 
rhizome characteristics only (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988/2004: 3-28)14 indicates 
the complexity of the term. Rhizome, if I try to put it simply, transfers our 
understanding of space from lineal to volume terms. It is multidimensional 
and unpredictable in the direction of its development. Its heterogeneity is 
extreme. Hetherington gives us the following graphic explanation:
Like a piece of ginger it (rhizomic space, my ref.) goes off in all directions at once, this 
way and that, always growing from the middle. … It is a space of multiple and indeed 
partial connections (ref.) continually pulling in all directions at once (Hetherington, 
1997a: 214).
The features of rhizomic systems, which are relevant to this research, 
concern such non-traditional terms as spatial distortions, folds and gaps. Those 
terms apply to specific spatial organisations, where various trajectories of 
development meet each other, creating a significant tension, as a result 
of which spaces can contract, fold up or even fall apart. As Hetherington 
puts it, ‘the fold weakens the fabric of space allowing new, yet unfixed and 
more partial, perspectives to come into view’ (1997a: 214). We shall look at 
various examples of such spatial movements shortly, but an illustration can 
be helpful here.  
Let us think about the space of the Museum in relation to the organisation 
that houses it. The Museum is in... or of Humanitas. We can start right away 
with that minor stumbling when choosing the right preposition. What is this 
14   The influence of the Bergsonian ideas on different types of multiplicities is obvious here. Six 
‘approximate characteristics’ of rhizome are connectivity, heterogeneity, multiplicity, asignifying 
rupture, cartography and decalcomania. 
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elusive relational territory between the Museum and its host organisation 
Humanitas? Should we see the Museum as part of Humanitas, or should 
we acknowledge that the Museum just happens to be situated within its 
premises? Is it just another ramification of the existing geographical territory 
with a function of a funfair or an independent unit, which proved to be strong 
enough to lead a life of its own? Those seemingly simple questions do not 
have straightforward answers, yet they highlight the still increasing spatial 
tension that has developed (in-)between the Museum on the one hand and 
the old people’s home on the other. That can be better understood if we treat 
the Museum for what it is, namely an indefinite interval, a rhizomic fold or even 
a junction without traffic lights on the map of the Humanitas organisation. 
By calling the Museum an indefinite interval I am referring to that elusive 
point of metamorphosis, the pivotal point of betweenness, when and where 
the space that was allocated within the Humanitas building becomes the 
place of the Museum. There is no definite border between Humanitas and 
the Museum, which will be illustrated in detail in the paragraph on its 
topography. But neither is the Museum a legally recognised entity, which 
can exist without its mother-organisation. At the same time people come to 
see exhibition because they have heard about the Museum, and the question 
of its location seems to be just a matter of geography to them. The Museum 
can be called an indefinite space, where various trajectories of spatial 
becoming meet each other: independent and yet dependable, possessing 
its own place and yet somewhere in between. Another example, which can 
illustrate the general rhizomic character of the Museum, is the multiplicity 
of narratives, which the Museum space causes, houses and finally folds up. 
The space reconstructs a Dutch domestic environment and at the same time 
clearly carries historic features of the world in and outside Humanitas. The 
complexity of recent Dutch history is carefully folded into the details of the 
display, such as the Indonesian cloth above the chimney or the yellow cloth 
Jewish ‘Jude’ star in one of the showcases. When talking about the social 
character of the Museum space we shall see how those folds can be opened 
and its abbreviated structure released and revealed. As for now, it is clear 
that the Museum space represents an intertwined juxtaposition of various 
spatial orders and dimensions. 
The Museum facilitates a vivid, often verbally communicated image of the 
past in the given environment. This is the ‘magic’ of the Museum, which is 
based on the tension that is built up between the neutrally charged and semi-
artificially created entourage and the highly charged emotional response to 
it. This tension is what we shall try to understand.  
The structure of the following discussion is built around two movements, 
which will be intersecting, competing and complementing each other. 
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The main direction will be the movement from topographic to topological 
analysis. This direction is not synonymous with movement from simple 
to more complicated, but it does seem to be logical to first take the reader 
through the geography of the place before we start describing the Museum’s 
topology. When speaking of the topography, we shall rediscover the place of 
the Museum in the manner of a usual visitor. When speaking of its topology, 
we shall see how the placement of the Museum has deformed, stretched and 
rearranged the entire space of the organisation. 
This main direction from topography to topology will be complicated by 
a second movement between various interpretations of materiality, and in 
particular things, which constitute the Museum collection. As a result of 
these complementing intersecting movements between the topography of 
the space and the social functions of the things towards the philosophical 
understanding of the things and the topology of the social space, the reader 
should be able to see why this strange place of the Museum feels like home.
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topography of the MuseuM space: Mapping
A naturally leading topography 
The people who come to visit the Museum are usually taken by surprise 
by both the range and the content of the collection. The Museum provides 
a set of objects that are prearranged in a way that most people of the elder 
generation can recognize. 
Groups of visitors are usually met at the entrance by one of the volunteers, 
who show the guests around. The visitors who come on their own can find 
their way quite easily. There are no pointers with the word museum on them, 
but there is a well-defined natural way to find the Museum. In order to reach the 
Museum, the visitors can use the lift in the main foyer at Humanitas. Apart 
from the very picturesque and in that sense untraditional sphere for a place 
where elderly people reside, the visitors pass on their way the collection of 
antique wheelchairs and a couple of showcases, which display old-fashioned 
things. The choice of the objects in the display cabinets depends on the time 
of the year. In December you will see there the faded glitter of old Christmas 
tree decorations, old-fashioned cards or yellowed paper with Christmas carols. 
Towards the end of April the cases are consecrated to the celebration of the 
Queen’s birthday, whereby plates, spoons and cups bearing the images of the 
members of the Dutch Royal family during the last century are displayed. In 
May the reminders of the last world war can be found there, e.g. an old piece of 
greasy paper that was used to wrap margarine, English tins with biscuits that 
were thrown from airplanes to feed the population or a carbide bicycle lamp. 
Those at first sight unremarkable glass cases do play a remarkable role by 
guiding the visitors towards the Museum. The message that the showcases 
convey is catching and alluring. It is a welcoming gesture, a quick look ahead 
to feed the curiosity but without silencing it, a flash of what will still be 
revealed in the Museum later on. But all that is not the Museum yet. It is just a 
prologue to introduce the atmosphere of the Museum exhibition and to create 
an emotional context for the visit. Most visitors take the lift to descend to the 
basement where the Museum is situated. Of course there is a staircase as well. 
In that case you will pass a number of showcases again, where various kinds 
of domestic appliances are on display, like for example a large collection of 
electric heaters. Either way you will end up in front of massive double doors 
with an old-fashioned front door bell attached to it. And although the doors 
are open for the visitors, everybody is welcome to pull the round handle and 
to admire the old-fashioned feeling in the arm that ‘still knows how to do it’, 
and the clinking sound of the bell. 
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Then the visitors come into what is called the Reminiscence Museum. The doors, 
the tree in front of the door, two lighted windows in the hall and the doorbell do 
their work perfectly. The entire setting looks like a house, not like a museum. The 
idea and the feeling of being at home is crucial for us to understand what will 
happen further on inside.  I shall let that rest for a while in order to first finish the 
topographical tour of the Museum. There are fourteen rooms, some of which are 
divided into sections with the use of showcases. Each room has its own nickname, 
reflecting the scope of the artefacts that are displayed there. From the entrance, 
which reminds one of a big hall and which is the most ambiguous in terms of 
content, one can go into the grocery shop, which is on the left side, or to the barn (or 
hobby shed), which is on the right side, or straight forward into the study. Beside 
the rooms that can be partially seen from the entrance, there are two sitting rooms, 
showing different house 
styles, one from the 1930s 
and another from 1960s. 
There is a sewing corner and a 
large kitchen space with three 
different kitchen installations, 
from the 1900s, the 1940s and 
the 1960s. A small charming 
washing corner is attached to 
the kitchen. Finally, there are 
three bedrooms in a row: the 
baby room, the teenager’s 
room and the master bedroom 
with a small bathroom and a 
water closet at the end of the hallway. The wall opposite the hallway houses a 
small but impressive school corner. Each room, corner or hallway is completely 
furnished. The objects are presented in such quantities that you can sometimes 
not see clearly what is actually there. The showcases that serve as divisions 
display all kinds of artefacts that relate to each other thematically, but at the same 
time differ considerably in terms of style, period and origin. 
There is no such thing as the correct order of looking at the exhibition which 
could be prescribed by the Museum staff in advance. It is not just a coincidence 
that starting from the entrance room you can choose between three different 
directions where to begin your tour. The volunteers working at the Museum 
do sometimes try to manage and direct the stream of the visitors when there 
are many of them at the same time, but in principle each visitor can choose his 
or her own route. At least this is the feeling the visitors are given. However, it 
would be wrong to presume that there is no intentionality in the way the space of 
the Museum is arranged. As Hetherington, while referring to another museum 
setting puts it, ‘the materiality of the space is there to help us with these choices’ 
(1997a: 201).
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Social topography of materiality
Talking about topography brings us naturally to the question of the role 
which materiality and, in particular things, play in constructing the social 
space of the Museum. In the context of Hetherington’s proposition one 
remark must be made. It would be wrong to reduce the materiality of the 
Museum to the objects it contains. Materiality can be seen as rooted and also 
manifested in things, but not exclusively. Materiality includes the location 
and the process of placing as well. In other words, it has a dynamic relational 
character which means that it actively influences and in return is influenced 
by the social conditions of its placing, using and preserving. Based on that, 
we can say that placing objects in the Museum has both topographic and 
social functions which can be revealed in relation to each other. J. Law & A. 
Mol have reflected that kind of correlation in their own research, arguing 
that ‘materiality and sociality are produced together’ (Law & Mol, 1995: 274). 
Let us now reconsider the situation described in the beginning of the chapter, 
starting with materiality as if it has a primary function regarding its social 
aspect. Piling old objects into a basement does not make much sense without 
understanding them as carriers of an interactive social meaning. The objects 
were brought together by all kinds of people. Lying there, they started to 
exercise an influence on each other and their physical surroundings and then 
even actively interfered with the life of the entire Humanitas organisation. 
At the same time we must realise that the basement at Humanitas would 
have remained empty if the advertisement for old objects had not been 
appealing enough or if its readers had not felt sufficiently suffocated by the 
presence of those old things cluttering up their homes. So in this case the 
question can be: did materiality invoke a social response or did sociality 
produce material rearrangements? Seeing materiality in terms of relations is 
the way to understand the synchronous reciprocal influence that materiality 
and sociality exert on each other. All the donated objects used to be parts of 
social domestic networks, which they had been introduced to at some stage. 
Those objects had been arranged within existing social settings, fulfilling 
various roles and functions there. Then, when either the durability of the 
setting or the durability of the object had expired, the objects were given a 
new symbolic signification, which was foreshadowed from the very moment 
they were gathered in the basement of Humanitas.
To summarize, let us say that the material and social aspects of the Museum 
collection form an interchangeable relation here. The initial decision to place 
the advertisement triggered a strong response from a broad social network. 
The request that Humanitas made referred directly to physical objects. 
When the objects had actually been brought to Humanitas it turned out that 
they could acquire the power of influencing the organisational strategy by 
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fine-tuning and rearranging initially taken decisions. Thus materiality and 
sociality were in fact creating an impact jointly. 
My primary interest here is still with the emerging topography of the Museum 
exhibition. Bearing in mind the interdependency between the material and 
social aspects of the Museum let me first concentrate on the material part. It 
makes sense to investigate the meaning and function of materiality in things. 
I shall use the term things as a generic notion. At the same time, the terms 
objects and artefacts will be used synonymously as descriptive terms, relating 
to the memories, activities and living conditions of the visitors. In our research 
we shall be zooming in on the spatial, mnemonic and social role of the things 
that were brought together in the Museum exhibition. But, as we shall see 
shortly, in order to fully understand and appreciate the aggregative and 
functional power of things in relation to the social space which they shape, 
we shall need to move on to a more complex philosophical interpretation of 
them, which in our analysis will signify a step from topography towards a 
topological description of materiality.
Things as gatherings 
The assemblage of things that were brought to Humanitas definitely did not 
look like a collection and at first certainly did not remind one of an exhibition 
either. The main issue was not that simply everything had to be sorted out 
and in many cases thoroughly cleaned as well. At that stage the ‘collection’ 
presented no more than a highly heterogeneous heap of things, in a spatial, 
temporal and discursive sense. Not only was the variety of the objects 
overwhelming. The style, age, extent of wear and tear, personal marks, in 
fact everything was screamingly different and as a result nothing fitted with 
anything. It was a remarkable gathering. Or better still, it was a remarkable 
gathering of gatherings. Let me illustrate that.
Almost each piece of domestic paraphernalia that is placed in the Museum has 
its own story. Some stories have been recounted purposefully and in detail by 
the people who brought their things to Humanitas, others can easily be guessed. 
In the sitting room there is an old-fashioned sideboard, which was donated by a 
family from Rotterdam. When I saw it for the first time it just looked to me like 
an ordinary old-fashioned piece of furniture. There was also a photocopy of a 
black and white photo, which was placed on the sideboard, picturing four girls 
of different ages who looked very much alike, especially because of the similar 
dresses and big ribbons in their hair. Out of curiosity I tried to open some of the 
draws, but the quality of the old thing was so poor that I gave up the idea. All the 
same this surprised me because old-fashioned furniture usually isn’t that fragile. 
A different kind of surprise was that just about every second visitor pointed at 
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the sideboard, saying that they recognised it. They all tried to open the doors or 
the draws; finally I started to warn people in advance that it would not work. 
The stories they told were 
not surprising: one of them 
used to have exactly the same 
sideboard at his parents’ 
house, another saw it at her 
aunt’s place. One visitor used 
to have exactly the same tea 
set behind the sliding glass 
doors, another was telling 
that she had the same set, but 
with a different pattern on 
it. In short this was a lively 
piece of furniture within 
the Museum which was 
attracting a lot of attention. And it had a touching picture on it. Then at one point, 
when the curator of the Museum was present, she asked the visitors whether 
they knew that the sideboard actually had its own story? Everybody looked at 
her with surprise and she told us, or better to say, retold us the story, which she 
had heard from the woman who brought the sideboard to the Museum. 
Rotterdam was one of the few places in the Netherlands, which was severely 
bombed during the Second World War. Most of the population in Rotterdam lost 
literally all their possessions. 
Because the town authorities 
wanted to support as many 
families as possible, they 
ordered relatively cheap 
furniture to replace the 
things that were lost due to 
the bombing. So the exterior 
of the sideboard looked all 
right, but in actual fact the 
quality was not very good. 
Yet understandably enough 
everybody was thankful and 
satisfied. Afterwards many 
people kept those pieces of furniture for various reasons, one of which was the 
memory of the most trying years in their lives. 
While the curator was telling her story it seemed to me that the entire 
atmosphere around the piece was gradually changing, as if the old-fashioned 
thing acquired more dignity, as an important silent witness. Just as I thought 
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15  See e.g. Online Etymological Dictionary: www.etymonline.com
that the story was over, the curator pointed at the picture of the four girls and 
added with a smile that they were the four sisters from that same family and 
that the picture had been taken right after the war. Their mother explained to 
them that all the pictures of earlier years were lost and that the picture would 
become the oldest photo in their personal photo albums. 
For me everything fell into place: the surprising popularity of the piece, 
its dubious quality, and even the four girls on the picture that were all 
dressed in the same way. I looked at the assemblage of the sideboard and the 
picture in a new light. What only a moment before had looked like a simple 
traditional interior arrangement (a sideboard with a family picture on it) 
suddenly became a multi-plot narrative, a crossing point of various socially 
meaningful and personally valuable stories; it became a kind of gathering.  
The question that presents itself here is how it is possible that a simple old-
fashioned piece of furniture can acquire the power to accumulate a number 
of social and personal narratives, which after so many years can still be 
appealing and even meaningful to us. The examples of such a powerful 
influence that the pieces of the Museum collection can have on us are 
numerous, but the explanation of how that fascinating mechanism works 
cannot be found in the empirical setting itself. It seems that a move towards 
an etymological and deeper philosophical understanding of things can be 
helpful here. 
One of the most interesting interpretations of the notion thing can be found 
in the later works of Heidegger. The philosopher proposes to consider the 
etymological background of the word thing. He searches for a clarification of 
the uniting power that according to him things have in their crucial role of 
keeping the world (fourfold, in his terminology) together. The word itself can 
be traced back to the old Scandinavian and old English meanings of meeting, 
assembly and later on entity, being, matter15. The evolution towards its current 
meaning, referring to an object, took several centuries, but the direction of this 
development corresponds consistently within several of the Indo-European 
languages. To justify this retrospective review Heidegger writes:
 
That language in a way retracts the real meaning … is evidence of the primal nature 
of these meanings; for with the essential words of language, their true meaning easily 
falls into oblivion in favour of foreground meanings. Man has hardly yet pondered the 
mystery of this process. Language withdraws from man its simple and high speech. But 
its primal call does not thereby become incapable of speech; it merely falls silent. Man, 
though, fails to heed this silence (Heidegger, 1951/1971: 146). 
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It could be called an associative game, to try and reintroduce into our contemporary 
discourse some semantic element of a meaning that has disappeared. Nevertheless, 
the result of the exercise proves to be enlightening. Meanings of words are similar 
to memories, in that they can disappear from actual discourse, but all the same 
remain potentially (virtually) present and can become explicit again. Just like 
forgotten memories that have influenced one’s development, we can still trace 
semantics in the meanings of certain terms today. The older the word is, the richer 
its etymology can be. In contemporary discourse only a small part of that rich 
history is actualised. As with (habitual) body memory, which is fully routinized, 
the use of language in everyday life is easily filled with clichés and standard idioms, 
which have lost the explicit connection with their original meaning. Similar to 
what can happen with ‘forgotten’ memories that are actualised at the demand of 
a specific situation, the hidden meaning of a word or phrase can suddenly present 
itself in all its forgotten beauty when triggered by a certain context. The sensation 
that we experience is close to the revelation one feels when we, for just a second, 
have been granted a chance to glance into the deeper meaning of life. 
If we now translate the lost etymological semantics of the word thing into the 
context of setting up the Museum, then we can see that the meaning of gathering 
is activated at two different levels: gathering as a life-story of each thing, and 
gathering as the collection of various things within the Museum. Things 
that have been collected in order to become a part of the Museum exhibition 
contain accumulations of known and unrevealed histories. Some people who 
personally brought in their possessions presented them together with long 
and detailed stories, as happened in the example with the sideboard. But those 
stories are only up to a certain extent about the things that were brought and 
somehow they never seem to be complete. Most of those things bear discreet 
marks of their lives. That reticent closeness will continue at least as long as the 
things have not yet been given a place within the Museum. The cracks and 
spots on their surfaces can of course tickle someone’s imagination. A piece of 
wallpaper that is glued to an old cupboard and brought along with it as one 
entity, represents a gathering in itself, as if a part of another place had grown 
around it to the extent that it became impossible to disconnect them. In other 
words, things brought along with them scraps of narratives from discourses 
they used to share and shape, even before they were selected and placed in the 
Museum. They are in fact the folded narratives themselves. 
When things finally find their destination in the Museum display, they are 
ready to reveal the stories of their lives. This revelation, which Heidegger calls 
unconcealment, provides us with insight into the being of things as something 
that is already there and that is bringing itself forth.  Because of the selectiveness 
of our interest, we can see only that part of them that presents itself at any 
given moment. The remainder we assume and reconstruct in our minds and the 
possibility of extrapolation is facilitated by our memory. It serves to extend and 
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expand the continuity of the things’ existence. That is exactly what happened in 
our example with the old-fashioned sideboard. Every visitor saw it differently, 
selectively reacting to the piece according to his or her personal experiences. At 
the same time the piece of furniture itself, with its explicit scraps and implicit 
stories, simply by the fact that is was standing in the Museum with a picture 
of the four sisters on top, was already telling its own story. That story was 
gathered during a long life but it was not finished. The old-fashioned thing was 
in a sense given a second chance in the Museum and was actively absorbing 
the stories of the visitors, adding them to its own life-story. The essence of its 
being has always consisted in gathering, but it took more than just a careful 
topographic placing within the exhibition to bring that forward. 
In order to understand how this takes place, Heidegger’s distinction 
between correctness and truth can be helpful here (Heidegger, 1949/2008)16. 
Not everything that is correct according to a chosen reference point is true. 
Correctness is a form of fixation of a certain meaning, while truth is a ceaseless 
revelation of it. Truth is revealed not via objectification of the subject matter but 
via its complex relations with and within the world. When visitors pointed at 
the sideboard saying that the piece belonged to a period just after the Second 
Wold War and that their families used to have similar ones, this was correct. But 
those remarks did not tell us anything about the true nature of the furniture. 
The story that was told by the curator of the Museum revealed a small part of 
the true history of the old-fashioned sideboard. But it was not the story itself that 
we see as a revelation here, but a constellation of various stories and memories, 
which had been evoked by the sideboard. In combination with those different 
stories the essence of the old-fashioned thing was partly revealed. 
The revelation of things as gatherings does not occur on its own. It is a 
complex process where our realisation of what is true is indebted, to use another 
term of Heidegger’s, to various causes (Heidegger, 1953/2008)17. Gathering 
presupposes the availability of a certain space, within which both preservation 
and replacement are possible. A piece of furniture is indebted not only to the 
material from which it was made, to the shape it was given, and to the functional 
purpose it was assigned but, as we have seen, also to the act of placing and 
becoming an integral part of a certain setting (a house or the Museum). It is 
indebted to the relations in which it finds itself. But those relations are not 
constant. Gathering is not done once-and-for-all but is rather a continuous 
activity and therefore time-sensitive. The association of a thing with time finds 
its substantiation in the etymology of the word as well. Based on its connection 
with ancient language, the word thing used to have the meaning of stretch of 
time for a meeting or assembly.
16   For more on the distinction see e.g. Heidegger’s essay On the  Essence of Truth.
17  The term is borrowed from Heidegger’s essay The Question Concerning Technology.
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Bearing in mind the spatiality and temporality of things, we can conclude 
that they are not static, that they are not stable or immobile and that they 
are in fact not timeless. In other words, we can talk about the mobility of 
things and subsequently about the mobility of materiality. In order to avoid 
unnecessary exaggeration let us point out that things do also possess a 
certain degree of immutability (Hetherington, 1997c: 189). As we shall see 
further on, they are in fact much more stable than our memories. That is 
why we consider them as one of the most trustworthy means to anchor our 
experiences. All the same, we are not talking about a fundamental distinction 
here. Things can only offer relative and never absolute stability. 
Another level of gathering was generated by the initially disjointed 
togetherness of the things in the rooms that were still to be turned into a 
museum. In order to reflect on what happens at that level we must place 
ourselves beyond the richness of the narratives that an individual piece 
contains and move from the topographic description to the social space of 
the Museum, which is relational and interactive by nature. This is the task 
for the following section.
Until now the topography of materiality and especially of the Museum 
collection occupied our attention. The description has shown that the role 
which things play in holding the collection together, overrides the simple rule 
of ordering and placing. One of the important reasons for that is that things 
are subject to change as well. Massey’s definition of things as processes (2005: 
20-21), which summarises a certain tradition within process thinking, fits the 
description perfectly well, but the tension between the visible stability and 
inner mobility of things is not something that can be explained by using a 
topographic description alone. Things as gatherings tell us about their being 
but things are becomings as well.
It is time then to move on in our analysis of the Museum collection from 
the description of the topographic attachment of things towards an 
understanding of the consequences of their detachment and displacement.  
Dissolving topography
Looking at old things can revive stories about them, up to the point when the story 
‘is told’, but in a certain sense those things are results for us. Those may be not 
final, but they seem to be marked by an impending expiry date. At the same time 
the term we have selected to describe the setting up of the Museum is becoming, 
not doomed. In the previous paragraph we have already hinted at the fact that the 
objects that were donated for the Museum collection not only have their stories 
about the past, but that they are stories in progress, or using Massey’s term, stories-
77
so-far. They are given a second chance not just by the simple act of placing them on 
display at the Museum. If they remain displayed and yet invisible for the visitors, 
then their ‘death’ will be even more conspicuous. New becoming becomes possible 
when the old-fashioned things enter into new kinds of relations with visitors, as a 
result of which new stories develop or the old ones get a new turn. 
The Museum was given quite a number of prams. One of them is very distinctive, 
large, white, beautifully shaped, with an impressive set of springs and large 
wheels. It is so appealing that 
almost everybody reaches 
out to seize its handle in 
order to make it swing. The 
movement is so gentle that 
the people immediately can 
feel the nobility of the old-
fashioned thing. I once saw 
the lady who donated the 
pram to the Museum. She 
went straight to it, radiating 
pride and joy, showed it to 
the people she was with 
and explained that a-all her 
children had enjoyed the supreme comfort it provides. It seemed to be clear 
that the pram was well placed and the recognition of its primary functionality 
could still cause lively and positive interactions among the visitors. 
Then one day a group of younger visitors came to the Museum. They were 
professionals working in various organisations within the care sector for 
the elderly. Upon arrival the group fanned out, as they usually do and 
everybody chose their own way to get acquainted with the collection. One 
of the women went straight to the pram and looked at it with admiration 
and almost with disbelief. Then she turned around in need of sharing her 
feelings and started talking, telling me that she had spent quite some time 
looking for a pram like that, but had not been able to find one anywhere. 
At first I assumed that she collected all kinds of prams, but I was wrong. 
She went on, explaining that she wanted the pram for her children, because 
that kind of quality and comfort can simply not be found in the modern 
buggies. The shape and the springs were just perfect then and they do not 
make them like that anymore. 
Her story sounded so familiar that at a certain point I almost did not know 
any more with whom I was talking, with the older lady who had brought 
the pram or with the future mother who was still looking for one. The 
story taught me something though. The objects on display are not just mute 
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witnesses of the past; they talk to us in a particular way and when relations 
are established their stories merge with ours. Things find their continuation 
in people and people rely on things to tell their own stories. 
After the story about the pram many items of the Museum collection seemed 
to acquire a more specific ‘identity’ after I had seen visitors pointing at 
them and telling their stories.  Two ‘Liberty’ chairs for example (named 
after a famous shop, which doesn’t exist anymore) can certainly be counted 
among the champions, not only because many visitors recognise them and 
then tell stories from their childhood, but also because several of them 
take a seat in them in order to feel the comfort they provide once again. 
The story does not end there, because several visitors express the wish to 
actually possess the chairs. 
There are many examples like these and they have an important feature in 
common. The interaction that the objects on display unlock is mostly based 
on their initial built-in functionality. The question arises what happens with 
that initial functionality of the objects when they are moved and set up 
within new surroundings.  
Let us first look at the transition which the artefacts are subject to both in the 
physical and the social sense of the word when they are given a new place to 
‘live’. Things that are displayed in the Museum are easily recognised by the 
visitors as long as their original function can be remembered. It is clear that 
an old-fashioned pram is to carry babies, while Liberty chairs are to sit in 
comfortably. But as we have seen the memories and emotions of the visitors 
who recognise those objects go far beyond those primary functions. In regard 
to the social functionality of things, we can assume that all objects are socially 
determined artefacts, since ‘what matters is not the qualities of the object itself, 
but the manner of its attachment to the people whose social relationships are 
thereby mediated’ (Middleton  & Brown, 2005: 153). If we look at the same objects 
within the environment of the Museum but with the context of that quote in the 
back of our minds, then we can conclude that the pram, the Liberty chairs and 
all other artefacts that are exhibited there have acquired a new function, differing 
fundamentally from the original one and yet still inseparably bound to it.
The appearance of that secondary function can be understood better via a 
process called displacement. Most of the objects displayed in the Museum 
were ‘removed from the temporal and spatial context for which they were 
obtained’ (Radley, 1990: 50). They were placed in a different setting18: the 
Museum, and as a result they can enter the narratives of the visitors. One can 
18  There is another interesting issue here, which has to do with the displacement of the elderly 
people. We shall dwell on it later on in the chapter on ageing.
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wonder what kind of functional transformation the objects have undergone 
before and when they were placed in the Museum. A. Radley presented the 
following account:
Tossed into drawers or boxes and left for some years, these objects eventually become 
interesting because they are displaced from their time, from the context shared with other 
items, and from social practices as part of which they were perhaps merely functional. 
This is the fate of a small proportion of artefacts which belong to each epoch, surviving 
through hazard into a period when their displacement is perceived as significant, and in 
being then deliberately set aside, become marked out as indices of the past, as objects to 
‘remember by’(1990: 52).
In this passage, Radley directly reflects on the development of the secondary 
function of objects, namely that they become tools and passages in the tunnels 
of remembering processes. But it is important to realise that objects can facilitate 
remembering processes only as long as their primary (mostly instrumental) 
function has not been forgotten. The Museum objects initiate remembering, but 
the content of reminiscence discourse is based on their original functionality 
(to wash, to iron, to repair). From that point on, the narratives can develop 
more or less independently regarding the materiality of the Museum, but the 
starting point will always be found at one of its displays. During the analysis 
of the remembering practices, it will become clear that the visitors refer to the 
functions of the objects first by re-establishing an attachment and by doing this 
they ‘re-invoke the context of which they were once a part’ (Radley, 1990: 54). 
The importance of this pattern cannot be underestimated. The context of the 
visitor’s lives is at stake here. Thanks to the artefacts, the visitors can recreate 
not only the physical proximity of the object, but also the social network of the 
past, which can have a great impact on continuously developing identities.
 
The displacement of objects is not a one-step process. The transformation that 
takes place should be regarded within temporal dynamics, which can best be 
expressed as an ‘idea of a gradual, and perhaps meandering transition’:
Yesterday’s functional artefact can become tomorrow’s memento of museum piece, although 
today its displacement may remove it to a limbo where it has outlived its usefulness though 
not yet been rediscovered or been marked as of special interest (1990: 58).
In other words, it is almost impossible to predict what kind of objects can 
become the symbols of social relationships in the future. Moreover, the decision 
what is worthwhile to be kept for time’s sake and what is worthwhile to know 
about the past is taken by different generations. This means that coordination 
of these decisions is hardly possible. Humanitas concentrated on collecting 
a number of objects which had gone out of fashion and had been displaced 
already some time ago and which acquired a secondary function by being put 
on display in the Museum. 
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The preparatory work for new displays, which remains invisible for the 
visitors while the selection is conducted, commences well in advance. The 
first step is that the people working at the Museum gather new artefacts. 
Some of them will be used in the new museums that will be set up19, but the 
remainder is still in a stage of ‘limbo’, almost forgotten, missed by nobody. 
The storerooms for new artefacts have physical limitations, so choices have 
to be made. The experience of the existing Museum can serve to filter what 
can be kept for future use. However, one mistake must be avoided, which is 
the illusion that what will be remembered and how, can be defined exclusively 
by people. In that respect, the powerful role that the objects themselves can 
play in the process of remembering must not be underestimated.
In our description of objects and how to put them on display in the Museum 
we were up till now consistently moving from the significance of their 
topographic attachments to understanding their displacement and the 
changing social functions. The interpretation of things as gatherings gave 
us the insight into the being of things; their socially determined functionality 
provided the possibility to see things as processes, which are subject to change 
and becoming. Following the suggestion of Hetherington, the emphasis was 
put on materiality in order to do justice to the material part of the Museum 
space, which is neither mute nor immobile. The next contemplations 
however led us to the conclusion that analysing things without considering 
their relations with people would be just as limited as ignoring the role of 
materiality in social relations and interactions all together. The issue that is at 
stake here has quite a history in the philosophical thought and boils down to 
the struggle that can occur when we maintain a dualistic vision of the world. 
Law & Mol’s (1995) proposition that materiality and sociality are produced 
together initially gave a clear message which direction we should take. But the 
analysis executed so far, while being closely related to our empirical setting, 
left us with an open question about the fundamental relations between things 
and people. We did talk about how those relations reveal themselves, but we 
were not able to go deep enough to answer the question about what kind 
of relations they are. That question is not only crucial for us to understand 
the topological complexity of the Museum space, but also for the following 
analysis of remembering practices in general. That question requires us to 
leave the empirical setting for a while in order to become engrossed in a 
more complex philosophical interpretation. 
19  From the very moment when the Reminiscence Museum was founded, Humanitas had plans 




In the previous paragraphs we have already used Heidegger’s approach 
towards understanding the true essence of things. The truth about things 
can be revealed or unconcealed but it cannot be fixed or objectified. What 
is especially valuable for our analysis is Heidegger’s refusal to see things 
as pure objects for manipulation, the instrumentality of which is equated 
to their essence (Heidegger, 1950/1971, 1953/2008)20. The relations between 
people and things are much more complex than the traditional correlation 
subject-object suggests (1946/2008)21. By introducing his famous ‘Dasein’, he 
fights that dualistic subdivision:
Self and world belong together in the single entity, Dasein. Self and world are not two 
entities, like subject and object … but self and world are the basic determination of 
Dasein itself in the unity of structure of being in the world (Heidegger, 1988: 297)22. 
Heidegger ‘insists that philosophy cannot look at reality from the outside, by 
way of its appearance’. In G. Harman’s interpretation of Heidegger, ‘human 
life is not something visible from the outside, but must be seen in the very 
act, performance, or execution of its own reality, which always exceeds any 
of the properties that we can list about it’ (Harman, 2007: 25). Reflecting on 
the relation between the world and Dasein in Heideggerian terms, Harman 
concludes:
Human beings are not just ghosts floating through the world and gazing at objects. Dasein 
is always being-in-the-world, and inseparable from the world. Even though Dasein and 
world must be different in some sense, being-in-the-world is a unified structure … It 
does not exist as an independent thing hovering in a void, but always finds itself in a 
particular situation with highly specific possibilities (2007: 61).
Several issues that Harman addresses here are important for us, namely the 
relational character of the connection between Dasein and the world and the 
rootedness of existence in ‘average everydayness’. Heidegger tells us that 
the dynamics of Dasein become apparent as a result of its temporal character. 
The revelation of being takes place in a constant motion, from the past to the 
future at any given moment. In this movement Dasein does not objectify 
the world but takes it ‘for granted’ as ready-to-hand, and the world reveals 
itself accordingly in the interaction between Dasein and itself. ‘Ready-to-
hand is the type of being possessed by tools’, which are ‘withdrawn from 
20   Most strongly Heidegger develops those ideas in essays Thing and The Question Concerning 
Technology.
21  Another essay where Heidegger works out his approach to subject-object issue is Letter on 
Humanism.
22   Cited in Kadar & Effken (1994).
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explicit view’ (Harman, 2007: 176). But as soon as objectification takes place, 
everything changes. The becoming of being is dramatically reduced to the 
present, the present-at-hand in Heidegger’s terminology, and the world (and 
let me add, things) are reduced to features and properties. Thus present-
at-hand is an objectified type of being, which is ‘stripped of any concealed 
mysterious layer’ (Harman, 2007: 176). We can ask ourselves whether that 
presence-at-hand can offer another opening for movement, but it would 
be premature to try and provide an answer to it here. Let us first have a 
closer look at how Dasein deals with the environment in its ‘everydayness’. 
In his discourse of readiness-to-hand Robert Brandom introduces an insight 
that brings philosophical understanding of being closer to our conception of 
things:
According to Heidegger, Dasein finds itself always amidst an already exiting world of 
equipment, consisting of significant things each of which is experienced as something. 
The readiness-to-hand of a piece of equipment consists in its having a certain significance. 
This significance in turn consists in its appropriateness for various practical roles and its 
inappropriateness for others (1992: 47-48). 
In other words, the significance of the pram lies in its suitability to carry the 
baby, and the appropriateness of the ‘Liberty’ chair lies in the possibility to 
sit in it comfortably. Both the pram and the chairs do not exist on their own; 
they are parts of a bigger equipmental complex, which we call our world. 
The significance and appropriateness are the notions here that institute the 
conceptual structure of equipment that is not opposed to Dasein, but, on 
the contrary, constitutes its world and is constituted by it in return. What 
strikes me even more is how graciously the social element is introduced into 
the understanding of readiness-to-hand. In his interpretation, Brandom 
uses the notions appropriateness and serviceability (as a condition to be 
defined by appropriateness) to characterize the ready-to-hand, and through 
these notions he makes a connection between ready-to-hand and the social 
response to it. ‘To discover something ready-to-hand, to appropriate it, is to 
take it as something, to respond to it in a certain way’ (1992: 49-50). 
A few summarizing remarks can be made here. Ready-to-hand exists in 
‘equipmental complexes’ (Dreyfus & Hall, 1992: 6) and not as an equipment; 
consequently, the world reveals itself in multiple interrelations. Ready-to-
hand asks for a certain response, or a type of performance, which Heidegger 
calls ‘in-order-to’ and ‘in-which’, and is shaped in various social practices. 
Finally, the appropriateness of ready-to-hand is based on its significance, 
which is in its turn acquired in social practice. 
What we have done so far helps to determine the ontological basis of what 
we used to call the functionality or instrumentality of things, in two respects. 
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23   It may be possible to say that things on display turned from transparent and invisible equipment 
into present-at-hand disturbances of different kinds which Heidegger calls conspicuousness, 
obtrusiveness or obstinacy. See more about those terms in Being and Time (1927/2008: 102-107).
Firstly, the philosophical categories of ready-to-hand and Dasein are 
understood in relation to each other and are looked at in the totality of their 
infinite appearances. The interaction between those two concepts is a far cry 
from mechanistic registration and automatic response. The dynamics of this 
interaction override the present and stretch from a priori knowing into the 
future. Secondly, ready-to-hand and Dasein are socially marked categories, 
especially when being observed in the context of ‘everydayness’. We can 
talk about an encounter with the world only if it has some significance. The 
significance is determined by the appropriate response it evokes and hence, 
the recognition of it as being appropriate by the self and by others. Here Dasein 
exists as Dasein-with, in its essential sociality and as a constituent for Being-
in-the-world (Heidegger, 1927/2008: 157). 
Now the affinity between functionality and readiness-to-hand has been 
established, we can look at the location of the Museum from a new 
perspective. Based on the previous description I can assume that the things 
that were collected and presented in the exhibition are ready-to-hand in 
their ‘average everydayness’. Or better to say, they were ready-to-hand until 
their conventional significances were worn out (Heidegger, 1925/2008: 102-
107)23. Let us have a closer look at them and see in what relation they reveal 
themselves to the visitors of the Museum.
People are coming to the Museum to look at the exhibition, which by definition 
contradicts readiness-to-hand. There is no equipmental invisibility there. On 
the contrary, everything is done to let visitors see, recognize and reminisce 
about the displayed objects. In terms of Heidegger, the Museum artefacts are 
present-at-hand, taken out of ‘being-in-the-world’ and turned into objects 
of attention, study and inference. Yet, later on we shall see how naturally 
various remarks about the functionality of the objects can be made and how 
automatically the artefacts on display can be put into action again. People 
react to the objectified things, but the content of their reaction often reflects 
their functional values. In other words, the present-at-hand is spoken of as 
ready-to-hand, which illustrates the reciprocity of the relation between the 
two categories and in fact is even more complex. Let us take an example. 
A visitor is looking at an old-fashioned warm-water plate for children. She 
reflects on it as: O, a warm-water plate … to keep the food warm. I used to have one. 
It was very handy, because my youngest child never wanted to eat, so she was sitting 
in her chair for ages but the food didn’t get cold. What happens here is a chain 
switching between the two categories ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. It 
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starts with the objectification 
or naming of an object 
(present-at-hand): O, a 
warm-water plate. Then the 
equipmental function of 
the object is pointed out 
(spoken of as ready-to-
hand): to keep the food warm. 
By virtue of those two steps, 
an assertion is made, which 
is followed by inference 
(present-at-hand): I used to 
have one. It was very handy. 
Then the assertion becomes 
something, which is given, 
and it is used in the following 
narrative as an equipmental 
statement (ready-to-hand) 
without explicitly naming 
the function anymore: because my youngest child never wanted to eat, so she was 
sitting in her chair for ages but the food didn’t get cold. 
The plausibility of this interpretation of assertion can be supported by a 
phrase from Heidegger: ‘What is expressed becomes, as it were, something 
ready-to-hand within-the-world which can be taken up and spoken again’ 
(Heidegger, 1927/2008: 266). Elaborating on this statement Brandom adds 
that ‘(A)asserting … has the significance of issuing a re-assertion licence to 
other community members. The assertion is produced as something usable 
by others’ (Brandom, 1992: 57). Thus, whatever is said / asserted in the 
Museum about the artefacts, can be seen as a specific kind of ready-to-hand, 
which appropriated the features of equipment and is available for use by 
others. 
This conclusion can have far-reaching consequences for this study. We can 
ask ourselves to which extent our assertions about equipment shape human 
communities. Or, since one of the functions of assertion is to facilitate 
communication, we can assess whether they play any role at all in ‘social 
preservation’, and then in a broader sense investigate whether they in any 
way refer to the social character of memory. 
We shall leave the last hypothesis for now and return to it when remembering 
processes are analysed. Another supposition takes us relatively far away from 
the goals of this study. To narrow it down somewhat let ask ourselves how the 
assertions about the old-fashioned objects from the display shape that temporal 
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community of the Museum? To interpret assertion as something that belongs 
to the community as soon as it is uttered seems to be a daring statement, even 
if we can still effortlessly track it down to its referential point. As Brandom 
states, ‘[T]the referentiality of the relation to the original piece of equipment 
is inherited by assertions about the object discovered in it’ (Brandom, 1992: 
60). What we should not forget is that the assertions we are addressing here 
are about something familiar, well-known but all the same sometimes long-
forgotten by most of the visitors. Visitors (and I am talking here about the 
target-group of this study: the elderly) are a community a priori, even before 
they have come to visit the Museum, since they belong to the same generation 
and have a collectively shared past. Thus, when they recognise things, objects, 
artefacts in the collection of the Museum they are already socially deeply 
engaged with each other through, because and thanks to those things.  
One terminological remark must perhaps be added here. As already 
mentioned elsewhere when speaking about the materiality of the Museum, 
we have used various notions to designate its constituents, like things, objects 
and artefacts. In this paragraph we added the term equipment. Generally 
speaking, the fundamental conceptual distinction between all those terms is 
based on the interpretations that we find in Heidegger’s works. Objects and 
artefacts are used as synonyms. They are present-at-hand; they remain within 
the focus of the description, but are directly and figuratively removed from 
their own being and then turned into targets of a scientific investigation. 
Equipment is what objects used to be, i.e. ready-to-hand. The equipmental 
character of the Museum objects is in fact quite intriguing, which according 
to our supposition has not totally disappeared. Thus, it would be a 
challenging task to find out what happens with the residues of usefulness 
and functionality of ex-equipment. Thing is the most difficult term to define. 
We have already shown how the semantics of gathering, which Heidegger 
discovers through the etymological analysis of the word thing, is manifested 
and realized in the arranging process. Heidegger also repeatedly comes back 
to the definition of things in his search for its thingness or the way it things 
(Heidegger, 1951/1971: 172), i.e. reveals or unconceals itself.
In spite of the distinctive differences, one thing must remain clear. There is no 
clear-cut division between those terms, since there are no pure things, objects or 
equipment in the world. As a result we cannot speak about a pure topography 
of materiality or things, either. Heidegger explains that ‘an independent, self-
supporting thing may become an object if we place it before us, whether in 
immediate perception or by bringing it to mind in a recollective re-presentation’ 
(Heidegger, 1951/1971: 165). That is exactly what we did first, when, talking 
about the topography of the Museum and its materiality, we described the 
placing of things within the Museum space. Then, while still closely looking 
at the empirical setting, we were confronted with at least two ‘complications’. 
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Firstly, materiality turned out to be inseparably connected with sociality. 
Secondly, it appeared that things were subject to change and becoming, and 
their topography dissolved easily into various trajectories and movements. 
Both thoughts disturbed the topographic description and made us search for 
a more sophisticated explanation of the role that materiality and things play 
in interaction with visitors and in shaping the multidimensional space of the 
Museum. When, in order to answer those questions, we left the empirical setting 
and turned to philosophical interpretations of the relations between things and 
people, we consciously left the topographic and social dimensions behind and 
submerged into what can be called a topological interpretation of things.  
A topological understanding of materiality and things does not allow for 
subdivisions, but on the contrary brings and folds together the terms and the 
processes, which at the level of topography can coexist but can never merge. 
Only by matching our empirical setting with the philosophical categories ready-
to-hand and present-at-hand and by defining their interrelations with Dasein, 
did we come closer to understanding how the being of things (and broader, 
materiality) simultaneously reveals itself as equipment, as an object, as a 
gathering, as becoming and even as an assertion. The term topology emphasises 
here that any identification of a thing with one of those possible representations 
conceals the complex essence of its being. To make that idea clear, let us for a 
moment return to our example with the old-fashioned sideboard24. 
The topographic description of the piece, which was placed in the ‘sitting room’ 
of the Museum, with the picture of four girls placed on top of it, gave rise to a 
kind of ‘objectified’ response of the visitors who recognised it and placed its 
origin within the right period of time and within the location where they had 
seen a similar piece of furniture before. As an object of the display, the sideboard 
could also be seen as performing an equipmental role in regard to the picture, 
which was placed on top. Sideboards are often used for these kinds of purposes. 
The post-war story told by the curator of the Museum, i.e. the real story of 
that particular sideboard, added a strong social element to the topographic 
description. The sideboard appeared to have the capacity to gather stories and 
at the same time to have its own personal history. It also appeared to have a 
propensity towards change. We could have stopped at that point of the analysis 
and said that that social topographic analysis gives us a clear image of how 
old-fashioned things stimulate remembering and narratives on the part of the 
visitors.  What we would not be able to see though is how things are not objects 
and how they in their being and becoming are able to tell their stories as well. The 
sideboard with the picture on top was telling its story from the very beginning: 
its dignified surface did not quite match the quality of its functions and the 
photo on top did not need to be a copy of a picture, since the Museum has a 
24   See description on pp. 71-73. 
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lot of original photos. Unless of course there were reasons for the ‘mismatches’, 
and indeed there were several. Unconcealment of an object occurs only when we 
can see the piece as all-in-one, with all its components coming forth and telling 
us the story which, when artificially divided, slides along its worn out surface 
without touching the truth of its being. 
The question that arises here is why it is so important to not only see, but also 
hear and understand the things that are displayed in the Museum. The answer to 
that lies in the fact that the exhibits are not there on their own, but actively and 
collectively shape and change the space that they occupy. Things can perform 
a universally binding role. Heidegger tells us that things do not just come to 
a ready-made location, but being gatherings, they are locations themselves. 
According to him, locations come into existence only by virtue of things. Thus, 
things can gather various interrelated elements and allow for locations. The 
‘located’ thing in turn provides a place, or even places (Heidegger, 1951/1971:152). 
Somewhere in-between and as it were on the move, the main theme of the 
Museum space starts to emerge. The process of localisation is a decisive stage in 
the transformation of a space into a place. This is when placing25 takes place. It is 
probably a moment for the celebration of materiality. The things almost seem to 
become proactive, by influencing the space they occupy. The happening as such 
is not momentous; it is the process of becoming, where everything is shifting. 
The initial simple mapping fades away; the linear space acquires substance; and 
different trajectories merge, creating folds and new openings. We shall now gain 
access to this challenging live space.
25   For more on the concept of placing see in Hetherington (1997c).
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topology of the MuseuM space: unfolDing
Narrative(-s) of the Museum space
When some time ago a group of people, who were involved in a different re-
search project, came to visit the Museum to make the tour, which by then had 
already become traditional for the guests of Humanitas, one of them exclai-
med O, I am at home! in the doorway. And he laughed. I also laughed, but for a 
different reason. I recognised the words and the happy surprise the man had 
expressed so naturally. It often happens that the first spontaneous reaction of 
recognition is accompanied by words my home, my house, my place. The surpri-
sing ease with which visitors attribute the word home to the entire exhibition 
can be better understood if we try and ‘read’ the space of the Museum as sug-
gested in the already cited quote from Hetherington (1997a: 200)26.
The discursive space of the Museum does not have one narrative that you 
can follow from one room to another. There is no explanatory message or 
even a sign in the Museum that can be used as an anchor to tell a half-hidden 
story. This clear lack of directives could be seen as a post-modern, challenging 
and interactive manner in which to present the collection, but this is not the 
case for the Reminiscence Museum. The question then arises whether there is 
one single or at least a dominant narrative at the Museum, or whether there 
are perhaps independent narratives in each room, which as a whole form an 
unusual fractured discourse? In one of their works Law & Mol introduced the 
patchwork metaphor that can be useful here. The strategy that is applied to 
the Museum can be understood as a ‘narrative method for pulling material 
differences together into a single kind of story’ (Law & Mol, 1995: 287). Still, 
the ‘differences’ that were placed together cannot simply be seen as perfectly 
fitting pieces of a puzzle. Most links that were made between the various 
pieces of the Museum display can better be seen as ‘partial connections’. 
Those connections do fit together but they are not predetermined and are not 
exhaustive; there is a potential multiplicity of links. At the same time, when 
sewing the pieces together one must trust their compatibility, even if their 
togetherness seems bizarre at first sight. This is the way materiality takes its 
place in the world of relations and introduces possible methods how to read it.
As we have already seen, the space of the Museum is extremely heterogeneous. 
The sequence of the rooms certainly does not sustain the logic of a one-
narrative version. The barn, which is situated next to the baby room, leads 
to an interruption of the narrative, not to its continuation. The study and 
26   See p. 64.
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the sewing corner, which are located in the same room, are separated by a 
showcase that displays coins, cigar bands, sewing accessories and even some 
pieces of jewellery, all at the 
same time. Not to mention 
the big showcase, placed 
against the other wall of the 
same room, where a large 
collection of photo cameras 
and other photo accessories 
are displayed. The photo 
‘narrative’ does not restrict 
itself to the showcase 
and has a supplement in 
the form of a table with a 
developer and a couple of 
photo albums on it, placed 
in the last free corner of the 
room. Based only on this 
description, which is far 
from being complete, we 
can easily define at least four 
or five narratives that can 
be told separately, while the 
visitors remain in the same 
room. The discursive space 
of the Museum, if we are to 
define one, reminds us of a 
pile of old photos. You pick 
up one and if you recognise 
the image then you can tell the story behind it. When you have finished with 
that, the picture goes back to the pile and you can choose another one and 
start all over again. 
What we just put forward means that in fact the discursive space of the 
Museum is even more heterogeneous than its material side. It is highly 
discontinuous, unpredictable and finally, it is perpetually illusive and 
changeable, since it can only become alive through the narratives told by the 
visitors. But as soon as the visitor is gone, his or her narrative disappears as 
well, in order to make room for the next, which we don’t as yet know. If it 
is true and the Museum does not have its intended narrative, but dozens of 
small ones scattered all over the place, then we must ask ourselves why this 
place still makes any sense.
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There is at least one theme that prevents the discursive space of the Museum 
from falling apart. That is the theme of domesticity. The Museum reconstructs 
a site that to a large extent has disappeared from everyday life quite a 
while ago already. The presentation of the artefacts aims at the collectively 
shared images of household life as it used to be and in the first place emits 
an atmosphere of domesticity. To try and define the main narrative of the 
Museum is the same as trying to define the feeling of being at home. Let us 
look just at one of such definitions:
‘Home’ is where we belong. It is in our experience, recollections, imagination, and 
aspirations. Home provides the physical and social context of life experience, burrows 
itself into the material reality of memories, and provides an axial core for our imaginations 
(Chaudhury & Rowles, 2005: 3).
This definition reflects the main component of the notion ‘home’. In spite of 
the level of abstraction that every categorisation involves, the importance of 
the specific and the personal is made very clear here. To be more precise I would 
like to make a distinction between the concepts of domesticity and feeling 
at home. The function of the material space of the Museum is primarily to 
project the sphere of domesticity, which is reconstructed through the use of 
all kinds of objects that were present in almost each Dutch household during 
the past century, but are now considered more or less obsolete. The idea of 
domestic life is usually also garlanded with an idealistic image of the pre-
emancipated perfect housewife, the mother of the household. It is therefore 
no surprise that the Museum display has a strong feminine bias, apart from 
just two rooms that the male visitors usually recognize as their own domain, 
namely the barn and the study.  
The feeling of being at home is derived from the complex discursive space 
of the Museum with its dispersed narratives. If we look at the investigations 
into the feeling of being at home, then they show that it is connected with 
various ‘dimensions of the experience: safety, rootedness, harmony, joy, 
privacy, togetherness, recognition, order, control, possession, nourishment, 
initiative, power, freedom’ (Zingmark et al., 1995: 47). These dimensions 
are very broad and at the same time highly valued. However, the list is 
not exhaustive for the categorical notion of feeling at home, which is also 
relational in its manifestation: 
The sense of being related was found to be a common condition of the experience of 
being at home, i.e., related to significant others, significant things, significant places, 
significant activities, oneself, and transcendence (Zingmark et al., 1995: 47). 
The materiality of the Museum cannot provide a narrative that is sufficiently 
rich and layered to reflect all those dimensions and relations. The tension 
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between the tendency and the capacity of the space cannot be easily bridged. 
It would take a visitor to write down the discursive part of the space, but 
this process can never be totally controlled. So in fact the discursive space of 
the Museum remains open-ended. It changes continuously, but can be never 
completed as long as the materiality of the Museum exists. The Museum 
provides the necessary tools to reconstruct images and to relive feelings. But 
its narrative is not homogeneous and it is not told solely by the Museum. 
Where the Museum space supplies the visitors with the necessary and often 
rather trivial building blocks in the form of outdated domestic objects, the 
memories and the feelings of the people shape the experience and produce 
the narrative, which is each time more or less standard as far as the general 
outlines are concerned, but quite unique in the details that it contains. The 
narratives refer to the material and discursive space of the Museum. As a 
result, the already irregular spatial parts of the Museum shift again. The 
anomalies appear, such as folds and blank spots (Hetherington, 1997a), 
making the already heterogeneous space even more complex. To understand 
the performance of the Museum space at this level we shall look at it from a 
different angle.
 The Museum’s folds
In his elaboration of museum topology Hetherington reflects on various types 
of spatial organisation in relation to the generally accepted aims of museums. 
He calls conventional museums ‘heterogeneous classifying machines’, which 
‘are about the performance of homogeneity; any heterogeneity that raises its 
head is generally either removed or subject to some form of control’ (1997a: 
215). Based on this definition and the description of the Museum that was 
presented so far, two straightforward conclusions are possible. Either we 
have not seen how control is executed over the Reminiscence Museum, or 
we are talking about a non-museum here27. Understanding the topology of 
the Museum can provide us with an answer or at least suggest another way 
to look at the performance of this space. In order to determine the topological 
organisation, Hetherington postulates the following: 
Topological space is not subject to the same sort code as a geometrical space that has fixed 
dimensions, lines and angles. Neither does it have a clear narrative nor does it allow 
discourses to be performed through narratives without at the same time questioning 
them (1997a: 215). 
27   A more elaborated discussion on the applicability of the term museum to the Reminiscence 
Museum will be given in the chapter ‘Remembering’.
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A topological analysis then is the best approach applicable at the points where 
irregularities or distortions occur. There is for example a remarkable difference 
between the way the topographical space at Humanitas leads the visitor to the 
Museum and the way the space of the Museum itself allows the visitors to decide 
freely in which order they will visit the various rooms. When visitors enter the 
Museum they usually experience a moment of blankness, in spite of the fact 
that they are normally speaking already informed about the general context 
of the exhibition. There are three possible directions they can take, but all the 
same most visitors stand still for a moment as if disoriented, as if they have 
reached a dead end. That point could be called the point of naturally intended 
disorientation, where the entourage of the entrance room plays a crucial role. 
That room is difficult to name or describe. Its large square space looks extremely 
variegated and the artefacts it contains are varied. There are a number of motor 
bikes, hats, walking sticks and magic lanterns on display. There is also one of the 
first television sets, a couple 
of mandolins, a foot rest, a 
dining room table with chairs 
around it, a hallstand, a long 
showcase with all kinds of 
technical objects in it, a bike 
dating back to World War II 
and a mannequin in a beautiful 
summer outfit. One of the walls 
represents the shop-window of 
a grocery store, where dozens of 
tins and boxes with household 
goods are exhibited. A peculiar 
cactus plant, which is more 
than 25 years old, is placed in 
that room as well; and I am still 
not even close to completing the 
list of objects that welcome the 
visitors in the entrance room 
alone. Although I have been 
there regularly, I nevertheless 
often still come across objects 
there that I have not noticed 
before. The abundance and 
variety of the objects on display 
is in one word overwhelming28.
28   The entourage of the entrance room has been slightly changed since that description has 
been made.
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 The entrance room tells us stories about nothing in particular and about 
everything at the same time. The sheer abundance of objects creates a point 
of blankness within the visitors’ minds comparable to when we are blinded 
for a moment after having looked straight into the sun. That feeling can be 
also compared with a sudden silence in a crowded place. This deformation 
of the space, the so-called fold of the space, has at the same time an important 
function. As Hetherington put it:
The fold weakens the fabric of the space allowing new, yet unfixed and more partial, 
perspectives to come in view (1997a: 214).
It seems strange to create such a confusing point precisely at the beginning of 
the exhibition, where the visitor is automatically looking for some guidance. 
This can be better understood if we look back and consider the role of the 
Museum in the context of the space at Humanitas. The discursive space of 
the Museum starts making sense when we place it into the wider discourse 
of the Humanitas organisation. The entrance room of the Museum, which 
only formally speaking boarders on the physical space of the Museum, is in 
fact a logical continuation of the narratives that are told within Humanitas. 
 
One of the unexpected perspectives that the Museum offers is the room for 
remembering that is created by the way in which the collection is arranged. 
Since only a very general idea of domesticity can be determined as a thematic 
basis of the exhibition, there are a lot of openings for the visitors to create 
their own narratives. It starts immediately in the entrance room, where 
everybody chooses not only the direction of the tour, but in particular what 
he or she wants to see. So in fact the space fold in the entrance room does not 
lead to a total standstill but allows for a new dimension of understanding 
the function that the collection can play. The way to deal with this fold of the 
Museum is to highlight an object and to tell about it within or outside the 
general context of the display. 
Folds of this kind are spread 
all over the Museum space. 
Here and there, objects of a 
distant or recent domestic 
life are piled up in great 
numbers. And as soon as the 
numbers are not conceivable 
any more, the fold appears 
in all its unpredictability and 
intriguing power. One of the 
most interesting influences 
that the folds provide for the 
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Museum is the power of absence. Among the dozens of cigar boxes, there must be 
the one that grandfather used to have. And if it is not there, the excitement caused 
by its absence seems to be even stronger than the joy experienced because of the 
one that was found. To explain this power we can borrow Bergson’s method for 
a philosophical critique of negation: the absence of something is already more 
than the presence, because it assumes the presence of something in the first 
place, it adds the absence to it and it becomes enriched by the expectation of 
the presence and the final disappointment or relief. Thus, the power of absence 
caused by such a fold is experienced quite intensively by Museum visitors. 
 
The objects that have not attracted attention in first instance form a blank spot 
and in this sense give some room to remember things that have been identified. 
If the visitor recognises and absorbs everything that is on display, she or he 
will probably be suffocated by the constant stream of the reminiscences and 
narratives that they evoke, just like Funes the Memorious, the famous hero of 
Jorge Luis Borges. To put it differently, the classifying work that is usually 
done by museums is delegated to the visitors of the Reminiscence Museum. 
Further down we shall see that even at the spots where the Museum seemingly 
executes a regular classifying function, folded spaces can appear just as easily. 
Using the terminology of M. Doel, the material space of the Museum is 
not flat, ‘but like ‘scrumpled geography’ that has no distinct direction or 
centre’ (Hetherington, 1997a: 214). The collections and the separate artefacts 
alternate with each other and the sequence of the alternation is not fixed. 
As a ‘classifying machine’, the Museum presents the objects on a varying 
scale, e.g. from three built-in kitchens to all kinds of domestic equipment, 
including washing machines, irons and coffee-grinders.
In my opinion, the kitchen at the Museum is one of the most interesting places, 
considering its multilevel topological structure. It does not contain a starting 
point. The three built-in kitchens can be looked at in any sequence the visitor 
chooses. In order to see each of them you simply have to complete a circle. 
One of the explanations for that can be the fact that the Museum has nothing 
to do with a chronological discourse. That is why a lineal way of looking at the 
exhibition would not make any sense. But a circle movement does not provide 
a comprehensive understanding of the exhibition either. Each single kitchen is 
a heterogeneous space by itself. The core is formed by the kitchen sink. Further 
down there are various sets of kitchen equipment and utensils, including stoves 
and pans. Behind each curtain and each cupboard door the visitor can find new 
objects. They are not just placed there to be exhibited. They are made to belong 
to the place where they are. In other words, the pans are neatly placed on the 
shelves, as they used to be, while ‘unattractive’ cleaning utensils such as soaps 
and a broom are hidden behind the curtain. Each drawer contains kitchen utensils 
and cutlery. The expectation that at least a part of the exhibition turns out to be 
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fake or empty fails each time when the visitor thinks that he has reached the 
point where the Museum space ends. The exhibition leads the visitors on. One 
could even suggest that there is a control element in the way the space of the 
Museum is organised. At the same time there is no culmination or a final point 
where it comes to an end. The infiniteness of the movement and the absence of a 
destination render the space of the Museum quite turbulent at all possible levels. 
The narratives that appear in front of one of the artefacts will almost immediately 
be overridden or erased as soon as the attention is focused on the next one.
 
What we have seen so far doesn’t provide an answer to the question how such a 
heterogeneous space can be experienced as an entity? And why is the impact on 
its visitors so strong? 
The Museum is called the Reminiscence Museum. If reminiscence is the most 
important ‘artefact’ that the Museum space intends to expose then it clearly 
has a problem with materiality. At the same time, the question can be asked 
what all those old-fashioned things are for. Apparently they are just a means 
to unlock a remembering process. Reminiscences cannot be kept under lock 
and key. They are evasive and transient by nature, which would seem to make 
them inappropriate for museum cabinets. And yet the message that the Museum 
sends is not delusive. The majority of the visitors are more than satisfied with 
what they have seen and experienced in the Museum. So the topological space 
of the Museum is held together and also given meaning by something else. Or 
by somebody else. 
Figuratively speaking there is one last display in the Museum, which is even 
more difficult to describe than anything we have mentioned before. It is 
as obvious as could be, but it is also constantly changing and moving. You 
cannot miss it, because it binds the space of the Museum in its totality and 
gives sense to it. When the Museum is closed, the display is empty. When it 
is open, every visitor takes his or her place there. Neither the visitor, nor his 
or her reminiscences belong to the Museum, but without them, the Museum 
will not work. The visitors of the Museum themselves, with their constantly 
unfolding and overlapping narratives, are the most remarkable sites on the 
map of the Reminiscence Museum. The relations that occur as a result of the 
interaction between the visitor and the Museum have to do with the main 
theme of the Museum exhibition, which we shall look at in more detail now. 
Between house, home and space of the Museum
The description of the various material and social dimensions of the Museum 
space has shown that as a physical, social and organisational entity the 
Museum does not fall apart, because ultimately it are the visitors who give it 
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a meaning or at least let the space reveal its implicit tendency or order. It goes 
without saying that not every space possesses such a potential. Normally the 
issue of ordering presents itself in all its powerful aversion towards disorder 
and discrepancies. We can agree that regardless of the specific grounds, 
ordering requires some basic homogeneity of supposedly disordered 
elements. The entire development around the idea of the Museum could be 
characterized as anything but homogeneous. Nursing homes do not found 
museums, museums are not placed in the basements of care institutions and 
museum collections are not composed of discarded domestic objects. Usually. 
But breaking conventional rules is not something that Humanitas has shied 
away from before. In this case, instead of introducing order into the Museum 
space, order was given the opportunity to introduce itself. 
Practically all the objects that were collected and placed in the Museum 
were at some stage attributes of domestic life. Their intrinsic functionality is 
directly projected into the space. The idea of ordering the things within the 
frame of domestic life appeared in such a natural way that it could be called 
self-evolving. Yet, the actual arranging and placing of the objects that took 
place afterwards was the result of complex relations that found their origin 
in the materiality of the Museum, but cannot be attributed to that alone. The 
relational aspect of the spatial ordering of the Museum is fed on the idea of 
domestic life and the tendency to preserve a status quo. 
A relevant question would be at this point: what it is precisely about the 
Museum space that makes it so recognisable to all kinds of people and 
especially for the older generation? The rigidity of this question is caused 
by the hidden presupposition that the Museum environment has been fixed 
and become static from the moment it was opened. This supposition is not 
only in contradiction with the way the Museum was set up and has evolved, 
but will challenge our basic understanding of the spatial processes in terms 
of becoming as well. Let us therefore turn the question around and present it 
in a different manner. What do the visitors see in the exhibition that triggers 
recognition powerfully enough to allow their identification with a basically 
unknown place? The reformulation of the question shifts the emphasis, but 
it does not mean that our attention is now exclusively riveted to the acting 
person, whereby the environment will be given a more or less decorative or 
instrumental function. If this were the case, then the Museum exhibition and 
its intrinsic dynamics would become a perpetual self-indulging non-entity, 
while the visitor would stay on the other side of the protecting glass of the 
showcase, politely scanning and deleting the surfaces of the objects, which 
would hardly penetrate his or her world of personal experience. 
Fortunately, this does not happen. The exhibition and the visitor approximate 
each other by means of giving/supplying and taking/accepting, but this 
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proximity will never become a match or a closure. It is more like a teasing 
horizon that is there, but unreachable at the same time. A visitor looks 
at things, recognises some of them, feels confident, then notices some 
differences, then doubts whether the things are really the same, then rejects 
them, then cannot find what he is looking for, then finds other matches, feels 
confident about something else and so forth. Standing next to the visitor 
one can almost literally feel how the physical environment adjusts itself 
each time an adjustment is made to the story. First, you find yourself in the 
parents’ house of the visitor, but the next moment it is the house of his / 
her aunt; then you are suddenly invited into his /her first house, or back 
to the house of the visitor’s grandmother. The fluidity of the experience is 
striking. Each closure leads to an opening in two respects, in respect of the 
exhibition and in respect of the visitor’s identification with it. The interactive 
dynamics of the Museum and its visitors are rooted somewhere (in-)between 
the interior of a private house that the Museum reproduces and the feeling of 
home that the visitor involuntarily experiences when entering the Museum. 
Two questions can be asked here: what turns a place into a house and what 
makes us feel at home somewhere. Comprehensive answers to these questions 
would probably require a number of studies. So let us agree to simply look 
for certain constituents of the notions of house and home in the framework 
of our project.
In 1925 Maurice Halbwachs published The Social Frameworks of Memory, an 
interesting and inspiring work on social / collective memory that I shall refer 
to repeatedly in the next chapter. What interests us now is how Halbwachs 
describes the notions of family memory and its connection to the idea of home. 
We have seen that the Museum is built around the idea of home, family life 
and domesticity. It appeals to the framework of domestic memory as soon as 
the visitor recognizes the details of the entourage. Halbwachs defines the role 
of the family by referring to the old Greek and Roman traditions, where on 
the one hand the role of the family ‘was not distinguished from the religious 
group, and on the other hand, being rooted in the soil, it was fused with 
house and land’ (1925/1992: 63). Halbwachs draws on the remarkable work 
of Fustel de Coulanges called Ancient City (1864/2001), where unbreakable 
bonds between the notions of family, house (hearth) and land are identified. 
The hearth is called one of the altars of the house:
This altar is the symbol of a sedentary life … It must be placed upon the ground; once 
established, it cannot be moved … When they establish the hearth, it is with the thought 
and hope that it will always remain in the same spot … And the family, which through 
duty and religion remains grouped around its altar, is as much fixed to the soil as the 
altar itself. The idea of domicile follows naturally. The family is attached to the altar, the 
altar is attached to the soil; an intimate relation, therefore, is established between the soil 
and the family (Fustel de Coulanges, 1864/2001: 48).
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De Coulanges develops the idea of sacredness of the hearth, which ‘must 
be isolated – that is to say, completely separated from all that is not of itself; 
the stranger must not approach it at the moment when ceremonies of the 
worship are performed, or even be in sight of it’ (1846/2001: 48-49): 
It is for this reason that these gods are called the concealed gods, or the interior gods, 
Penates. In order that this religious rule may be well observed, there must be an enclosure 
around this hearth at a certain distance. It did not matter whether this enclosure was a 
hedge, a wall of wood, or one of stone. Whatever it was, it marked the limit which 
separated the domain of one sacred fire from that of another. This enclosure was deemed 
sacred. It was an impious act to pass it (1846/2001: 49).
One remark is required here, before we can continue and think about the 
implications of the texts we quoted for our study. In his pursuit of revealing 
the role of religion in the political and social development of ancient societies, 
de Coulanges is primarily interested in the origin of the right of property. His 
understanding of the emergence of this institution allows for one more quote:
There are three things which, from the most ancient times, we find founded and solidly 
established in these Greek and Italian societies: the domestic religion; the family; and 
the right of property — three things which had in the beginning a manifest relation, 
and which appear to have been inseparable. The idea of private property existed in the 
religion itself. Every family had its hearth and its ancestors. These gods could be adored 
only by this family, and protected it alone. They were its property (1846/2001: 48). 
In spite of the centuries that separate us from the practices that are described, 
the understanding of the house and its sanctity still resonates in the views 
and beliefs of modern society. Yet it would be an exaggeration to presume 
that there have been no serious shifts in the ideas about home and domestic 
life. Obviously, we are not talking about external stylistic adjustments. We 
shall look at those shifts in a minute, but first it would seem useful to outline 
the main pattern of those changes. 
In the understanding of ancient societies, home was an integral entity. Using 
modern language, it was four-in-one: soil, dwelling, family and religion. Solid 
as a rock that cannot be split, this concept fed the feeling of stability and gave 
confidence in the future. The home was guarded and had clear-cut frontiers. 
A quick comparison with our contemporary situation shows considerable 
changes in the structure of the concept. Some of the components, like soil 
and religion, have either disappeared altogether or have undergone vital 
changes. Others, like dwelling and family, have acquired new interpretations 
and have lost the stiffness of non-ambiguity. The most basic change is 
perhaps that home and house are not the same thing anymore. Like a rock can 
be converted into sand by time and nature, the once solid and unchangeable 
idea of home has nevertheless become fluid over time. 
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The three passages that were quoted provide us with sufficient material to 
illustrate those changes and to make at least three projections into modern 
day life. Home was and still is about values, about belonging and about 
boundaries.
The welcoming warmth of the hearth provides a telling image for the 
description of what one can associate with home values in both the material 
and the spiritual sense of the word. It is accompanied by a feeling of stability 
through the permanence of the settlement as well as by the responsibility 
to keep the fire burning and to preserve it for the generations to come. The 
reciprocal relations of give and take we have seen before in the Museum 
are noticeable here as well: the hearth provides shelter and comfort and 
simultaneously asks for protection and care. At the same time one cannot fail 
to notice that the firmness of these values has been shaken. By that I would 
not want to say that values regarding home have become non-existent in 
our present day society, but they have acquired a certain mobility; they can 
no longer be considered to be fixed and permanent. Nowadays each new 
generation does not feel the obligation to act in the same way their parents 
and grandparents did, without facing public condemnation or expulsion. 
Also the houses we live in have lost their geographical and material 
emplacement and rootedness. Nowadays houses are often built on neutral 
land, which makes it easy to tear them down and to build new ones. Besides, 
people are much more on the move. Listening to the stories of the Museum 
visitors, one can frequently hear a pattern of at least several major moves in 
their lives. The most common one is from the parental house into one’s own 
place, and finally from one’s latest (second, third …) house into a service flat 
or a special institution29. Moving has become an intrinsic feature of our lives. 
Material values however resist movement and displacement (Marcoux, 
2001). As a result a certain tension occurs between the fluidity of our homes 
and the weight of its values. That tension is the price we pay for giving up 
the immobility of the hearth. All the same this does not stop us from placing 
our values into removal boxes along with some valuables as we set off for 
a new place, ‘because while these possessions move in relation to a place, 
they may represent stability in relation to the people’ (Marcoux, 2001: 71). 
The movement we are making is a kind of surging between what we are and 
what we are becoming. And our boxes with (values and) valuables serve as 
guiding ground lights, while we are hovering in the air. 
The self-identification that permanent settlement used to instil in people’s 
lives was based on two principles. On the one hand, there was an almost 
unbreakable connection with the soil upon which the hearth was placed. 
29   I don’t consider here the younger generation, that by the age of 30 often already moved half 
a dozen times, or those who have stayed in the same house all their lives.
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On the other hand, there were gods / ancestors who were inalienable from 
both house and family. These two principles preclude direct translation into 
the reality of our present day lives; in fact they would become definitely 
problematic in multi-storeyed apartment buildings with central heating 
systems. Identification with the place that we call home is however undeniably 
present in our age as well. What has taken the place of hearth and soil can 
probably be called home possessions. These should be understood in the 
sense of cherished belongings and not as objectives for consumer behaviour. 
Belonging is bilateral. Not only do certain things make us comfortable and 
give us the feeling of home, i.e. understanding where we belong, but we 
ourselves long to find a reflection of our identity in the things that surround 
us and give us a sense of warmth and stability, just like hearth and soil used 
to do for our ancestors. 
Another principle of identification with home, namely gods and/or ancestors, 
has a direct link with what we could call family history, which is transmitted 
in family memories. Those gods were sacred as well as family memories 
often still are. In those memories, there is a source for our understanding 
who we are and where we belong. Halbwachs makes that point very clearly 
when he writes:
What would happen if all the members of my family disappeared? I would maintain 
for some time the habit of attributing a meaning to their first names. In fact, if a group 
has affected us with its influence for a period of time we become so saturated that if we 
find ourselves alone, we act and think as if we were still living under the pressure of the 
group (Halbwachs, 1925/1992: 73). 
Therefore two types of belonging are at work here to feed our identities 
through identification with our home: belongings and belonging to. But both 
types are not as stable as they were in former days. As we have already 
seen, our possessions are on the move almost just as much as people are. 
And even the place that we think we belong to, namely the ‘place myth’ of 
home (Munro, 1998: 211), looks like a product of our imagination shaped by 
the social and cultural frameworks we move in. Hetherington’s disclosure 
seems quite characteristic:
There’s no place like home. Home in western cultures is the quintessential basis for 
the idea of place as individually and socially meaningful. Home implies not only a 
particular familiar site in which we dwell and live out our everyday lives, it also implies 
more broadly a sense of belonging, security and identity that adds to our understanding 
of ourselves. Belonging is its utopic. The very idea of a centred subject – essential and 
unique within every individual – implies this sense of belonging and nurturing to be 
found in the utopic that is given the name of home (1997c: 192). 
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Through the interpretation of belonging, the idea of home has therefore 
become more than mobile. It is even called utopic here, which makes me 
wonder whether it has any conceptual materiality in it at all. Looking at home 
from the point of view of identity and belonging does not resolve the tension 
we have already mentioned before. Not only can possessions not anchor 
us anymore, also the essential understanding of who we are has become 
so fundamentally fluid, that only the movement itself can still be helpful 
in grasping the answers about belonging and being. The idea of belonging 
however does not include self-denial or self-oblivion. On the contrary, it 
makes us realise that within the complexity of relations and movements each 
individual is unique, and also that each house where he or she belongs is his 
or her sacred territory, which should be protected with the help of material 
and/or spiritual boundaries. This sounds like a paradox and it probably 
would have been contradictory if we were to see the boundaries as inviolable 
tight lines. But this is surely not what I am aiming at. 
 
As we have seen in the description of home in ancient societies, boundaries 
were considered to be necessary attributes of every recognised abode, but they 
were also considered to be private and inviolable. This notion of home that must 
be protected by its boundaries is perhaps the most promising starting point 
to understand the ways in which visitors adopt the Museum as a homelike 
environment. Following the logic of mundane life, we can easily recognise the 
idea of a domestic enclosure in our own habits. Even where walls and hedges 
are taken away and religious beliefs no longer prevent people from trespassing 
on one’s territory, we still stay keenly alert on guarding our own domain and 
respecting that of others. The notion of boundaries is an inseparable part of 
our understanding of an abode. Even if they are not physically present, they 
are still rooted in the unbreakable social code. 
If the concept of home is attached to the notion of boundaries and ‘boarders, 
that separate domestic groups’ (Halbwachs, 1925/1992: 65) as well as to 
the idea of belonging to a certain place / piece of land, then the visitors 
of the Museum must be experiencing a confusing feeling. That feeling is 
caused by two mismatches. The boundaries of an abode are supposed to 
be clear; the dwelling must be enclosed. Indeed the interior of the Museum 
looks like that of a house, but there is no enclosure there. A home always 
belongs to somebody, but the Museum is lost somewhere between nobody’s 
and everybody’s place. The transformation of an amorphous space into a 
crowded place and subsequently into home-like surroundings, did not take 
place in the form of a linear or foreclosed process. From the innumerable 
hypothetical possibilities just one seemed to be dominant from the very start 
of the project. Looking at the Museum as it is now, we find it natural that its 
display has acquired the form of a house. And that is the reason why visitors 
appreciate the collection so much. The question which still remains open is 
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why the Museum acquired the shape of a house. In other words, it would be 
justified to question the naturalness of this development and find out what 
it is actually based on. 
From clearing-away to dwelling
Let us have one more quick look at the process of becoming, which has 
transformed the basement of Humanitas into a lively space: the Reminiscence 
Museum, which has acquired the appearance of a home. The idea to found 
the Museum was followed by the decision to clear a couple of rooms in the 
basement, in order to give a place to the artefacts that were being gathered. 
The old-fashioned things that were then collected and stored in the basement 
appeared to have the power of influencing the space, as a result of which 
the rooms acquired the shape of a home. When the visitors came to see the 
exhibition the Museum turned into a multidimensional social gathering 
space that attracted a multitude of narratives and acquired an intricate 
topological organisation, which till now remains subject to constant change. 
One theme however has held the space together from the very beginning, 
namely the theme of domestic life. The identification of the Museum displays 
with home, which the visitors persistently express, forms the basis of the 
topographic, discursive and topological unfolding of that space. 
We should look more closely at one phase in that non-linear process of 
becoming, which will help us to understand why the Museum has acquired 
its current shape. Topographically speaking, clearing a space in order to allow 
for the future museum was just a technical question of moving away some 
objects and painting a couple of walls. But we have already seen that in order 
to understand the processes that underlie the topographic placing we have to 
look somewhere else for the reasoning that lie behind them. The etymological 
insight that Heidegger provides of the word space in his lecture Art and Space 
(Heidegger, 1973), can be enlightening here. Heidegger filters the meaning of 
clearing-away and freeing from wilderness:
Clearing-away brings forth the free, the openness for man’s settling and dwelling. 
When thought in its own special character, clearing-away is the release of places toward 
which the fate of dwelling man turns in the preserve of the home or in the brokenness 
of homelessness or in complete indifference to the two … Clearing-away brings forth 
locality preparing for dwelling … Clearing-away is release of places (1973: 5).
In one single paragraph and as if it were without any effort, the notions of 
space, place and home are brought together. But the simplicity is deceptive. This 
way of thinking is deeply rooted in his later works, where the Heidegger-
philosopher and the Heidegger-romantic conduct a passionate dialogue 
about art, truth, dwelling and being (Shaver, 1973). Within the context of 
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our project Heidegger’s interpretation of space and dwelling are truly 
invaluable. Especially in the context of the Museum project, clearing away 
introduces the question what for? and along with it the idea of purposefulness 
and intentionality. Posing this question takes us somewhat away from 
Heidegger’s position, who avoided subjectivity in favour of being as ‘being-
in-the-world’. According to Heidegger, clearing-away prepares the place for 
dwelling. If we translate that supposition into the process of the becoming 
that the Museum has gone through, then we can find the answer to the 
question why the Museum eventually acquired the form of a dwelling. At the 
same time, openness and the freeing of space do not lead to the origination of 
a place, unless a ‘dwelling man’ forms an integral part of the whole. The role 
of man is initially specified by the function of dwelling:
To dwell, to be set in peace, means to remain at peace within the free sphere that 
safeguards each thing in its nature. The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing 
and preserving. It pervades dwelling in its whole range. That range reveals itself to us as 
soon as we reflect that human being consists in dwelling … (Heidegger, 1951/1971: 147).
Let us first enumerate the aspects of dwelling that ensue from this philosophical 
definition, and then translate its meanings into the given empirical setting. 
Heidegger starts with the contemporary meaning, i.e. to live, to stay in place, to 
reside. Then, using his favourite etymological approach, he reveals two other 
meanings, firstly, to be at peace, to be brought to peace, to remain at peace, and 
secondly, to spare, to preserve. Each of these meanings suggests that dwelling is 
unthinkable without a person who dwells. At the same time, the range of the 
reading goes further than the semantic definition of the word. Heidegger makes 
the notion relational and points out several interdependences, i.e. between 
dwelling and things and between dwelling and space/place. Philosophically, 
Heidegger uses the meaning of dwelling as conditional towards ‘being-in-
the-world’. In poetically tinted language he writes that ‘in saving the earth, 
in receiving the sky, in awaiting the divinities, in initiating mortals dwelling 
occurs as the fourfold preservation of the fourfold’(1951/1971: 149). This 
integral description of dwelling has to wait for exemplification until the last 
chapter of this book. Only after we have followed various directions of analysis 
we shall be able to look at the experiences and interaction, which take place 
during the Museum visits in all their inter-relational richness.
The social and physical contexts of dwelling are connected and framed by 
the natural necessity to spare, to preserve:
The sparing itself consists not only in the fact that we do not harm the one whom we 
spare. Real sparing is something positive and takes place when we leave something 
beforehand in its own nature, when we return it specifically to its being, when we ‘free’ 
it in the real sense of the word into a preserve of peace (Heidegger, 1951/1971: 147).
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Preserving evolves simultaneously in two dimensions, temporal and spatial. 
We must be aware of the fact that this kind of (anti-Heideggerian) division 
is artificial and can be accepted only for the purpose of obtaining a more 
transparent description. If we think about the emerging of the Museum in 
terms of becoming, then it would be more appropriate to talk about a spatio-
temporal dimension. At this stage I am preoccupied by the spatial aspect 
of preserving. We shall touch upon the temporal later, since it is closely 
related to the concepts of memory and remembering practices. The spatial 
dimension of preserving is related to the placing and arranging of material 
things, which has been already described. Heidegger returns to the meaning 
preserve frequently. By making a relational link with things, he underlines 
that ‘dwelling itself is always a staying with things’. And because things are 
an inescapable form of presencing, they must somehow be taken care of, 
e.g. by nursing, nurturing, growing and constructing. Bringing or donating 
things to the Museum collection is what people did explicitly. Securing 
things from extinction and thereby indirectly prolonging their own way of 
life can be seen as an implicit message transmitted by their actions. Clearing 
place for the future Museum is an action of the same order. Heidegger sees it 
as making-room, which unfolds in granting and arranging:
First, making-room admits something. It lets openness hold sway which, among other 
things, grants the appearance of things present to which human dwelling sees itself 
consigned. On the other hand, making-room prepares for things the possibility to belong 
to their relevant whither and, out of this, to each other (1973: 6).
Thus, in making room, in freeing and opening up space, ‘the yielding of 
places happens’. In those places preserving occurs, namely ‘the gathering of 
things in their belonging together’ and ‘a dwelling for man in the midst of 
things’ (1973: 6). In that respect the Reminiscence Museum is a released place 
where things that were gathered, are being preserved by presenting their 
togetherness and belonging to the human dwelling. 
Each of the three meanings of dwelling that were mentioned above is actively 
engaged there. Dwelling as living and residing has been realised in the 
physical form that the Museum display has taken. Dwelling as preserving 
and caring plays a role at two different levels: initially, in gathering and 
caring for things and, as we shall see later, in nurturing and caring for people. 
And finally, dwelling as being brought to peace or as staying at peace can be 
revealed by listening to and understanding the passionate stories told by the 
visitors of the Museum, which we shall do in the next chapter. As for now, 
the things were left ‘in their own nature’, so to say at peace. 
One last question that has been presented earlier on needs to be addressed 
here. The things on their own, even with their implicit nature of gathering, 
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can hardly be charged with intentionality. Was the way the Museum was 
self-organised unintentional as well? Was it a true, genuine assemblage of 
old-fashioned things? In order to answer to the last question let us turn to 
Heidegger’s understanding of truth again. ‘Truth is the unconcealedness of 
that which is as something that is. Truth is the truth of Being’ (Heidegger, 
1935/2008: 79). Understanding what truth is in the given definition does 
not imply correctness or agreement about certain facts. Truth is the ‘un-
hiddenness’ or ‘unconcealedness’ of beings. Truth simply happens or 
becomes disclosed at work. This is perhaps the best way we can look at the 
‘authenticity’ of the Museum collection. At a glance it would seem that old 
things are collected and arranged there as a kind of show. Do the visitors 
observe those scattered artefacts independently, or are they able to ‘disclose’ 
the truth and decipher the intricate relational world behind them? I tend to 
believe the latter. The manner in which this takes place will be described in 
the next chapter.
When observing the ‘material’ assemblage of the Museum display, there do 
not seem to be any strong pros or cons in respect to its tendencies. As for 
the intentions of the organisation, even if Humanitas had decided to refrain 
from interfering in the arrangements regarding the Museum, then that in 
itself would still be an example of a negative intention. The management 
at Humanitas has done its best to refrain from interfering and to let the 
things speak for themselves, and they have stuck to that. In the mean time 
the Museum has acquired certain personal features but it is still in or of 
Humanitas. 
106
Between topography anD topology of the MuseuM space
Conceptual and material boundaries of the Museum
We have returned to the question that was raised before, namely how we can 
define the boundaries of the Museum space. Let me start with the quote that 
I used in the beginning of the book:
A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the 
boundary is that from which something begins its presencing. That is why the concept is 
that of horismos, that is, the horizon, the boundary (Heidegger, 1951/1971: 152).
Elegantly as always, Heidegger introduces two seemingly conflicting terms 
within one definition: boundary and horizon. But if we look back it becomes 
obvious that from the moment when the concept of space was introduced 
into this study, the description was nothing more than a search for its 
boundaries, or the so-called framing of the project. Yet, flagging the territory 
and testing its limits, I ended up each time in front of another opening, 
or a horizon. The approach that was chosen elaborated a combination of 
such different interpretations of the notion space as Heidegger’s dwelling, 
Massey’s heterogeneous inter-relational social space and Hetherington’s 
non-Euclidean topology. Individually none of them could offer sufficient 
insight into understanding how the space of the Museum is organised. I 
have tried to bring the approaches together, not in a confronting mixture 
of incompatibles, but in such a way that they can complement and enrich 
each other. In fact the description has become quite similar to the way the 
collection of the Museum was assembled. The heterogeneity of materiality 
has inspired me to unfold the heterogeneity of the conceptual framing. That 
is why by defining the boundaries of the Museum, I shall not talk about 
one line or one limit. My starting point will be that the boundaries or limits 
themselves are broad and spacious and my second presupposition will be 
that they have no enclosure; they are always open for a new horizon with a 
new limit to strive for. 
Looking at the Museum from the perspective of conceptual and material 
boundaries, one can see how territories of different origins coincide, creating 
ambiguous frontiers and openings. Literally speaking it is difficult to say 
where the Museum starts and ends, upstairs at the showcases, downstairs in 
the long hallway or behind the large doors, which symbolise the entrance to 
the home. 
A similar confusion about boundaries can be encountered if we look at the 
exhibition and try to place it into a certain period of time or some specific 
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social environment. There always will be things that do not quite fit into 
the normal classification and teasingly lure you into still another period or 
environment, with their own ever-unreachable horizons. What happens is 
that instead of facing some fixed frontiers, the visitors found themselves in a 
kind of interval, shaped by their constant movement between two infinitely 
escaping edges. Neither a home, nor a museum, neither mine, nor strange. 
To better understand that interval and the tension that this subsequently 
causes, let us look at an etymological observation, which was made by L. 
Marin in his article ‘Frontiers of Utopia’:
The Latin limes signifies in its etymological origin a path or a passage, a way between 
two fields; the limes is the distance between two edges… . The limit would be a way 
between two frontiers, a way that would use their extremities to make its way. The limit 
is at the same time a way and a gap (Marin, 1993: 409). 
As we can see, the semantics of interval, or gap, are not alien to the meaning 
of limit. On the contrary, through spatialization it shows the essence of its 
semantic structure. At the same time, the unreachable extremities are pre-
sented here as well, ‘as if one of its edges were tending toward the other 
without ever reaching or attaining it’ (Marin, 1993: 410). Marin understands 
that gap or interval, as ‘the locus of the neutral’:
My semantic journey … points out a notion I will call a neutral place, a locus whose 
characteristics are semiotically negative, whose specificity consists in being neither one 
nor the other, neither this edge nor the other. It is the place where two kings meet to 
make peace after having been at war with each other for many years, a neutral place 
where they negotiate (1993: 410).
So the boundary leaves room for uncertainty, which at the same time is an 
opening for new possibilities. In their ‘presencing’ boundaries are not static. 
There is an intrinsic movement within boundaries and an external move-
ment of boundaries as well. As we have already pointed out, the spreading 
out of the Museum territory was the outcome of a rather spontaneous pro-
cess. Physically and conceptually, the Museum as it is now, has rooted itself 
in Humanitas and even far beyond it, since it has ramifications in the homes 
of almost all the Museum’s visitors. They all recognise things that they still 
have or used to have. 
The fluidity of the Museum’s boundaries does not in any way suggest that 
its texture is falling apart. A certain rigidness could have caused that, but 
there is nothing rigid about the Museum’s boundaries. Once during an in-
formal discussion, it was suggested that the Museum could become a kind 
of a closed box where elderly people can be locked in with their past. As 
if the past can exist on its own! I shall reserve a treatment of remembering 
processes for the next chapter. As for the closed box, to see the Museum in 
that way means to totally miss its essence. Not only does the materiality of 
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the Museum represent a movement of its own. Writing off the Museum as an 
inert reconstruction of past domestic life would mean to write off the rooted-
ness of our feelings about home and all together to write off a major part of 
the fruitful soil which feeds our identities. 
It would be interesting to find out how our identification with place devel-
ops, and then bring it in connection with the discussion about boundar-
ies. ‘Identity is territory, not subjectivity’ (Macgregor Wise, 2000: 301). This 
definition given by J. Macgregor Wise grasps one of the essential links be-
tween our feeling about home and being what we are. In his argument Wise 
draws on Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of territory and milieu. According 
to Wise, ‘a territory is an act, territorialisation, the expression of a territory’ 
(2000: 298). Projecting this understanding of territory into the notion home, he 
comes with the following multilateral description:
Home … is a collection of milieus, and as such is the organization of markers (objects) 
and the formation of space. But home, more than this, is a territory, an expression. 
Home can be a collection of objects, furniture, and so on that one carries with one from 
move to move. Home is the feeling that comes when the final objects are unpacked 
and arranged and the space seems complete … The markers of home, however, are not 
simply inanimate objects (a place with stuff), but the presence, habits, and effects of 
spouses, children, parents, and companions. One can be at home simply in the presence 
of a significant other. What makes home-territories different from other territories is 
on the one hand the living of the territory (a temporalization of the space), and on the 
other their connection with identity, or rather a process of identification, of articulation 
of affect. Homes, we feel, are ours (2000: 299).
In this definition home is described as a material assemblage that can be felt, 
as a semiotic system that can be read, and as a spatial and temporal entity that 
can be lived. Identification takes place through feeling, reading and living. The 
interweaving of the material space of home with the expressive territory of 
the identity makes it almost impossible to talk about probable boundaries in-
between. The limit here, or the neutral place in Marin’s terminology, is fluid. It is 
all action or movement, and it is all becoming. In this movement, identities and 
homes are born and reborn. It would not be right to consider this movement to 
be a chaotic nondirectional process. Identity, though not ultimately fixed, has 
a propensity for conservatism (just like our ideas of home). That is why the 
movement in the interval, the movement that shapes boundaries, is nothing 
but repetition and resonance30. Wise calls it ‘the pattern of sound, of light, of 
meaning that constructs the space’ (Macgregor Wise, 2000: 302). The visitors of 
the Museum do nothing else but look for those patterns, search for repetitions 
and resonate to what has been said by others. That is why Wise determines 
communication as resonance.  Looking at the data, one could be quite surprised 
30  This notion of resonance as presented by Wise will be further elaborated in the chapter 
‘Ageing’.
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to see how often visitors literally repeat what has been said by others, or react to 
each other with affirmatives like yes, yes, indeed, sure enough etc. The discussion 
about the Museum’s boundaries supplies us with a new insight to understand 
this type of ‘echoing’. Repetitions provide the necessary confirmation of who 
we are, but they are never identical. This is why the movement stays constant. 
‘There is no fixed self, only the habit of looking for one (likewise, there is no 
home, only the process of forming one)’ (Macgregor Wise , 2000: 303).
It looks as if the entire discussion about boundaries and the feeling of home, 
which the Museum awakes, induced the place of the Museum to stretch again. 
Only this time we do not expect it to close up. The place of the Museum not 
only challenges Euclidian geometry, but the philosophical concept of dwelling 
as well. With its sharply determined domestic core, the place of the Museum 
dissolves at the edges, just like a selvage31 that mixes with something else and 
then turns into something else as well. Seeing the boundaries of the Museum as 
ambiguous intervals of movement between the edges is the way to understand 
how it is embedded within Humanitas, within society and in the visitors’ lives. 
Maybe the Museum even can be seen as a horizon itself, a kind of continuously 
attracting and eluding utopia that is giving us the answers to questions that 
still need to be asked. 
Speculating in this manner looks like we are two steps ahead of our own 
analysis. For now, the Museum looks like a dwelling; it appeals to the feeling 
of home, especially with the older generation. At the same time, one cannot 
live there. The element of caring and preserving can be traced through the 
description of the material side of the Museum. The question is then what 
happens with ‘preserving’ and caring for people, that is to say with the most 
important constituent of dwelling. In the next chapter, we shall see that it is 
taking place, but beyond the horizon, from where the Museum space grace-
fully fades into the space of Memory.                                                                                                                        
          
Between Space and Memory
So far we have looked at the becoming of the Museum from various 
perspectives in order to understand the potential functionality of its space. We 
have moved from the empirical setting and matched it with various theoretical 
insights and analysis reaching as far as philosophical interpretations of things 
and dwelling. Now it is time to return to the Museum and see how the deeper 
31   The term has been proposed by L. Marin and means ‘the fringe of an edge’. It is associated 
with the French lisière, which according to Marin means ‘the space of a gap, but uncertain of 
its limits, as when a land, an estate, a forest have simply their own edge, with no other limit 
in front of it, just a wild or an undetermined space’(Marin, 1993: 410).
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understanding of the processes that shape its space can be reflected in the 
Museum’s performance of itself. 
There can be no doubt about the importance of the role that the objects of 
the exhibition play in the arrangement of the Museum and as a result in the 
stimulation of remembering processes. If the artefacts remain unnoticed then 
the whole idea of the Museum has failed. We have seen that there is much 
more in the entire setting that reveals itself and yet can remain unnoticed 
in its naturalness and self-evidence, something ready-to-hand, so to speak. 
In the earlier comments I already stated that the exhibition has taken the 
form of a house in a very natural way. People often react to the arrangement 
at the very beginning of their visit, remarking that it looks and feels like 
home. Such an explicit general objectification regarding the entourage of the 
Museum is symptomatic for the initial stage of a visit only and hardly occurs 
later on. Once it has happened, recognition entails certain expectations on 
the part of the visitors, which one can anticipate within the home-like sphere 
of the exhibition. The domestic environment, once disclosed as such, is now 
automatically referred to. Besides, it feels much more reliable and does 
not need ‘objective’ confirmation of its credibility any more. This is what 
ultimately determines the functional potential of the Museum space.
 
The general atmosphere of the Museum works as a trigger towards an entire 
spectrum of sensory incentives. The functional clues of the setup, like for 
example the inviting handle of the mangle or the spinning top, facilitate 
the switch that takes place in the mood and imagination of the visitors and 
provoke them to take actions, to ‘try out’ their almost forgotten skills again. 
The Museum offers a great number of artefacts that can be perceived by 
means of sight, hearing, smell, touch and taste. Unlike in most conventional 
museums however, these artefacts are expected to be recognised and ‘used’ 
by the visitors. When this happens, the perceived information appeals to 
the visitor’s personal experiences, so that the recognition bears a thoroughly 
personal signature to each individual visiting the Museum. 
At the same time, these personal experiences are inseparably connected 
with the general cultural knowledge that each visitor possesses. The 
basic positioning of the rooms remains permanent but small changes and 
improvements are introduced into the display very frequently. It gives a 
visitor a certain frame, within which he or she is invited to remember, but 
does not limit the remembering process to that frame. Their interactions are 
partly based on general cultural knowledge and up to certain extent they are 
predictable as well; some of the things they say seem to be prescribed. The 
recognition and predictability of such reflections cannot be separated in this 
situation. The artefacts of the Museum reflect the period from the end of the 
19th century up to the 1960s and the entire setting is based on very general 
111
cultural clichés. Besides, the setting is presented in such a way, that each 
visitor remains free to fill it with his / her own reminiscences. Imagine a 
story that is written with spaces instead of with names or pronouns. This is 
what the Museum offers: a kind of interaction, where certain rules and paths 
regarding the historical time and specific locations are applied.  
It is obvious that no such characteristic could be given to a place if the 
involvement of the personnel and the visitors were to be strictly regulated 
and narrowly channelled by rules that prescribe a passive and observing 
behaviour. All the rooms in the Museum are open and accessible to each 
visitor. There are no ‘please be silent’ signs on the walls and no ‘please 
do not touch’ boards next to the objects (Becker, 2008)32. On the contrary, 
the visitors are invited to speak up and to take artefacts in their hands. 
The spontaneity of the reactions caused by this absence of restrictions and 
rules is particularly noticeable during family visits. In order to illustrate 
this we can draw an outline of the main pattern of such a visit. At first the 
representatives of the various generations scatter around all over the place. 
Then, after some time, they come together to listen to the story of the eldest 
of them. Then they usually wander around on their own again, but just for 
a moment, because the need to share what they have seen will push them 
back to the core (the grandmother or the grandfather) of the family again. 
These almost ‘tidal’ movements of the family members are accompanied by 
an intensive exchange of impressions and factual information, which seems 
to be especially appreciated on the occasions when small children are part 
of the group. Children represent the smallest group of the Museum visitors, 
which is understandable given the circumstances of their visits (usually 
visiting grandmother or grandfather who lives at Humanitas). Besides, they 
are probably the only group of visitors who do not recognise the objects 
of the exhibition from their own experience and need some guidance and 
explanation, just like in a conventional museum. Still, even for them the visit 
can turn out to be a unique experience because of the emotional bonds they 
have with their grandparents. The appreciation that grandparents feel in the 
presence of their grandchildren is of another kind. The authority of their 
knowledge is indisputable; they can command the children’s attention and 
share their experiences with a kind of altruistic passion. Those moments are 
beautiful examples of a natural and mutually valued exchange of experience 
among generations. 
Because of the informal and spontaneous atmosphere of the visit, I would 
not call the interaction between the representatives of various generations a 
teaching experience. As Beaumont and Sterry put it, ‘if teaching behaviour 
32   It is not by chance that the last book of H. Becker about the museum is called 
Verboden af te blijven, which means Prohibited not to touch.
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includes attention to detail, close proximity of adult and child in front of 
the exhibit, and looking and talking’, then the observations regarding the 
intergenerational communication in the Museum could be better described 
as a free offering of knowledge and experience, which is emotionally framed 
into short or long stories from the personal past. The role that the exhibits 
play in that specific type of interaction differs from the interactions that one 
can observe between adults. ‘Exhibits appear to be points of departure for 
grandparent and grandchild conversations, which develop away from the 
exhibits themselves’ (Beaumont & Sterry, 2005: 176). The consequences of 
the ‘detachment’ from the Museum objects are important for both the elderly 
and the young. This detachment however is not a loose end. The materiality 
of the Museum space helps the representatives of the various generations to 
look at themselves and their relations in the perspective of time and ageing, 
providing the means for reconciliation with the imminent changes to the 
elderly and a basis for understanding and respect on the part of the young. 
Informal interaction is a characteristic feature of almost each Museum 
visit. That is the reason why the Reminiscence Museum is a rather noisy 
environment during the usual opening hours. The Museum permits and 
stimulates the joyful chattering that the visitors indulge in. It adds a certain 
cosiness to the already informal and relaxed atmosphere within the Museum. 
At the same time all the bustling about can be quite confusing, especially 
for clients of a nursing home. Among them, there are people with dementia 
syndromes and also people with hearing problems. They usually come to 
visit the Museum in the company of professionals or volunteers. Some of the 
features of the Museum, which are considered to be advantageous for the 
rest of the visitors, can therefore be experienced as disadvantages for those 
persons and in many cases can even discourage them to pursue the visit. 
Both the origin of the problem and its solution lie in the affinity of the Museum 
with the organisation where it was founded and located. As has already been 
mentioned, one of the cornerstones of the ideology at Humanitas is its yes-
culture. This principle applies to the Reminiscence Museum just as much as 
to each other ‘regular’ department of the organisation. 
The solution of the noise problem has been found within the same yes-
culture: the inhabitants of the nursing home who can be easily distracted 
or confused by a noisy crowd can also visit the exhibition during hours 
when the Museum is officially closed. These visits take place under very 
different circumstances, whereby a more intimate relationship of trust and 
mutual understanding can develop and grow between the visitor and the 
person accompanying him / her. The visitors feel more confident and the 
staff members often learn new things about them. In fact, they are sometimes 
genuinely surprised at the amount of knowledge and emotions that the 
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clients can still show, in spite of the obvious restrictions in their ability to 
communicate. 
The general conclusion is that the Museum offers an environment to a very 
broad range of visitors, which they can use in accordance with their interests 
and abilities. Bearing in mind the ethos of Humanitas, we may say that the 
Museum has the following potential:
-	 Stimulation of the ability to remember through narratives, unfolding 
around displaced objects that are collected and arranged in accordance 
with a domestic theme;  
-	 Interactive space, where remembering occurs spontaneously;
-	 A highly informal setting for family or group visits (for the inhabitants 
of the nursing home as well as for external visitors), whereby an 
intergenerational transition of cultural knowledge is initiated and 
enhanced;
-	 An additional working space for communication between elderly people 
and the people that are taking care of them, which allows for a more 
informal dialogue.
If we look at the Museum in terms of its relation to Humanitas, then we can 
point out that its existence has shifted the external image of the organisation 
as a whole. The Museum has not only become an integral part of Humanitas, 
it has become its trademark. The Reminiscence Museum is a fold in the 
space of the organisation that rearranges the whole mapping, offering new 
opportunities and raising new questions. In the following analysis we shall 
try to support this preliminary conclusion in order to restate it in the final 
chapter. 
In spite of the importance of the material part of the Museum, it does not 
dominate the people involved. On the contrary, it is the people and foremost 
the visitors who reign over the Museum, by rediscovering their experiences, 
by bringing the artefacts back to life and by reviving the stories of their lives. 
Therefore, even if the Museum has its own story to tell, it takes people to 
make that happen. 
Remembering
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introDuction           
         
Examples – Starting points and guidelines for discussion – Topography and topology of memory – 
Topography: The plot of the ‘usual’ Museum visit – Museums and wonders – Museum as a space of 
memory – Spatialisation of remembering – Adaptation to the space of memory – Modes of the channelled 
memories: Instrumental mode – Mode of the firework sequence – Swinging mode  – Mode of revived 
snapshots  – Topology: metaphors of duration – Mode of focusing – Mode of alignment – The major 
theme – Ethics of remembering – Beyond topography and topology: ontology of memory.
In 84 years old acquaintance of mine was visiting the Museum for the first 
time. She had heard about it from me and she was curious to see it for herself. 
At one point she stopped at the school corner and stood there, looking at the 
old school objects and obviously enjoying what she saw. Her face lightened 
up with joyful surprise. She picked up the reading board and effortlessly 
recited the words by heart. Her minute size and her excited voice completed 
the image. Looking at her 
at that moment you did not 
need a lot of imagination 
to see a small girl who was 
eagerly presenting her well-
learnt homework. Then 
she named the author of 
the school posters and the 
reading books and finally 
looked at the high desk. 
‘That’s it’, she said. ‘My 
father sat at it when he 
was giving his lessons’. 
Both her parents had been 
schoolteachers. In fact her 
father had been the head of 
a village school. As a small 
girl she was allowed to sit 
on his lap during classes, 
because she could ‘walk into 
the school just like that, into 
his classroom’. Her father 
didn’t mind and continued 
his teaching undisturbed. 
She lived in the same village and in spite of the fact that she was still too 
young to go to school, she found it enticing. So one day she decided to go 
to school, all on her own. It was quite a distance and the road went through 
the forest, but life was ‘quiet and safe’ in those days. The school was always 
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open (‘Why should it not be?’) and upon arrival she simply stepped into the 
classroom, to the enormous joy of the pupils. And within a few minutes there 
she was, sitting on her father’s lap, listening to his stories. 
I listened to her with a smile. I could almost literally feel the trust and warmth 
that she felt, while sitting there on her father’s lap. And I could clearly see 
the place in front of me, even though I had never heard about it before. 
 ***
An elderly couple came to visit the Museum. They were both about 70 years 
old. The visit took quite some time, because they thoroughly enjoyed the 
exhibition. They never left each other’s side and listened to one another’s 
stories carefully. Their reminiscences were open and quite emotional at times, 
and their togetherness radiated trust and happiness. That was probably the 
reason why I stayed with them during their visit. By the time we came to 
the sitting room, they had 
already spent at least an hour 
in the Museum. The man 
sat down in one of chairs to 
get some rest. We chatted 
about their impressions 
and without any apparent 
reason I reflected on the 
warmth of their relation, 
expressing my admiration 
for people who were able 
to keep their feelings intact 
notwithstanding the turmoil 
of the many years. They 
stared at me, and I scolded 
at myself, still not really 
believing that I could have 
mistaken their appearance 
for natural feelings. The 
man came to his senses 
first and asked me how I 
could possibly know that 
they were happy together. 
Cautiously I told them that 
nobody could have missed the way they had been talking and listening to 
each other, telling their stories and remembering the lives they had lived. 
After spending an hour with them in the Museum I had developed the 
impression that they loved and cared for each other. Fortunately they had 
started smiling by then, although both faces were also shadowed by some 
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sadness. Very soon I understood why. The man told me that they both were 
widowed. They had known each other and each other’s partners for a long 
time, but they each had suffered the loss of their beloved. After some time 
had passed, through combined reminiscences and mutual support, they had 
rediscovered each other and had found the opportunity to build up a new 
relationship. So they were indeed in love and they did care for each other 
very much, obviously unconscious of the impact that their relationship was 
making on the people around them. They appeared to feel a bit shy about 
this, but also quite flattered at the same time. The man helped us to regain 
our senses. He was sitting in front of the fireplace and suddenly he burst 
into laughter, pointing at it and saying: ‘Do you know what happened to 
my parents once!’ Very vividly he told us that his parents had saved some 
money. Together with some documents it was more or less the most valuable 
possession that they had at home. The money was kept in a metal box. Then 
once, when the family went away, his mother looked for the safest place to 
keep the treasure, so she hid it in the fireplace. When the family returned 
home, it was cold and rainy, so the first thing the father did was to build a 
fire in the fireplace … We burst out into laughter even before the man had 
finished his story. 
***
One of the volunteers of the Museum was talking to a visitor in the ‘grocery 
shop’. The 73 years old and remarkably attractive lady was pointing at the 
big coffee boxes on the shelves, telling him that she still had a similar one 
at home with her husband’s family name on it. I joined them, and the lady 
was immediately interested in my East-European accent. The volunteer then 
left us alone. The lady was glad to hear that I was Russian. She said that she 
had always found the Russian language very beautiful and had even learnt 
it herself. She switched into Russian and was obviously happy she could 
impress me. In answer to my questions she told that she came from Poland 
and that she had been living in Holland for many years already. Then, without 
a pause, she said that what had happened to her father was awful and then 
she started crying.  Her account did not sound like a polished tale that had 
been told many times before, but to her it was certainly a familiar and still 
emotionally charged story. Her father was an officer in the Polish Army. He 
was imprisoned and sent to Siberia, but managed to survive there. The way 
back to communist Poland was closed to him, so he managed to escape and 
received asylum in England. It took seven years of total silence before his 
family in Poland (her mother and a little sister and brother) heard from him 
again. Somebody clandestinely crossed the border, found the family and 
passed on the message that they had to be ready to escape. The journey took 
a long time. First they had to travel to Krakow and stay there for some time. 
The ceiling and the walls of the room where they were staying were covered 
with lice. They kept falling down all the time, especially during the nights. 
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Because of that they were hardly able to sleep. The beds were placed in the 
middle of the room, but lice still kept falling down on top of them. The lady 
was shivering while she was talking about it and she was still in tears. She 
had been 13 years old then. At that point somebody came into the ‘shop’ and 
interrupted her story. Rather than pick up her story, she looked at the coffee 
box again and said that she would probably give hers to the Museum. Then 
she thought it over and said that she still had to think about it, since the box 
could also be important to her children. I told her that there was no hurry 
and that she should indeed discuss it with her children first. Her answer was 
direct and immediate. She said that she herself would be deciding what had 
to be done but that she would need some time to think about it.
***
I see the Museum as a success because people enjoy their visits immensely. 
While looking at the exhibition, the visitors become truly excited; they tell 
their stories eagerly and sincerely, and enthusiastically participate in short or 
extensive conversations. They leave the Museum deeply satisfied, emotionally 
touched and often still engaged in the process of digesting their impressions. 
I am talking about most of the visitors. Returning to the Museum daily for 
more than a year, I have found myself entrusted and almost overloaded with 
the life stories of people I have met there. The naturalness and willingness of 
the visitors to share their experiences, reminiscences, feelings and concerns 
is overwhelming.  Even if you are not tasked with a research question, as I 
have been, you can still question yourself, as by the way, many volunteers of 
the Museum indeed do, as to what it is in the environment of the Museum 
and what is missing in the everyday lives of the visitors that causes all these 
spontaneous eruptions of memories and emotions during their visits. 
The examples that were presented above show all kinds of different 
perspectives from which the visitors look at the display. They also offer 
various possibilities to observe the visitors themselves. Lots of remarks and 
stories are anchored in the objects that are displayed in the Museum. It looks 
like the stories merely require an impulse in order to be revived, and material 
impulses are perhaps the most telling and explicit ones. But it is quite obvious 
that the response of the visitors cannot be reduced to this one-way traffic 
rule. The examples show us that even in cases when memories are facilitated 
by the material objects of the exhibition, remembering processes themselves 
are hardly unidirectional. It rather reminds you of going back and forth in 
your memories. It is similar to the effect of resonance, where fluctuations are 
essential, but their amplitude changes constantly. 
Another aspect of remembering that can be recognised in almost all the 
examples is its social and interactive character. The variety of forms in which 
sociality can be expressed is innumerable. The most general way to define this 
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can probably be grasped as a search for common grounds. Those common 
grounds can initially be provided in cases when the visitors are related to 
each other or know each other very well. In other cases the commonality 
can be found inside or outside the exhibition and its facilitation. The fine-
tuning of the stories will take place by means of a dialogue and finally almost 
every visitor will feel that he or she has been heard and listened to. They 
will experience excitement and in a certain sense they will also feel at home, 
surrounded by familiar things and by people who understand them well. 
If we read them carefully, the three stories contain reappearances of past 
experiences. What is told there is connected to the present, and the meaning 
that people attach to their stories is shaped by what they are now and what 
they need today. My personal feeling during those conversations was that 
the visitors felt a strong need to share their experiences and knowledge. At 
the same time they were all cautiously aware that there might be nobody left 
who still wanted to listen to them. That realisation must be rather unpleasant, 
like the feeling of having a past and a present but no future. Without bearing 
that last notion in mind, it will be pointless to search for the answers to the 
Museum’s success. 
Because of the almost unanimously positive reactions of the visitors, I can 
assume that the Museum provides a specific environment which differs from 
other conventional museums, as well as from other places where people can 
reminisce. My tentative supposition would be that the Museum satisfies 
the intellectual and emotional longing of elderly people to recognise and 
remember objects and experiences from the past. This supposition echoes the 
conclusions of another research, which studied the emotions that the visitors 
typically feel at museums.  Those emotions include ‘feelings of adventure, of 
awe, of affiliation with loved ones or friends, and of seeing, perhaps touching, 
and learning about new things’ (Falk & Dierking, 1992: 83-84). At the same 
time recollections during the Museum visit occur in a very particular way. 
Figuratively speaking the Museum reminds one of a multilayered package 
of the past. There is no obligation to unfold that package, but the invitation 
that Humanitas offers is compelling and the curiosity of the visitors turns out 
to be insuperable. Speaking more strictly, the Museum interactively appeals 
to the visitors by means of sensory and intellectual simulation, helping to 
reconstruct an image of the times when they did not have to put up with the 
physical and social changes that caught up with them in the course of their 
lives. When speaking of changes, I am thinking of the natural weakening of 
physical health, the narrowing of the social network and responsibilities and 
the change of lifestyle, the most explicit manifestation of which is the move 
to a service flat or a nursing home. In this context the visits to the Museum 
often awaken feelings of melancholy and loss, whereby the entire experience 
of the visit turns into a confirmation of inevitable decline. 
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At the same time the Museum visits appear to fortify elderly people, in order 
to overcome at least part of the negative consequences of these changes, 
by restoring their feeling of self-esteem in both a social and a personal 
perspective. In those cases the Museum visits seem to renew their sense 
of belonging to a larger group and to a larger world, where they can feel 
in their place again. How this takes place and which role our memory and 
remembering can play in these contradictory processes will be described in 
this chapter.
Starting points and guidelines for discussion
Memory is one of the central concepts that are treated in this work, but it 
would certainly be a mistake to expect that by opening the discussion about 
remembering processes, the space of the Museum would be left behind. The 
main goal of this chapter is to point out the particularities of remembering 
processes in the specific context of the Reminiscence Museum. Neither 
the material aspects, nor the social space that the visitors of the Museum 
traverse, should be ignored if we are to understand how, what and why is 
being remembered during Museum visits. It would be more accurate to say 
that as we start the discussion about remembering, we shall in fact be looking 
at the intersection of several different kinds of processes at the same time. 
As we have already seen, space is not some neutral backdrop against which 
scenery we play out our lives. The relative stability of its materiality is 
deceptive, since it possesses its own dynamics. The boundaries of space are 
rather dissolving than circumscribing. Addressing the concept of memory 
will not bring any stability into the description either. Memory can assume 
spatial forms, but we cannot catch it; memory disguises itself as a multiple 
flow of moments, but it also reflects duration itself. Memory is not magic, 
but it certainly deserves some credit in that respect. My description of what 
takes place during the visits will highlight a fluidity of relations between the 
place of the Museum, its visitors and their memories. In other words, the 
description will rather be focused on the process of remembering than on the 
concept of memory. 
The phenomenon of memory has been addressed in different kinds of 
studies and can without exaggeration be called one of the most complex 
notions among the multidisciplinary terms in modern science. The recent 
foundation of Memory studies33 has unlocked an exciting discussion about 
the concept of memory: its definition, usage and applications in various 
disciplines and its perspectives of becoming an interdisciplinary instead of a 
33   Journal Memory Studies, Sage publication. Vol. 1 (1), 2008.
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34   The term remembering is used in this book as generic; the terms recognising, recollecting or 
reminiscing are used as various modes of remembering. For more about this see Casey (1987). 
multidisciplinary field (Roediger & Wertsch, 2008: 9). I have already indicated 
in the introductory chapter that this study treats multidisciplinary themes as 
it addresses the spatial organisation of the Museum (space), the remembering 
process that takes place there (memory), and the majority of its visitors (age). 
Yet by looking at the intersection of those concepts within the context of 
the project an effort has been made to treat them as interdisciplinary, i.e. as 
concepts that feed upon and enrich each other at the same time. How this 
takes place is very much a question of conceptual choice. The juxtaposition 
between the three concepts will be addressed after each of them has been 
given sufficient attention. In this chapter we shall deal with concept of 
memory, drawing whenever necessary on the analysis of the Museum space 
that was presented above. But first I would like to delineate my personal 
choices with regard to memory. 
I am particularly interested in memory as a social phenomenon. The 
collected data reflect accounts of oral memories / reminiscences34 of elderly 
people during their visits to the Reminiscence Museum. One of the most 
intriguing facts that were observed during those visits was the aligning 
of personal memories, which, even in cases with fundamental differences, 
could nevertheless be embedded into a more general and all-encompassing 
collective narrative about the past. To embed those observations, one can talk 
here about the universality of remembering processes in general, or about 
the universality of the Museum’s basic theme (=domesticity), or about the 
universality of the experiences that were shared within one same generation. 
The universality is in my view the least interesting aspect, but it does not 
mean that I shall ignore patterns and generalities of remembering. The focus 
of my attention however are the peculiarities and inconsistencies which, 
according to me, can tell us much more about the general tendencies and at 
the same time help us to preserve our fascination and respect for each unique 
manifestation of the remembering process. For me that is not just a question 
of methodology. It is an essential issue of ethics, which consists in grasping 
the limitation of generality and the infinity of singularity. In other words, the 
interplay of the personal and collective aspects in the remembering process 
is entwined with ethics of memory. 
The ethics of memory have been addressed in various kinds of contexts, 
including political debates and discussions about violence, gender and 
trauma, just to name a few of them Margalit, 2002; Blustein, 2008; Eugelink, 
2009). These themes, like for example the memories of World War II, to 
some extent echo back in the material that we have collected. But the most 
important issues of memory ethics regarding this study are connected with 
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the concept of age. The generation I am referring to, namely people who 
are 65 and older, are granted the right to speak in the Museum, but they 
cannot be judged for it. What I shall try to point out is that the authenticity 
(understood as correctness35) of memories is of much less importance than 
the right and the actual sensation of remembering and the feeling of being 
recognized by others. Through recognition and /or the confirmation of your 
story in the stories of others, the sense of belonging is revived, which is a 
crucial weapon within the fight against loneliness and isolation. In that sense 
remembering can be seen as a way of being, or more precisely as being in 
the world with others. Here the issues of ethics are inseparably linked to the 
acceptance of ageing within our society. 
Thus, the memory that interests me is a social and ethically sensitive concept, 
but before weaving it into the net of the entire study I would like to make a 
number of general statements. Aligning the possible views and approaches 
towards memory does not have one common ground here. It will prepare the 
further discussion about the interdisciplinary character of memory, and at 
the same time it will delineate my personal theoretical preferences regarding 
the research approach. 
Firstly, I regard human memory as one of the most generous gifts, which 
we take for granted unless we start losing it. Memory allows for a feeling of 
continuity with regard to ourselves and the world around us. At the same 
time memory generously endows us with the faculty to forget, protecting 
us from being overloaded by the innumerable impressions and experiences 
of our daily life (Connerton, 2008). From a socio-cultural point of view the 
value of memory and remembering are determined by their irreplaceable 
influence on our understanding of the past. From an individual perspective 
it is closely linked to our personal history and identity (Middleton & Brown, 
2005). On the whole, when our attention is explicitly drawn to it, we regard 
our memory and our capacity to remember as very positive faculties. Even 
where our memories contain traces of traumatic and painful experiences, 
this cannot be compared with the torture of a total or even partial loss of 
memory, whereby part of our personal unique narrative vanishes forever.
Secondly, memory is reconstructive by nature and we experience it as a 
multipurpose activity. A generally accepted assumption, which I share, is 
nowadays that we do not have any kind of storage room inside our brain, 
where we can find an appropriate recollection that suits the moment. 
Memory manifests itself at the moment that we remember and this has to 
do with both the neurological processes and our response to the interactive 
35   See our discussion on Heidegger’s interpretation of truth and correctness, p. 105. 
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social surroundings at the same time (Schachter, 1996). Memory functions 
as a connection between the present and the past; it shapes our view of the 
present and the future, by relying on and using the past. 
Thirdly, in respect to its plausibility and the way memory manifests itself, 
it is polyphonic. Reflections on the same things or similar events yield such 
different accounts, that we are either forced to verify them (where? by 
whom?) or to accept the fact that each memory is credible and that our image 
of the world, and our past as a part of it, is miscellaneous (Wertsch, 2002). 
Moreover, only polyphony as a principle feature of personal and historical 
narratives in particular can facilitate the most ‘truthful’ image of the past. 
This image cannot be fixed, it is many-sided and it is also elusive. That is 
why polyphony is so important, since it is by definition based on diversity. 
To spotlight the diversity of individual experiences is one of the main tasks 
of this work.
Fourthly, memory has a strong social character and is dialogic by nature. Even 
if a person seemingly reminisces ‘on her own’, the inner dialogue and the 
patterns of thinking imposed by the group that that person belongs to, 
cannot be underestimated (Halbwachs, 1925/1992). The interplay between 
‘everybody knows it’ and ‘I am the only one who knows it’ in the remembered 
stories demands its share of attention towards the personal and the collective 
components in the visitors’ memories.
Fifthly, memory replaces the past, since the past is not here anymore. On the 
basis of our memory we create places which, following P. Nora, are called Les 
Lieux de Mémoire, sites of memory. Those places acquire a specific function 
for the performing of rituals and the preservation of traditions. In our project 
the memory function is reinforced by the place, which reminds one of a 
‘memory site’. This site reinforces remembering processes. Memories I am 
observing are therefore place- or site-bound.
Sixthly, our memory has an instrumental function. As individual persons we 
make use of it in all kinds of interactions: work, pleasure, study etc. We use 
it as groups and as societies, talking about the past and our experiences and 
transmitting our knowledge from one generation to the next (Connerton, 
1989). Its instrumental nature is of great importance if we think about the 
way that history is being written nowadays. Using fashionable technological 
vocabulary, memory has become one of the Open Source projects, where 
the information of the ‘source code’ belongs to the public domain. Our 
participation in the project is determined by our own knowledge and 
experience, as well as by the preparedness to take responsibility for writing 
about the universal and ever changing version of history (Nora, 1989). 
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Seventhly, memory and remembering, especially in the case of elderly 
people, does not fall in the category of just one more pastime to fill the day. 
The emotions that accompany the remembering process and the meaning 
that the visitors of the Museum attach to the entire experience, override 
the boundaries of everyday entertainment. Remembering, preserving and 
transferring knowledge somehow seem to have become a way of being. Being, 
on the other hand, is continuous. You can change the way of being but it 
cannot be interrupted, unless we speak in a metaphorical sense. That is why 
I conceive memory as a very important constituent of being, since every next 
moment does not exist without the previous one, or to be more precise, since 
there are really no moments at all, but only one continuous current of being 
(Bergson, 1912/2004; Deleuze, 1966/1991). 
As one can see, even this relatively short list of ideas embraces dozens of 
disciplines and approaches that deal with memory. As Roediger & Wertsch 
put it: ‘The problem is that the subject is a singular noun, as though memory 
is one thing or one type, when in actuality, the term is almost always most 
useful when accompanied by a modifier’ (2008: 10). In his reaction to the 
emerging ‘memory studies’, S. Brown develops this assertion and points out 
that ‘the notion of substantivizing memory again in the wake of the memory 
wars, of 9/11, and the migration of commemoration into virtual realms seems 
oddly anachronistic’ (Brown, 2008: 270). His own process-oriented approach 
to memory and the ‘science of memory’ is quite challenging. At the level of 
scientific discourse, while thinking about the domain of emerging ‘memory 
studies’, Brown talks about ‘the crucial shift … away from a noun referring 
to some substantive, towards a verb referring to a set of activities and 
experiences. One advantage of making this shift is that practices are clearly 
not determined by any single factor, nor are they readily containable in a 
single analytic framework’ (2008: 267, 268). To make his point clear Brown 
uses a passage from Creative Evolution of Bergson, where the philosopher 
develops his most famous notion of duration on the basis of his idea of the 
‘cinematographical mechanism of thought’. We are only forced to think in 
‘stops’ and ‘immobilities’ because of the natural limits of our perceptual 
capacities, while ‘the world is in a perpetual state of flux, of change’. If we 
understand the world not as something, ‘to which movement and change is 
attached’ but as movement itself, then Brown’s direction towards mediation 
instead of substantivization makes good sense. Regarding this particular 
study it will mean that when talking about memory, we shall be looking at 
certain memory practices. Another suggestion that Brown outlines, is based 
on the interdisciplinary character of memory studies. Bearing in mind 
possible shortcomings and misinterpretations of the transdisciplinarity, he 
proposes that ‘a community of scholars dedicated to memory studies will 
need to invent (and continuously re-invent) a set of concepts or models that 
articulate transversal relations between disciplines’ (2008: 266). 
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A process-oriented approach to this research has been used during the 
description of the Museum exhibition. It was not accidental that I was talking 
about the becoming of the Museum place, instead of describing a permanent 
collection of old-fashioned objects. The choice I am making now is based 
on the conviction that remembering practices can only be understood as 
constantly evolving processes in a person’s life, which do not fit ‘a single 
analytic framework’. This again can clarify the multi-conceptual framework 
that has been chosen for this study. A logical next step could be to look at the 
three basic concepts of the research (i.e. space, memory and age) again and 
redefine them, stressing this time the dynamic aspect of the notions (from 
nouns to verbs, so to say). I shall indeed do that, but only at a later stage, 
when the data analysis leaves no doubts any more concerning the role of 
movement and change in the practical situations that were observed. 
The general statements concerning memory that I have made earlier touch 
upon a range of fields including psychology, sociology, history, literature, 
education – to list only a few. Transversal links, as suggested above, could 
play an important binding and demarcating role here. Still, our approach 
needs to be narrowed down and sharpened. In the previous chapter we 
have chosen a multistage analysis, where the main direction was from a 
topographical to a topological interpretation of the Museum space. We 
moved from a general physical description of the Museum place to more 
complex forms of relations, which occur in that social space, and further on to 
its meaning as a place for dwelling.  Just like in the description of the place of 
the Museum we shall be moving from topography to topology while describing 
remembering practices. Before I explain the terminology in relation to the 
concept of memory, let me point out that this decision was not made because 
of the desire to make the structure of the two chapters symmetrical (it is not), 
but due to the possibility which those terms offer, namely to move between 
different levels of complexity in the description of the observed practices. As 
we shall see shortly the data are not unambiguous. That is why only a more 
sophisticated analysis, which embraces various approaches, can match the 
purposes of the more or less comprehensive description.
Just like in the previous chapter, the movement we shall be making will be 
not from simple to more complex, but rather from explicit to implicit forms 
(modes) of remembering and their meanings. A simple enumeration of 
forms of remembering that occur in the Museum, accompanied by matching 
illustrations, could have given us a good impression of what takes place in 
the Museum, but it would never reveal the meaning that the visitors give to 
their experiences there. That is why instead of talking about the typology or 
the taxonomy, I have chosen to talk about the topography and the topology 
of the remembering process. 
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Remembering is a multilayered complex process, the description of which 
depends on the theoretical stance that one is willing to assume. The terms 
topography and topology of remembering are multidimensional by 
definition. Thinking and analysing in terms of topography, for example, 
we shall not oppose the artefacts of the display and the memories that they 
invoke, but bring them together in a kind of mutually complementing process 
of interaction, as a result of which various forms of remembering occur. At 
the same time the topography of the remembering process offers a broader 
explanation for the complex interrelations between personal and collective 
memories, which will be explained through the entwined structure of social 
frameworks. Social remembering can be studied in relation to historical 
discourse, which often manifests itself in commemorative activities that are 
place- and object-bound. Collective and personal remembering that bears 
the traces of group narratives to which one used to belong can be examined 
in relation to past or still existing social networks. My goal will be to mark 
the place and the meaning of personal memories on the map of collectively 
shared experiences by the older generation. This is what we shall call the 
topography of the remembering process and what will be given due attention 
in the first of the two descriptive parts of this chapter.
The topology of our memory, as well as the topology of space, is perhaps the 
most intriguing part of the analysis. Where the topography of remembering 
presents us with the final stage of the remembering process, topology is 
directed to the description of the process itself. In simple words, it is about 
everything in the remembering process that is not explicit, or to be more 
precise that is not extensive and cannot be justified by any cause-effect logic. In 
order to make it more transparent let us return for a moment to the description 
of one of the visits presented in the beginning of this chapter. When relying 
on the behaviour of the elderly couple, I remarked on the warmth of their 
presumably life-long relation, after which a sudden silence fell. I had seen 
the harmony of their remembering as rooted in shared experiences, and I 
presumed that the pleasure of that united remembering constituted the 
meaning of the Museum visit for them. As it turned out, the meaning of 
the remembering that both people attached to their Museum visit was quite 
different. I was not wrong about my initial assumptions: both of them shared 
their memories. But their memories during the visit were not just a simple 
sum of past events. The two stories intertwined in a dramatic way. And at the 
crossing point of their lives, the Museum exhibition and my own presence, 
the depth of the visitors’ emotional experiences and appreciation turned 
out to become something completely different from a simple composition 
of the two courses of life. The aim of the topological analysis will be to show 
how and why this kind of non-consecutive transformation takes place. 
In other words, the topology of remembering is about an outcome that is 
not equal to the simple sum of the parts; it is about everything that falls 
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outside the pattern, and nevertheless can be found in every single visit to 
the Museum. Whenever an unexpected silence falls or an explosive reaction 
follows a seemingly inconspicuous remark or observation (think about the 
story told by the Polish lady), whenever any kind of ‘mismatch’ occurs in the 
conversation, we can talk about gaps and folds that, as we shall see, thread 
our remembering. There is however a very distinctive difference between 
the spatial gaps that we have seen in the arrangement of the Museum 
display and the so-called remembering gaps, which we shall observe during 
the analysis of the Museum conversations. Mnemonic gaps only have an 
appearance of a break because memory does not know pauses and breaks. 
Understanding memory as a ceaseless process that underlies all our activities 
demands a different approach that can explain the utter inconsistencies 
of remembering. This is what the topological description of remembering 
processes is supposed to do. The topology of remembering processes will be 
the theme of the second descriptive part in this chapter. 
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topography of reMeMBering: Between the place anD the visitors  
 
The plot of the ‘usual’ Museum visit
Each visit to the Reminiscence Museum is unique and each story that is told 
there is different. Reading the reports that I have made during the past years, 
I still can see the people I have talked with and I can hear their voices. For the 
purpose of this research I feel the need to take some distance from specific 
conversations, in order to draw up some general lines regarding the Museum 
visits, but this will not affect my feelings of deep respect for the people who 
entrusted me with the stories of their lives.
The visits to the Museum are unique events, but still I would argue that there 
is a pattern to them. When talking about a pattern, I try to filter off an ideal 
typical structure of the - or any Museum visit. A typical visit is a very pliable 
definition, which is exactly what I want it to be. The diversity of specific 
experiences at the Museum is infinite. There is no way anyone can describe 
and make sense of each single one of them, considering the unpredictability 
and uniqueness of the event. But the pattern of the visits and the sequence 
of the reactions that the visitors have manifest themselves clearly and 
repeatedly if you have been to the Museum often enough to observe them 
and notice the reiteration. On these empirical grounds one can safely present 
what in all its complexity and relativity I shall call a usual museum visit. 
When the visitors step out of the lift, they make their first free choice regarding 
the Museum. In front of the entrance there is a hall that represents a kind of 
front garden to ‘the house’. There are a tree, a bench and a pram standing 
there. Then there is a showcase with hand-made old-fashioned dolls, which 
reminds you that however unorthodox the place would seem to be, it is still 
a museum. Some of the visitors go straight ahead and start their tour in a 
way that seems to them the most appropriate manner. Others hang around 
by the entrance for some time, first looking in amusement at the well-known 
and long forgotten objects. This second group has in fact already begun to 
discover the exhibition, albeit without giving it too much thought. Making 
a free choice like that, looking around and talking about familiar things, 
makes people forget their roles as visitors. The reader is already familiar 
with an example from the previous chapter, which described the lady who 
recognized her pram, which she had brought to the Museum. From that 
moment on the visit had developed into a personal sweep, not only for her 
but also for the entire group she had come with. 
As soon as they enter the Museum the visitors are confronted with its highly 
informal environment. There are no special routes or guidelines to follow. 
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Everybody can choose any room to start their explorations. The effect that this 
kind of freedom of choice has on the visitors extends from silent agreement 
and surprise, to a feeling of being lost and helpless. At first the visitors take 
their time, turning around and looking for ‘arrows’ to follow. But finally, with 
or without help of Museum volunteers, they choose a direction. They are 
welcome to ask any question they want, but eventually it becomes obvious 
to them that nobody is going to tell them a story, except perhaps for very 
general remarks like: This is a shop and This is a bedroom. But this does not 
mean that the visitors are left alone. They can feel disoriented for a couple 
of moments, until they have adjusted themselves to the new surroundings. 
That is a curious moment to observe. Most of the visitors expect to remain 
‘invisible’, in accordance with the usual pattern of Museum visits. Silence 
falls the moment they realise that there are no inscriptions or label plates next 
to the objects. At this stage the visitors are confronted with the most general 
question: ‘what is this place?’ A choice must be made once again. Either you 
stay silent and keep each emotion and recognised name to yourself, or you 
feel that you must talk to the person you are with or to a Museum attendant, 
in order to share your knowledge. It goes without saying that in most cases 
the silence will not last for long. The need to share, to communicate, finds 
its way out. The talking starts and the place will never be the same again for 
any of them. 
In spite of all the uncertainty that was created, this first stage usually is 
quickly replaced by much deeper feelings of interest and curiosity. There is 
much to be recognised and there is an audience that is eager to listen. I call 
this moment ‘making the place your own’. At this stage, almost each visitor 
points at certain objects that he or she recognises without really telling much 
about them, often just playing the ‘who can tell first what this is’ game and 
placing the entire setting in the right timeframe and the right place. This 
is also the moment when the tension between the collective image of the 
past and the visitor’s personal experiences usually occurs for the first time. 
Let us look at this stage closely. The objects are named one after another, 
without any logical sequence. It looks like a free scanning process is taking 
place and a new name flashes up every now and then when a simple round 
from perception to representation has been completed. It is obvious that the 
path of recognition is not paved without some hidden stones. Pauses are 
made at moments when the right name has not popped up automatically, 
when questions are asked or even disagreement is expressed. It grows into a 
matter of self-esteem to remember the right word for an object. This search is 
usually conducted jointly. It is a united effort, where special techniques are 
applied, one of the most successful of which is to talk about the functionality 
of the object. When, why and how the object was used is the most usual 
clarification in the Museum. But there is an even more important reason for 
the visitors to talk about the functionality of the old objects, besides the fact 
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that it can advance the recognition process. It is directly connected with the 
most important role the elderly generation is expected to play in any society, 
namely to be a means of intergenerational transmission of knowledge. This 
last aspect will be described at length later on. 
The setup of the Museum is based on the collective image of a certain period 
in the past. Roughly speaking this image is a blend of personal experiences 
and stories of a whole generation of people who have read more or less the 
same books and have watched the same TV programmes. The elderly visitors 
recognise this image effortlessly. This recognition, i.e. placing the setting into 
the right timeframe, is the easy part. It is often explicitly expressed with the 
words: O, I know this from my childhood years, or We used that during the war, or 
Everybody learned that at school.
Putting the setting in the right place is a very different process. The place 
that a visitor remembers is always personal and therefore always different. 
There is of course a possibility that the visitors will not show much personal 
involvement or perhaps only at the very end of their tour, but I would argue 
that even then they implicitly undergo a transformation, that can be called 
‘going back to your own place’. 
This ‘going back to your own place’ is always a very animated stage of the 
visit. Usually it takes place at a moment when the visitors start making 
their personal comments. They talk in a more relaxed way, they at last 
dare to touch the objects, they start making jokes and the general tone of 
the conversation rises. The people are warming up to the occasion; they 
are enjoying themselves and talking about their past. There are various 
elements that facilitate and subsequently strengthen this process. Apart 
from the extensive visually perceived information, there are various tactile 
and olfactory physical experiences that people can undergo in the Museum. 
Many of the visitors take the heavy cast-iron irons in their hands or take 
a sniff at the mothballs. There are various audio stimuli as well, like the 
ringing of the shop bell and the sound of the old-fashioned knife-grinder. 
Besides these sensory triggers the Museum offers interactive options. Unlike 
what usually takes place in conventional museums, the personnel, who are 
volunteers, ask the visitors all kinds of questions and encourage them to tell 
their stories. All this comes to the visitors bit by bit; it is adopted, absorbed 
and processed, both physically and intellectually.
It is exactly at these kinds of moments that the visitors rather unexpectedly 
reach back to the ‘reality’ and start asking questions about the Museum, 
about its opening hours, about the collection or about other logistical issues. 
At a glance all that has nothing to do with the emotional response to the 
collection that they have shown just a couple of moments before. It seems as 
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36   A more elaborate presentation of this kind of behaviour will be given in the next part of the 
chapter, where a number of Museum conversations are analysed.
if they are checking on the world where they live now before they can become 
immersed into their past again without any further reservations. I think those 
moments when they ask about the Museum logistics are needed as anchors 
in the situation, which in spite of all its visible pleasure is still quite a trial 
for the elderly. The experience they undergo must be quite overwhelming. A 
rendezvous with the past and with oneself in all its completeness due to the 
physical and intellectual stimulation that they undergo is not an everyday 
exercise for them and indeed a hefty experience, no matter how enjoyable it 
can appear. When finally the connections with the present, the now and here, 
are re-established, the visitors switch back to the remembering mode again, 
this time without much effort or time.36 
Then it happens. The moment that everybody who is working in the Museum 
likes best. It can be called the opening up, or in fact the culmination of the 
entire visit. A very personal remark, a story or an event is revealed, whereby 
the presence of a listener is more or less a must. It can be told with a smile or 
with tears, quietly or loudly. It can occur once or several times. We could give 
a few examples, but it would not be worthwhile to try and cover the entire 
diversity of the forms of expression that people use. 
The most remarkable thing is the transformation that the visitor has undergone 
from the moment he/she has entered the Museum till the moment of the 
‘opening’. At this stage there is nothing impersonal about the visitor anymore. 
At the same time the rather generalised interior of the Museum tends to 
acquire a new shape, as if a new physical dimension has opened up and 
you are engrossed in another place, which is well known to the visitor and 
into which he wants to introduce you. Perhaps this description sounds a bit 
presumptuous, but I have observed it taking place repeatedly. In my opinion it 
shows how each of the visitors tends to appropriate this nobody’s place of the 
Museum, turning it into his/her own place. At that point, the visitors resolve 
the tension between the impersonal and the personal, because their memories 
and experiences of the past are brought back home, almost in the literal sense 
of the word. By home, I do not mean an imaginative reconstruction of a specific 
place; the result is much more complicated. It is like a subtle, fragile and brief 
intersection of the actualised images that the visitor has of his or her own 
past, with that which is physically present and perceived in the Museum. It is 
the result of a filtering, fitting and fine-tuning of the past with respect to new 
experiences that show up, ending up in the creation of a very different space, 
which feels like home but which in fact is not. 
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How do I know all that? There is one stage in almost every visit that has a very 
explicit reflexive character. It mostly takes place at the end of the visit, but 
sometimes the traces of reflexivity echo forward earlier on during the visit. 
At this final stage, two kinds of remarks are often made. Deep appreciation is 
expressed about the possibility to see the exhibition at all. In that regard the 
visitors’ book is a wonderful document, almost a poem, reflecting various 
feelings that the Museum has evoked. Another type of remark describes the 
genuine surprise that the visitors experienced regarding the way they were 
able to remember and talk about things that had seemed to have disappeared 
from their lives years ago.
The pattern that has been sketched here should be seen as something like 
an ‘ideal typical’ version of a Museum visit. If we want this pattern to tell 
us more about people’s experiences, then it should be enriched with real 
conversations between visitors and staff members, which we shall do 
shortly. This pattern can be called a topographic map of the visit, which 
accurately registers the peaks and the drops in the remembering process by 
neatly placing them on the layout of the Museum. This kind of topographic 
matching allows us to look at the Museum place in its relation to the concept 
of memory in general and in particular to the remembering processes in 
which the elderly visitors of the Museum become engaged. 
This approach brings us back to the question that most of the visitors ask 
themselves in the very beginning, namely what kind of place is this? Let us 
be clear about the fact that this question does not address the same issue 
as in the previous chapter. Instead of the material and social aspects of the 
Museum exhibition the question here is about the social role and function 
that a place called the Reminiscence Museum can perform in modern society. 
At this stage we know for sure that the place actively facilitates the process 
of recognition, as a result of which most of the visitors find themselves 
involved in a spontaneous remembering process. The place could be called 
the space of memory, but the question that must be answered first, is whether 
it is a museum at all, or just a commemoration site, or perhaps even a kind 




The visits to the Museum do not simply happen; they evolve. There is nothing 
definite or complete about them. The unexpectedness of the collection and 
as a consequence the spontaneity of the reactions to this surprise are features 
that can be observed there repeatedly. When following the visitors, you see 
them becoming involved in the process of appropriating and digesting the 
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information that they are confronted with. In the beginning the information 
is received almost exclusively via visual perception. This information is 
accompanied by a laconic recital of ‘the house rules’. In fact, what the visitors 
are told is that there are no specific rules in this Museum and that they can 
enjoy it in any way they choose. But it takes some time before they are able 
to give up their roles of impersonal visitors. This is a remarkable turning point 
in almost each visit. 
As the general sketch of a usual Museum visit has already shown, the 
experience of the visitors that are looking at the exhibition consists of 
reinforcing their identities rather than giving them up. Visitors use the staged 
environment of the Museum in order to merge it with their past. The Museum 
plays a facilitating role in the process that can be both thrilling and shocking 
for the elderly visitors at the same time. It helps them to learn more about 
themselves in the place, the influence of which they initially underestimate 
but which finally does not disappoint them in the least.
When elderly people read about the Reminiscence Museum in a small local 
newspaper, their expectations do not differ much from what they would 
expect to see in any other museum. But they take good note of the piece of 
news and they usually plan their visit carefully, often with the aim to fill 
the whole day, especially if the visit involves travelling. The reasons for 
them to come can vary. For example, they could have heard an enthusiastic 
account from somebody who has already been there him/herself, or they 
were already planning to visit somebody in the Humanitas nursing home 
at the same location, or they even could have seen a TV programme where 
the Museum was mentioned. It doesn’t really make a lot of difference. Any 
expectation will have a positive effect. The Museum is something new that 
they have not yet seen; the name ‘Reminiscence’ (Herinneringsmuseum in 
Dutch) sounds both intriguing and promising. They anticipate spending 
some time to look around at the exhibition, usually not very long, after 
which they intend to go shopping, drink tea together, chat and exchange the 
latest news. The visit to the Museum is just one of the beads on the carefully 
arranged string of activities for a certain day (Hetherington, 2006). In a sense 
they have signed a kind of agreement of satisfaction long before their arrival 
at the Museum. They have planned to enjoy their day, engaging in various 
activities, amongst which a visit to the Museum. It would seem like they have 
signed this contract blindly, prepared themselves in advance for an identity-
loss and role-play at the Museum for part of the day. This readiness is not 
surprising if we consider the mentality and experiences of the generation 
in question. Being 65+ they think they know what their expectations can 
be. Besides, the obligation is more or less mutual, since Humanitas as an 
organisation that cares about its image and invites people to come for a visit, 
stands as a guarantee for a worthwhile experience. It looks as if neither of the 
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two parties can fail to fulfil their obligations. After all, most elderly people 
are experienced visitors of public places; they know how to behave and they 
are not easily surprised. It is in this frame of mind that the visitors usually 
enter the Reminiscence Museum in Rotterdam. 
***
Traditionally the expectations concerning the role of museums in society are 
based on their educational value. However important this idea can be for a 
better understanding of what is happening in the Reminiscence Museum, 
it seems to me that the function of remembering overrides the Museum’s 
educational role. The issue of calling the place a museum then asks for 
additional attention. To place the Reminiscence Museum into a broader 
context of museum studies in general is not the ambition of this study, but we 
must take into account some widespread ideas about the role and the place 
of museums in modern society. That can help us to answer the seemingly 
simple question whether the Reminiscence Museum can in fact be called a 
museum at all. Raising this question in its turn presupposes the existence of 
a general definition for the notion museum, which according to E. Hooper-
Greenhill can be quite elusive, considering the developments and changes, 
which museums have undergone in the last hundred years:
What is a museum? Museums are no longer built in the image of that nationalistic 
temple of culture, the British Museum. Today, almost anything may turn out to be a 
museum, and museums can be found in farms, boats, coal mines, warehouses, prisons, 
castles, or cottages. The experience of going to a museum is often closer to that of going 
to a theme park or a funfair than that which used to be offered by the austere, glass-case 
museum (1992: 1).
Let us assume Hooper-Greenhill’s position and agree that ‘there is no 
essential museum’ and that ‘the museum is not a pre-constituted entity, that 
is produced in the same way at all times’ (1992: 191). The notion museum was 
framed according to different criteria in different times. Those criteria range 
from educational purposes and satisfaction of aesthetical needs to simple 
amusement and leisure. In order to illustrate this, Hooper-Greenhill, for 
example, leads us to the splendours of the fifteenth century Medici Palace 
in Florence (1992: 23-46) and T. Benett (1995) links the modern museum 
techniques to the behavioural management of fairs, amusement parks and 
exhibitions. R. ten Bos en R. Kaulingfreks (2005) give an interesting historical 
record of the transformation from the Wunderkammer, the wonder room, to a 
modern museum. Because of the unorthodox function of the Reminiscence 
Museum the insights of these various authors can be helpful. They show that 
the idea of preservation and collection was initially based on the singularity 
and exceptionality of the artefacts that were displayed in the so-called curiosity 
cabinets. The incomparability of the ‘wonders’ made them worthwhile to be 
collected and looked at, accompanied by stories about their provenance: 
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Thus, the first museums let see the singular: it is about something that cannot be but still 
is present. It is about an exception to the rule. That is why there is no difference between 
the imagined and the factual (my translation) (Ten Bos & Kaulingfreks, 2005: 199).
The wonder rooms were not about the transformation of specific information from 
one generation to the next, but about unknown facts and artefacts, which were 
exciting and instructive for everybody. If we place the Reminiscence Museum 
into this setting, then initially we can only see some partial affinities between the 
original wonder cabinets and the Museum, especially in the way it excites the 
imagination of its visitors. As for the possible learning effects of the Museum, let us 
first follow Hooper-Greenhill, who in her analysis draws on Foucault’s diachronic 
‘archaeological’ description of the conditions, under which human knowledge 
has been accumulated. 
After the Renaissance period another ‘structure of knowledge’ conquered the 
world, with its ‘founding structure…of order, through measurement and drawing-
up of hierarchical series’ (Hooper-Greenhill, 1992: 15). That structure was based 
on the correspondence and comparability of facts and phenomena, which had 
replaced uniqueness and exceptionality. The museums started displaying types, 
sorts and series. Every exception was welcomed, on the condition that it eventually 
received an explanation. Ten Bos and Kaulingfreks describe that stage as follows:
There is no more place for dwarfs and frivolities. The museum is not a wonder room any 
more. It is crucial that in the scientific museum the object itself does not occupy the central 
position but only indicates the hidden correspondence, an underlying classification, a 
secret link. The catalogue emerges (my translation) (Ten Bos & Kaulingfreks, 2005: 201).
Thus taxonomy replaces exclusivity, knowledge becomes ‘the commodity 
that museums offer’, and museums turn into ‘Classifying Houses’ or 
‘storehouses’ (Hooper-Greenhill, 1992: 4, 6). Leaving aside the excitements of 
further developments, let us say that this trend seems still to be holding on. 
The classifying and educational functions of museums are recognised and 
appreciated by general public opinion. Miracles are replaced by the notion 
of exotics and museum visits alternate the routine of everyday life (see e.g. 
Goulding, 1999).
This description brings us back to the frame of mind in which the visitors usually 
enter the Reminiscence Museum in Rotterdam. But as we have already seen, 
their response to the exhibition hardly reflects the usual pattern of behaviour 
in a museum. Instead of a respectful silence the Museum is filled with excited 
voices and laughter of visitors, who do not need to be educated. They are in 
a place where everything looks utterly familiar to them and where they can 
take over the role of educators themselves. The Reminiscence Museum can be 
seen as a ‘classifying machine’, but any effort to give a systematic description 
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of its collection would be thwarted by the gaps and distortions, which we have 
described in the previous chapter. 
Nevertheless the Reminiscence Museum in Rotterdam fits within the current 
trends of development that museums are subject to. While ‘the educational 
role of museums is claimed as a major justification’ (Hooper-Greenhil, 
1992: 2) for their existence, there are developments and changes towards 
understanding the role that the visitors play in defining the place of museums 
in public and cultural life. Falk & Dierking, for example, claim that ‘visitors 
create their own museum experience’ and that ‘each visitor’s experience is 
different, because each brings his own personal and social contexts’ (1992: 
67). Walsh strongly criticises the general ‘commodification of the past’ and 
suggests that ‘the key to improving an understanding of the past and the 
way it is represented, is to involve the public in either producing their own 
displays, or letting them know how exhibitions are developed’ (1992: 170). 
Those ideas bring us closer to the principles, on which the Reminiscence 
Museum in Rotterdam is founded; yet some essential differences between 
the organisation and exploitation of the traditional museum space and the 
Reminiscence Museum in Rotterdam cannot be ignored. Let me show an 
example here. 
Hooper-Greenhill identifies several factors through which decisions are 
made about the positioning of artefacts in the context of existing displays: 
‘the existing divisions between objects, the particular curatorial practices 
of the specific institution, the physical condition of the material object, and 
the interests, enthusiasms, and expertise of the curator in question’ (1992: 
6). Those factors can hardly be called surprising when applied to a modern 
conventional museum. But the placing of objects in the Reminiscence 
Museum in Rotterdam is not that straightforward at all. Very often when 
people donate their personal belongings, they explicitly ask them to be placed 
on display in that particular Museum37 . The Museum staff is aware that the 
donors will not forget their request and will return with their acquaintances 
or family members in order to show their former possessions that are on 
display. Thus the visitors of the Reminiscence Museum influence the content 
of the Museum collection in a much more powerful way than the donors of 
official and more prestigious museums. Imagine the following situation. An 
elderly man came to the Museum to bring some old-fashioned things. One 
of his donations was a very old cactus plant, which he had inherited from his 
brother, who died long ago. The deceased brother bequeathed the plant to 
the man, for whom taking care of the cactus became a symbolic extension of 
his connection with his brother. At the moment however he felt that the time 
37   The visitors are often told that Humanitas also has a few other museums where their 
donations can be displayed. 
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had come to say a farewell to the plant, and the Museum seemed to him to be 
a natural solution for that. Strictly speaking, the old and odd looking plant 
should be considered a step too far, even for the flexible and unorthodox 
exhibition of the Museum, but it was accepted for the collection, because it 
had its own story to tell and memories that it could revive. Most important 
of all, it was what the visitor in question had requested. If we look back at 
the factors mentioned in the beginning of this paragraph, which are used to 
decide the positioning of artefacts in museums, then we can conclude that 
they would hardly take into consideration the personal opinion and wishes 
of a visitor, and certainly not in the way this happens in the Reminiscence 
Museum in Rotterdam.
What we have seen until now is that the Reminiscence Museum occupies 
a specific place among the institutions that traditionally fall under the 
definition for a museum. It is certainly a particular space of memory, which 
strongly appeals to the personal experiences of its visitors and where the 
educational role of the display gives way to an emergent personal response. 
The heart of those differences lies in understanding, appreciation and 
engagement with the experience, which is both collective and personal. In 
his reflexion on ‘the modernity of the museum and its direct engagement 
with issues of experience’, Hetherington explains:
To understand the museum as an emergent modern creation and to address the differing 
responses it elicits we need to consider this issue of experience as an epistemological 
basis for understanding the museum as an idea rather than simply trace out lineages or 
ruptures with earlier institutionalized forms of collecting, displaying and interpreting 
artefacts of varying kinds (2006: 599).
In other words, much has changed in the way we look at museums. However 
honourable the educational task of the museum can be, a visitor does not 
always go there for yet another lesson. More and more often museum 
visitors introduce their own experiences and re-live them in the context of 
the museum exhibition. By experiences I understand here their personal 
memories, which are placed alongside or even against the generalized 
narrative that the museums present. Memories may contradict the context 
that is presented to visitors, in which case the re-experiencing will create an 
alternative to the museum version of the narrative. Understood in that way, 
the emergent character of the modern museum becomes explicit. It brings 
us back to the idea of wonder rooms by reintroducing respect and interest 
towards the singularity and uniqueness of the objects on display. At the same 
time it opens the opportunity for a multi-voiced narrative about the past that 
is collective and personal at the same time. 
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In the meantime, museums are doing their best to shape collective narratives 
that correspond with the individual ones. It is obvious that this kind of 
narrative can never be perfect. At best it will be completed with all sorts 
of details and corrections corresponding with the personal knowledge or 
experience of the visitors. In other cases, an explicit ‘distortion’ can occur, 
because of incompatibility between the museum’s version of events and the 
personal narrative of the visitor. Fortunately, the Reminiscence Museum in 
Rotterdam does not aim to safeguard the ultimate (historical) truth. That is 
probably why it can hardly offend one’s feelings concerning the authenticity 
of the collection. Besides, because the visitors are invited to comment on 
what is displayed in the Museum, there is always a chance ‘to correct’ the 
given version of the past, if there should be a need for that. This is relaxing, 
and the difference offers new perspectives in comparison with the prevailing 
narratives in the official museums, where the expectation to find out ‘what 
has actually happened’ is an inescapable part of a museum visit. 
It seems as if two different trends are developing at the same time. On the one 
hand, in order to survive and to safeguard their public role, museums have 
become more personal, appealing to the recent past, the witnesses of which 
are the target group of such museums (think of the Holocaust museums for 
example). These kinds of historical museums appeal to the generation that 
is still alive and can confirm or reject the narrative that is presented. On the 
other hand public life in general has become more ‘museumified’ since we, 
as visitors of the public space, quite often use a distraction mode to scan and 
choose the most appropriate way of action without allowing strong emotions 
into the process (Hetherington, 2006).
Let us stay with the first trend for a little bit longer. One can argue that 
everything that a visitor undergoes during a museum visit is based on 
his or her personal experience. Nevertheless there are exhibitions that 
leave us emotionally untouched, and there are others that make us think, 
dream and talk about it again and again. There can hardly be one universal 
explanation for all these different responses. Based on my observations at 
the Reminiscence Museum I would argue that there are several important 
components of the enormous effect that the exhibition of the Museum has on 
its visitors. There is not-quite correspondence and therefore in many cases a 
discrepancy between the reminiscences of the visitors and the artefacts that 
are displayed in the Museum. And there is the uniqueness of each ‘author’s’ 
story that is told during Museum visits. For me as an observer the Museum 
is a wonder room, where from its unique singularities, which are not the 
artefacts on display but the visitors themselves, the collective image of recent 
Dutch history arises in its unofficial and polyphonic beauty. 
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If one tries to look at the Museum as a true representation of domestic life 
during a certain period of Dutch history, then the door will instantly be opened 
to endless discussions, during which differing official opinions about that past 
will be presented. The best way to catch the idea that underlies the Museum 
exhibition is to see it as a generalized presentation of former domestic life, which 
only cuts through the most superficial but all the same utterly recognizable 
layer of people’s memories. By doing so it opens up opportunities to search 
deeper into one’s reminiscences. In that sense the function of the Museum can 
be seen as an invitation to make the collective narrative personal. The Museum 
does not contain the wonders of personal stories and experiences - these are 
brought by the visitors. Wonders then occur twice: first when stories are told 
and the environment of the Museum appropriates the unique features of one’s 
home. And then once again when the visitor realises that without intending to, 
he or she has been sharing memories about his or her personal past. Finally, 
the visitors are surprised by the Museum, which they look upon as a wonder 
room, while the observer (a volunteer for example) is taken by surprise by the 
willingness and ability of the visitors to remember and share their personal 
experiences. In that sense the Museum can be characterised by its predictable 
unpredictability, its recognisable uniqueness and its polyphony of singularities. 
Space of memory
So far our topographic analysis of the Museum has left us without a definite 
answer to the question whether the Reminiscence Museum can be called 
a museum at all. When there are no visitors around it looks like a non-
identifiable place filled with a strange collection of old-fashioned objects. 
It turns into a wonder room when stories told by visitors bring the displays 
back to life. Most of the visitors come there with an expectation to just enjoy 
another museum visit, but very soon they forget and discard their usual 
reserved approach to a public place. The remembering practices that then take 
place give us yet another opportunity to interpret that very original space of 
memory. In my understanding the topography of memory is closely connected 
with materiality and with the recursive patterns of the remembering process. 
Materiality can be understood in different ways here: materiality as a collection 
of artefacts, which has already been given enough attention, and materiality 
as a lieu de mémoire, using the term introduced by Pierre Nora. Taking a usual 
Museum visit as an example, we can say that the visitor scans the landscape of 
the Museum display, and each time he or she stumbles on a familiar object the 
remembering process is activated. Thus the mediatory function of the artefacts 
helps to map one’s reminiscences, creating a memory landscape with sharply 
focused (remembered) and blind (forgotten) squares in it. Let us look now at 
the Museum from this new perspective and see if it can also be called a lieu de 
mémoire, a site of memory. 
140
The term lieu de mémoire was coined by Nora in the beginning of eighties and 
has not lost its currency since then. We have already seen that while trying to 
catch the essential particularities of the Museum, we have been captured by 
what we have called the space of memory. Let us now pay some attention to 
the possibility to spatialise our memories. The idea of localising our memory 
was not new at the moment when Nora started on his project. About forty 
years earlier Halbwachs had already elaborated on the importance of 
territorialisation of a group’s memories in The Legendary Topography of the 
Gospels:
To be sure, it was important that the believers be confident they were seen and touching 
the very places where the facts subsequently transformed into dogma had happened. 
The memory of groups contains many truths, notions, ideas, and general propositions 
… (1941/1992: 200). 
In his description Halbwachs points directly at something that I would call the 
materiality of memory. The remarkable part of his statement has to do with the 
fact that it is primarily collective memory that he focuses his attention on and not 
individual memory. It can be relatively easy to anchor one’s individual memory 
in the material world of, for example, cherished objects. The materiality of our 
collective memory is less tangible, to say the least. This realisation however 
does not slow down Halbwachs in his effort to territorialise collective memory. 
In various contexts, when describing certain kinds of groups (professional, 
religious, family), he searches for a justification for the existence and persistence 
of collective memory, by applying various spatial terms or metaphors:
The place a group occupies is not like a blackboard, where one may write and erase 
figures at will. No image of a blackboard can recall what was once written there. The 
board could not care less … But place and group have each received the imprint of the 
other. Therefore every phase of the group can be translated into spatial terms, and its 
residence is but the juncture of all these terms. Each aspect, each detail, of this place 
has a meaning intelligent only to members of the group, for each portion of its space 
corresponds to various and different aspects of the structure and life of their society, at 
least of what is most stable in it (1950/1992: 130). 
Halbwachs’ idea of the ‘spatial and physical dimension’ regarding collective 
memory was further developed by Middleton & Brown (2005). The authors 
underline the stability of collectives and their memories, based on the traces 
we leave in our physical surroundings, and the reciprocal bidirectional 
character of relations ‘between humans and their environment’. Those 
conclusions and especially the idea of ‘implacement’ of frameworks, 
understood as ‘a series of images of the past and a set of relationships that 
specify how these images are to be ordered’ (2005: 39) will be useful to us 
when we talk about the place that modern society indicates as an appropriate 
territory for the elderly people to live in. 
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There is no doubt that Halbwachs’ works were known to Nora and that 
Nora subsequently drew upon the structure of collective frameworks and 
spatial dimension of the collective memory as explained by Halbwachs. The 
presentation of les lieux de mémoire was preceded by various developments 
and changes that had taken place, both in society in general and in the 
modern historic and historiographic sciences. In the light of our study, let us 
briefly pay attention to the definition of ‘acceleration of history’, which Nora 
uses. Nora points out the fundamental changes that have taken place in the 
course of history during the 20th century:
The acceleration of history: let us try to gauge the significance, beyond metaphor, of 
this phrase. An increasingly rapid slippage of the present into a historical past that is 
gone for good, a general perception that anything and everything may disappear – these 
indicate a rupture of equilibrium. The remnants of experience still lived in the warmth 
of tradition, in the silence of custom, in the repetition of ancestral, have been displaced 
under the pressure of a fundamentally historical sensibility (1989: 7).
What Nora so eloquently brings together in this definition, is our increasing 
sense of insecurity caused by the rapid loss of tradition. The feeling of 
belonging is replaced by the formal act of referring one’s life to a certain 
historical period. As we shall see later, the ‘nostalgia epidemic’ is one of 
the possible consequences of such uprootedness. To understand the crucial 
changes about which Nora talks in his passage, let us illustrate them with 
some examples. Imagine a visitor of the Museum who is about 70 years old. 
A simple exercise in history will show the enormous scope of events of both 
personal and public significance, which this person must have witnessed 
during his / her life. In many cases the visitors of the Museum express 
bewilderment when they are confronted with the abbreviated version of 
their lives that is presented in the displays: I cannot imagine we always had 
to do this! Or: It is unbelievable! In such a short time such a sweeping change. Or: 
Where has it all gone?
The consequences of the acceleration of history are quite severe, especially for 
the older generation. On the one hand we can count our blessings if our 
memories of the past are clear. On the other hand one can talk about the 
‘work load’ in terms of working out and managing the growing scope of 
memories that we are sentenced to bear. The speed of the changes we are 
witnessing introduces a new dimension to our appreciation of what memory 
means to us. Our language reflects it beautifully. What used to be referred 
to as the year when Uncle John’s eldest son got his motorbike, we would 
now determine as the ‘pre-computer’ times. The idyllic image of being born 
and dying in the same place, surrounded by the same family members, 
neighbours and friends, does not reflect the realities of modern life any 
more. We move to new places at a high speed, while the old ones are being 
torn down; we meet new people on our way, while being informed that 
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old acquaintances have passed away. We are constantly busy and so is our 
memory, which is overloaded with information. This is the right moment for 
‘extreme measures’, to be taken in order to save whatever can be saved. This 
is the point, when ‘specific places of memory do not simply arise out of lived 
experience - instead they have to be created’ (Misztal, 2003: 105). As Nora 
eloquently put it, ‘There are lieux de mémoire, sites of memory, because there 
are no longer milieux de memoire, real environments of memory’ (1989: 7).
It seems like the Reminiscence Museum in Rotterdam can be considered to 
be such a site of memory. But there is a distinct difference between the way 
Nora explains the origins of the sites of memory and my personal experience 
with the Museum: 
Lieux de mémoire originate with the sense that there is no spontaneous memory, that 
we must deliberately create archives, maintain anniversaries, organize celebrations, 
pronounce eulogies, and notarize bills because such activities no longer occur naturally 
…We buttress our identities upon such bastions, but if what they defended were not 
threatened, there would be no need to build them … Indeed, it is this very push and pull 
that produces lieux de mémoire – moments of history torn away from the movement of 
history, then returned; no longer quite life, not yet death, like shells on the shore when 
the sea of living memory has receded (1989: 12).
This passage contains a tinge of bitterness and irony. In the battle between 
history and memory, Nora remarks on the disappearance of the natural 
memory and its replacement by symbolic, functional and monumental sites 
like museums, archives, festivals, commemorations, anniversaries etc. He 
calls them ‘boundary stones of another age, illusions of eternity’ (1989: 12). 
If the topography of memory has to be understood in these terms, then each 
description of sites of memory will turn into a description of a cemetery. Yet 
my experiences in the Museum were anything but lifeless. The place of the 
Museum certainly has a symbolic meaning, but it was never intended to 
become a crypt for moments in history. 
Nora compares memory to ‘the gigantic and breathtaking storehouse of a 
material stock of what it would be impossible for us to remember’ (1989: 
13). The question is what happens with the memories themselves, which 
Nora calls ‘sacred’. His answer does not sound very optimistic: ‘The sacred 
is invested in the trace that is at the same time its negation’. Speaking about 
sites of memory, he points out the obsession to immortalize the form (trace), 
to the expense of the essence of memory. Looking at the Museum from the 
perspective of Nora’s lieux de mémoire, we can see a mirror of the processes 
that caused epidemics of nostalgia and commemoration in modern society. 
At the same time there are some distinctive differences. These concern the 
symbolic character, the functionality and the monumentality of memory sites.
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Since the Museum reconstructs a very general image of former domestic life, 
it can easily be assigned a symbolic character. This symbolism is disturbed 
by the fact that the Museum visitors and staff members are in certain cases 
the same people who have donated things for the Museum exhibition. Here 
and there you can find personal belongings which have little to do with 
symbolism, but still bear the warm touch of their former owners. I remember 
a woman who donated a beautiful old photo camera to the Museum. She 
was proud of it and told about it to everybody who was present. During the 
following months I saw that woman visiting the Museum quite regularly. 
Each time she brought along new acquaintances and it goes without saying 
that she stopped in front of her camera each time to show it to her friends 
and to tell them that it used to be hers and how she decided to donate it to the 
Museum. The camera had acquired some symbolic meaning for the woman 
who used to own it and is constantly drawn towards reminiscing, whereby 
the camera plays the role of a familiar milestone on the road towards the 
past. But the camera also contains the power to inspire other people with 
spontaneous personal memories, which are unique and sacred. 
The symbolism of the Museum objects does not supplant the spontaneity of 
the reactions. This can be explained by their dual nature. An object, like for 
instance a photo camera, symbolises the past in connection with the activities, 
values, passions and hobbies that were inseparably a part of somebody’s 
life. At the same time the camera from our example has a symbolic meaning 
concerning present activities, values and passions. We shall see further 
on that the older generation is quite sensitive regarding the fate of their 
possessions, especially those that they do not use anymore. The woman who 
donated the camera found a solution by giving the cherished object away 
while at the same time managing to achieve two results, namely to preserve 
its value and to establish a new value through her own gesture. That second 
part of the camera’s ‘symbolism’ has little to do with immortality of the past 
and has a direct positive influence on the person’s present life. 
Another difference between the Reminiscence Museum and lieux de 
mémoire concerns their functionality. Sites of memory reflect a strategy of 
self-preservation. The sites are created to preserve what they show. But the 
Reminiscence Museum is not intended to preserve whatever is displayed 
there. It is intended to facilitate remembering, especially among elderly 
people. The preservation of artefacts merely plays an instrumental role in 
the Museum, since the Museum itself is instrumental for three-dimensional 
stimulation of remembering, which cannot be preserved. The difference that 
has crystallized here can be illustrated by comparing the role that rituals 
play at commemorative sites and at the Museum. Commemorative and 
celebrative practices are built upon and strengthened by means of rituals, 
uniforms, symbols and fixed meanings. Those practices have steady roots, 
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patterns and guardians, and any attack on them could easily be considered as 
blasphemous. Think for example of the parades, salutes, eternal flames and 
speeches that have become the inevitable attributes of war commemorations. 
The Museum, with its reconstruction of the entourage of domestic life, leaves 
not only enough space for the awakening of various kinds of rituals for former 
housekeeping, but also provides an opportunity to re-assess the past. Let us 
take an example. In the washing room corner of the Museum the visitors 
often reminisce about Monday being the traditional washing day, including 
the entire ritual. The mother of the family would collect the washing on 
Sunday evening and let it soak all night. Then on Monday the washing pan 
would be placed on the oil stove. After having been boiled for a few hours, 
the washing would be removed from the stove (which frequently caused 
horrible accidents), after which it would be put into a sink with cold water 
in order to be rinsed. By the time the children had returned from school, the 
washing was always ready to be wrung. So they were ordered to the wringer 
and the seemingly endless rotating exercise started: the washing went from 
the sink with cold water into the wringer. Then it came out on the other side 
of the wringer and fell into a bucket. By then it was ready to be hung on the 
clothesline.
 
What I have just described here is told repeatedly by all kinds of people 
during their Museum visits. There are no pictures or a written explanation in 
the washing room corner that can support their stories. There are only objects, 
such as a washing pan, a wringer and soap, which are arranged in the way 
it could have been many years ago. The example shows that the Museum 
does not require any rituals in order to make people remember something. 
My rather generally worded story would have dozens of personal nuances 
if we could listen to each and every visitor. But what is remembered here is 
the ritual itself. That ritual endures in the story that is told and has little to 
do with the rigidness of officially established rituals that are used elsewhere 
to look back and recall the past. 
There is another important aspect to the way certain rituals of domestic life 
are remembered. The Museum has no claim to the manner in which the 
visitors should look at their past. The same washing ritual provides an entire 
spectrum of reactions, which varies from romanticising the heavy labour at 
home to open dismay against how it used to be. So in fact, by presenting 
some generalised settings, the Museum does not have any control over the 
people’s memories; as a result each single memory remains valuable and 
authentic in its living power.
This last point of re-evaluation brings us to the last distinction between the 
Reminiscence Museum and the lieux de mémoire, namely their monumentality. 
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Sites of memory are mostly created as a reaction to disappearance. Their 
artificiality and the absence of the original reference point are in a sense a 
passport for their immortality. We must realize that in times where people 
fight for control over sources of information, sites of memory are also 
targets. By control we mean here the authority of knowledge that is coded 
into the sites and also the measure of its openness or closeness to revision. 
Sites of memory must be regarded in the context of political and ideological 
developments that take place during their existence. On the whole the best-
functioning sites are relatively conservative, since they can be adjusted 
almost unnoticeably to the still changing situation (Wertsch, 2002). 
I can only partly recognize this pattern in the founding of the Reminiscence 
Museum. The site of domestic life as it is reconstructed there has almost 
disappeared. Almost means that here and there you can still find houses with 
features or objects from grandmother’s days. They are rare ‘survivors’ and 
the next major renovation of those houses will probably remove their traces 
forever. Their current existence provides a subtle but distinct link between the 
present and the past that is fading away; this singles the Museum collection 
out amidst the various memory sites. You can often hear visitors saying: O! 
That is something I still have / use at home! I happen to live in an apartment 
where the first model of the famous Dutch Bruynzeel kitchen was installed. 
The Museum has one of them as well, and there is hardly a visitor who does 
not stop in front of it, recognizing its particular style with a hint of nostalgic 
romanticism and reflecting on its then ultra-modern design. 
The Museum was opened only a couple of years ago, in 2006, but a lot of 
changes have already been made since then, both in regard to its collection 
and to the placing of the objects. The main reasons for those changes were the 
accuracy of the reconstruction and the functionality of the Museum space. 
These changes were initiated by the management of Humanitas, people who 
work in the Museum, and by the Museum visitors themselves. In that respect 
the authority about knowhow regarding the Museum is delegated and 
shared at the same time. The adjustments, which still occur quite regularly, 
have hardly touched the initially created image of domestic life: a painting 
is given a more appropriate place on the wall; a set of chairs was replaced by 
another set that fits the style of the room better; a surplus washing machine 
was moved to a Humanitas affiliate. 
If you look at the Museum exhibition in terms of movement and change, then 
you realize that the various adjustments all work as the sharpening function 
of a lens. The image becomes more precise and includes more details, which 
in a certain sense enlivens the entire setting. This fascination can be compared 
with the experience one gets while looking at paintings of famous masters 
like Johannes Vermeer. The longer you look, the more the details of the scene 
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reveal themselves to you. But the difference is that ‘looking longer’ at the 
Museum display appeals not only to your aesthetical feelings and cognitive 
curiosity but also touches directly upon one’s personal experiences and often 
long forgotten knowledge. Once again, that is exactly the point where the 
difference between the official lieux de mémoire and the Museum becomes 
explicit. 
Making the Museum exhibition ‘more beautiful’ can have a price tag. One 
can argue that this is what usually happens with places like these: the 
novelty gradually wears off and we are confronted with a dull image of 
former domestic life, which no longer appeals to our emotions. But for the 
time being it does not look like the Reminiscence Museum is destined to this 
fate. A decision, which could be called political, was taken by the director of 
Humanitas; he suggested to store some of the objects, which were considered 
too ‘young’ for the Museum now, but which will probably attract a lot of 
attention in 10-20 years time, as the next generation becomes older. Those 
things are kept out of sight now, but at some point they will replace the 
current artefacts, which by that time will not awaken many reminiscences 
anymore. The flexibility of the adjustments that can be still made is 
determined by the universality of the theme around which the Museum is 
built. The topographical chart of everybody’s life includes a certain point 
called home, which we are sentenced to reminisce about as we get older. 
The Museum can be called a politically neutral site. If one should look at 
the political power of the Museum, then that would mainly concern the 
social positioning of the older generation within society. While leaving this 
discussion for chapters later on, let us just say that the exhibition of the 
Museum aims to be neutral, but that it does make a certain public statement 
as an entity. The goals that the sites of memory and the Museum aim at differ 
quite considerably. The sites aim at stimulating a reciprocity of actions and 
feelings without questioning their value or allowing the assumption that 
this value has changed. The Museum too is a site of preservation, but what 
is preserved there can be called the living memories of people who want 
to pass their knowledge on or to share it with others. Those memories are 
subject to change, revision and oblivion. In that respect, the Museum, which 
is not quite a museum or a wonder room, nor truly a site of memory, is in fact 
a unique space for memory. 
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38   The terms actual and virtual are introduced here with reference to Bergson’s theory on 
memory. A brief definition, which will be expanded on later, can clarify the use of those terms 
in our present discussion. Middleton & Brown propose the following interpretation: ‘The 
distinction between ‘virtual’ and ‘actual’ is pivotal to Bergson’s account of lived experience. 
Whenever Bergson uses the term ‘actual’, he is referring to action, to what is being done, what 
is being perceived in the here and now. By contrast, the term ‘virtual’ refers to what does not 
act, what could be or has been perceived or done. ‘Virtual’ is synonymous with ‘potential’ 
(2005: 74-75).  In relation to memory virtual therefore relates to the totality of our preserved 
experiences, while actual points at a small part of them which are called upon at the present 
moment.
Eluding Treasure Island
While investigating the topography of memory we came across an interesting 
observation regarding the pattern of the Museum visits, namely the 
spatialised character of remembering. By the term spatialised I understand 
that remembering processes are firmly anchored in materiality, in our case 
in the materiality of the Museum exhibition. At the same time remembering 
presents itself through spatialisation of virtual images which our memory 
ceaselessly preserves (Bergson, 1912/2004).38 That is why we can become the 
witnesses of this process and share at least a part of the emotions the visitor 
is providing. 
In order to determine the term spatialised, it seems useful to start with 
exclusion. Following Bergson and the arguments he presented at length 
in Matter and Memory, I agree that the brain cannot be seen as a simple 
container for human memory. Thus, talking about the spatialised process of 
remembering, I am not looking for the treasure island inside our brain where 
our precious memories are hidden, even though the semantic structure of 
the metaphor is one of the most popular ones in the history of studies on 
memory (Draaisma, 2000). Middleton & Brown take one step further, not 
only explaining why the ‘container’ metaphor is not right for the description 
of the remembering processes, but also offering a new opening concerning 
the ‘spatialised conception of experience’:
…we often do tend to think of ourselves in spatial terms, as ‘containers’ of our own 
experience. However, we only do so by transposing the spatial terms in which we 
understand action to our understanding of change and time. What Bergson calls the 
‘cinematographical mechanism of thought’ is critical to our ability to live and act. We 
could not survive without it, but it does not allow us to adequately think about the kind 
of movement and change that are proper to our experience of enduring as living beings. 
There is, then, a tension between the spatialised forms our experience takes and those 
intersecting ‘virtual’ forms of experience that constitute us as dynamic, living, temporal 
beings (Middleton & Brown, 2005: 224).
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Thinking and talking about memory in terms of collecting, accumulating, 
keeping and preserving has become common in the everyday discourse. 
The genesis of this metaphor has to do with our understanding how the 
selves of human beings are formed and preserved in general and what each 
personality consists of in particular. Let us look at Bergson’s interpretation:
[T]he relation of container to content borrows its apparent clearness and universality 
from the necessity laid upon us of always opening out space in front of us, and of always 
closing duration behind us. Because it has been shown that one thing is within another, 
the phenomenon of its preservation is not thereby made any clearer (1912/2004: 192).
Here Bergson deploys his well-known argument about the tension between 
the continuous virtual existence of memory as a whole, and the customary 
way of its (metaphorical) spatial representation. His other remark concerning 
preservation looks interesting as well. According to Bergson the essence 
of the phenomenon of preservation lies beyond spatiality. If preservation 
relates only to the virtual part of memory, then we can probably put a sign 
of equality between memory and preservation. Preservation can be given 
various interpretations. I think that preservation as a social act has quite 
a different nature from the preservation that Bergson is talking about. The 
most important distinction is that while memory is ‘always on’ (Middleton 
& Brown: 73, 229), so that we cannot willingly switch it on and off, socially 
meaningful preservation is an act of will, even if it seems to be free of 
consciousness and takes place almost as naturally as breathing. 
Why though is the ‘preservation’ of memories considered to be so important? 
A simple answer would be that our memory is in fact what we are. And what 
we are can be understood as a human personality, or selfhood. The concept of 
selfhood is based not only on a unique combination of the physical elements that 
are held to each other by natural forces, forming our body, but more important 
still, it is deeply rooted in the uniqueness of our personal experiences, which 
turn us into the person we are and make us do what we do: 
[J]ust as the talent of the painter is formed or deformed in any case, is modified – under 
the very influence of the works he produces, so each of our states, at the moment of its 
issue, modifies our personality, being indeed the new form that we are just assuming. 
It is then right to say that what we do depends on what we are; but it is necessary to 
add also that we are, to a certain extent, what we do, and that we are creating ourselves 
continually (Bergson, 1912/2004: 9).
Once again Bergson brings different concepts together to show their 
interdependence. Everything that happens in human life is ‘preserved’ to 
feed and form our personality, which in its turn changes constantly. We are 
aware of this, since our desires and actions are constantly directed by the 
patterns of our character. Every action brings a change, and each change will 
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be preserved again, so that it will influence the personality, which will lead to 
another action…. This is a kind of reciprocity without enclosure and identity. 
This is a limitless duration of becoming that does not fit into an infinite space 
since, still speaking metaphorically, we do not know how much they both are. 
Adaptation
The notion spatialisation will be transposed to the topographic description 
of remembering processes. In the theoretical framework which guides my 
analysis I start from the already mentioned tension between ‘the spatialised 
forms our experience takes’ and ‘virtual’ forms of our being. The tension that 
Middleton & Brown talk about gives us the first key to understanding what 
happens from the very moment the visitors enter the Museum. This tension 
is caused by a number of changes that take place simultaneously, but are 
very different by nature. By starting his or her tour, the visitor either enters 
or crosses invisible but sensitive lines of belonging to various groups. One 
specific feature of this experience is that the mutual influence of the various 
networks accumulates and accelerates during the entire visit. As a result the 
visitor finds him/herself playing the role of the main character, while he/she 
had come with the intention to enjoy the play as a member of the audience. 
When entering the place called the Reminiscence Museum, the visitors find 
themselves unexpectedly exposed to various kinds of highly intensive 
stimuli. From the very beginning the place and the visitors react to each 
other by means of sight, hearing and smell. Standing in the first room, some 
of the visitors look like people who have received a perceptual shock and 
need some time to recover from that. The unexpectedness is often expressed 
with discursive interjections like O my God! or It is so big! or with a moment 
of profound silence, which I could call the most expressive form of reaction. 
Although these reactions are the most common ones, they do not exhaust the 
diversity of the responses to the overwhelming wave of sensory information 
that the visitors are confronted with. Sometimes visitors, who have just 
entered the Museum, stop abruptly saying: (It is all old rubbish.) I don’t want to 
see this. A separate category of first reactions to the Museum display is when 
clients from the nursing home (often suffering from a form of dementia) react 
upon this new situation by refusing to engage themselves in the situation 
they are confronted with. This block can usually be reduced or taken away 
altogether after some time, under the attentive guidance of the professionals 
who accompany them. 
These examples, however diverse they seem to us, clearly show the intensity 
of the sensory impressions that the visitors are confronted with from the 
very start of their visit. The equilibrium of the ‘impersonal’ visitor that was 
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mentioned before is therefore instantaneously changed, and we could say 
that the remainder of the visit will be a pursuit of the balance that was lost 
earlier on. 
The change that the visitors undergo, no matter how crucial and important 
it is, occurs to them as a sudden metamorphosis, a kind of surprising and 
instantaneous opening up of their memory. But the change is not a jump from 
one state that they are in to another; it is a process of constant acceleration, 
where memory ‘covering as it does with a cloak of recollections a core of 
immediate perception, and also contracting a number of external moments 
into a single internal moment, constitutes the principal share of individual 
consciousness in perception..’ (Bergson, 1912/2004: 25).  
At the same time, everything that ‘is perceived’ in the first instances of the 
visit, is either recognised or rejected. These processes cannot take place 
outside the spatial context of the entire setting. Not only because the stimuli 
are external, but also because all kinds of invisible threads are formed and 
spread out, creating a new dimension, with the visitor’s consciousness as a 
speeding generative core in the middle of it. To complete the comparison, I 
can say that in the same way that the accumulation process of a dynamo at 
some point in time will produce sufficient electric current to ignite a light, 
the intensity of our perception will at a certain point create sufficient tension 
for the actualisation of the virtual images.
Thus, perception and remembering work in an accelerating mode, and the 
Museum visitors adapt to the contents in accordance with their social skills, 
knowledge and personal experience. In all those processes, spatiality plays 
an important role. While we talk about the virtual becoming actual, or about 
joining or rejecting certain frameworks, everything that happens with the 
visitors of the Museum has to do with their spatialised way of thinking 
and expressing themselves as social human beings. The remembering 
process benefits enormously from the localisation of thoughts or objects. 
The Museum offers this kind of localisation by definition. In the beginning 
however, it seems like there are several different places that each visitor is 
confronted with: an open but unfamiliar place, which is the Museum and the 
sealed one inside themselves. And only with the right tools will they be able 
to break the seal, in order to reveal –layer after layer– the depths, to which 
their memories can take them.  
This intensity of perception cannot be clarified solely by the physical means 
that the Museum offers. Otherwise all kinds of spontaneous and broad 
recollections would occur in every place where old-fashioned things were 
brought together. Think for example about antique shops, flea markets or 
even conventional museums. We could assume that the potential intensity 
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of the physical stimuli in those places is not less strong than in the Museum. 
Still, it would be an exaggeration to say that people come to such places 
and start telling the stories of their lives. They might in certain cases, as an 
exception, but certainly not as a rule. 
In the Museum this story telling happens almost all the time. In order to 
understand how and why this happens we must listen to the conversations, 
taking into account the entire spectrum of factors that has influenced and 
irrevocably changed the lives of the visitors. We must consider the usual 
living conditions and the things that surrounded the generation of the 
visitors from the earliest years of their lives on. We must realize how much of 
their past is still alive, either officially or privately, immortalized in cherished 
objects and places. We must take into account the collective memory of the 
entire generation of elderly people about its shared history, which is full of 
glorious but also traumatic events and which is at the same time interspersed 
with personal memories of the most trivial and yet dearest and unforgettable 
moments. Finally, when we are puzzled and cannot make much sense of 
what has been said and why, we should bear in mind that the meaning of the 
remembering process lies in the present, not in the past. 
In other words, the complex topography of the remembering process 
moulds the coming analysis, which, using another Bergson’s metaphor, will 
help to follow ‘the progress of a memory’, which ‘precisely consists … in its 
becoming materialized’ (1912/2004: 174). 
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channelleD MeMories
‘It’s surprising how much of memory is built around things unnoticed at 
the time’. Those words were written by Barbara Kingsolver (1991: 280) and 
concisely catch an important resource of our reminiscences. Indeed one 
small forgotten artefact, suddenly found, can lead to a long evening, filled 
with stories and anecdotes about the past. Just imagine the intensity of 
impressions when you enter ‘a house’ that is full of small forgotten things. 
After the first challenging moments of the visitors’ surprise, their curiosity 
usually takes over. The place that seemed to be so strange in the beginning 
gradually takes shape, becomes coloured and scented. These features do not 
completely belong to the place itself because the visitors refer the things they 
see at that moment to their personal experiences. As an observer you can 
only rely on reactions in the form of descriptions and names that the visitors 
give to what they see and feel; some of those words have not been used or 
spoken aloud by the visitors in many years.  
The passage from things to recollections seems to be the shortest road 
leading to reminiscences. Admittedly that has been always the idea behind 
the exhibition, namely to let the older generation see and recognise things, so 
that they can react to them directly by making a remark or telling a story. And 
although the content of what is remembered is often unpredictable, it paves 
the way into the world, passing the same familiar stations on the memory 
road between things as a starting point and the actualised images of the 
past as their end destination. It is this reciprocal fulfilment of the reactions 
to the things, a kind of expected spontaneity, which allows me to call those 
memories channelled. The term envelopes several semantic elements, which 
are: the explicit connection between the remembering and the artefacts that 
were seen on display, the combination of predictability and spontaneity in 
the remembering process, and the fluidity of the unfolding memories. The 
first element points at the fact that the remembering practices we shall be 
talking about here have been connected to artefacts at the Museum display. 
The names of those artefacts are usually called out aloud by the visitors. The 
second element refers to our previous discussion on things39, which, following 
Heidegger, we understand as relational entities that can be unfolded in all 
their complex relations towards the world. The possibility to unfold things 
is based on the presumption that they already contain an infinite number of 
relations within themselves (think of predictability), but the direction of the 
unfolding can be determined by the visitor only based on his/her personal 
experiences (think of spontaneity). The third element of the term channelled 
39   See our discussion on pp. 71-75. 
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40   See our discussion on pp. 71-75. 
I call fluidity. It is rooted in the process character of memories, which can be 
compared with the current of a stream that is flowing. Its spring and channel 
decide on the main direction of the stream but the stream itself cannot be 
controlled, because by definition it lives on the continuity of change and 
movement. Similarly we can talk about the patterns of remembering in a 
broader sense, bearing in mind that the ever moving and changing stream 
of memories not only depends on a certain physical stability of the artefacts, 
but also contains all kinds of deviations and ramifications, which gnaw on 
and change the source itself. In a sense the definition channelled links back 
to the suggestion presented by Massey to understand things as processes as 
well.
During the past thirty years, things, objects and artefacts have been repeatedly 
examined in the context of various fields of research, such as material 
culture, memory studies, history, anthropology, ageing - to name just a few. 
While talking about the evolution of the Museum, we have paid attention 
to the role that things play by shaping the topography and the discourse of 
the collection. We looked into the functionality of things and connected that 
with the functional particularities of the Museum. What we shall be looking 
at now is the role of the objects in and during the recollections that occur in 
the Museum. It would be no exaggeration to say that almost every researcher 
who is interested in remembering practices, has a high regard for objects, 
which are persistent and ‘restless’ in the stimulation of remembering. Radley 
for example writes that almost each simple object is ‘inextricably’ connected 
with memories:
When put aside or gathered into collections, everyday objects can be used, either 
informally as memorabilia or formally in museums, to evoke a sense of their time 
and place. It is often the ordinariness of such objects, sometimes coupled with the 
circumstances of their acquisition, that enables the owner to indulge in particularly 
pleasurable forms of remembering (1990: 47). 
This quote is interesting for several reasons. It catches the significance of 
things to the awakening of remembering processes, so that we can say that 
things are not only gatherings of life-stories, but this time they are gatherings 
of personal and collective memories40. There is also a certain contradiction 
here in regard to what is taking place at the Museum. The objects in the 
Museum are not used formally and the Museum itself is not ‘a repository 
of objects’. The household objects that were collected in the Museum appeal 
directly to the visitors who used to have them or still have them at home. 
You can therefore hardly expect to hear a heroic ballad about them; rather 
anecdotes or personal stories without any pretence to sketch a historically 
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significant past, which is exactly what I would call the most important 
part of the Museum visits. By displaying the ordinary and the mundane, 
the Museum manages to touch the most intimate strings of the visitor’s 
personality. Via small almost forgotten things it boosts his/her confidence, 
and this confidence opens the doors into the treasure house called memory.
Things can cause various kinds of mnemonic responses. In what follows I 
shall pay attention to a number of modes of remembering41, which exemplify 
the patterns of a ‘usual Museum visit’ and help us to answer the question 
about their meaning for the older generation. The modes that we shall discuss 
here include: the instrumental mode, the mode of the firework sequence, the 
swinging mode and the mode of revived snapshots.
Instrumental accompaniment of remembering
In the degree that my horizon widens, the images which surround me seem to be 
painted upon a more uniform background and become to me more indifferent. The more 
I narrow this horizon, the more the objects which it circumscribes space themselves out 
distinctly according to the greater or less ease with which my body can touch and move 
them (Bergson, 1912/2004: 6). 
The most remarkable idea in this passage is about the way we, or better to 
say, our bodies choose to react to the world that surrounds us. According to 
Bergson there exists a direct dependence between the interest we show in a 
certain object and the degree of action that we can apply to it. ‘To recognize 
a common object is mainly to know how to use it’ (1912/2004: 111). Bergson 
makes this conclusion in order to explain the sense of familiarity in one of the 
forms of recognition, which is based on the ‘consciousness of a well-ordered 
motor accompaniment’. There are various issues at stake here simultaneously. 
It is about the habitual body memory, which is preserved by automatism of 
the action on the same or a similar object (see e.g. Casey, 1987). And it is about 
the way of being-in-the-world that is filled with equipment, which has been 
discussed in detail in the precious chapter.42 We learn to deal with it once, in 
order to never pay attention to it again afterwards. Just imagine for a moment 
that we fail to perform some simple mechanical operation because we have 
been out of practice for some time. Reacting to that possibility, Casey writes: 
Indeed, it is often in the suspension of just such a basic and taken-for-granted operation 
– a suspension whose significance for our sense of instrumentality has been singled out 
by Heidegger – that we are reminded of how pivotal and presupposed body memory is 
in our lives (Casey, 1987: 146).
41   Under modes I understand here the ways and manners in which the visitors remember their past. 
42   See the discussion on pp. 81-87. 
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A suspension of an automatic body reaction can lead to far-reaching 
consequences for our way of being-in-the-world. If we go back to what 
happens during the Museum visits, we shall notice that objects are very 
often recognised through their instrumental functions. When my neighbour 
and friend, who was 84 years old, paid a visit the Museum, she drew at the 
round door bell knob without hesitation in order to make the bell ring. What 
her hand did automatically was not as automatic for me. I might have tried 
to turn the knob, or to pull it up or down, or to push it as a button. In other 
words, I could have spent some time learning how to use that old-fashioned 
doorbell, while my older friend did not even have to think about it, because 
her hand still knew. This kind of reactions, which Bergson calls ‘recognition 
by inattention’, takes place all the time and can be observed outside the 
Museum as well. We shall draw our attention to some cases now which are 
particularly relevant to the remembering practices and that are at the same 
time rooted in the instrumentality of things. Those cases present a kind of 
border zone between attentive recollection and habitual memory, where 
both trespass in each other’s territories, telling us something new about the 
way the elderly people are-in-the-world.
Imagine a group of elderly women who have come to visit the Museum. In 
the ‘baby room’ of the Museum there are a couple of boxes, which a curious 
visitor can freely open to find out what kept inside. Sometimes the boxes 
are opened by a Museum worker whilst asking visitors whether they can 
recognise the objects inside. What the women in my example looked at were 
curved flat pieces of wood. None of them knew immediately what they were. 
Just looking at them was evidently not enough, so they each took one in their 
hands, while the whole 
exercise was accompanied 
by animated exclamations, 
suggestions and hm-like 
contemplations. Suddenly, 
one of them knew. She took 
a second piece; with some 
effort, she arranged them 
in her hand and made a 
gracious and very specific 
movement with her arm. 
The wood rattled uneasily 
but then everybody 
understood what it was: 
Castanets! (Handklappers!) The two other women from the group also tried to 
produce the appropriate click sound. The movements of their arms reminded 
one of the beautiful movements of Spanish dancers. Of course their weak 
grasp and the lack of coordination between their fingers betrayed them, but 
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nobody felt bad about it. For a moment, the Museum was filled with rattling 
and clicking sounds. Each of the ladies was smiling; it looked like each one 
of them was feeling young and full of energy again. 
The episode we just described represents a rather complex way of 
remembering, where the instrumental meaning of an artefact plays a very 
important role. Remembering processes are initiated (or channelled) by 
a certain object from the Museum exhibition. The object itself is a single-
function item, so that to remember it one must actually know it from the 
past. The sight of the castanets though, was clearly not sufficient to awaken 
reminiscences. Only combined with tactile experiences does perception 
become strong enough to dig into the right regions of our virtual memory 
in order to mobilise the necessary images. In other words, the remembering 
process in this case is strongly linked to the motor mechanism, which usually 
manifests itself in spontaneous automatism. The spontaneity has obviously 
been lost in the years that have passed. The automatism however can be still 
surprisingly present in the right movement of the hand that pulls the bell or 
imitates the Spanish dance. 
Another important element of the remembering process in the castanet 
example is the collective activity of the women, who eagerly and 
enthusiastically stimulated each other’s memories by taking the wooden 
pieces in their hands, trying to make sense of them and loudly discussing the 
possible ways of using the strange artefacts. Together they were looking for 
the matching functional explanation and finally it took one of them to solve 
the puzzle, to the joyful satisfaction of the entire group. 
Remembering processes cannot be automated, since they are based on a 
unique selection that takes place when virtual images reincarnate themselves 
‘borrowing the body of some perception into which they (it) slip(s)’ (Bergson, 
1912/2004: 72). We can say that the mechanism of remembering must be quite 
efficient, given the scope of memory that we are carrying throughout our 
lives. Remembering through a former instrumentality seems to be a plausible 
suggestion in that respect. Living in a world of equipment, we experience it as 
ready-to-hand, using the already familiar term presented by Heidegger. While 
recollecting something it would be then quite logical for us to navigate our way 
back through time, constantly reviving frequently used functions of objects, 
which at that time constituted an invisible but also inextricable instrumental 
side of our being. Let us have a look at how an elderly couple, accompanied by 
a Museum volunteer who belongs to the same generation, uses the know-how 
of their past in order to create a new experience.
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MW1:  This is the children room, 
 the baby room.
W:  O, those pictures are nice, 
 aren’t they?
M:  Lovely. Oh, God, 
 those sweet … Ah!
MW:  Very familiar, very familiar.…
MW:  There is also the chest with  
 those knick-knacks.
M:  Oh, yeees.
MW:  Yes, because of the cold, you  
 see, it gets cold, a little vest on  
 top, yes.
W:  Nappies…
MW:  And this, so healthy.
 They are talking all together:   
 Oh yes…
W:  It smells filthy...
MW:  But then you wouldn’t die…
W:  Yes, you wouldn’t die.
MW:  …with a bit of sugar added. 
W:  Yes. (simultaneously) 
 But nevertheless
MW: … nevertheless it was filthy.
W:  It was so filthy.
M:  Old-fashioned thermometer.
W:  Yeees.
MW:  Old-fashioned fever   
 thermometer. 
W:  Yeees 
 (sounds as if she in a trance).
M:  Yeees, yeeees 
 (from high to low).
MW:  And then hot-water bottle.  
 There had to be a crocheted  
 thing round it. 
W:  Indeed, Zwitsal (baby powder).  
 And then such a thing to warm  
 the bottles.
MW  interrupts: to warm the bottles.  
 Yes indeed.
MM1:  Hier is de kinderkamer, 
 de babykamer.
Vr:  O, die foto’s zijn leuk, zeg.
M:  Enig. O god, 
 die zoetsappige ... Ah!
MM:  Heel bekend, heel bekend.…
MM:  Hier ook de commode met 
 die spulletjes.
M:  O ja-a-a.
MM:  Ja, want het koud, he, het   
 wordt koud, een hemdje   
 overheen, ja.
Vr:  Luiertjes….
MM:  En dit, zo gezond.
 Praten door elkaar: O ja…
Vr: Het stinkt vies…
MM: Maar dan werd je niet dood… 
Vr:  Ja, werd je niet dood.
MM: …een beetje suiker toe.
Vr:  Ja. (tegelijk) Maar ondanks dat 
MM:  …ondanks dat het was vies.
Vr:  Het was zo vies.
MM:  Ouderwetse thermometer.
Vr:  Ja-a
MM:  Ouderwetse    
 koortsthermometer.
Vr:  Ja-a (klinkt alsof ze in trance is).
M:  Ja-ja, ja-ja (van hoog naar laag).
MM:  En dan kruikje. Daar moest  
 zo’n gehaakt ding omheen.
Vr:  Ja, Zwitsal. En dan zo’n   
 dingetje om flessen 
 op te warmen.
MM  valt in de rede: om flessen op te  








M: Yes, I heard about that. Yes. 
W: It is old, isn’t it, 
 (MW: Old indeed) that little box. 
MW: These blocks. That’s right.   
 ‘Course that is altogether all  
 very old.
W: unclear.
MW simult.: You can build a castle 
 with that.
W: Yes. That black box. Complete,  
 isn’t it?
MW: …I shall just… (they are busy  
 with the box). This goes like  
 that. (W: Yes) Right. 
W:  Yeees, oh yes, yes.
MW:  Yes, like this, little pillar upon  
 little pillar.
M:  Look at that.
W:  Yes, such an arch, yeees.
M:  But if you tidied it up then  
 everything fitted exactly into  
 that little box...
MW:  Oh yes, yes, but that was   
 difficult, that tidying up was  
 the worst. (M: Yes) Was done  
 least of all. (M: Yes) 
 They are talking and laughing  
 together.
1  The following abbreviations are  
 used in all the extracts:
MW:  Museum volunteer (f)
W:      Woman visitor
M:     Male visitor 
Vr tegelijk: Ja!
MM:  Tegenwoordig gaat het in de  
 magnetron, hè? 
Vr:  Ja.
MM:  Ja.
M:  Ja, dat hoorde ik. Ja.
Vr:  Het is oud, hè, (MM: Ja, oud) 
 dat doosje.
MM:  Die blokken. Dat klopt. Dat is  
 ‘tuurlijk helemaal allemaal oud.
Vr:  onverstaanbaar.
MM tegelijk: Kan je daar een   
 kasteeltje van bouwen.
Vr:  Ja. Dat zwarte doosje.   
 Helemaal, hè?
MM:  ….Ik zal het even… (ze zijn  
 bezig met het doosje). Die gaat  
 zo. (Vr: Ja) Zo.
Vr:  Ja-a, ja, ja. 
MM:  Ja, zo, en pilaartje op pilaartje.
M:  Kijk dat.
VR:  Ja-a, zo’n boog, ja-a.  
M:  Maar als je dat opruimde 
 dan paste alles precies 
 in dat doosje…
MM:  Ja, ja, maar dat was moeilijk,  
 dat opruimen was het ergste. 
 (M: Ja) Werd het minste   
 gedaan. (M: Ja)
 Praten door elkaar, lachen   
 samen.
1  De navolgende afkortingen zijn  
 in alle extracten gebuikt:
MM:  Museum vrijwilliger (v)
Vr:    Vrouwelijke bezoeker
M:     Mannelijke bezoeker
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The volunteer’s second ‘functional’ remark, the joke about cod liver oil, has 
much more success. One of the visitors eagerly shares her reminiscences 
of the commonly hated liquid, which had to be swallowed by children in 
order to stay alive. The way in which the two women agree on the subject 
is worth reflecting on. It is remarkable how every phrase uttered by one 
was repeated and affirmed by the other and only then the next addition 
was made, until both appeared satisfied with what had been jointly said. 
The impression you get from this fragment is that they are building their 
recollections systematically, as if at every next moment another element of 
the virtual image is actualised and needs to be verbalised, in order to make 
the others aware of it. 
In spite of their physical aversion to the liquid, both women are keen to 
stress its always-trusted usefulness. Yet the entire dialog about cod liver oil 
contains a hint of irony. We hear it right from the start: MW: And this, so 
healthy. W: It smells filthy.... This semantic extension appears when memories 
about their old beliefs contradict with the convictions they have nowadays. 
It becomes obvious that the remembered value of the object (a kind of 
instrumental value: drink cod liver oil in order to remain healthy) does not 
match with the value that is attached to the liquid nowadays. This is the 
tension between what they were taught to think then and what people are 
actually thinking now. At first, the convictions are localised in the different 
images of the past and present, and then they are bridged by means of irony. 
The realisation that the visitors have changed, in turn changes the way they 
remember certain things. 
All three participants are in their 70s, which is one of the reasons why the 
temporary framework that unites the visitors and the representative of the 
Museum was created effortlessly. The conversation starts at the very first 
moment of the visit and their mutual understanding increases steadily until 
the moment the couple leaves the Museum. 
The extract begins when they are looking at the collection in the ‘baby room’, 
where their visit starts. Neither the Museum volunteer nor the visitors have 
had the opportunity to show any preference in their choice of objects till 
then. In the beginning it looks as if they name object after object without 
any evident logic in the sequence. Let us concentrate on the functional 
explanations that follow the naming of the artefacts, first very laconically, 
then more frequently and with much more details. The first ‘instrumental’ 
remark is made by the Museum volunteer who tries to explain the merits of 
the baby clothes that were warmed up purposefully. She is still alone in that 
explanation, but by giving an example she shows one of the ways the visitors 
can exchange their roles of passive listeners for the position of respectful and 
joyful authority in the field of past domestic knowledge. 
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This last note can also become a turning point in our understanding of 
what the ‘remembered’ readiness-to-hand actually means. Remembering 
how objects used to be used is linked to their former equipmental status, 
but I would not call their recollected instrumentality the primary function 
of this type of remembering. The memories based on the ‘I-know-how-
to-use-it’ seem to refer to a much more important social function, namely 
that of preservation. When the two women look at the baby dressing 
table, they point at various objects that have often already disappeared 
from contemporary domestic life. They add some information about the 
functionality of the objects, like for example a protecting crocheted cover for 
the hot-water bottle, or an appliance to warm up the bottles with baby milk. 
Those things have disappeared (nowadays baby bottles are warmed up in 
the microwave, we are told), but their functions are deeply imprinted in the 
women’s experiences, so that they can easily retrace them during the visit. 
The retrieved knowledge can hardly be called useful in a direct sense, but 
the opportunity to share it gives the visitors a pleasant feeling of authority. 
I see it as a natural feeling, especially for the older generation. It opens a 
possibility for them to feel like guardians of forgotten knowledge and to 
take upon themselves the responsibility to preserve the know-how of past 
life. It is true that regardless of the kind of experiences, elderly people enjoy 
sharing their knowledge of how to sharpen knives on a grinding machine, 
how to develop photographs, or how to build a beautiful castle, using blocks 
which never fit into the box where they have come from in the first place.  
The will to preserve and the need to use almost forgotten skills manifests 
itself strongly at moments when the visitors become physically engaged 
in the activities with the objects of the exhibition. The Museum allows and 
facilitates those activities and the Museum volunteers are always there 
to give you a hand or to 
support your enthusiasm. As 
we have seen, this actually 
happens at the moment 
when the two women are 
taking the blocks from the 
box in order to build a castle 
as they used to, ‘a little pillar 
upon the little pillar’. The 
primary meaning of the 
function, namely how you 
can build a castle, is not on 
their everyday agenda any 
more. But by recalling and 
talking about it, they adapt 
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the contemporary equipmental disposition of their being-in-the-world. The 
remembered function needs to be clarified sometimes (especially for the 
younger generation), but further on it will be used instrumentally, rather in a 
semiotic way as ready-to-hand preserved knowledge with a referential point 
somewhere in grandmother’s past. That can explain why the visitors and the 
Museum volunteer, who have never seen each other before, can all the same 
understand each other easily. That also gives us a hint why, while speaking 
the same language, different generations often lose track of the conversation. 
In a sense the Museum experience shows that in a conversation like that, 
simple hearing is not enough, because we often lack the knowledge that the 
older generation possesses and uses as ready-to-hand. It is not necessary to 
make that knowledge our own but we can learn to take our time in order 
to listen and bridge the gaps in the communication between the different 
generations. 
The instrumental commentary that accompanies remembering processes in 
the Museum, represents a stable pattern of reactions made by its visitors. It 
runs through the Museum conversations from the beginning right up to the 
end. The all-threading idea of preserving and the authority of past knowledge 
can have important consequences if we are to understand the meaning of the 
remembering for the elderly. But there are other remembering modes, which 
I would like to describe and reflect on first.
Firework sequence and selective attention 
The things that are displayed in the Museum provoke various kinds of 
reactions. One of the most animated and playful among them can be called a 
firework sequence remembering.
In the sitting-room
W21:  This is the style when we got  
 married. I had such chairs 
 (W1: Yes) and then a 
 rosewood table like that, a 
 darker one therefore.
W1:  That cupboard too… Talk together
W2:  And that fruit bowl.
W1:  And lamps… Yes.
MW:  That is from the 60s, isn’t it?
In de zitkamer. 
Vr21:  Dit is de stijl toen we trouwden.  
 Ik had zulke stoelen (Vr1: Ja) 
 en dan zo’n palissander tafel, 
 dus een donkere.
Vr1:  Ook die kast… Door elkaar
Vr2:  En die fruitschaal. 
Vr1:  En lampen… Ja.
Mm:  Dat is uit jaren 60, hè?
Extract 2
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 Just imagine two women who are about 65-70 years old standing in the living 
room and pointing excitedly at everything that they effortlessly recognise at 
that stage of the visit. They speak fast and sometimes simultaneously. Their 
voices sound high and very enthusiastic. It looks like there is nothing that 
escapes their attention, but that is only an impression. They are extremely 
good at cutting out everything that they do not recognise or do not find 
worthwhile mentioning. It seems like the two women are in this together and 
at the same time they are not. They do not listen very attentively to what the 
other person is saying, but nevertheless they stick together in this firework 
experience of recognition, because it is felt like a challenge, like a game with 
the aim to see, recognise and name things first, sharing the joy of recollection 
and at the same time keeping the warmth of the reminiscences to yourself. 
Each of the women is following her own line of thought without crossing 
the territory of the other, until the last two remarks, which finally turn into a 
dialogue. The first woman points out the cupboard, the lamps and the peanut 
set. The other points at the chairs, at the fruit bowl and then remarks on 
the specific colour of the furniture. They do hear each other, but they aren’t 
W2:  I used it in 62.
 Together: Yes, yes, yes.
W2:  That ochre, that was modern!
MW:  Yes, of course.
 
W2:  It was so modern.
W1:  And that… little peanut set and 
 that cake set, like that, made of  
 plateel (kind of ceramic).
W2:  Yes, yes.
W1:  That was horribly expensive; 
 that was given to you by at least  
 ten aunts when you got married. 
 It was that expensive.
W2 simult.: Hoh, as a present!
W1 simult.: It was horribly expensive.
W2:  That tin I have, this one (W2: Yes) 
 I still have that. Funny, isn’t it? 
W2:  Here is your peanut set.
W1:  Yes, I threw it away, didn’t I?
1MW:   Museum worker (f)
W1:      Woman visitor 1
W2:      Woman visitor 2
Vr2:  Ik heb het in 62 gebruikt. 
 Samen: Ja, ja, ja.
Vr2:  Dat oker, dat was modern! 
Mm:  Ja, natuurlijk.
Vr2:  Het was zo modern.
Vr1:  En dat …pindastelletje en die
  gebakstel, zo, van dat plateel.
Vr2: Ja, Ja.
Vr1:  Dat was hartstikke duur, dat
 kreeg je wel van tien tantes met 
 je trouwen. Zo duur was het.
Vr2 tegelijk: Ho, als cadeau!
Vr1 tegelijk: Het was verschrikkelijk duur.
Vr2:  Die trommel heb ik, deze, 
 (Vr2: Ja) die heb ik nog. 
 Grappig, hè?
Vr2:  Hier je pindastelletje.
Vr1:  Ja, heb ik weg gegooid, hè?
1MM:  Museum medewerker (v)
Vr1:    Vrouwelijke bezoeker 1
Vr2:    Vrouwelijke bezoeker 2
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really listening. That does not bother either of them though, so when at the 
end one of them comes across the peanut set, which the other has already 
mentioned before, she makes her discovery explicit, which sounds like a 
final phrase: Here is your 
peanut set. The economy of 
our speech is always quite 
amazing. We can only guess 
at the number of contextual 
meanings that can be coded 
into one single word. When 
the woman says your, she 
of course is not referring 
to belonging. Your can be 
understood in many ways: 
like the one you used to have, 
or like the one you’ve just 
mentioned, or like the one I 
remember you had once etc. The interpretations can be multiple, but the fact 
that both women found a common point of reference from their past makes 
the entire experience of their visit more personal. 
The last remark in the extract dovetails with the fragment that was quoted 
earlier with regard to the ordinariness of the things that awaken remembering. 
The peanut set that was mentioned three times had actually been thrown 
away, which sounds a bit surprising to its ex-owner as well. Old people do not 
throw their things away just like that. There are many reasons to clear things 
up, which have much deeper grounds than a change of taste or hygiene. In 
the case we will be looking at now there is no need to guess, just to listen: 
W11:  Indeed, threw it away, didn’t I?
 Unclear
W2:  … what is here. 
 Just very nice to look at.
W2:  But indeed, as you are saying, 
 as soon as leave home you can’t  
 take everything with you. 
MW:  Yes, yes.
1MW:    Museum worker (f)
W1:     Woman visitor 1
W2:     Woman visitor 2
Vr11:  Ja, heb ik weggegooid, hè?
 Onverstaanbaar 
Vr2:  …wat hier staat. 
 Alleen maar erg leuk om te zien.
Vr2:  Maar inderdaad, wat je zegt, 
 zodra uit huis kan je niet  
 alles meenemen.
Mm:  Ja, ja.
1MM:   Museum medewerker (v)
Vr1:   Vrouwelijke bezoeker 1
Vr2:   Vrouwelijke bezoeker 2
Extract 3 (the same participants as in extract 2)
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Seemingly unintentionally the conversation touches upon a very important 
and rather sensitive theme: becoming old and moving to another place. 
But neither of the women expands the subject, as if in order to protect the 
atmosphere of excitement, which probably makes them feel young and in 
charge again.
 
Several conclusions can be made here. However deep into their memories the 
Museum visitors go, awareness of their current circumstances never leaves 
their consciousness. This can create an exciting situation of balancing between 
the present and the past. Another conclusion is that in spite of personal 
preferences and experiences, the reminiscences and their emplacement 
within a discourse of the conversation about the present living conditions 
has a distinctively social character. There is no doubt that the two friends 
belong to the same social framework. That is why even at the moments when 
they are hardly listening to each other, they are still prepared to offer support 
to each other in the form of an automatic affirmation or acknowledgment 
(Yes, of course; Yes, yes.). For example, it happens when one of the two friends 
mentions a special ceramic cake set, which was ‘horribly expensive; that 
was given to you by at least ten aunts when you got married’. The remark and 
the reaction to it make everybody who is present smile. It is sharp, ironic, 
funny and absolutely true at the same time. One sentence contains an entire 
package of collectively shared knowledge about former family life, like for 
example the famous stinginess of aunts, or a trivial wedding gift, which 
actually was or had to be very expensive, or the modest circumstances under 
which a young couple usually started their own housekeeping. But the same 
remark also points at the magnitude of the changes in the living conditions 
and the appreciation of those conditions by the same generation, which is 
about 50 years older today. What in those days was seen as standard and 
a sign of respectability, can look strange and even a bit funny nowadays. 
The re-evaluation that the older generation is capable of making can be 
quite a surprise for people who are used to thinking about age in terms of 
conservatism and retardation. 
Conversations like the one we have just discussed can occur during any 
visit and almost at any stage of it. Most of the time when the visitors start 
naming the objects one after another there are hardly any pauses between 
their remarks. Very often they talk together at the same time. The presence of 
another visitor or a Museum worker is more or less a condition to the visit, 
since the entire experience has the purpose of sharing your knowledge and 
tuning your reminiscences in order to establish a tangible reality of the past, 
even if that should look unbelievable or a bit funny in the present. 
In spite of the overwhelming number of artefacts that are shown in the 
display, the visitors tend to recognise and react to those that are familiar 
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to them. Their scanning and filtering capacities are sharpened during the 
course of the visit. Looking at a showcase or a shelf with dozens of artefacts, 
they often point at just one small and inconspicuous little object that has a 
reference point in their past: Look! There are garters or Ah, reels! or Sunlight 
soap! or Buisman! (powder that adds flavour to your coffee) or Gas meter 
coins!  This seemingly kaleidoscopic way of responding to the exhibition is in 
fact a clear demonstration of how selectively we react to the objects around 
us. Bergson describes this process by using the body as a central image that 
determines the images of the world that surrounds it:
Everything…happens for us as though we reflected back to the surfaces the light which 
emanates from them, the light which, had it passed unopposed, would never have 
been revealed. The images which surround us will appear to turn towards our body 
the side, emphasized by the light upon it, which interests our body. They will detach 
from themselves that which we have arrested on its way, that which we are capable of 
influencing … Our representation of things would thus arise from the fact that they are 
thrown back and reflected by our freedom (1912/2004: 29). 
Following this line of thought, we can see that the choice the visitors make is 
neither at random nor absolutely free. The correspondence between a certain 
artefact and the recollection about it is determined by the personal interest of 
the visitor, which has both a social and a psychological background. 
While Bergson is mostly concerned with the way we choose to perceive 
certain sides of the objects that are of interest to us, I shall apply these ideas 
to situations where the visitors select the objects for their perception in order 
to become engaged in what he called attentive perception. To fully understand 
how the selection process of visitors in their choices of artefacts takes place, 
we must look at it in a broader social and spatial context. The question then 
will be to what extent the selection and the recognition of the artefacts is 
determined by the person him/herself, or by the spatial arrangements of the 
Museum, or by a choice made by others? 
In my opinion we shall do no justice to the phenomenon by trying to 
introduce a hierarchy within the causality. It can differ per person, per group 
and even per day. The conclusion will have to be that selection is a result of 
an interplay between individual and social preferences. We shall see now 
how the interplay is constituted.  
Mention has already been made more than once of the social frameworks 
of remembering, that is, the social groups or networks to which the visitor 
belongs. Before continuing our analysis let us pay some attention to that 
notion. Social remembering appears as a result of interactive social practices 
within the social structures, which Halbwachs called collective or social 
frameworks. One of his well-known statements is that ‘no memory is possible 
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outside frameworks used by people living in society to determine and 
retrieve their recollections’ (1925/1992: 43). Reflecting on the interrelation 
between individual and collective memory in his later writings, Halbwachs 
writes:
Our memories remain collective … and are recalled to us through others even though 
only we were participants in the events or saw the things concerned. In reality, we are 
never alone. Other men need not be physically present, since we always carry with us 
and in us a number of distinct persons (1950/1980: 23). 
Several ideas are important here for a better understanding of what takes 
place in the Museum. Nobody can escape his or her ‘membership’ of 
whatever social group he or she belongs to. Moreover, the remembering 
process is always interactive. The connection with the group can become 
weaker or seem to disappear altogether until the moment when the person 
in question is required to deal with a specific situation. What happens then, 
Halbwachs describes very subtly:
In each of these moments I cannot say that I was alone, that I reflected alone, because I 
put myself in thought into this or that group … Other men have had these remembrances 
in common with me. Moreover, they help me to recall them. I turn to these people, I 
momentarily adopt their viewpoint, and I re-enter their group in order to better 
remember. I can still feel the group’s influence and recognize in myself many ideas and 
ways of thinking that could not have originated with me and that keep me in contact 
with it (1950/1980: 23-24). 
Bearing in mind Halbwachs’ understanding of social frameworks let us 
look at one specific example. On the shelves of the grocery shop, which is 
reconstructed in the Museum, the visitors can see various types of the soap 
bar. Each visitor knows the 
brands but Sunlight soap is 
the most popular among 
them. Sunlight soap was used 
in almost every household 
of the Netherlands during a 
couple of decades as a basic 
means for washing. Since 
it is one of the constituents 
of the collective image that 
visitors have about their 
former domestic life, it 
occupies a prominent place 
on the shelf in the shop. 
Even if one of the visitors has not reacted upon it while standing in front of 
the shelf, there will be another who would joyfully point it out calling the 
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name of the brand, taking the pack in his or her hands and smelling it as if 
searching for even more confirmation that it is real. The story will follow, 
probably not a personal one, that you could collect points or stamps by 
buying the soap, and if you had enough of them you would receive a present, 
like a tea cloth. The selection of the object in this example is clearly based 
on the spatial and social character of the remembering process. However, it 
would be one-sided to say that personal experience does not play any role 
in this process of recognition. It is not incidental that the visitors want to 
take the pack in their hands and to smell at it. The choice of the object has 
been made by the visitor as a member of a certain social group, but the way 
the object has subsequently been re-perceived, re-recognised and placed into 
the reminiscences, brings the visitor himself into the centre of the analysis. 
Attentively looking, touching and smelling the object is not as spontaneous 
as the initial act of calling it by its name. Our perception is instantaneous 
and this fact raises obvious difficulties to reflect on it. Bergson’s explanation 
of the instantaneity of perception rests on the realisation that memory and 
perception are inextricably linked:
In fact, there is no perception which is not full of memories. With the immediate and 
present data of our senses we mingle a thousand details out of our past experience. In 
most cases these memories supplant our actual perceptions, of which we then retain 
only a few hints, thus using them merely as ‘signs’ that recall to us former images. 
The convenience and the rapidity of perception are bought at this price; but hence also 
springs every kind of illusion (1912/ 2004: 24). 
We can then retrace a process which every visitor undergoes when he or 
she first sees and recognises the soap bar as Sunlight soap. The momentarily 
shaped image contains more features borrowed from past knowledge than 
from the present perception, since the generation of the visitors used to use 
that brand of soap for years. The next step however is quite different. The 
visitor literally takes his or her time, since the initial recognition is already in 
place. Bergson introduced the notion of attentive perception, applying it to 
cases when the initial recognition takes place:
 
Every attentive perception truly involves a reflexion, in the etymological sense of the word, 
that is to say the projection, outside ourselves, of an actively created image, identical 
with, or similar to, the object on which it comes to mould itself (1912/2004: 127).
I would rather call this process selective perception. Selective perception lies 
beneath the firework reminiscing mode. Understood as reflexion, it manifests 
itself most strongly via visualisation but at the same time it is spoken up, 
because the social element of the recognition is not less important.
168
The image which is ‘remembered’ first is not very specific. It depends on 
the degree and speed, with which the virtual images can be actualised at the 
moment of perception. Bergson put it in the following way: 
To obtain this conversion from the virtual to the actual it would be necessary not to 
throw more light on the object, but on the contrary to obscure some of its aspects, to 
diminish it by the greater part of itself, so that the remainder, instead of being encased 
in its surroundings as a thing, should detach itself from them as a picture (1912/2004: 28).
This claim is very important in order to understand what the visitor actually 
sees and means when he or she points at the soap bar saying: Sunlight soap! 
The object that is present in the Museum is certainly not the same that the 
visitor used at home, but according to his or her experience, it is one of those 
he could have used all those years ago. The name of it is spoken out loudly, 
as if the visitor needs to strengthen his or her membership with the broader 
network: I know what it is; therefore, I am a member of the group. If remembering 
is a social process, then we all, regardless of our age, tune our memories with 
the group or groups to which we belong. At a later stage in this study we 
shall see that being a member of the group has a very special meaning for 
elderly people. Ultimately, it becomes one of the determining factors of their 
feeling of wellbeing. 
The next round however, when the visitor engages himself with some deeper 
reflection towards the same object, I would call attentive perception. The 
visitor is much more conscious of this phase, unlike the first recognition, 
which came with a speed we cannot even think of measuring. This stage 
verges on the firework mode and goes beyond it. The speed of the reactions 
is slower, the pauses fall more often and much more is said about the object 
that was recognised than just a simple pronunciation of its name. To be able 
to see the differences in these stages better, I have chosen another extract 
from the visit of the same two women.
W11:  And just a small curtain in 
 front of it.
W2:  Yes.
W1:  And the tap up there because 
 you didn’t have the geyser.
W2:  And all kinds of oil burners.
W1:  And the stove was, yes, indeed.  
 There was a-always water 
 (a kettle) on top. 
Vr11:  En zo maar een gordijntje 
 daarvoor.
Vr2:  Ja
Vr1:  En de kraan daarboven 
 want de geiser had je niet.
Vr2:  En allemaal petroleum stelletjes
Vr1:  En het kachel stond, ja, 
 inderdaad. Daar stond 
 a-altijd water op. 
Extract 4
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W2:  Gas burners.…
W1:  Are those chairs to sit on?
MW:  I don’t know if it is better for 
 you, this is a bit broader 
 (moves the chair), this is 
 more comfortable.
W1:  We have been on the road for 
 some time already. 
W2:  She knows that, that little kitchen.
W1:  Oh, I found it so beautiful.
MW:  It was so modern then. 
W2:  That was so modern.…
W1:  And the little racks up there 
 with those handles.
W2:  This, ye-es.
 Talk all together…
W1:  That I used to have as well.
 Unclear
MW:  That one behind there, that is 
 real, that is from the 40s, they 
 say, that dates back to the war.
W1:  Yes, yes, during the war, e-eh,  
 e-eh, at our place in the Putselaan  
 and in the Barendzelaan, yes like  
 that, and Hetty she took this,  
 because it was modern, it was  
 unaffordable then. 
MW:  Super, yes.
W2:  Refrigerator.
W1:  Hoh!
W2:  Gas cooker, gravy pan.
W1:  Well, that gravy pan I still have!
 They all laugh.
1MW:     Museum worker (f)
W1:      Woman visitor 1
W2:      Woman visitor 2 
Vr2:  Kook pitten.…
Vr1:  Is deze stoelen om op te zitten?
Mm:  Ik weet niet of het beter voor 
 u is, die is ietsje breder 
 (schuift de stoel), 
 dit is makkelijker. 
Vr1:  We zijn al eventjes onderweg
Vr2:  Dat weet ze, dat keukentje. 
Vr1:  O, dat vond ik zo mooi
Mm:  Toen was het zo modern
Vr1:  Dat was zo modern…
Vr1:  en de rekjes daarboven met 
 die steeltjes
Vr2:  Dit, ja-a.
 Praten door elkaar…
Vr1:  Dat heb ik ook gehad
 Onverstaanbaar
Mm:  Die er achter, die is echt, dat 
 is van de jaren 40, zeggen ze, 
 dat is van de oorlogstijd.
Vr1:  Ja, ja, oorlogstijd, e-e, e-e, bij 
 ons op de Putselaan en op de  
 Barendzelaan, ja zo, en Hetty 
 die nam dit, want het was 
 modern, dat was toen niet 
 te betalen.
Mm:  Super, ja 
Vr2:  Koelkast.
Vr1:  Ho!
Vr2:  Fornuisje, juspan
Vr1:  Nou, die juspan heb ik nog!
 Lachen allemaal.
1MM:    Museum medewerker (v)
Vr1:    Vrouwelijke bezoeker 1
Vr2:    Vrouwelijke bezoeker 2
The dialogue takes place in the ‘kitchen’ of the Museum. Both visitors see it 
as a woman’s domain by definition, especially in the times they refer to in 
their recollections. This Museum room is arranged in a dynamic way, where 
you can follow the changes in one of the most important places of every 
Dutch household, covering a span of approximately 90 years. The exhibition 
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contains three different sets of kitchens. The visitors independently 
determine the sequence of the tour and the items they want to react to in 
particular. In the extract above we can already recognise a familiar pattern 
of pointing out and calling out the names of the objects. Nevertheless, the 
identification that both women are giving is often filled with more details 
than in the previous example. They start by giving names to each of the 
objects. Then they extend their explanation beyond that, by using some of 
their ‘complementary recollections’. Reacting to the tap above the sink, one 
of them clarifies it by the absence of a geyser. The geyser is also an attribute 
of the past; it is present in the Museum but in the setting of another kitchen. 
The woman who gives the explanation has not seen it yet, but the notion of 
it is already at her disposal, conveniently delivered by her recollections. The 
next moment she points at the oil stove. Then she adds that there was always 
a water kettle on top of it, for hot water. She does not actually see the kettle 
on the stove, but her memory about it is obviously so distinctive that she fills 
the perceived image with missing details. This example shows clearly how 
the appropriation of the Museum space takes place. 
The psychological grounds of the same process can be found in what I have 
just called the attentive perception. At the moment when attentive perception 
takes place, we observe that perception and reflection become reciprocal and 
the already familiar tension between collective and personal images of the 
past arises. Bergson gives a very detailed description of this ‘scooping’ into 
the past, when a person is looking for more and more specific images to 
identify an object:
Memory thus creates anew the present perception; or rather it doubles this perception by 
reflecting upon it either its own image or some other memory-image of the same kind. If 
the retained or remembered image will not cover all the details of the image that is being 
perceived, an appeal is made to the deeper and more distant regions of memory, until 
other details that are already known come to project themselves upon those details that 
remain unperceived. And the operation may go on indefinitely;–memory strengthening 
and enriching perception, which, in its turn becoming wider, draws into itself a growing 
number of complementary recollections (1912/2004: 123). 
The process, which feels like going deeper and deeper into the past, is 
actually about drawing into the speeding core of remembering more and 
more virtual images, that become actualised in order to substantiate the 
visitors’ recognition. In fact, two opposing processes are taking place at 
the same time. One is directed at the recognition and has as its source the 
setting of the Museum. The other originates from inside. It contains a stream 
of recollections that will influence the initially perceived images. This is 
the process of extrapolation of the actualised images, which if necessary 
substitute the perceived ones with actualised images from the past. To go 
back to the example, the visitor sees (=perceives) the oil stove in the Museum, 
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but when she calls it by name, she actually has an image of another one from 
her past with a water kettle on top. 
In order to answer the question of how these two processes correlate, all 
the stages of a Museum visit will have to be described first. In the given 
example the visitors, in spite of the fact that they are just beginning their tour, 
evidently already feel very much at home. Not only do their interactions 
show a lot of recognition, but they also use the physical space of the room 
directly. It becomes obvious when one of the women asks if it is allowed 
to sit in the chair, which is standing in the kitchen. She is using a walking 
stick and she is tired because she has been on her feet all day. She wants 
to sit down almost as soon as she comes into the kitchen and during the 
entire dialogue there she does not leave the chair, pointing out in different 
directions and turning around to see things better. She feels at ease, so that 
you can tell that the room does not look strange to her either, since she 
and her friend are no strangers there. The experiences of the visitors in the 
Museum have a very distinctive spatial character, which becomes evident 
through the superposition of at least two images, namely the image of the 
Museum space and the corresponding image(-s) from their personal past. 
Having said that, I would not argue that the recognition of the oil stove for 
example, could not have occurred somewhere else, but I do believe that the 
recollection of a specific oil stove with a water kettle on top has everything to 
do with the entire setting of the Museum, namely with the atmosphere that 
it provides, with the mental and physical state the visitors are in at that point 
and with the interaction that is taking place.
Almost each Museum visit has its ‘firework’ moments. Sometimes they 
occur repeatedly, sometimes only once. The particularities of the visitors’ 
experience are the selectiveness of the ‘seen’ objects, the speed of the reactions 
(i.e. actualisation) and the increasing personal involvement which they feel 
towards the exhibition and as a result, towards the broader social framework 
of the Museum workers. We have also seen that the objects that are displayed 
in the Museum give a stable ground for the ongoing actualisation of virtual 
images, which finally present themselves as reminiscences. But while the 
social and psychological processes that underlie the experiences of the 
Museum visitors are more or less universal, the forms of remembering and 
their meanings to the elder generation can vary quite a lot. 
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Swinging mode (between times and frameworks)
From the previous description it should have become clear that the commercial 
value of the things that were collected has never been considered a proper 
reason to place one or another object into the display. This does not mean that 
the Museum has no beautiful things in its display, but it does explain why 
at some point almost each visitor is happily surprised to discover an object 
that looks similar to what she or he is still using at home. In that respect the 
most popular showcases are the ones with dishes or tea-lights. The dishes 
with the famous Dutch ‘boerenbont’ (special pattern for crockery) regularly 
provoke an exclamation like Oh! That one I still have at home! To be more 
precise, there are various possibilities, by means of which the visitors as if 
unexpectedly switch off the remembering mode and reach for the present. 
The first reaction is one full of surprise or pride. The realisation that things 
that you are using at home make a part of the Museum collection, makes the 
visitors see their possessions in a new light, even if it is only a well-known 
brand of the washing powder, like in the following visitor’s remark:
Another reaction like for example Where has it all gone? has a more reflective 
character. It is more sentimental and contains a tinge of nostalgia and regret. 
This kind of switching has an obvious communicative purpose, but also 
makes explicit the process of adaptation and appropriation regarding the 
place of the Museum. Within the interaction of the visit an exclamation 
or a rhetorical question as in the examples above not only substantiates a 
dialogue, they are also used as tuning tools while a new framework is being 
constructed. The possibility to create a new framework is very important not 
only for the following analysis, but also for our general understanding of 
why elderly people appreciate the Museum visits so much. Let us dwell on 
it a little bit longer.
The interactive character of the Museum space is strengthened by the 
communicative options it offers to the visitors. By these options, I mean the 
constant presence of the Museum personnel, who in many cases accompany 
Looks into the drawer
W1: Dritex, Sunlight, yes indeed, Dritex, 
could wash with that too, Klok, you still 
have that, that is now, and starch I used as 
well, Crack Free, yes, Sil I still have, that 
still exists. Persil I still have myself too.
1W: Woman visitor
Kijkt in de la
Vr1: Dritex, Sunlight, ja hoor, Dritex, kon 
ook nog mee wassen, Klok, dat heb je nog, 
dat is nou, en stijfsel heb ik ook gebruikt, 
Crack Free, ja, Sil heb ik nog, dat bestaat 




the guests during their visits. Unlike in conventional museums, the Museum 
staff consists mainly of volunteers, most of who belong to the same age 
group as the visitors. In that respect they have a similar generalised image of 
the past. The impressions they gain from their first time in the Museum does 
not differ much from the reactions of the other visitors. 
What is quite different though, is the way that the volunteers behave towards 
the visitors once they have become representatives of the Museum. Most of 
them do not try to tell general stories about the artefacts, or to impose their own 
recollections on the visitors. In fact, they are asked not to do this and they follow 
this request willingly, because the general idea of the Museum appeals to them: 
the visitors come to remember and to talk, and the staff members are there to 
listen and to keep that process going. It is the presence of listeners in the Museum 
that makes the interactive atmosphere of the Museum specially attractive and 
inviting for everybody who wants to share his or her reminiscences. The feeling 
of trust that is required during the sharing of one’s memories is enhanced by the 
fact that the visitors and the volunteers usually speak the same language, both 
in the linguistic and sociocultural sense of the word.
 
This description provides us with enough information to assume that the 
Museum represents a specially organised social space. The arrangements at 
the Museum are based on a collective image of the past that was ‘produced’, 
fine-tuned and subsequently adjusted by a group of people working 
for Humanitas who were involved in the project. To give a very general 
description, this group consists of people who are 55-70 years old. Most of 
them live in Rotterdam or used to live there for a long time. They either work 
or live in Humanitas or they have relatives who they visit there. They socialise 
easily, they are willing to help others and they are inclined to preserve things 
from the past. In other words, a more or less predetermined social framework 
is already in place by the very fact that the Museum exists. Following the 
ideas of Halbwachs about the way selfhood is determined at the juxtaposition 
of social frameworks, we can observe a certain overlap of those frameworks 
from the moment the visitors enter the Museum. The frameworks that are 
familiar to the visitors are ‘brought along’, often explicitly with the company 
they keep: spouses, friends, family or organised groups. Once they are in the 
Museum, they find themselves face to face with another framework from 
the very beginning. This framework has clear spatial dimensions and is 
represented by the people who work there. The visitors are kindly invited 
to experience and study it, but they are free to choose: to stay outside of it, 
as usually happens in museums, or step inside and try to make it their own. 
It does not seem like visitors, even the most enthusiastic ones, immediately 
acquire the wish to become a member of the Museum framework. They 
recognise the surroundings, the style and the language in which they are 
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addressed. The inviting opening is already in place from the very moment 
they start to study the exhibition. The experience of recognising things 
intensifies during the tour, especially in cases when one of the volunteers 
accompanies the visitors, offering him/herself as a willing listener or 
collocutor. At the same time the visitors have to bridge the gap between their 
personal experience of a visit to a conventional museum and this one. At 
the Reminiscence Museum they are hardly given any information they did 
not know already. On the contrary, an appeal is made to them to recognise 
the artefacts and to speak up about things they know and remember from 
their past, and the Museum staff is there to facilitate this experience. Thus a 
connection between the visitors and the Museum personnel is established, 
which is characterised by specific features. It is spatially determined, it is 
time-wise sensitive and it is based on a mutually shared knowledge about 
the past. As a result several frameworks are juxtaposed and the visitor feels 
caught up in the middle of various social networks. 
There are various ways in which the visitors react to that juxtaposition. 
What I shall describe here usually happens at the end of the visit. The most 
frequently observed shift is caused by visitors who want to help and enrich 
the collection by bringing their own things to the Museum. I am talking 
about a very large group of people who pursue at least two goals, namely 
to assist the Museum and to clean up their own place. By cleaning up, 
we can understand the process of taking distance from certain cherished 
objects from the past, which the owners do not want to throw away. But 
they do not have any room for them either. In a certain way, the Museum 
offers a physical solution and at the same time it gives the donor a feeling of 
satisfaction and public appreciation. This effect has an important meaning. 
By donating things, this group of visitors explicitly ‘applies’ for membership 
of the Museum framework, even if it is just a temporary one. By offering 
some belongings they establish direct contact with the official body of the 
framework. A meeting will take place, a diary will be taken from a purse or 
jacket and appointments will be made. It is almost a business-like moment. 
All the same it does not interfere with the excitement of the visit. Its unspoken 
meaning seems to be the prolongation of the highly positive feeling of being 
useful again. When those people return to bring their stuff, it will often take 
hours for one of the Museum workers to listen to their stories. Some of them 
are concise as if they were written on paper. At that moment, the position 
of those visitors regarding the Museum framework has voluntarily shifted 
to the direction of the Museum. In some cases it will take an absolute form, 
when the visitor offers his or her services to work as a volunteer. Another 
possibility is that people who have brought their own things to the Museum 
will come again and again, often taking their friends with them, showing 
them around and promptly pointing at the (still personal!) things that they 
have given up for the exhibition. In this second case, they will still be visitors 
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and not really members, but their personal involvement in the existence of 
the Museum collection connects them strongly with the framework, and 
they want to keep this connection as an open option. 
Switching between old and new frameworks is an example of how topology 
of remembering invades the more explicit topographic description. Making 
new contacts is an explicit act while fighting loneliness and oblivion has 
to do with its deeper implicit goal. But let us return to the cases when the 
topography of the visit is explicit and when swinging between the present 
and the past can tell us more about transformations that visitors undergo 
during the Museum visits. One of the manifestations of such a mode is a 
discursive switch between recognition and reflection on the present situation, 
which takes place throughout the entire visit but especially in the beginning: 
W11:  Isn’t that nice! Warm water  
 plate. How sweet!
W2:  Bulletje en Bonestaak! 
 (famous comics)
W1:  Oh, delightful! Ha-ha-ha. 
 Pause Spinning tops. Pause Yes.
W2:  Where has it all gone?
W1:  Sweet, everything.
W1:  That you could get it.
MW:  It is brought along from all  
 sides, you see, and yes, when  
 we see things that we are really  
 interested in, then we have to  
 buy them as well.
W1:  We live in Acropolis.   
 (Headquarters of Humanitas)
MW:  Yes (carefully).
W1:  of the … (searches for the name)  
 and there you have some small  
 things too, during Easter things  
 are …
W2:  Humanitas!
1MW:     Museum volunteer (m)
W1:      Woman visitor 1
W2:      Woman visitor 2
Vr11:  Leuk, hè! Warmwater bordje. 
 Wat schattig!
 
Vr2:  Bulletje en Bonestaak! 
Vr1:  O, za-alig! Ha-ha-ha. 
 Pauze Tollen. Pauze Ja.
Vr2:  Waar is het allemaal gebleven? 
Vr 1:  Schattig allemaal.
Vr 1:  Dat jullie daaraan aankomen.
MM:  Dat wordt van alle kanten   
 aangedragen, he, en ja, als we  
 dingen zien die echt onze   
 belangstelling hebben, dan  
 moeten we ze ook wel kopen.
Vr1:  Wij wonen in de Akropolis. 
MM:  Ja (voorzichtig).
Vr1:  van de … (zoekt naar het woord)  
 en daar heb je ook al wat kleine  
 dingen, met Pasen spullen 
 staan…
Vr 2:  Humanitas!
1MM:    Museum vrijwilliger (m)
Vr1:    Vrouwelijke bezoeker 1
Vr2:    Vrouwelijke bezoeker 2
Extract 6
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This extract is taken from the beginning of the visit of two elderly women. 
They are accompanied by a Museum volunteer who belongs to the same 
generation. The women have just started their ‘trip’ to the past, but their 
bouncing back follows almost immediately in the form of the already 
familiar rhetorical question. The switch takes place very quickly, which is 
rather unusual, even if we take into consideration the patterns of a ‘normal’ 
visit. It looks like bridging the past and the present at the very beginning 
of the tour helps the visitors to position themselves with respect to an 
unexpectedly challenging situation. They are adjusting themselves to a new 
place, which looks strange and familiar at the same time (Sweet, everything); 
they are trying to place the Museum in a broader context of their social life 
(We live in Acropolis…and there you have some small things too), and they are 
busy broadening the existing social framework (the women are good friends) 
by allowing the members of the Museum staff in as well (That you can get it). 
This extract brings us back to the discussion about the displaced objects, which 
was carried out in the previous chapter43. All of the artefacts that the two 
women so eagerly mention in their dialogue are in a sense dislocated objects, 
having been donated to the Museum collection. The visitors rediscover them 
through a process that consists not just of a simple naming of the objects, but 
also in attaching themselves to the entire complex of relations which those 
objects used to represent. The warm water plate must have taken the women 
to the times of their youth, their motherhood, taking care of children and their 
first family abodes. The title of the comics shifted them to very different times 
when they were children themselves who enjoyed the much less abundant 
world of children’s literature than nowadays. One can only imagine what 
kind of swinging in times and emotions the visitor undergoes while attaching 
and reattaching herself to the various artefacts of the Museum collection. The 
rediscovery of dislocated objects is almost always accompanied by surprise 
from the visitors. As an observer I am surprised even more by the complexity 
of the reattachment process, which has only the appearance of automatism, yet 
which at the end of the day asks for a serious and prolonged effort of absorption 
on the part of the visitor.  
The processes facilitated by various Museum objects are brought into motion 
simultaneously, which is why the experience of the visitors must have been 
quite overwhelming. As I have already noted, remembering will present itself 
in an accelerating flux, which always goes together with an intensive emotional 
involvement of the reminiscing person. How much of those emotions each 
visitor can take at a time would be a wrongly formulated question. What we can 
ask ourselves is how the visitors cope with this constantly growing stream of 
memories. Based on observations and conversations with visitors, I can assume 
43  See the discussion on displacment of objects, p.78.
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that the switch between remembering and the present is a naturally applied 
strategy, repeatedly used by visitors of the Museum. It gives them time to process 
their impressions, to overcome the uncertainty regarding forgotten experiences 
and most of all to savour the moment in a prolonged and relaxed manner. 
Remember the woman who wanted to sit down in the ‘kitchen’ of the Museum in 
order to feel comfortable and then utterly enjoyed that moment. Another type of 
strategy will be to look for and find a social framework to which you can belong 
and where sharing experiences can decrease the burden of the pleasurable but 
still unexpected and therefore sometimes frightening excitement. 
Everybody who used to swing as a child knows the joy of the free fall. But the 
most breathtaking moment is when you reach the point high enough to think that 
you can make a full turn. Excitement is a word too weak to describe its fascination. 
First, you are high in the air, then you freeze for a split second and only after that, 
you come down with a feeling of doing the famous loop. After spending some 
time in the Museum many visitors reach that fascinating point of almost child-like 
joy. The Museum place looks more and more familiar, giving them the powerful 
feeling of coming back home. The doors to the memory treasury are opened, the 
reminiscences are likely to stream as soon as the slightest action sends a request 
for it and if you are lucky to be there at that moment, you will be awarded by the 
visitors’ openness, trust and by the most amazing stories from their lives. 
Revived snapshots
In the majority of the examples given so far, the comments of the visitors 
remind one of a labelling process. As soon as recognition has taken place, 
the language is there to fix it, often in a laconic form of classification: time, 
branch and function. The dialogical character of remembering and interaction 
within frameworks contribute to the emotional side of communication, 
which constitutes an important part of the visitors’ pleasure. The comments 
themselves are often straightforward, from things to representations, as 
it is supposed to be with channelled memories. This linear connection is 
not unconditional. When the visitor is ready for it, a certain object in the 
exhibition will play a role of ignition in starting up a remembering process: 
W1:  And such a rug above that dish,  
 you draped it, didn’t you, yes,  
 indeed… (M: Was beautiful)…  
 And do you know that your   
 granddad cut the cloth sometimes? 
M & MW: Oh!
Vr1:  En zo’n kleed boven die schaal, die  
 drapeerde je, hè, ja, ja … (M: Was  
 mooi) … En weet je dat je opa het  
 kleed wel eens sneed?




W:  He was going to cut something off. 
M  starts talking simultaneously: That  
 was dramatic. That man, he always  
 repaired shoes. Then he hammered  
 the new, new soles under  
MW interrupts: He doesn’t need to do that  
 on the table, does he?
M:  No, on the mould, right.
MW:  Yes, on the mould.
M:  Because he had a steady hand  
 and that was on the inside, the  
 nail heads stood out, they were  
 flattened afterwards of course but  
 then you couldn’t walk on them  
 anymore, … with cardboard he  
 then cut soles and that he did that  
 on the table sometimes, so he   
 would be cutting, like this, like this  
W1:  And such a rug above that dish,  
 you draped it, didn’t you, yes,  
 indeed… (M: Was beautiful)…  
 And do you know that your   
 granddad cut the cloth sometimes? 
M & MW: Oh!
M:  Yes.
W:  He was going to cut something off. 
M  starts talking simultaneously: That  
 was dramatic. That man, he always  
 repaired shoes. Then he hammered  
 the new, new soles under  
MW interrupts: He doesn’t need to do that  
 on the table, does he?
M:  No, on the mould, right.
MW:  Yes, on the mould.
M:  Ja.
Vr:  Hij ging wat afsnijden.
M door de Vr heen: Dat was dramatisch. Die  
 man, die repareerde altijd schoenen.  
 Dan sloeg hij de nieuwe, nieuwe  
 zolen onder
Mm onderbreekt: Dat hoeft hij toch niet op de  
 tafel te doen?
M:  Nee, over de leest, he?
MM:  Ja, over de leest.
M:  Want hij had een stevige hand en  
 dat was aan de binnenkant, staken  
 die spijker koppen uit, die werden  
 daarna plat geslagen natuurlijk maar  
 dan kon je er niet meer op lopen, …  
 van karton sneed hij dan zooltjes en  
 dat deed hij wel op tafel, dus hij was  
 wel aan het snijden, zo, zo en zo en  
 dat was in de vorm van de zolen had  
Vr1:  En zo’n kleed boven die schaal, die  
 drapeerde je, hè, ja, ja … (M: Was  
 mooi) … En weet je dat je opa het  
 kleed wel eens sneed?
M en MM: O!
M:  Ja.
Vr:  Hij ging wat afsnijden.
M door de Vr heen: Dat was dramatisch. Die  
 man, die repareerde altijd schoenen.  
 Dan sloeg hij de nieuwe, nieuwe  
 zolen onder
Mm onderbreekt: Dat hoeft hij toch niet op de  
 tafel te doen?
M:  Nee, over de leest, he?
MM:  Ja, over de leest.
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To make the picture complete let me add what is not directly readable from 
the extract. The conversation took place between an old couple and the 
Museum volunteer of the same age. By that point their visit to the Museum 
had been going on for three quarters of an hour. You could not see any signs 
of tiredness though; they were looking more curious, excited and absorbed 
by the exhibition than in the beginning. This is what I meant saying about 
‘being ready’. Both visitors have their own way of reacting to the collection: 
she does it with a kind of distant contemplative look, without missing a 
small detail; he moves more energetically but keeps silent for some time, 
until he has found something that triggers his memories, and then he shares 
his knowledge with a great deal of animation and performance. The old lady 
(the wife) starts by pointing at the draped rug above the fireplace. When 
her husband is reminded about the accident, his posture, the way he moves 
and the tone of his voice changes considerably. In the example, the wife’s 
mediation between the rug above the fireplace and the story of her husband 
is inescapable. She notices it and he is very quick on the uptake. While 
telling his story he moves towards the side of the table and reproduces all 
the movements his grandfather supposedly made. The moment of cutting 
the soles he accompanies by showing the precise movements his grandfather 
made, so that you can literally follow the process like this, like this and like this 
and you can almost feel at once how the knife goes through all those layers, 
through the tablecloth up to the table board. The expectation is quite strong 
and everybody starts laughing, even before his story is finished. 
The extract shows how dwelling on the past is integrally connected with 
the dialogical character of remembering in general and with the interactive 
M:  Because he had a steady hand  
 and that was on the inside, the  
 nail heads stood out, they were  
 flattened afterwards of course but  
 then you couldn’t walk on them  
 anymore, … with cardboard he  
 then cut soles and that he did that  
 on the table sometimes, so he   
 would be cutting, like this, like this  
 and like this and that was in the  
 shape of the soles he had cut   
 right through the table-cloth. Of  
 course my grandma had something  
 to say …
 They laugh together
1MW:   Museum volunteer (f)
W:      Woman visitor
M:      Male visitor
M:  Want hij had een stevige hand en  
 dat was aan de binnenkant, staken  
 die spijker koppen uit, die werden  
 daarna plat geslagen natuurlijk maar  
 dan kon je er niet meer op lopen, …  
 van karton sneed hij dan zooltjes en  
 dat deed hij wel op tafel, dus hij was  
 wel aan het snijden, zo, zo en zo en  
 dat was in de vorm van de zolen had  
 hij zo het tafelkleed door gesneden.  
 Nou mijn oma zei toen natuurlijk 
 wel wat…
 Lachen allemaal
1MM:  Museum vrijwilliger (v)
Vr:    Vrouwelijke bezoeker
M:     Mannelijke bezoeker
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sphere of the Museum visits in particular. It also makes evident how the 
frameworks within which reminiscence occurs influence the presentation 
and the content of the events that are remembered. Finally, it highlights 
family life as both context and content of home-attached reminiscences. 
The interpretation of the discursive aspects of reminiscence is borrowed 
from the impressive phenomenological study on remembering by E. Casey:
The most immediate, as well as the most telling, clue we have as to the inherently 
communal-discursive aspect of reminiscing is the mere fact that it flourishes in the 
company of others. Not only does it frequently occur in a specifically social setting, it is 
also actively solicited by such a setting (1987: 113).
Looking back at the example, we can see that a short dialogue precedes the 
story, which is first interrupted by a question-comment and only then is it 
completed without further disturbances.  As Casey puts it, ‘something at once 
social and verbal is happening’. The lady introduces a theme, her husband 
and the volunteer eagerly react to it; then the husband takes over. But the 
Museum volunteer, also a woman, is keen on highlighting her knowledge and 
gender authority in housekeeping issues. After that, the man takes over and 
with impressive performing skills, he finishes ‘his’ story. The quotation marks 
are deliberate. How far is the story that is told actually his, given the fact that 
his wife reminded him of the event, which was obviously already known to 
her and probably had been told to her several times? Then the other woman 
remarks on his story and the man complies by adding more information. 
Finally, excited by the attention and empathy of the listeners, he embellishes 
his story with his bodily performance. The question is how much of that, if any, 
could have happened without the stimulating dialogue and attention of his 
company. Halbwachs’ idea of the social character of remembering cannot be 
better illustrated. But let us have one more look at the discursive specificity of 
what took place. Another insight of Casey seems to be very helpful here:
It is a striking fact that whereas the verbs ‘to remember’ and ‘to recollect’ both take 
a direct object, ‘to reminisce’ does not. We do not reminisce something, we reminisce 
about it. In this regard, reminiscing is comparable to reminding … But there remains a 
critical difference. In a circumstance of reminding, I am characteristically in a passive 
position, as is signified in such expression as ‘I am reminded’ or ‘that reminds me’ … 
In reminiscing, I assume a more active posture … I or we get in touch with the past 
actively, thanks to concerted efforts at talking about it, musing on it, and so on. Such a 
difference between reminding and reminiscing is not just a verbal matter. It reflects the 
fundamental difference between being thrust into a world of the ready-to-hand – where 
I am willy-nilly parasitic on the pre-existence of given reminders arranged around me 
– and being a participant in an ongoing conversation in which I am responsible for 
articulating the past in quite particular ways (1987: 105).
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Applying these typological variations of remembering to the analysed 
extract, we can see how reminding and reminiscing differ and at the same 
time work together. The peculiarity of the situation consists in the fact that 
the reminder, i.e. the question from the lady directed to her husband, also has 
a discursive form, but it is still treated as a reminder. Her husband reacts by 
simple asserting it: Yes. Reminiscing, as it appears from the definition above, 
requires a much more active positioning of the reminiscing person, as well 
as special circumstances and preferably also the presence of other people. 
The lady bridges reminding and reminiscing by starting his story: He was going 
to cut something out. By doing this, she treads on the sacred territory of his 
memories and practically leaves him no choice. The impact is too strong to resist, 
and the man starts telling the story himself. This example offers a plausible 
explanation of the differences in the way channelled memories are manifested. 
In cases of reminiscing, the present action that ignites the remembering process 
must be much stronger than in other modes of remembering. At the same 
time, this mode, while still directly connected to the object of the exhibition, 
is the least ‘channelled’ one. Casey’s grammatical explanation helps us once 
again. The impossibility to reminisce something is counterbalanced by another 
option. Reminiscing involves not just remembering certain things, but also 
remembering the situations, in which these things have played an important 
role. Reminiscing about invites everybody present to partake in the process and 
even change the content if it fits the main line of the story. When that happens, 
we can with certainty talk about the influence of the social frameworks again.
What is often remembered in the Museum is deeply rooted in family life. 
The spatio-temporal amplitude of the recollections is impressively vast. 
Reminiscences extend from stories about the visitors’ grandparents and 
parents, their own early years in the parents’ house, via their first independent 
lodgings right up to the place where they are currently living. Home is the 
most usual scene of the reminisced events, and family members are the most 
prevalent social framework within which the remembering process occurs. 
A number of studies have shown that couples who have lived together long 
enough have developed a pattern of supporting and stimulating each others’ 
memories (Dixon & Gould, 1998). This division of responsibilities helps 
elderly people to successfully exercise their mnemonic abilities. It seems as 
if in our example the wife did exactly what she used to do for years, namely 
to catalyse her partner’s remembering process, who in his turn responded to 
her impulse according to his own pattern. 
Throughout the data there are various examples of reminiscing together, where 
mutual support and stimulation of family members or friends promote and 
assist the remembering process. It also happens within temporal frameworks, 
which appear during the visits and mainly consist of visitors and Museum 
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W1:  Once a week a big tub came into  
 the kitchen .., the hot water went  
 in, and then the three of us went 
 in … The first one who went in, it  
 was the same water. And there was  
 always a fight who was allowed to  
 go in first (both laugh).
MW:   Wasn’t it that the youngest always…
W:  No, no, no.
MW:  How many children were you?
W:  Seven children …
W:  I mean, it was a large zinc tub and  
 that it, well not full of course but a  
 couple of.. pans with hot water 
Vr1:  Eens in de week kwam een grote teil  
 in de keuken .., kwam het heet water  
 daarin, en dan gingen we met  
 z’n drieën in … De eerste die   
 dan ging, het was hetzelfde water. En  
 het was vechten wie de eerste mocht  
 (lachen allebei). 
Mm:  Was het niet zo dat de jongste altijd…
Vr:  Nee, nee, nee.
Mm:  Met hoeveel kinderen waren jullie?
Vr:  Zeven kinderen…
Vr:  Ik bedoel, het was een grote zinken  
 teil en dat die, nou vol niet natuurlijk  
 maar een paar..pannen heet water  
Extract 8
volunteers. The personnel at 
the Museum know by now 
where the visitors’ favourite 
places are, i.e. the places 
where almost everybody will 
actively react to the display 
and will tell a story, which 
is channelled not only by 
the displayed artefacts but 
also by the expectations and 
motivating behaviour of the 
people who work there. The 
rooms of the Museum are 
like the snapshots, which are constantly revived by the visitor’s reminiscences. 
The room that I personally find surprising in the way it consistently appeals 
to the visitors’ reminiscences is the washing corner. My supposition will be 
that under the circumstances when there simply was no warm water, washing 
machines or a heating system, laundry and washing activities were considered 
to be an unavoidable, heavy weekly labour. Those who experienced it, the 
majority of them female visitors, are obviously immediately reminded of its 
hardships. Another reciprocal line of reminiscing in the washing corner brings 
lighter reminiscences about the early years, when children had to take their 
baths in the tub together. All the attributes that are mentioned in the stories are 
present in the Museum. While looking at them or holding them in their hands, 
the visitors start remembering their experiences and the discursive line of their 
stories serves as a thread, upon which they string recognised objects, finally 
creating a unique necklace of their reminiscences. 
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 went in and you have to heat it on  
 the gas stove. And that cooled off  
 quickly, and now I must… can I  
 have some more? (Laughs)
MW:  Yes, indeed, and that was just a bar  
 of soap, wasn’t it?
W:  Or the shower gel, something 
 like that.
MW:  Yes, yes.
W:  And the washing glove, you have 
 to wash … as well.
MW:  But that wasn’t every day?
W almost whispering: No, on Saturdays we  
 went into the tub. True.
1MW:   Museum worker (f)
W:      Woman visitor
 gingen er maar in en je moet het op  
 het gas warm maken. En dat was ook  
 snel koud, en nou ik moet… kan er  
 nog een beetje bij? (Lacht)
Mm:  Ja, ja, en dat was gewoon een   
 zeepblokje, hè?
Vr:  Of de douche gel, zo iets. 
Mm:  Ja, ja.
Vr:  En de waslap, moet je ook …wassen.
Mm:  Maar dat was niet iedere dag?
Vr bijna fluisterend: Nee, ‘s zaterdags gingen  
 we de teil in. Ja. 
1MM:  Museum medewerker (v)
Vr:    Vrouwelijke bezoeker
In this example we recognise the familiar pattern of a dialogical remembering 
in the interactive surroundings of the Museum. The sight of the tub helps to 
awaken the reminiscences and the interlocutor intensifies their extension by 
asking a couple of questions. The two women understand each other perfectly, 
albeit for different reasons. One of them shares her own experiences, while 
the other bases her reactions on similar stories, which she has heard from 
other visitors or volunteers. 
What is interesting about this episode is that the visiting woman situates 
herself as a child within the recollection. Presumably it might have been 
possible as well to tell a story of her own adult experiences with such a 
tub (perhaps bathing her own children). She builds up the scene from the 
perspective and concerns of a child (e.g. fighting over turns in the tub) and 
uses active voicing to dramatise the event further (can I have some more?). The 
domestic scene is then unfolded around the tub, which serves as the marker 
between then and now. Little description is offered of her family itself – 
instead it is the relations between persons as mediated by objects such as the 
tub, hot water and washing gloves which provide the focus. The tub present 
in the kitchen then acts as a kind of envelope (see Middleton & Brown, 2005) 
into which this description of a typical Saturday bath-time is packed. Once 
that typicality has been adequately described it returns back to the tub itself, 
and hence to the present. 
The example above, as well as the next one, shows how a collective image of 
the past domestic life is literally being recreated. 
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Extract 9
N1:  Do you see that tub?
W3:  Yes.
N1:  We used to have a very large one in  
 the garden.
N2:  And we have to go into the tub in  
 the evenings.
N1:  Exactly.
N2:  Not every day.
N1:  No.
 All together
Mw:  How many of you at the same time?
N1:  One at a time but on the same day.
Mw:  Yes, of course.
N:  Fetch water at the water boiler.
Mw:  And how many children then?
N1:  We were with five children at   
 home. ... We were divided. My  
 sister was the last-born one, so 
 she didn’t have to, she went in  
 one of those small tubs (Mw: Yes,  
 yes, yes). And I had to go with  
 my three brothers on Friday   
 afternoons and with my two sisters  
 on Wednesday afternoons.
Mw:  Yes, that was well arranged.
N1:  … fetch water first … carry   
 buckets with boiling water.
W4:  At the water boiler’s.
N1:  Yes, at the water boiler’s. I lived in  
 the staircase (W4: Yes). And I 
 really walked up the stairs 
 with the buckets with hot water. 
 I was, I am taking about when I  
 was 8-9 years old. (W4: Yes) With  
 that boiling water…
Mw:  That is the way it was, everybody  
 did it.
N1:  I never burned myself.
Mw:  No, no, indeed.
Vr B1:  Zie je die teil?
Vr 3:  Ja.
Vr B1:  We hadden een heel grote in de tuin. 
Vr  B2:  En we moeten ’s avonds in de teil.
Vr B1:  Precies.
Vr B2:  Niet elke dag
Vr B1:  nee
 Door elkaar
Mm:  Met hoeveel tegelijk?
Vr B1:  Een tegelijk maar wel dezelfde dag.
Mm:  Ja, natuurlijk.
Vr B:  Water bij de waterstoker halen.
Mm:  En hoeveel kinderen dan?
Vr B1:  We waren met vijf kinderen thuis.  
 …We waren gedeeld. Mijn zusje was  
 het nakomertje, dus ze hoefde niet,  
 zij ging in zo’n klein teiltje   
 (Mm: Ja, ja, ja). En ik moest 
 met mijn drie broers   
 vrijdagmiddag en met   
 twee zusjes op woensdagmiddag. 
Mm:  Ja, dat was goed geregeld.
Vr B1:  … eerst water gaan halen… met  
 emmers heet water sjouwen. 
Vr4:  Bij de waterstoker.
Vr B1:  Ja, bij de waterstoker. Ik woonde in  
 het trappenhuis. (Vr 4: Ja)  En ik liep  
 echt met de emmers heet water de 
 trap op. Ik was, ik heb het toch over  
 dat ik 8-9 jaar was. (Vr 4: Ja) Met 
 dat heet water… 
Mm:  Het was niet anders, iedereen 
 deed het.
Vr B1:  Ik heb me nooit van verbrand.
Mm:  Nee, nee, precies.
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1Mw:  Museum worker (f)
W3:    Woman visitor 3
W4:    Woman visitor 4
N1:     Nurse visitor (f) 1
N2:     Nurse visitor (f) 2
1Mm:   Museum medewerker (v)
Vr3:     Vrouwelijke bezoeker 3
Vr4:     Vrouwelijke bezoeker 4
Vr B1:  Verpleegkundige bezoeker (v)1
Vr B2:  Verpleegkundige bezoeker (v)2
Extract 10
W1:  And then she (granny) was  
 living on the third floor, and  
 then she went to the… water  
 boiler’s , she went to fetch   
 buckets.., such buckets with 
 hot water, she  climbed up all  
 those stairs with the boiling hot  
Vr1:  En dan woonde zij (oma) 
 driehoog, en dan ging ze bij de  
 ..waterstoker, ging ze emmers..,  
 zulke emmers met het hete water  
 halen, liep ze al die trappen op 
 met het gloeiend hete water. 
 Dat ging daarin en dan ging 
This collective building of a narrative around the tub is noticeable from the 
opening of the extract. Whilst it is the visiting nurse who opens up the topic, it 
is her colleague who builds the context of the tub being a device for washing, 
which is then confirmed by the first nurse who goes on to take receipt of the 
questions addressed to the group by the Museum attendant. The first nurse 
then offers a small description of bath-times, again from the perspective of 
a child rather than as an adult. As with the previous extract, this description 
focuses on practical arrangements that the child endures during bath-time, 
such as carrying buckets of boiling water. The contribution by one of the 
visiting ladies (W4) is significant as she offers the phrase waterstoker. This 
is local Rotterdam dialect for a water boiler. Hence the receipt ‘ja, bij de 
waterstoker’ by the first nurse in the next turn unites them into a group. 
The recollection is placed as relative to a common past that is shared by the 
women, of growing up in the same area where the Museum is now situated. 
Jointly building the recollection then does the work of shaping this group of 
women in the present, sharing community and a communal history.
When describing collective memory, we often refer to rather generalised 
images, which already exist within various social groups. If we look 
consistently at the last two extracts that are presented, then even without any 
previous knowledge about Dutch domestic life 60-70 years ago, one begins 
to see a picture of it, based on the personal stories told by various people. 
At least, this is how my own image about those times has been created. My 
position in it however is still the position of an outsider. The people who 
share their reminiscences with each other, also share a very broad framework. 
It can be a socio-temporal framework of the same generation, or a socio-
geographical framework being citizens of Rotterdam. Here is an example of 
a very Rotterdam-bound description. 
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Although this extract is taken from an absolutely different visit, it is obvious 
that the reminiscences almost coincide. Both women grew up in Rotterdam at 
approximately the same time, and only in Rotterdam the notion ‘waterstoker’ 
(the boiler’s) can make any sense. This term is recognisable for the generation 
of old Rotterdam citizens, but it is not evident at all for younger people. After 
hearing it so many times, I did not hesitate to use the word in contemporary 
Dutch discourse, but the surprised looks of the listeners made me aware 
of the fact that I was unwittingly mixing the idioms of very different social 
frameworks. A citizen of Amsterdam would rather talk about a ‘water and 
fire boss’ and the rest of Holland is unlikely to recognise such terminology 
at all. That insight however reached me later, after quite some searching and 
learning. Even if I am able to recognise the collective in the personal, I shall 
never be able to reminisce about it or recreate the patterns of the framework, 
which is genuinely not mine. However, the entire experience teaches us that 
listening is a skill of crucial importance if you want to learn from the older 
generation. The knowledge that you acquire in this way cannot always be 
found in books. It can introduce you to unknown sides of the lifestyle your 
parents and grandparents had and thereby remove unnecessary obstacles in 
understanding and communicating with each other. 
To counterbalance the previous story, here is another example, where the 
knowledge of the ‘Monday washing ritual’ we already mentioned earlier 
served well in establishing trust and mutual understanding between the 
visitors and myself as 
a representative of the 
Museum. A group of 
people was visiting the 
exhibition. Their average 
age was about 55. They 
were genuinely interested 
and wandered about the 
Museum freely. There was 
a pleasant moment in the 
washing room where I saw 
a woman who was alone 
at that point. We chatted a 
 water. It went into that and then  
 it started to … I have done all  
 that too as a child, where you  
 get the water, yes.
1W:  Woman visitor
 het een beetje… ik heb het ook  
 allemaal gedaan als kind, waar  
 je het water haalt, ja.
1Vr:  Vrouwelijke bezoeker
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little bit; everything amazed her but she could not recognise very much. So 
I decided to draw the general picture of ‘Monday, the washing day’ for her, 
based on the stories that other visitors had told me. She listened very carefully. 
When I had come to the point ‘the children came from school and were sent to the 
wringer’, her husband came inside. He was excited and immediately began 
to tell us about his early years, how he came home from school on Mondays 
and had to help his mother with washing and wringing… His wife laughed 
and pointing at me she said: she has just told me the same thing.
The fact is that I had not. My story was not quite the same as her husband’s 
story, but it did not really matter. My retelling the story and its similarity to 
the real one was a way to talk and to understand each other. At that point, 
in spite of all cultural and age-related differences, we became members of 
the same group, which shared some interesting knowledge. What is even 
more important is that this small incident influenced their family relations 
in a positive manner. The woman learnt something about her husband that 
had obviously never been mentioned before, and the husband was glad to 
tell a story about his early days, using and appreciating the opportunity to 
share something with his partner in life. I think that the woman was quite 
surprised when she heard her husband almost literally repeating the story. 
My surprise was even stronger. The whole incident made me realise that the 
influence of the groups and societies to which we belong or are associated 
with, is strong and all-penetrating. In the light of this discovery, the well-
known passage from Halbwachs’ Collective Memory seems to be very much 
to the point:
How often do we present, as deeply held convictions, thoughts borrowed from a 
newspaper, book, or conversation? They respond so well to our way of seeing things that 
we are surprised to discover that their author is someone other than ourselves. ‘That’s 
just what I think about that!’ We are unaware that we are but an echo (1950/1980: 44-45). 
The stories that people tell are not about an entire generation, at least not 
from the very beginning. Visitors usually start with personal remarks and 
only at the end sometimes make a kind of general comment, which confirms 
their belonging to a broader group. Listening to the stories, which repeat 
or echo each other as if in unison, you unavoidably ask yourself why this is 
happening? Why do all those people find it important to tell about rather 
ordinary events of their early life? The answer could be that it is exactly 
because of the sensation that has been just described. Awakening the interest 
in others for something that has been an important part of your life makes a 
lot of sense, especially for the older generation. Sharing an experience, feeling 
in charge and appreciated again could also be among the main reasons for 
reviving the past. The visitors are doing it sincerely. They come into a room, 
look around as if making a number of quick snapshots and then choose their 
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favourite view to zoom into. It reminds me of the feeling one can experience 
while looking at photos. First all the pictures look a bit the same and almost 
lifeless. They are reminders of the past, of people that passed away and 
of former events. Very soon though, if your interest or curiosity is strong 
enough, you will catch yourself wandering within your reminiscences and 
looking at the images that are still in front of you. Only then will the dead 
snapshots turn into slow motion movies, full of colours, sounds and life.
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topology of MeMory: Mechanics anD Magics of reMeMBering
The previous examples have shown that even when remembering 
processes seem to be apparent, the mechanisms underlying them are very 
sophisticated.  Now we shall turn to the observations of the experiences the 
structure of which is more intricate. Duration will be a key notion in the 
coming discussion. Therefore it deserves some special attention.
Metaphors of duration
The notion of duration is central to the philosophy of Bergson. It is in 
vain that one would go through his works in search of notions like stable 
substances, fixed qualities and settled states and images. One quotation from 
his ingenious Creative evolution will render any further doubt on the subject 
superfluous:
Let us take the most stable of internal states, the visual perception of a motionless 
external object. The object may remain the same, I may look at it from the same side, at 
the same angle, in the same light; nevertheless the vision I now have of it differs from 
that which I have just had, even if only because the one is an instant older that the other. 
My memory is there, which conveys something of the past into the present. My mental 
state, as it advances on the road of time, is continually swelling with the duration which 
it accumulates: it goes on increasing – rolling upon itself, as snowball on the snow … The 
truth is that we change without ceasing, and that the state itself is nothing but change 
(1911.2005: 4). 
It was not by chance that Bergson held change in such a high esteem. 
Change, time, memory, duration are for him interdependent notions and 
he returns to them repeatedly in his works. For Bergson these are the most 
sophisticated operating tools in his approach to philosophy. He understands 
the world and the human in terms of constant movement and change. As the 
quoted passage clearly indicates, there will be never an instant that stays the 
same, since every instant has to do with time, which does not have instants 
at all. Time, real time at least, is indivisible. Bergson talks about time as a 
multiplicity of a new kind, which is heterogeneous and therefore qualitative, 
and cannot be understood in the metric terms: 
When I follow with my eyes on the dial of a clock the movement of the hand which 
corresponds to the oscillations of the pendulum, I do not measure duration, as seems to 
be thought; I merely count simultaneities, which is very different. Outside of me, in space, 
there is never more than a single position of the hand and the pendulum, for nothing is 
left of the past positions. Within myself a process of organization or interpenetration of 
conscious states is going on, which constitutes true duration (1913/2008: 107-108).
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What Bergson stresses here is change or movement, which is understood as 
‘succession without distinction’, as ‘a mutual penetration, an interconnection 
and organization of elements, each one of which represents the whole, and 
cannot be distinguished or isolated from it except by abstract thought’. 
However, Bergson understands the utopianism of that representation since 
it could have been given only by a being ‘who was ever the same and ever 
changing, and who had no idea of space’ (1913/2008: 101).  
Bergson’s opposition between the spatial (i.e. extensive) and the temporal 
(i.e. intensive) leads to one of the most beautiful explanations concerning 
the contradiction between the (=temporal) way we live and the (=spatial) 
way we reflect on it in our thoughts. In his Time and Free Will he uses a 
musical metaphor to describe the melting effect of the notes, which create a 
sensationally indivisible melody. At least, we hear it as indivisible, otherwise 
we would never have been able to recognise music among the other sounds 
that are constantly disturbing the atmosphere around us. 
This idea of indivisibility spans all Bergson’s writings. He admits that his 
own language often forces him to express the understanding of duration 
in spatial terms or metaphors. In Creative Evolution he takes one step 
further and presents a more complicated image, namely the concept of the 
cinematographical mechanism of perception and knowledge, which describes 
the workings of perception, intellection and language as based on taking 
‘snapshots …of the passing reality’. The restriction that our way of thinking 
imposes on us results in the fact that ‘the mind manages to take stable views 
of the instability’ and that we finally ‘solidify into discontinuous images the 
fluid continuity of the real’ (1911/2005: 328-329). 
Bergson’s critique of language is based on his opinion that language 
‘gives a fixed form to fleeting sensation’, and ‘makes us believe in the 
unchangeableness of our sensations’ (1913/2008: 131). He writes that ‘the 
word with well-defined outlines, the rough and ready word, which stores up 
the stable, common, and consequently impersonal element in the impressions 
of mankind, overwhelms or at least covers over the delicate and fugitive 
impressions of our individual consciousness’ (1913/2008: 132). It is quite 
a strict definition for somebody who always looks for motion and change 
instead of ‘rough and ready’ substances, which finally prevent him from 
seeing the opening between the temporal and the spatial, which language 
so generously offers. I would not argue against the fact that language is not 
always compatible with the nuances of the ever changing reality, but I would 
certainly suggest that there are metaphors of language that can catch the 
most subtle changes and movements within our experiences. 
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Let us leave Bergson for a moment and present an example from contemporary 
modern discourse. One of the visitors of the Museum, being deeply 
impressed by what he had seen, kept repeating during his visit: You have a 
piece of history here! Not as sophisticated as Zeno’s paradoxes, the visitor’s 
remark nevertheless clearly catches the ‘confusion between motion and the 
space’ (1913/2008: 112). It seems as if the metaphor has arrested the moment, 
as Bergson suggests, but at the same time it has opened the possibility to 
look at the exhibition from a different angle. The visitor did not point at 
any specific object at the time of his utterance, so his words can be related 
to the entire exhibition. The fact that his metaphorically expressed reaction 
is rather emotional and has nothing to do with professional (scientific) 
observations, makes it almost even more valuable for us. Imagine for a 
moment that history is broken into pieces and frozen for the next generation, 
to give them a taste of the past. As soon as we try to decode a metaphor, i.e. to 
extract the initial meanings of the words, the seemingly absurd combination 
of its components will prevent us from understanding its deeper discursive 
meaning. A metaphor is a multiplicity in itself. Its construction introduces a 
change in degree (a combination of several words functions as a unity). At 
the same time its meaning is the result of a change in kind. The essence of 
a live metaphor consists in constant mutual extrapolation of two different 
terms, the boundaries of which cannot be defined. In that sense metaphors 
are ceaseless processes of creating new meanings. Bergson’s writings, and 
especially Creative Evolution, for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize for 
Literature, are the best arguments against a possible underestimation of 
them. Thanks to the metaphors of language Bergson is able to give us the 
most tangible definition of duration.
There are many definitions of duration that Bergson sharpens from one book 
to the next. Here is, in my opinion, one of the best among them:
Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which 
swells as it advances. And as the past grows without ceasing, so also there is no limit 
to its preservation. Memory, as we have tried to prove, is not a faculty of putting away 
recollections in a drawer, or of inscribing them in a register. There is no register, no 
drawer; there is not even, properly speaking, a faculty, for a faculty works intermittently, 
when it will or when it can, whilst the piling up of the past upon the past goes on 
without relaxation. In reality, the past is preserved by itself, automatically. In its entirety, 
probably, it follows us at every instant; all that we have felt, thought and willed from 
our earliest infancy is there, leaning over the present which is about to join it, pressing 
against the portals of consciousness that would fain leave it outside (1911/2005: 7).
It would be almost cynical to count all the metaphors that Bergson employed 
in the passage (I would say about 17). A remarkable effort for somebody 
who saw language as a necessary instrumental limitation for the expression 
of processes and sensations. But the result is overwhelming. Everything 
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about duration is brought together here. He speaks of an unbreakable and 
ceaseless line of changing and becoming where there are no limits or artificial 
boundaries, because there are no entities (moments, instants or intervals) to 
fence in, where everything is interconnected and never ceases to exist, being 
invisibly and yet vaguely present till it ‘can give useful	work’ to us.
 
The most striking particularity of the quoted passage, ‘is that Bergson 
uses ‘memory’ as a synonym to duration’ (Middleton & Brown, 2005: 72). 
Duration as a concept is in my opinion much broader than memory. I would 
refine the proposed synonymic relations between duration and memory 
in the last quote and define them as metonymical. Memory, understood as 
duration, is only one possible line in the universal process of becoming, as are 
evolution, progress or ageing. Understood in terms of constant change and 
of becoming, memory demands a specific ontological approach and its share 
in the definition of Being. I shall let those issues pending for now and first 
look at what memory means for human beings, especially for the generation, 
whose reflection on its past and reminiscing about it has become a way of life. 
***
One afternoon a small group of people from another nursing home in Rotterdam 
came to visit the Museum. They were all about 75-80 years old. In the beginning 
the visitors seemed to be a bit shy, but with the assistance of a professional 
who had already been to the 
exhibition, their shyness was 
quickly replaced by genuine 
curiosity. They did not stay 
together and each of them 
independently chose a room 
to start the tour. After some 
time a man with a walking 
frame drew my attention. 
His movements had a certain 
pattern. First, he would stand 
still, looking around. Then 
suddenly, as if he had taken 
a decision, he would quickly 
move towards a certain object. He would stand in front of it for some time, taking 
it in his hands if possible, muttering from time to time Oh boy, oh boy! Then he 
would go back to some observation point, freeze there, choosing another place 
or thing which attracted his attention. The swiftness of his movements took turns 
with the quietness of contemplation. He obviously was not looking for company 
and was totally absorbed by what was in front of him. He would come back to 
things that especially struck him two or three times. One of those things was an 
old-fashioned bakelite telephone. The man was clearly fascinated by the sight of 
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the heavy black apparatus. The first time he immediately picked up the receiver 
and started to dial. Only then, after two attempts, he turned to me a little bit lost 
and said that it did not work. He did not really ask or expect my reaction. It was 
rather a matter-of-fact statement. He returned to the telephone again and again, 
each time touching the heavy receiver, dialling and listening to its clicking sound 
as the dial turns back44.  Later on he moved to the sitting room where a couple 
of people from his group were already sitting at the dining table. Just like before 
he quickly moved to the table and after a couple of moments sat down, picked 
up the box with ‘Do not get angry, man’ (a popular old-fashioned game in the 
Netherlands) and with evident joy and satisfaction began to study the game. 
The radio in the sitting room 
was playing an old-fashioned 
tune. The old shaded-lamp 
above the oval table that was 
covered with a thick rug lighted 
up a peaceful scene of a family 
evening: all of them gathered at 
the dining table at the end of 
the day, some of them reading 
a newspaper, others playing 
a game. A soft tune in the 
background and the comforting 
ticking of the big clock above the 
fireplace rounded off the scene. 
The picture was complete. They 
were finally at home again.  
The beauty and the apparent simplicity of the visit that I have just described 
are such that I feel almost drawn back by its harmony in my effort to 
understand what actually happened in the Museum that day. The most 
challenging part of the analysis lies in the fact that the visitors, and especially 
the man whom I followed, did not say much. But that silence was very 
expressive all the same. It was amply compensated by the body language 
and undisturbed patterns of the man’s movements. The incentives, such as 
seeing, hearing, touching, which play an awakening role here are multiple. 
In the example with the telephone we can see how functionally determined 
actions, which can be still fulfilled by the visitor independently, lead to the 
repetition of a pleasurable experience. In the dining room the man’s actions 
look like he is automatically placing himself into the recognised pattern of 
the family framework. Except for the emotionally tinged discursive O boy!, 
44   At the moment of the visit the old-fashioned telephones were not connected to the telephone 
line. Nowadays some of them actually work, so the visitors can also hear a tone.
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he does not voice the processes he is actively engaged in at that point. The 
mechanics of his remembering remain hidden from us to a large extent, but 
the magic effect of it, which shows up in the striking metamorphosis that I 
witnessed at the end of his visit, is quite overwhelming. He, as well as the 
rest of his group, while sitting in the reconstructed sitting-room in the cellar 
of Humanitas, acquires peace and trust as one usually does upon the return 
home after a (life-)long journey.   
It will be these implicit mechanics and magics of the Museum visits that we 
shall be looking at in the following description.
Mechanics of focusing and magic of becoming
Remembering is not an instantaneous happening, even if it presents itself like 
a momentary event. Talking to the visitors of the Museum I was repeatedly 
struck by the sharpness of their reminiscences, which seemed to appear 
in a flash. But that image is deceptive since each occasion of remembering 
represents a duration in itself. In the examples that we shall be looking at 
shortly, the remembered images are presented at such a fast rate that we 
do not feel the urge to talk about any duration at all. Often remembering 
appears as an instant and ready-made detailed snapshot of the past. The 
illusion then is absolute, and there is hardly any evidence to be found 
in oral discourse to contest it. Still it is only an illusion. The speed of the 
actualisation is incompatible with the speed of our reflexion. Actualisation 
is always expanded in time, and probably only discourse can still keep some 
traces of its duration. Here is a short example of it.
They walk into the living-room.
W1:  Oh, look, a drying rack.
MW:  Yes. 
M:  That is... yes.
MW:  This is a living-room dating back
 to the 1940s. And this is 1960.
W unclear
MW:  I find it a very warm, a truly warm  
 living-room. 
W:  Yes.
MW:  And the rack around of the 
 stove, see?
W laughs: Yes.
Ze lopen de woonkamer binnen.
Vr1:  O kijk, een droogrekje.
MM:  Ja.
M:  Dat is…ja. 
MM:  Dit is een huiskamer van de jaren  
 1940, ongeveer. En dit is 1960.
Vr onverstaanbaar
MM:  Ik vind het een hele warme, een echt  
 warme huiskamer.
Vr:  Ja
MM:  En het rekje om de kachel, hè?
Vr met een lachje: Ja.
Extract 11
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There are several rather striking moments here which show how nonlinear 
remembering processes are. The elderly woman is quite ahead of both her 
husband and the Museum volunteer in her reactions. Evidently, the sight of 
the sitting room appeals straight away to certain depths of her memory, so 
she hardly needs any time for adaptation. This is not surprising as the couple 
had been in the Museum for about forty minutes already. The Museum 
volunteer still feels some obligation to make introductory comments which 
sound a little bit artificial. 
She realises that almost 
immediately and tunes her 
reflexion with the mood of 
the visitors by first making 
a very personal evaluative 
comment and then repeating 
the remark of the woman 
in the form of the question, 
as if inviting them both to 
go on. This fluctuation is 
almost unnoticeable but one 
should not underestimate 
its significance. Both visitors are almost silent for a moment. The volunteer 
fills in the gap, but it is done in such a subtle way that whatever processes 
the visitors are engaged in, they remain undisturbed. It can be only partly 
ascribed to the fact that the visitors and the volunteer belong to the same 
generation and their mutual understanding has steady cultural and social 
grounds. It is also a result of respect and the desire to understand one and 
other, which, if taken seriously, can be a good model for the creation of 
intergenerational and professional relations with elderly people. 
M:  Nice, isn’t it? (nostalgic)
W:  A pity, isn’t it? And the tea cosy.  
 Yes, looks really cosy.
W:  Slippers, father’s, all ready   
 (pause),  when he came home.
MW:  Yes, yes.
1MW:   Museum volunteer (f)
W:      Woman visitor
M:      Male visitor
M:  Leuk, hoor (nostalgisch)
Vr:  Jammer, hè? En de theemuts. Ja, ziet  
 er echt gemoedelijk uit. 
Vr:  Slofjes, van vader, staan al klaar,  
 (pauze) als die thuis kwam.
MM:  Ja, ja.
1MM:  Museum vrijwilliger (v)
Vr:    Vrouwelijke bezoeker
M:     Mannelijke bezoeker
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While the Museum volunteer, who is familiar with the exhibition, tends to 
reinforce the sociality of the remembering, both visitors are literally using 
their time to go deeper into their memories and to reach that perfect point 
where their present perception becomes vivified by personal experiences 
from the past. Bergson describes that moment as the necessity of ‘frankly 
placing ourselves within’ the past. 
 Essentially virtual, it cannot be known as something past unless we follow and adopt 
the movement by which it expands into a present image, thus emerging from obscurity 
into the light of day (1912/2004: 173).
As if reflecting on the whole process the man says Nice, isn’t it and his wife 
agrees with him by answering A pity, isn’t it. It is a remarkable exchange. But 
this apparent contradiction is not what it seems. They agree on both remarks. 
What they see is recognisable, appealing and exciting for both of them. Also, 
both of them are sentimentally touched by the idea of their passed youth 
and the disappearing tokens of their former life. The remarkable thing about 
that dialogue is the universality and sameness of the processes they both 
were undergoing while not saying a word to each other. The woman does 
verbalise a part of the process, so that we can glimpse at the picture she has 
in mind in front of her. Her memories brought her back to her parent’s home, 
with a similar fireplace, which was necessarily edged with a similar rack, a 
tea cosy, and where her father’s slippers were waiting for his return home. In 
her reflexion, the woman has not added anything else to the Museum scene, 
but she covered the Museum image with her own thoroughly and with a 
final touch enlivened it by introducing the memory of her father. 
Populating the actualised images is usually one of the last steps in the process 
of appropriation of the Museum place. Emotionally it is also the most charged 
one, because very often the inhabitants of the visitors’ memories have either 
disappeared forever or have changed a lot. Almost unavoidably it brings each 
visitor to the point of contemplating his or her own age. At such moments 
the visitors are caught up by the present situation, when the already familiar 
swinging sensation between the different planes of time occurs. 
The idea of different planes of memory belongs to Bergson. It is linked to his 
most important concept of duration and together with it can be elucidative if 
we are prepared to follow and decode the implicit ‘discourse’ of remembering: 
Whenever we are trying to recover a recollection, to call up some period of our history, 
we become conscious of an act sui generis	 by which we detach ourselves from the 
present in order to replace ourselves, first in the past in general, then in a certain region 
of the past - a work of adjustment, something like the focussing of a camera. But our 
recollection still remains virtual; we simply prepare ourselves to receive it by adopting 
the appropriate attitude. Little by little it comes into view like a condensing cloud; from 
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the virtual state it passes into the actual; and as its outlines become more distinct and its 
surface takes on colour, it tends to imitate perception. But it remains attached to the past 
by its deepest roots, and if, when once realized, it did not retain something of its original 
virtuality, if, being a present state, it were not also something which stands out distinct 
from the present, we should never know it for a memory (1912/2004: 171). 
There are several ideas here that can be interesting for us.
One of them concerns the actual mechanics of remembering, where in order 
to remember we place ourselves first in the past in general, and then in a 
certain region of the past. The past therefore is not homogeneous. In order 
to explain this Bergson suggests imagining the ‘true’ memory (understood 
as ‘the totality of the recollections’) as a cone (see fig.1)45, that has various 
planes (AB; A’B’; A’’B’’ etc.), each of which represents the entire memory 
but differs in the degree of its contraction. The 
summit of the cone (S) stands for ‘the present 
perception’ of one’s body and merges with 
the most contracted plane of memory which 
coincides with ‘the actual representation’ (P). 
What is happening when somebody engages in 
the remembering process is described by using 
the ‘focusing of a camera’ metaphor. As we 
first reach more contracted planes of memory 
(A’’B’’), the image of the past is presented less 
distinctively. The result is that when you place 
yourself in the past, you initially obtain a rather 
vague picture. The work of adjustment, as 
Bergson calls it, is necessary to get closer to the vivid and sharp images. This 
is the stage when we are ascending to higher planes of memory which are 
less contracted so that the images we are looking for contain more details and 
can be navigated with more precision. This is exactly what the two visitors in 
our example have been doing, while taking a break in their conversation. This 
activity does not need to be implicit, as we shall see in other examples. 
Another important idea of the passage concerns the process of sharpening 
the image, when virtual becomes actual. At that stage the image is filled with 
more details. The particularity of the stage consists in the overlapping of both 
images, namely the personal image and the one provided by the Museum. 
Often those two must be either adjusted or extrapolated. In our example 
the woman does not correct the Museum scene with details from her own 
reminiscences, but widens it by bringing somebody from her past into it. 
Fig. 1
45   For a detailed discussion see bergson (1912/2004: 195-225).
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The last idea which interests us is that even if the actualised images suit 
the present perception perfectly well, we remain aware of the fact that 
they are borrowed from the past. This last realisation underpins not only 
the mechanism of remembering, but in a broader sense the social character 
of change and becoming. Remembering, which is always connected to the 
present, inevitably reveals the degree of change, which has taken place 
between then and now. The indivisible character of duration disguises 
changes, dissolving them in the constant flux of life. But this cover cannot 
hold forever. It is true for external objects that have the appearance of non-
changeability and it is true for human beings who are, according to common 
sense, subject to change which, in order to become evident, demands a 
certain distance in space or in time: 
It seems that these objects, continually perceived by me and constantly impressing 
themselves on my mind, have ended by borrowing from me something of my own 
conscious existence; like myself they have lived, and like myself they have grown 
old … Hence we confuse the feeling itself, which is in a perpetual state of becoming, 
with its permanent external object, and especially with the word which expresses this 
object. In the same way as the fleeting duration of our ego is fixed by its projection in 
homogeneous space, our constantly changing impressions, wrapping themselves round 
the external object which is their cause, take on its definite outlines and its immobility 
(1913/2008: 130).
Bergson speaks about the illusion of the seeming permanency of objects, which 
is based on their stability and a very slow rate of change. He also points to our 
insensibility to movement. In spite of the fact that we are constantly involved ‘in 
a perpetual state of becoming’, motion and change remain unnoticed, because 
everybody is changing at the same time. The sensation is close to the illusion of 
passengers who are sitting in two trains, which are moving with the same speed. 
Looking at each other, they do not notice any movement at all. Time passes by, the 
never resting duration sedates our awareness of becoming, and when suddenly 
we receive a wake-up call, because some changes cannot be ignored anymore, 
everything seems to have changed as if by magic. The most incomprehensible 
change in ourselves we call ageing. It is quite an astonishing leap, while we are 
in the illusion of absolute motionless. By describing remembering as indefinite 
duration, Bergson gives us steady grounds for understanding being as becoming. 
The Museum is an excellent place to hear this wake-up call. The realisation 
can be rather harsh, because in first instance it is caused by apparently the 
most stable part of a person’s life, namely by objects which he or she used to 
have. The next step is predictable. If things have changed so much, then the 
acknowledgement of personal changes must follow as well. Accepting and 
dealing with that however is a separate issue. 
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W31:  … That thing standing over there,  
 my mother had that.
W2:  Yes, I had that too at the time, that  
 was from the savings bank. 
W3:  Was for the gas and light bill.
W2:  Yes, had that myself.
W3:  ... and for clothing.
W2:  Yes.
W3:  We didn’t do about holidays but  
 the delivery boys came to the   
door (W2: Yes). I remember 
 the owner (all together)…,   
 undertaker...
W2 simult.: I began at … 20, or something  
 like that, can remember it well.
 Talk all together. Pause.
W2:  How life has changed, hasn’t it! 
 When you see this then. 
 On Mondays my mother never 
 left the house. Everything came by  
 there. 
W4:  I can’t remember any more which  
 day they came by.
W2 almost simult.: At our place on Mondays.  
 Then everything came by. 
W3:  That used to come to the door.
W2:  And when there were no cents left  
 then she wasn’t at home.
 Laughs
W3:  Then we still had to...
W2:  Then we had a problem.
 One of the attendants goes upstairs  
 with another client.
W3:  Hasn’t everything changed, eh?
Mw:  Now indeed, ho, incomparable. No.
W3:  No, it is not comparable any more.
1Mw:  Museum worker (f)
W2:    Woman visitor 2
W3:    Woman visitor 3
W4:    Woman visitor 4
Vr31:  …Dat ding die daar staat, die had 
 mijn moeder.
Vr2:  Ja, dat heb ik ook nog gehad toen, dat  
 was van de spaarbank. 
Vr3:  Was voor de post van het gas en licht.
Vr2:  Ja-a, heb ik zelf ook nog gehad.
Vr3:  … en voor de kleding. 
Vr2:  Ja.
Vr3:  Vakantie deden we niet aan maar  
 de bodes  kwamen aan de deur 
 (Mw: Ja). Ik herinner me de 
 huisbaas  (door elkaar)…, begrafenis  
 ondernemer..
 
Vr2 tegelijk: Ik ben begonnen met… 20, of zo  
 iets, kan me goed herinneren.
 Door elkaar. Pauze.
Vr2:  Wat is het leven toch veranderd  
 eigenlijk, he! Als je dan dit ziet. 
 Op maandag ging mijn moeder nooit  
 weg. Daar kwam alles langs.
Vr4:  Ik weet niet meer op welke dag ze  
 langs kwamen.
Vr2 bijna tegelijk: Bij ons op maandag. Dan  
 kwam alles langs.
Vr4:  Dat kwam aan de deur vroeger.
Vr2:  En als de centen op waren dan was ze  
 niet thuis.
 Lacht
Vr4:  Dan moesten we toch…
Vr2:  Dat was bij ons dan een probleem.
 Een van de begeleiders gaat naar  
 boven met een andere cliënt.
Vr3:  Wat is de heleboel toch veranderd, hè?
Mm:  Nu wel, ho, niet te vergelijken. Nee.
Vr3:  Nee, het is niet meer te vergelijken.
1Mm:  Museum medewerker (v)
Vr2:   Vrouwelijke bezoeker 2
Vr3:   Vrouwelijke bezoeker 3
Vr4:   Vrouwelijke bezoeker 4a
Extract 12
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This extract is taken from the transcription of a group visit. Five women were accompanied 
by two professionals from another nursing home while visiting the Museum. This 
small conversation takes place in ‘the kitchen’, where one of the women sees an old-
fashioned moneybox. Boxes 
like that one usually had a 
rectangular form with separate 
compartments inside. The cover 
had a number of slots to insert 
coins. Very often the purpose of 
the savings was stated on top of 
the box, like for example coal, 
gas, clothing, holidays etc. The 
box was a standard accessory in 
every Dutch household. That is 
why it is one of the frequently 
recognised objects in the 
Museum.  
This example is especially valuable because of the integral movement of different 
processes that cause, feed and stimulate the joint remembering. The final image 
that the women create is a result of their collective work, where their personal and 
shared reminiscences of the past literally mould together. At the same time, each of 
them obviously engages in the process of ascending to certain memory planes, as 
Bergson describes. We shall see now that placing oneself in the past, and eventually 
in a certain region of the past, is not a unidirectional process. The adjustment of the 
image causes multiple movements and unexpected turns. 
Discursively the initial recognition is manifested indirectly, namely via populating a 
specific recollection instead of naming the recognised object. The moneybox is never 
mentioned by name, but the contextual emplacement of it into the frame of the past 
accumulates more and more details, showing how the focusing literally takes place. 
The woman who starts the conversation populates her reminiscences by introducing 
the image of her mother. The region of her memories thus lies somewhere in the 
period of her childhood. Her group friend engages in the reminiscing by taking 
the same direction, but first she specifies the object itself (it was from the savings 
bank) and then she focuses her attention on quite a different period, namely on the 
time when she herself was saving. The third woman eventually joints the collective 
work of remembering, but surprisingly enough they all remain in similar regions 
and only one of them (W2), as if bridging two periods, swaps the generations while 
commenting on it. She starts with her own authority as the mother of a family, 
and then suddenly refers to her own mother, seeing herself as a child that time. 
Swapping generations happens quite frequently during the Museum visits. It 
mostly concerns a change in the position of a woman within a family, namely from 
a child who was taken care of to a mother who takes care of others. The persistence 
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of this swap makes us aware of the very strongly defined role-bound education that 
the generation of the visitors received at home. The reassessment factor in those 
reminiscences has to do with self-evaluation, where a direct comparison with the 
parents makes it evident how well they have met their expectations. 
In the meantime more details are remembered, like the various purposes of saving, 
the way the money was collected, and more generally, the difficulties that almost 
each family had to face when there was not enough money to cover the costs. 
The reminiscences overlap, break and supplement each other. Often the women 
are talking simultaneously, whereby the ‘we’ that they are using to refer to their 
families, eventually appropriates another meaning, namely ‘we, who are talking 
now’. That binding becomes obvious in two reflective remarks about change. The 
first one How life has really changed, hasn’t it! is still accompanied by the explanatory 
When you see this then. The second one Hasn’t everything changed, eh? repeats the 
first one, but in a more rhetorical way. The whole remembering exercise receives 
its completion here. From the more or less general remark about ‘that thing’, via 
the mechanism of populating and focusing the image, finally swapping roles 
within different planes of the past, the visitors have arrived at the explicitly 
stated realisation of the changes that they and the whole world around them have 
undergone. 
Power of alignment and sophistication of autonomy 
As we have seen the focusing mechanism involves a lot of fine-tuning, which is 
done both collectively and individually. The last example has also shown how 
the visitors actively look for the confirmation and corroboration of their own 
experiences in the stories of others, in spite of all the differences. This validation 
strategy is underlain by the mechanism, which can be called alignment. 
Alignment is rooted in the social nature of remembering. It demands not only the 
physical presence of a social network, but also a real intersection of experiences. 
Discursively alignment most evidently manifests itself in repetition.
Extract 13
W31:  Look, and all those matches…  
 Swallow (brand).
W4:  Swallow Matches.
W3:  Look at that, Swallow.
N1:  Nice, isn’t it?
N2:  And all those things separately.  
 You could buy everything   
 separately, couldn’t 
 you … in former days?
Vr 31:  Kijk, en al die lucifers… Zwaluw.
Vr 4:  Lucifers Zwaluw.
Vr 3:  Kijk eens, Zwaluw.
Vr B1:  Leuk, hè?
Vr B2:  En al die dingen los. 
 Alles kon je los kopen, hè … vroeger?
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It is remarkable how often and precisely the words of one visitor are repeated 
by others. You could partly explain this by the necessity that is felt to keep the 
conversation going, whereby the communicative aspect of repetition is given a 
prominent role. This is not the only cause of alignment. While the visitors are busy 
placing themselves in the past, they are passing the same milestones on the road 
of collectively shared events. Intersections are unavoidable, especially within the 
same generation. Joint recognition can be strengthened by an almost physical 
longing to articulate a long-forgotten word. This happens with the word ‘swallow’ 
(regarding the matches) in our example. In the collected material this kind of 
‘tasting’ of articulations is not uncommon. During another visit, for example, a man 
recognises a certain brand of coffee grinder: A hanging coffee grinder, yes yes. It was 
from PD. Pe-De (as if he tastes 
the sounds). I asked him 
about the abbreviation. He 
could not place it but was still 
distinctively repeating Pe-De. 
Aligning occurs during the 
entire visit and depends on 
how intensively the visitors 
are engaged in collective or 
personal remembering. When 
visitors have ‘agreed’ on a 
subject, the necessity is often 
felt to make a more general 
statement, as if they realise 
that they are acting as a group at that moment. In the given example this is done in 
a summarizing appreciative remark regarding the Museum collection. Conclusive 
remarks can also have a re-evaluative character as in the following example.
W4:  Yes, you could buy everything  
 separately.
N2:  Yes, absolutely...  But I find it a  
 very special museum, you know.
1W3:   Woman visitor 3
W4:    Woman visitor 4
N1:     Nurse visitor (f) 1
N2:     Nurse visitor (f) 2
Vr4:  Ja, je kon alles los kopen.
Vr B2:  Ja, absoluut… Maar ik vind het een  
 heel bijzonder museum, hoor. 
1Vr3:    Vrouwelijke bezoeker 3
Vr4:     Vrouwelijke bezoeker 4
Vr B1:  Verpleegkundige bezoeker (v)1
Vr B2:  Verpleegkundige bezoeker (v)2
Extract 14
MW1:  Salted beans, salted French beans.
W:  Yes-yes.
W:  And these ‘Cologne’ pots, to   
 preserve them.
MM1:  Zoute bonen, zoute sperziebonen.
Vr:  Ja-ja.
Vr:  En die Keulse potten, inmaken.
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A familiar pattern of re-evaluation regarding the unpleasant taste of cheap 
traditional food, which was present in many Dutch households, is reinforced here 
by the activity of alignment amongst the three persons. Each of them has a similar 
experience, and although the degree of emotions between them differs, they agree 
on the main idea: Impossible to eat.
Alignment allows them to feel the power of the group, while humour obviously 
helps them to overcome unpleasant reminiscences, and finally the authority of 
‘knowhow’ strengthens their right to be critical. The participants improve their 
terminology as their remembering advances (salted beans, salted French beans, 
Cologne pots, cut beans), as a result of which a detailed picture of a certain seasonal 
occupation appears in their discourse more distinctively. 
Both the physical sensation of articulating the words, which they have not used for 
some time already, and the social feeling of belonging to a larger framework, are a 
prelude to understanding how the mechanism of alignment works. Bergson gives 
us some invaluable insights in that respect. Alignment looks like a specifically 
social mechanism, which in a sense was not the main focus of Bergson’s work. 
But careful reading of Time and Free Will and Matter and Memory can provide some 




MW:  But of course unfortunately there  
 wasn’t any vegetables during the  
 winter.
W:  No-o. There was absolutely   
 nothing in it any more.
MW:  No.
W:  No.
M:  Impossible to eat.
MW:  And then you have to soak it 
 of course (M: Yes), did that as 
 well. (M: Yes.)
W:  All those cut beans with those  
 white beans. That was filthy too.  
 Laughs. (M: Awful, you know) Uh!  
 (with disgust)
1MW:   Museum volunteer (f)
W:      Woman visitor
M:      Male visitor
Vr:  Vies 
M:  Ja-a
Vr:  Vies.
MM:  Maar er was helaas geen groenten  
 natuurlijk ’s winters. 
Vr:  Ne-e-e. Er zat helemaal niks meer in.
MM:  Nee.
Vr:  Nee.
M:  Niet te eten.
MM:  En dan moet je het natuurlijk weken  
 (M: Ja), heb ik ook gedaan.(M: Ja.)
Vr:  Al die snijbonen met die witte bonen.  
 Dat was ook vies. Lachen.(M: Erg,  
 hoor) Uh! (met afschuw)
1MM:  Museum vrijwilliger (v)
Vr:    Vrouwelijke bezoeker
M:     Mannelijke bezoeker
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Two of Bergson’s ideas are especially interesting, namely the already familiar idea 
of memory contraction, the degree of which varies within the memory cone, and 
his contemplation on the two aspects of the self46. Let us start with his interpretation 
of the self, differentiating its social and personal aspects. Understanding being 
as a duration, Bergson is talking about the internal, the real aspect of self as a 
‘confused’ and ‘ever changing’, that cannot be analysed in terms of breaking it 
into pieces and putting it under a magnifying glass. The social nature of a human 
being puts certain claims on us and the universal human capacity of projecting 
time into space does not spare the self, so we ultimately change quality into 
quantity and replace the personal aspect of self for its social surrogate:
We should therefore distinguish two forms of multiplicity, two very different ways of 
regarding duration, two aspects of conscious life. Below homogeneous duration, which 
is extensive symbol of true duration, a close psychological analysis distinguishes a 
duration whose heterogeneous moments permeate one another; below the numerical 
multiplicity of conscious states, a qualitative multiplicity; below the self with well-
defined states, a self in which succeeding each other means melting into one another and 
forming an organic whole (1913/2008: 128).
Developing the idea, Bergson admits that the social aspect of the self serves 
well the practical purposes of our being as being-in-the-world-with-others:
As the self thus refracted, and thereby broken to pieces, is much better adapted to the 
requirements of social life in general and language in particular, consciousness prefers it, 
and gradually loses sight of the fundamental self (1913/2008: 128).
What Bergson is suggesting here is that since we are unable to deal with the 
obscure fundamental self we choose instead to create another version of the self 
which concurs more easily with the social roles we are fulfilling. This version of 
the self is bound to the social space in which we live. It gives us a feeling of self-
control and a basis to unite our self with the selves of others in various kinds 
of groups and networks. As a result ‘a second self … obscures the first, a self 
whose existence is made up of distinct moments, whose states are separated 
from one another and easily expressed in words’ (Bergson, 1913/2008: 138). 
Given this understanding, let us return to remembering processes, bearing 
in mind different aspects of the self and multiple planes of memory, which 
provide the present perception with more general or more concrete images 
from the past. Let me repeat that Bergson’s idea of the memory cone suggests 
that every plane contains the entire totality of memory, but each plane differs 
in its degree of memory contraction. The summit of the cone lies closer to 
the present perception, but it is also its most contracted section, which can 
supply us with extremely general, easily shared social recollections. Bergson 
46   More about Bergsonian understanding of the self and its consequences to the process of 
ageing is treated in the next chapter.
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calls them ‘less dreamed, more impersonal, nearer to action and therefore 
more capable of moulding itself – like a ready-made garment – upon the 
new character of the present situation’ (1912/2004: 321).  
This description fits perfectly the examples of remembering, where visitors 
look for commonalities in each other’s stories or directly expect confirmation 
for the described patterns of former domestic life. The alignment activity is 
triggered by the social aspect of the self and is confirmed by the actualisation 
of the highly contracted and therefore more general images. The process 
of remembering as we have seen is not unidirectional. It is rather based on 
reciprocal movements, one of which is ‘translation, by which it [memory, eb] 
moves in its entirety to meet experience’, and another is ‘rotation upon itself 
which may prove to be the most useful’ (Bergson, 1912/2004: 220). Putting it 
in our own terms, the remembering process consists of two kinds of swinging 
movements, i.e. between the past and the present and between different planes 
within the past. The bigger the amplitude of the swinging becomes, the wider 
the plane of memory is that the visitor reaches, and the more personal his or 
her reminiscences become. At that point the united force of alignment gives 
way to the particular uniqueness of the personal experiences. 
There are various ways in which the particularities of personal memories break 
or go beyond the collective work of unification. It can start with the application 
of the alignment mechanism and eventually turn into personal reminiscences. It 
can take the form of a polyphonic soundtrack from the very beginning, where 
different stories will be running simultaneously but remain independent and only 
partly if at all cross each other. The following piece of conversation takes place 
between a visiting couple and one of the Museum volunteers. There is a distinctive 
difference in the behaviour patterns between the lady and her husband. The man, 
who has suffered a stroke, is slower in his reactions and speech. The lady on the 
contrary is a very energetic type. Their age is between 65 and 70. 
Extract 15
MW1:  It is of course the whole thing. That  
 kitchen is quite large. But that one  
 is of course very small (W: Yes,  
 yes) and lower.
W:  Lower. Yes. We also had something  
 like this in our lodgings, because  
 when we were lodging we also had  
 a small kitchen like that. 
M:  In ‘63 we came to live in the   
 Achillesstraat.
W:  Yes, that is right. We lived in the  
 Achillesstraat for years.
M almost simult.: In ‘69…
Mm1:  Het is natuurlijk het hele ding. Die  
 keuken is redelijk groot. Maar die is  
 natuurlijk heel klein (Vr: Ja, ja) en  
 lager.
Vr:  Lager. Ja. Zo iets hadden we op onze  
 inwoning ook, want  toen 
 we inwoonden hadden we ook zo’n  
 klein keukentje.
M:  In ‘63 kwamen we wonen in de  
 Achillesstraat.
Vr:  Ja, dat is waar. In de Achillesstraat  
 hebben we jaren gewoond.
M bijna tegelijk: In ‘69…
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It seems like all three of them are talking together, but as soon as we try to follow the 
‘main’ line of the conversation it breaks into various themes and subjects. The Museum 
representative is busy with an introduction of the various kitchen installations. Her 
words sound more like an invitation to pick up a certain topic. The contradiction lies 
in the fact that after she has given a hint to the visitors, they are left alone and she 
withdraws from further exchange. 
The man is very laconic. Having difficulties with speech he chooses only exact facts 
to share with the others. His memories are very precise, almost mathematically 
determined, which is why he mentions names, years and sizes. On the one hand, 
he adds information to the remarks made by his wife; on the other hand, he chooses 
his own direction within his past. He starts with memories about moving to another 
place and rounds them off by trying to describe the lack of space in one of their first 
houses. In spite of the fact that the conversation starts and continues in the kitchen, 
the man reminisces about the tiny shower, where there was no room for a washing 
machine.
His wife is the most flexible of the three. She is moving between different lines of the 
conversation and manages to build up her own story. She accepts the invitation of the 
Museum volunteer first, by aligning and agreeing on some details (the kitchens were 
W simult.: Then we moved to Omoord   
 (district in Rotterdam). And from  
 Omoord to Nieuwerkerk a/d IJssel.  
 That is where we are living now.
MW:  And this is just a Bruynzeel   
 (brand) kitchen. One of the first.
W interrupts: Yes, that is the first one. Yes,  
 with this underneath. There is a  
 little curtain there, we had that too.  
 With a little shelf. Yes! Just the  
 same. (MW laughs). Yes. Yes. 
 We hung a small curtain in front  
 because…
M interrupts: 1 by 2 meters…
W:  A?
M:  The shower was 1 by 2 meters.
W:  Yes, it was very small.
M:  That wouldn’t fit a washing   
 machine.
W:  Yes. Pause. That is nice, you know. 
1MW:   Museum volunteer (f)
W:      Woman visitor
M:      Male visitor
Vr tegelijk: Toen zijn we naar de Omoord  
 gegaan. En van Omoord naar   
 Nieuwerkerk a/d IJssel. Daar wonen  
 we nu.
Mm:  En dit is gewoon een Bruynzeel  
 keuken. Een van de eerste.
Vr onderbreekt: Ja, dat is de eerste. Ja, met dit  
 daaronder. Daar is een gordijntje, dat  
 hadden we ook. Met een plankje. Ja!  
 Precies hetzelfde. (Mm lacht) Ja. Ja.  
 We deden gordijntje voor want…
M onderbreekt: 1 bij 2 meter…
Vr:  A?
M:  De douche was 1 bij twee meter.
Vr:  Ja, die was heel klein.
M:  Daar kon geen wasmachine in.
Vr:  Ja. Pauze. Dat is enig, hoor.
1 MM:  Museum vrijwilliger (v)
Vr:    Vrouwelijke bezoeker
M:     Mannelijke bezoeker
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small and low), and then by filling it with new details like telling exactly where they 
moved to and where they live now. She also attends to the conversational direction 
in which her husband proceeds and gets involved in that as well, aligning for the 
second time. Then she switches to the volunteer again. She eagerly enumerates the 
details of the kitchen that she recognised and is ready to add even more information 
We hung a small curtain in front because… Then she is interrupted by her husband, 
who is in the middle of his own recollection. She joins him in his story, and does not 
pursue her own any more. Yet she still needs to make a finishing remark, and chooses 
the most general way to do that by saying That is nice, you know. We can only guess 
what exactly is nice – the collection, the way they can talk and remember things or 
their former life. 
The way the people interact in this example can be called a separate or a parallel 
runners mode. One encounters a clear logistical problem while collecting data like 
this. The visitors who want to tell their stories very often talk simultaneously and 
often address the representative of the Museum at the same time. The Museum 
staff finds themselves in amongst a choir of stories and it takes a lot of experience 
and patience to be able to hear and react to them adequately. This situation is not 
exceptional. For the visitors this is a usual way to respond to the exhibition, especially 
in cases of visiting couples or friends, when people know each other very well and 
can listen to their partner or friend with half an ear. In ‘extreme’ cases they split up in 
the beginning of the visit and literally stay on their own, coming to each other only at 
moments when something quite exceptional or mutually important has been found. 
Examples like the one above are much more intriguing though. One can see how 
people pick up a theme and develop it in the presence of the others. The implicit need 
to have a listener plays an important role here, but as has been shown, the stories are 
sometimes running in parallel. Using Becker’s term, there are different ‘conversation 
pieces’, which people effortlessly pick up in the Museum, but there is not always a 
clear conversation there. 
There is an important issue at stake here. Does making your memories more personal 
and specific result in a loosening of the social element of reminiscing?  Bergson’s 
reasoning on the relation between common and personal is based on the different 
degrees of tension in memory:
Everything happens, then, as though our recollections were repeated an infinite number of times 
in these many possible reductions of our past life. They take a more common form when memory 
shrinks most, more personal when it widens out, and they thus enter into an unlimited number of 
different `systematizations’ (1912/2004: 220).
Thus, the closer to the present perception our images are, the less tense the relation 
between virtual and actual tends to be. Our memories for the most part refer 
to collective images of the past. As a consequence the socialisation during the 
remembering becomes less difficult. When we talk about alignment, the group as a 
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Extract 16
W11:  This is homemade. Homemade.
MW2:  The spread? (points at the   
 bedspread)
 All simultaneously: Yes, yes.
MW2:  That’s a real nice one. 
W1:  First they crocheted separate   
 runners, and then they joined 
 them all together.
W2 (interferes): We had them before the war  
 still. We also had those crocheted  
 spreads, I think, made of cotton. 
W1:  Yes.
W2:  And then in the war they were  
 unravelled in order to knit socks. 
MW2 (to W1): But you are saying that those  
 runners were crocheted separately  
 and then together.
Vr11:  Dat is eigengemaakt. Eigengemaakt.
MM2:  A? De sprei? (Wijst op de sprei op  
 het bed)
 Allemaal door elkaar: Ja, ja
MM2:  Die is echt een mooie.
Vr1:  Eerst waren aparte banen gehaakt en  
 dan zetten ze het allemaal aan elkaar.
Vr2 (onderbreekt): We hadden nog voor de  
 oorlog, hadden we ook van die  
 gehaakte spreien, geloof ik, van  
 katoen.
Vr1:  Ja.
Vr2:  En toen in de oorlog die zijn ze  
 uitgetrokken om sokken van te breien. 
MM2 (aan vr1): Maar u zegt dat die banen  
 werden apart gehaakt en dan aan  
 elkaar. 
unity is a basic factor, which makes the tuning of opinions possible. The mechanism 
of alignment is secured by the repetitive actualisation of certain images, which are 
ready-made, highly contracted and are mainly experienced as a domain of collective 
memory. The more personal the actualised images become, the more effort is required 
from each party present, to stay with the ‘storyteller’. In the previous examples we 
have seen that some personal stories can be quite catching as such. But everybody 
also recognises the feeling of impatience that somebody gets while listening to the 
partner or friend and at the same time having your own story stored in the waiting 
room, ready to be told as soon as one gets a chance for it. 
One of the advantages of the Museum place I mentioned earlier is to create a very 
mobile interactive space. Elderly people usually don’t communicate much with the 
outer world. In the case of the Museum they do not know in advance what kind of 
exhibition they are going to visit. Their surprise and open joy are therefore quite 
genuine. The realisation that they may and in fact are expected to tell their stories 
gradually turns into a steady pattern of remembering. But it is imperative that the 
visitors are heard and hear the stories of the others. Solitary reminiscence is quite 
often a daily experience for them, so they should not waste the unique opportunity 
to reminisce together. It happens even when the visitors take seemingly different 
directions in their remembering. In these situations the role of the Museum staff is 
essential. They often smooth and bridge the differences and divergences in the parallel 
stories, and sometimes even actively restore the parity between the visitors in their 
‘demands’ for attention.  Here is an illustration of such a complex communicative 
discourse, which can be understood only within topological analysis: 
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There are two separate stories in this example, which are channelled by the sight 
of the crocheted bed spread in the ‘parents’ bedroom’. Both visitors have a story to 
tell about it, so when one of them starts her explanation, the other simply interrupts 
her because she is totally absorbed by her own reminiscences. The member of the 
Museum staff ‘repairs’ the situation by going back to the first story when the second 
one is finished. If both stories 
had been told in a normal 
sequence then everybody 
would probably have been 
given a better opportunity 
to react to them. This is what 
takes place during specially 
organised ‘reminiscence 
sessions’ but not in the 
Museum. The spontaneity and 
speed of interactions and mis-
reactions is very high. One can 
assume that some things pass 
by unnoticed. My opinion is 
that this is a fair price to pay for the fact that there is no person who passes by 
the Museum unnoticed. Their conversations evolve naturally and each single one of 
them who uses the united social framework gets a chance to share his or her most 
personal experiences, which in many cases were kept in oblivion for years. 
There is also another reason why much more sophisticated personal memories do not 
break free from the commonly shared images of the past. To explain that let me use 
a music metaphor. The diversity of the Museum stories that are told simultaneously 
or consecutively reminds one of a complicated piece of music with a repetitive 
polyphonic pattern. Sometimes it is harmonious, but sometimes a dissonance can 
clearly be heard.  What really turns a piece of music into one entity is mainly the key, 
in accordance to which all combinations acquire their meaning. 
W2:  Ye-ss. For instance they made  
 such a broad runner, you see,   
 otherwise they became too 
 heavy, and then they took that  
 whole length from that spread like  
 that. And then they would put it all  
 together by hand like that. 
MW2:  That is interesting. I didn’t know that.
W2:  Well. It really went that way.
 Pause
1MW2:   Museum worker 2 (f)
W1:      Woman visitor 1
W2:      Woman visitor 2
Vr2:  Ja-a. Bijvoorbeeld maakten ze zo’n  
 brede baan, hè, anders werden ze  
 te zwaar, en dan haalden ze die hele  
 lengte zo van die kleed af. En dan  
 gingen ze met de hand allemaal aan  
 elkaar zetten zo. 
MM2:  Dat is interessant. Dat wist ik niet.
Vr2:  Ja-a. Dat is echt zo.
 Pauze 
1MM2:  Museum medewerker 2 (v)
Vr1:    Vrouwelijke bezoeker 1
Vr2:    Vrouwelijke bezoeker 2
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Two very different stories are united here, and not just because of the effort of the 
attendant who let them follow one after another. Like dozens of other stories within 
the same visit or in any other visit that I have witnessed during the past couple 
of years, they do not fall apart and they never are inappropriate. The key holds 
them all together. The Museum is built around the idea of home. Everything that is 
remembered there in one way or another has to do with former domestic life, houses 
and places where the Museum visitors used to live, together with their families and 
their beloved ones who are either still alive, or more often still, are gone forever. 
  
In the major key
Looking back at the examples that I have used so far to illustrate our discussion, 
I cannot find a single one that has not been connected to a major theme of the 
Museum. The most frequently occurring framework within which the remembering 
takes place is the family framework. The visitors come accompanied by their 
spouses, children, cousins, daughters- and sons-in-law. There are elderly sisters 
and brothers, aunts and uncles or simply people, who are seen as relatives because 
of the life-long relations of support and trust that have been built between them 
over the years. Apart from them there are of course groups of people who do not 
share any family bonds, but share something much more important, namely this 
subtle, almost imperceptible ac-(s)cent of life, which turns them into ‘us’ and which 
I as an observer shall never be able to become.   
One of my initial ideas when considering the description of remembering processes 
that take place in the Museum, was to make a thematic list of all possible subjects 
the visitors reminisce about. I gave up the idea relatively quickly, for a number 
of reasons. One could count all the conversations about domestic labour and 
subdivide them into the ‘cooking and preserving’, ‘washing and ironing’, ‘cleaning 
and shopping’ activities, and then draw up a thorough statistical representation in 
percentages of each theme as a function of the total number of visits. The question 
would be whether we could possibly learn more about the process of remembering 
on the basis of such a picture, and in particular about the way elderly people ‘pick 
up’ their memories. Another question, more of a methodological character, would 
be how I could split into separate parts a conversation with a woman, who started 
Whatever the combination in the Museum tune may be, my colleagues and I have 
never experienced it as cacophonic. The last example illustrates that very well. Two 
women ascend to different planes in their memories. One is reminiscing about a 
type of handwork the women used to learn at home. She remembers all the details 
and readily shares her knowledge with the younger Museum attendant. The other 
woman picks up quite a different story, which takes everybody back to the dramatic 
times of the last World War. But she does not sound depressed, rather business-like, 
telling how inventive people had to be in order to survive those disastrous years. 
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by joyfully telling me about her mother sending her as a small girl to buy exactly 
100 grams of butter, because each cent counted at home. Then she turned to the 
old-fashioned box with empty milk bottles and told me about the milkman who 
used to come along with a cart, which was pulled by a dog. Then she pointed to 
the floor scales and remarked that she liked to step on them as a child. She was 
going on and on in this way, and within five minutes you already had quite a 
full picture of her early years, filled with several sweet and unconnected details. 
Breaking such a conversation into small pieces reminds me of a recycling plant, of 
which the overall functionality overrides all its particularities. As a result, instead 
of the warm and vivid face of the woman some rationalised scheme of a seemingly 
predictable behaviour would have appeared. That would not only be contrary to 
my own convictions but also against the entire idea of the Museum. The intention 
of the place is to let people talk, laugh and cry, i.e. be what they are without any 
reservations. The idea is also to let them feel that their knowledge and experience 
can still matter, without the need to filter and decide what kind of knowledge or 
what sort of experience it could be. 
Another reason to avoid a statistical representation of data is that whatever stories, 
remarks or anecdotes the visitors tell in the Museum, they are almost all connected 
to the major theme of the Museum, i.e. to their home and family life. I have tried 
to understand why this theme is so persistent while describing how the Museum 
acquired its present form. We shall return to this topic in the last chapter of the book. 
Rounding off the description of how visitors remember their past let us now look 
at examples where the inner need to share memories of past domestic life finds its 
manifestation in the already familiar non-linear discursive modes. The particularities 
of the following examples are to be found in that they seem to be explicit. The stories 
and remarks deal directly with former experiences, often in great detail. All the same 
it requires an effort of an attentive listener to notice and understand how the whole 
pattern of the past life emerges from the stories. Using our own terms, there are 
certain mechanics underlying home- and family-triggered stories, that ensure those 
magic moments of the visits when, for example instead of the self-ensuring adult 
woman one can suddenly see an unsure little girl in front of oneself. 
Extract 17
W1:  Wonderful. It was very nice. And  
 to make clothes. Always. I never  
 ….hardly ever had to buy anything.  
 And knitting. And making new  
 things from old ones. (MW: Ye-es,  
 yes) That I had from my mother, 
 she made new from old, so can  
 I, well, so can I, to make new little  
 things from old things.  A bottle 
 that would break a hundred times.  
 (MW laughs). It was still made 
Vr1:  Prachtig. Het was heel erg leuk. En  
 kleertjes maken. Altijd. Ik heb het  
 nooit… haast nooit wat hoeven te  
 kopen. En breien. En uit oud nieuw  
 maken. (Mm: Ja, ja) Dat had ik weer  
 van mijn moeder, die maakte uit oud  
 nieuw, kan ik ook, nou ja, kan ik ook,  
 dus ook uit oud nieuwe dingetjes  
 maken. Een flesje wat honderd keer  
 brak. (Mm lacht). Het was nog van  
 glas en dat stond op een granieten  
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The woman visiting the Museum switches generations at least twice, taking upon 
herself the role of the mother and of the daughter in turn. This mode of remembering 
occurs regularly, especially during the visits of women who very often thread their 
stories with an invisible but intrinsic generational line from grandmother to mother 
and to daughter. This can be partly explained by the persistent leading role that women 
played in keeping and safeguarding their houses and family lives. Not only were the 
patterns closely socially determined (the men worked and earned money), but the 
future roles in life were an inescapable part of home education, like in the example 
above, where as a small girl the visitor had to learn to take care of the housekeeping 
 of glass then and it stood on the  
 granite kitchen sink, and fell over  
 and it was broken (laugh) (MW: O  
 my God).
MW:  Yes of course, the kitchen sink was  
 made of stone (W: Yes, indeed), it  
 went like that (W: Oh, dear)
 But could you still buy a new   
 bottle, somewhere?
W:  Yea, yes, yes. Well yes, I was still  
 at home then, my mother had  
 seven children, so there was a baby  
 too, so there was also a bottle. You  
 have to clean it and then I would  
 rub a cloth along the wash… One  
 broken again? Well, when I had to  
 go to the chemists to buy a new  
 one.  (Laughs)
MW:  Nowadays there are plastic things.  
 Just drop it. Just drop it. 
 (W simultaneously unclear)
 And the microwave?
W:  Well, ye-es. In the little pan with 
 hot water, and I wait for a moment  
 to feel...
MW:  And then still taste for yourself  
 first… Laugh
W:  Awful, wasn’t it?
MW:  But time was short. You couldn’t 
 do more than that. 
W:  That is what we are complaining  
 about all the time.
MW:  Yes, absolutely.
1MW:   Museum worker (f)
W:      Woman visitor
 aanrecht, en omviel en het was kapot  
 (lachen) (Mm: O God).
Mm:  Ja natuurlijk, het aanrecht was van de 
 steen (Vr: Ja, ja), het ging gewoon zo  
 (Vr: O jee)
 Maar was er nog een nieuw flesje te  
 kopen, te vinden? 
Vr:  Ja, ja, ja. Nou ja, ik was toen nog  
 thuis, mijn moeder had zeven  
 kinderen, dus daar was ook een baby,  
 dus er was ook dan een flesje. Je  
 moet het afwassen en dan ging ik 
 met een doekje langs afwas… Alweer  
 één kapot? Nou, toen ik naar een  
 drogist moest om een nieuwe halen.  
 (Lacht) 
Mm:  Nu zijn er plastic dingetjes. Laat  
 maar vallen. Laat maar vallen.
 (Vr tegelijk onverstaanbaar)
 En de magnetron? 
Vr:  Nou, ja-a. In het pannetje met heet  
 water, en wacht ik even met voelen…
Mm:  En dan nog zelf proeven eerst …  
 Lachen
Vr:  Ontzettend, hè?
Mm:  Maar de tijd was vol. Meer konden 
 de mensen niet doen.
Vr:  Dat klagen we steeds daarover.
Mm:  Ja, zeker.
1MM:  Museum medewerker (v)
Vr:     Vrouwelijke bezoeker
213
and the upbringing of the other children. That is why that switch between being 
a daughter and being a mother apparently does not cost her any effort at all. She 
starts with a proud declaration of the well-learnt skills and draws an equivalence 
between her mother and herself in that respect. The mentioning of her mother takes 
her further back into her memories and she then sees herself as a girl, one of seven 
children, obviously one of the eldest who was supposed to help her mother. From the 
story about the broken bottle she reaches again to her own experiences as a mother 
and compares it to the luxury of the present situation, telling a familiar story about 
warming up and tasting the baby’s milk.
The entire dialogue lasts no longer than a couple of minutes, but it is remarkable how 
informatively intense and emotionally charged it is. Evidently, this is the theme for 
the visiting woman as well as for many others. The exhibition steers her in a certain 
way, but the naturalness of her choices has more to do with the need to bring her past 
closer to the present moment. She contracts it in her own way, by constantly moving 
between different planes as if checking on the authenticity of her own memories. At 
the same time she takes a lot of pleasure in the exercise and is not inclined to give it 
up soon. So her movements acquire a reciprocal character and the fluctuations become 
broader, reaching for the deepest personal experiences. The visitors often do that but 
the given example has an advantage of explicitness. The visitor not only enjoys the 
experience, but reflects on her own feelings herself. Here are a couple of her remarks 
she made at the very beginning of the conversation: I’ve come for the second time. I have 
already brought something, now I have brought a lot again. Yes. You see, I cannot get enough of 
it (laughs). I see all kinds of things again of which I think: O God, used to have that as well … .
Moving in your memories between generations and swapping roles is not the only way 
to stay within the major key of the Museum collection. Another often inconspicuous 
and touching way to do that is to delineate your life along the lives of your children. 
In many cases the children who are now adults are present during the visits, so a direct 
addressing takes place when a story or a remark is supposed to get some firm support. 
Very often the unfolding narrative of a housewife and a mother is set along the lives 
of her children. To see the entire pattern one must follow a visit from the beginning to 
the end, which will be done in the next chapter. For now I shall give just a couple of 
extracts from such a visit here, in order to illustrate this pattern.
Extract 18
In the washing corner, looks at the irons.
W21:  These are 50 years old, because  
 then you had them with… when  
 Nicolette was born, then I had the  
 first electric one. 
MW:  You are saying school. Was it an  
 ordinary school?
In het washokje, kijkt naar de strijkijzers.
Vr21:  Deze zijn 50 jaar oud, want toen had  
 je met… toen Nicolette geboren werd  
 dan had ik de eerste elektrische.
Mm:  U zegt school. Was het een gewone  
 school?
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W2:  Housekeeping school….For girls it  
 was a very good education in those  
 days, you know. 
MW:  Yes, yes.
W2:  And the difference between Ingrid  
 and my education is like day and  
 night. We were already sewing a  
 coat after two years .., setting the  
 table and serving, very tidy all that.
W2:  Such a washing machine, had one  
 as well. …Yes, I used to have this  
 one but I also have a wooden…   
 And that one I had in the beginning  
 of my married (Mm: Yes). I am 75  
 years old, my daughters are 51 and  
 50, eldest.
W2:  Oh yes, a big washing pan like this 
 I put on the stove with water ... and  
 the washing was boiled in that too. 
MW:  Yes, yes, exactly.
W2:  And then my husband would 
 throw it in and it would stand on  
 the stove soaking during the night  
 and then in the mornings before he  
 left for his work I would fill a   
 wooden washing machine, but the  
 spinning went a little bit different  
 from this one, that flywheel was  
 underneath (she is speaking 
 very quickly now, almost without  
 breathing) highly dangerous   
 because… my boy, he died
 unfortunately when he was 40, 
 4 years ago, but he was very as  
 quick as anything and before you  
 knew it he was fiddling at that  
 flywheel.
MW:  O my god!
W2:  That’s why, highly dangerous.
W2:  My son who was 40, he would 
 be 44 now, till he was 4, only 
 then did I get a spinner. (MW: Yes,  
 yes). But my daughter recently  
 said: I still remember that you only  
 … they said then, fantasising: it  
 is practically dry. (MW: Yes, yes).  
 It wasn’t though. It wasn’t that dry.  
Vr2:  Huishoudschool. …Toen voor de  
 meisjes het was een heel goede  
 opleiding, hoor.
Mm:  Ja, ja.
Vr2:  En het verschil van Ingrid en mijn  
 opleiding is dag en nacht verschil.  
 We naaiden al een jas als we twee 
 jaar .., dekken en dienen, heel netjes  
 alles.
Vr2:  Zo’n wasmachine, ik ook nog een  
 gehad. …Ja, deze heb ik gehad maar  
 ik heb ook een houten… En dat had 
 ik in het begin van mij trouw (Mm:  
 Ja). Ik ben 75 jaar, mijn dochters zijn  
 51 en 50, oudste.
 
Vr2:  O ja, zo’n grote wasbus ik heb met  
 water op de kachel gezet ... en daar  
 werd de was ook in gekookt.
Mm:  Ja, ja, precies.
Vr2:  En dan gooide mijn man het daarin  
 en stond het op de kachel ‘s nachts 
 te trekken en dan ’s morgens voordat  
 hij te werk ging eerst dan laadde 
 ik een houten wasmachine, maar het  
 snel draaien deed ietsje anders dan  
 deze, dat vliegwiel zat daaronder 
 (praat snel, soort van zonder  
 ademhaling) levensgevaarlijk want  
 … mijn jongen, die is helaas   
 overleden toen hij 40 was, 4 jaar  
 terug, maar die was watervlug en hij  
 zat al gauw even aan dat vliegwiel.
Mm:  O god!
Vr2:  Dus levensgevaarlijk. 
Vr2:  Mijn zoon die 40 was, die zou nu  
 44 zijn, tot zijn 4de jaar, toen pas  
 kreeg ik een centrifuge. (Mm: Ja, ja).  
 Maar mijn dochter zei laatst: ik weet  
 nog dat jullie maar … ze zeiden dan,  
 fantaseerden ze:  het is praktisch  
 droog. (Mm: Ja, ja). Dat was toch  
 niet. Dat was niet zo droog. (Mm:  
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It is remarkable how the important events of this woman’s life are linked to the 
daily care for her children and her home. After giving birth to her daughter she got 
her first electric iron. The birth of her son was accompanied by the purchasing of a 
spinner. All her activities turned around the domestic labour and the care for her 
husband and children. Finally, her own age has a meaning only when it is mentioned 
in relation to the age of her children. The extracts were taken from the beginning of 
her tour, but the pattern remains the same till the moment she leaves the Museum. 
She was accompanied by one of her daughters, so the verification of what she had 
said and the authority to which she laid claim as a mother, were in the air during the 
entire visit. Her often peremptory tone shows in the extract as well. She compares her 
education with the education of her daughter and unequivocally states that hers had 
been better. She is obviously proud of her skills as a mother, a wife and a guardian of 
her family. She is a wonderful example of the women of her generation who saw their 
domestic responsibilities as an honourable profession, which you must learn well in 
order to be good at it. Later on she states herself: But still what you’ve learned early, you 
always do well automatically later on. This is obviously a motto of hers. 
This visit is simultaneously both usual and unusual. The images of the past 
are actualised while the visitor is studying the display, as we have seen in many 
examples. She adjusts herself to the situation and gradually takes the initiative 
to lead the conversation. The theme of the Museum is the theme of her life. This 
discovery gives her the necessary authority to make evaluative remarks regarding 
the past and the present. She moves easily within different periods of her and her 
children’s lives, and it is clear that her memory capacities are in an excellent state. 
The particularity of her remarks lies in the consistent coupling of her own life with 
that of the future generation. There is almost no mentioning at all about her parents 
or grandparents. Later on she will remember some funny episodes from her early 
years, but the dominant pattern of her stories remains connected to her role as a 
mother. If I compare this visit with the one featured in extract 17, then this difference 
becomes even more apparent. It looks like the woman visitor from extract 17, who is 
approximately 15 years younger, effortlessly creates the links between at least three 
generations within her family. Lady visitor 2 from extract 18 does mention her grand-
daughter at some point, so we can talk about linking three generations here as well. 
 (MW: No, no). But later on, 
 my son is, my youngest son is  
 40, and then I says: I don’t mind  
 having a baby but the horrible  
 thing was always to dry things in  
 my house, I find it awf(ul), and  
 then I got a dryer.
1MW:     Museum worker (f)
W2:      Woman visitor 2
 nee, nee). Maar later, mijn zoon is,  
 mijn jongste zoon is 40, en toen zeg  
 ik: dat ik een kind krijg dat vind ik  
 niet erg maar dat ellendige was  
 altijd in mijn huis te drogen, 
 ik vind het verschrik(kelijk), en toen  
 kreeg ik een droogtrommel.
1MM:    Museum medewerker (v)
Vr2:    Vrouwelijke bezoeker 2
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But the difference lies in the direction of the links. The first woman moves between 
the past (her mother) and the future (her children), while the second chooses to look 
only ahead. Does it mean that at some point elderly people prefer to shut certain 
doors of their memories, leaving them behind forever? The question remains open to 
me. Looking at the collected data from the perspective of the last example, I cannot 
discover a distinct steady pattern in it. There are visitors who are older than 75 and 
who still tell you about their grandparents with a lot of emotion and often humour. If 
I turn the question round and look at the mothers and housewives who are visiting the 
Museum, then I can surely state that there is not one of them who would not mention 
the children. It happens even when those visitors have tragically lost their children 
and even when they are less and less able to express themselves. We can conclude 
that one of the striking features of the visitors’ generation is that they see both their 
past and their future tightly bound to the younger generation. 
My last remark concerns the generation of visitors in general, not just women of a 
certain age. It could be said that the last examples contain a gender-related bias. The 
fact that housekeeping and bringing-up children were considered to be primarily 
female tasks does not need any additional illustration. But this does not mean 
that domestic life, family and home are gender-tinted notions as well. One should 
not confuse the distribution of the roles and the share of time spent at home with 
responsibilities that both women and men had together. Even in the story of the last 
woman, who could be called an exemplary housewife, her husband was mentioned 
as soon as she told about some heavy housework. All the same it is noticeable that in 
the Museum the women are on the whole easier and more eager interlocutors than 
the men. The men who visit the Museum do not break free from the major theme of 
the exhibition, but they certainly do have their own favourite places, like the hobby-
shed or the collection of photo cameras. Men’s reminiscences in the washing corner 
would not differ much from what has been told already, but their loose stories would 
more likely be about football competitions, a blowlamp or the first independently 
repaired moped. 
Let us look at one last example, which can elucidate the latest remarks. A group of 
elderly people had been in the Museum for some time already. They were in their 
80s, very energetic and noisy, laughing, talking together and interrupting each other 
the whole time. My story is about a couple who made up a part of the group. The 
husband’s voice rose far above all the other voices. The wife could clearly not compete 
and supplied the conversation with general agreeable remarks. After listening to the 
radio in the sitting-room, the husband, who was still impressed by an old record 
with a live description of a football match, started to tell how he used to play football 
himself, and how his team used to be beaten up when they had won away matches. 
The story was told in a rather rough language, but everybody enjoyed it very much. 
He had not finished yet when I noticed that his wife was persistently touching my 
arm asking for attention. I wanted to ask whether I could help her but she had already 
started telling me her story. It was about her volunteer work for Humanitas many 
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Extract 19
M1  comes back: Anna!
W:  What’s the matter Jos?
M:  We’ll come by here again 
 some time.
W:  Oh!
M:  Because I am thirsty!
 W & Mw laugh
M:  … look for second over there.
W:  Verkade old tins…
M:  You know … you know if we only  
 … that in the e-eh, Zeestraat we  
 used to have a Verkade shop?
W:  Yes.
M:  And when we went on holidays,  
 went to that woman to fetch two  
 tins because we packed everything  
 we needed on the way into them.
 All laugh
M:  Yes? Don’t you remember 
 any more?
W  with doubt: Well … I am sure we  
 had that. 
 Talk all together
M:  I am, you know. We used to go 
 to Italy in little Daf (DAF, a 
 small car). I had one of the first  
 Daffies. And then we went in it  
 to Italy, and then you could take  
 out a seat, and then had one 
 of those little A-tents and that’s  
 were the children slept and we  
 slept in the Daffy. Took out the 
 seats there, we turned them over  
 and the backseat… and that’s why  
 we needed those two tins, because  
 that back part, which had to fit in- 
M1  komt aan: Anna! 
Vr:  Wat is het Jos?
M:  We komen hier nog langs een 
 keer terug.
Vr:  O!
M:  Want ik heb dorst!
 Vr en Mm lachen.
M … daar nog even kijken.
Vr:  Verkade oude blikken...
M:  Weet je … weet je als we maar 
 … dat we in de e-e Zeestraat daar  
 Verkade winkel hadden?
Vr:  Ja.
M:  En als we dan met vakantie gingen,  
 gingen bij die mevrouw twee blikken  
 halen want daar stopten we alle  
 spullen die we onderweg nodig  
 hadden. Lachen allemaal. 
M:  Ja? Weet je het niet meer?
Vr  twijfelend: Nou … dat zullen we  
 zeker gehad hebben.
 Praten door elkaar
M:  Ik wel, hoor. We gingen dan in Dafje  
 naar Italië. Ik had een van de eerste  
 Daffies. En dan gingen we mee naar  
 Italië toe, en dan kon je een bank  
 uithalen, en dan hadden zo’n kleine  
 A-tentje en daar sliepen de 
 kinderen in en we sliepen in de 
 Daffie. Haalde we die stoeltjes 
 daar uit, die draaiden we om en 
 de achterbank …. en daarom hadden  
 we die twee blikken voor nodig,  
 omdat dat rugstuk die ertussen  
 moest, om dat op die twee blikken te  
years ago, which I found quite interesting in itself, but the point was that both of 
them obviously needed a listener in order to talk about things that interested them. I 
even remember that at some point I thought what a pity it would be if they actually 
do not talk to each other at home. Both looked extremely excited by the attention 
of others, but to me it seemed that they were two separate islands in each other’s 
neighbourhood. During the last part of her story the husband went upstairs with the 
rest of the group, but towards the end he was back with her again.
218
 between, to put it on the two tins,  
 and then we put, then we put, put a  
 sheet over it and a sleeping bag and  
 then you had a bed.…
M:  Yes. Because the roof expenses, the  
 roof expenses we could not afford.
W:  Not very nice either. 
M:  So that was the ... the … the-e  
 holiday. With my own little car,  
 everything inside, and you could  
 drive quietly, you could leave it  
 everywhere. Because there wasn’t  
 all that crime yet.
W:  Yes, and besides that my youngest  
 daughter, she is my only little  
 daughter, she was asthma and  
 she needed very much to go to the  
 height of Switzerland. 
M:  Yes, she went to the Asthma Centre  
 in Davos  three years. Davos we  
 also know by heart. 
All together: Yes, yes.
W:  Yes, but we did it quite well, 
 you know
M:  Hey, seven times a year we went  
 with… Six times a year by train 
 and the seventh time during the  
 holidays (W: Yes, yes, yes) by car. 
 Talk all together
M:  In the 60s.
 They are still talking
M:  Coffee is ready!
1W:      Woman visitor
M:      Male visitor
 zetten, en dan gingen, dan gingen,  
 gingen hoeslaken overheen en een  
 slaapzaak en dan had je een bed.…
M:  Ja. Want dak kosten, dak kosten  
 konden we niet betalen.
Vr:  Ook was niet leuk.
M:  Dat was dus de … de … de-e 
 vakantie. Met mijn eigen autootje,  
 alles er in, en je kon rustig rijden,  
 je kon overal gaan staan. Want toen  
 was die criminaliteit niet.
Vr:  Ja, en daar kwam erbij dat mijn  
 jongste dochter, dat is mijn enige  
 dochtertje, die was astma en die had  
 het hard nodig naar de hoogte van  
 Zwitserland.
M:  Ja, die is drie jaar in het Astma  
 Centrum in Davos geweest. 
 Davos kunnen we ook uittekenen. 
Alle:  Ja, ja.
Vr:  Ja, maar we hebben het ook goed  
 gedaan, hoor
M:  He, zeven keer per jaar gingen we  
 met… Zes keer per jaar met de trein  
 en de zevende keer met de vakantie  
 (Vr: Ja, ja, ja) met de auto. 
 Praten door elkaar
M:  In de zestiger jaren.
 Steeds praten
M:  Koffie staat klaar!
1Vr:    Vrouwelijke bezoeker
M:     Mannelijke bezoeker
In contrast to the previous part of their visit, both of them reach for each 
other immediately, in their accustomed informal way, and they stay this way 
till the end of their visit. We can look at this extract from different angles. 
The transcribed piece contains almost all modes of remembering that we 
looked at in detail in this chapter. The story is partly channelled by the sight 
of the biscuit boxes. The man populates his memories, fills it with functional 
details, looks for his wife’s confirmation and finally revives the whole picture 
of the family vacation. They both swing between the past and the present, 
re-evaluating the good old times when people were not afraid of crime and 
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finally they make a remarkable personal turn, bringing into the conversation 
the story about the illness of their daughter. The story is collectively built 
and at the same time it bears a personal touch of both the man and the lady. 
Another possibility is to look at the extract in the context of the entire visit. 
There are three stories here, which were told by the same couple. The first 
two were held separately, the third one grew into a remarkable united effort. 
The impression that one gets is that both of them had been out for some 
time, but at the end of the day they needed to return to each other. The most 
powerful uniting force for them seems to be the intrinsic family feeling, 
complemented by their sincere devotion to their child. 
This basic understanding and belief does not always lie on the surface of the 
visitor’s reactions. Some of them mask their vulnerable feelings; others are 
overwhelmed and not in a condition to share their reflexions. But even if the 
major theme of the Museum is not explicitly named, it echoes in almost each 
story that is told and in each revived memory. In the last piece it is ‘us’ that 
the two elderly people are talking about, like Yes, but we did it quite well, you 
know. And I can imagine that ‘it’ means their entire life, those small and big 
things, for which they shared their love and responsibilities. 
The three separately told stories are not really different from each other. In 
order to bridge them we can make use of topological insight where, along 
with social and discursive analysis, we touch upon issues like being in the 
world with others. When we talked about the topological approach towards 
remembering, we found that understanding life as duration and becoming 
can give us a key to an improved interpreting of remembering modes. This is 
why one should not see the described mechanisms as each representing one 
particular mode of remembering. Like in duration the moments and states 
melt into each other, remembering too evolves by engaging in various modes 
and techniques, which suit us best at present. The visitors of the Museum are 
often totally absorbed by the naturalness of what is happening, so that the 
final realisation of the Museum’s effect strikes them as if unexpected: I have 
not noticed the time! It is magic.   
Ethics of remembering
In my opinion the last examples show us much more than can be filtered 
by careful socio-psychological, discursive or phenomenological analysis 
all together. The fact that the topographic and topological approaches 
intersect there supports our previous conclusion about the complexity 
of remembering, which does not sustain the purity of various modes but 
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rather demonstrates how those modes entwine creating for a visitor a unique 
experience of engaging with the past. But there is more to be said about the 
remembering practices of the older generation, which is connected to the 
way the visitors remember the past but at the same time brings forth a more 
profound issue of ethics. The feelings of parental responsibility, the pride 
of having done things right, which were so strong in the last two examples, 
introduce issues that are directly connected to the life values of the entire 
generation in question. Ethical issues around ageing will be discussed in 
the next chapter. The following discussion can be seen as an introduction to 
that important theme, which will ultimately lead us to answering the main 
question of this research.
The swinging mode of remembering has been introduced within the 
description of the channelled memories, which are related to certain artefacts 
of the display but cannot be exclusively reduced to them. The recognition of 
familiar domestic objects and appropriation of the Museum space are not 
the only reasons that cause the sensation of swinging between the past and 
the present. Some of the reasons lie much deeper and are connected to issues 
such as ageing, appreciation and re-evaluation of the past. Those issues lie 
at the core of the entire project. In varying degrees, they underlie almost 
each reaction I have witnessed in the Museum. Bearing that in mind we shall 
now look at the example, which represents memories that are enlivened by a 
swinging mode but at the content level reach far beyond its mechanics.
Extract 20
MW1:  Such a shirt, look, or blouse, look 
 at this shirt, isn’t it just like 
 a wooden plank.
M:  These are, hay, under-vests. 
MW:  Well, I don’t know, but…
M:  Yes, under-vests. Indeed. 
 In army. Army.
W:  That didn’t look nice, such …
MW:  Yes, but now listen to me, we are  
 used to it now, right? (W: Indeed)  
 Of course there was no 
 heating then. 
W:  No.
MW:  It was horribly cold. So that was  
 nice and warm then of course.
M:  Y-e-es.
MW:  And the people all used to work  
 outside. (M: Outside) unclear
MM1:  Zo’n hemd, kijk, of bloes, kijk wat  
 voor hemd, dat is toch net een plank. 
M:  Dat zijn, hè, de borstrokjes.
MM:  Ja, ik weet het niet maar…
M:  Ja, borstrokjes. Ja-a. In leger. Leger.
Vr:  Dat stond niet prettig, zulke …
MM:  Ja-a, maar moet eens luister eens,  
 we zijn nu gewend, hè. (Vr: Ja) 
 Het was toen natuurlijk 
 geen verwarming.
Vr:  Nee
MM:  Het was hartstikke koud. Dus dat was  
 toen natuurlijk heel lekker en warm.
M:  Ja-a.
Mm:  En de mensen werkten allemaal  
 buiten. (M: buiten) onverstaanbaar
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M all mixed up: Those ... farmers were   
 working outside the whole day. 
W:  And that too to wash with, to do 
 the washing, all those 
 big heavy things.
MW:  Hah-hah. Pause.
M &W one after another: Ye-es, ye-es. 
MW:  And this is difficult of course,  
 everybody has central heating 
 (W: Yes) and the people go to 
 their work in cars and well…
W:  And this?
M:  Yes, of course we also have …  
 because I have, I have, I still have  
 a thermal suit because I used 
 to need that for sailing. But that,  
 that is a suit like that and if you put  
 that on then you can sit still in the  
 freezing cold, then nothing 
 goes wrong.
MW:  Yes, because those thermal pants  
 are still there (M: Sure), because  
 my son, he works in the Botlek 
 (M: Yes, yes), and he is outside  
 often, and they have thermal   
 underwear there. 
M:  True.
MW:  Because it is of course terribly 
 (W simult.: Terribly) cold. 
M:  And nothing happens (MW: No). 
 It is ever so warm.
MW:  But before, there were only those  
 planks. After it was washed, 
 then it became even more like 
 a plank.
 
W:  That soap was no good. 
MW:  Yes, yes, yes, but that was very  
 different of course. 
1MW:   Museum volunteer (f)
W:      Woman visitor
M:      Male visitor
M door elkaar: Die … boeren werkten de 
 hele dag buiten.
Vr:  Ook dat nog met om te wassen, om 
 de was te doen, al die grote 
 zware dingen.
MM:  Ha-ha. Pauze
M en Vr achter elkaar: Ja-ja, ja-ja. 
MM:  En dit is natuurlijk moeilijk, iedereen  
 heeft centrale verwarming, (Vr: Ja) 
 en mensen gaan met de auto’s naar  
 werk en ja…
Vr:  En dit?
M:  Ja, we hebben natuurlijk ook … want  
 ik heb, ik heb, ik heb nog wel een  
 thermopak want had ik vroeger  
 nodig voor met zeilen. Maar dat, dat  
 is zo’n pakje en als je dat aandoet  
 dan kan je stil in de vrieskou kou  
 zitten, dan is het niets aan de hand.
MM:  Ja, want die termonderbroek is er 
 nog (M: Zeker), want mijn zoon 
 die werkt in de Botlek (M: Ja, ja),  
 en die is ook veel buiten, en 
 die hebben er termondergoed. 
M:  Zeker.
MM:  Want het is natuurlijk verschrikkelijk  
 (Vr tegelijk: Verschrikkelijk) koud. 
M:  En gebeurt niks (MM: Nee) Het is  
 heerlijk warm. 
MM:  Maar vroeger waren alleen maar van  
 die planken. Als het was gewassen,  
 dan werd het nog grotere plank.
Vr:  Die zeep niet goed was.
MM:  Ja, ja, ja maar dat was heel 
 anders natuurlijk.
1MM:  Museum vrijwilliger (v)
Vr:    Vrouwelijke bezoeker
M:     Mannelijke bezoeker
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The conversation between the elderly couple and the Museum volunteer 
has been triggered by an old-fashioned piece of underwear, which they see 
in the ‘master bedroom’. This piece of clothing unlocks a vivid multi-topic 
discussion, which is based on collective and personal experiences of the 
three persons present. The main reason why the conversation sways at times 
is the decreased value attached to an object that had been indispensable in 
the man’s wardrobe many years ago and that could even have saved his 
life. While talking about the merits and shortcomings of the under-vest the 
visitors and the volunteer first draw some specific information from the 
past, which is apparently shared by the entire generation: this clothing was 
used in the army, it was warm and it did not look nice. A comparison with a 
wooden plank does not leave any room for a nostalgic sentiment. Very soon 
however, the initial irony is countermanded by an explanation of the changes 
that have taken place in the modern world, namely a world with a central 
heating system, warm cars and much less work out of doors. By aligning 
all these arguments the participants are likely to by manner of speaking 
take this piece of clothing under their protection, and even to re-establish 
its usefulness by mentioning some modernised versions of it (thermal suits). 
The volunteer personalises her argument by mentioning her son who works 
in the Rotterdam harbour and wears a special thermal suit; the man shares 
his own experience of wearing a thermal suit while sailing. As a result, the 
ironic tone is replaced by a much more balanced account, where the habits 
of the past have been given back their meanings and values. The sequence of 
arguments partly restores an attitude of respect towards the piece of clothing, 
namely an attitude that is based on the rather widespread conviction among 
the elderly people that good old things can be trusted forever. 
To establish the indisputable authority of the past, in this case the authority 
of knowledge and the authority of quality (of things), visitors often reach 
for the present, where this knowledge is lost and therefore their authority 
still can make some sense. In our example the contradiction between the 
need to be heard and the realisation that the world has changed create a 
tension which each of the participants faces in his/her own way. The man 
(the visitor) is on the whole positive in his remarks. He values the functional 
utility of the clothing and uses the switch between the past and the present 
to accentuate the consistency of his appreciation. The volunteer (the woman) 
voices two totally different viewpoints. She starts by ironically comparing 
the under-vest with a wooden plank. Then, as if regretting it, she sketches 
the poor circumstances of former life, compares it with the luxury of the 
present and restores the value of the vest. And finally, not being able to 
restrict herself to a ‘respectful’ tone, she comes back to her first definition, but 
that time consciously re-evaluating not only the under-vest but the general 
poverty of the living conditions. The reaction of the woman visitor is quite 
laconic and also quite consistent. She sees and remembers the under-vest in 
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the light of heavy domestic labour. Almost each remark she makes is about 
the hardships of washing by hand, and she automatically extrapolates those 
uneasy recollections of the piece of clothing. In comparison with the other 
two people she barely bridges the past and the present. I would say that 
during this short conversation about tough experiences, she in fact never 
leaves the present, because the looming past can give her neither the joy of 
authoritative knowledge, nor the sweetness of its expired beauty. In order to 
avoid a wrong impression, let me add that she is not that sombre during the 
entire visit. The moment her attention is drawn to something else, the tone 
of her voice changes and she is smiling again. Enthusiastically she discusses 
with the volunteer the bottle of Soir de Paris that her mother used to have at 
home, and having recognised something else on the dressing table she adds: 
Oh, yes, and my mother also had a roller like that to make her nails shiny.  It seems 
like the clouds cast over her by the sight of the old-fashioned under-vest 
have been dispersed and she radiates light and youth again. 
It is this last example, which primarily gives me the grounds to talk about 
distinctive ethics of remembering, the rights and wrongs of which gradually 
come into view while the visitors are switching in their stories between times 
and places. There are a number of issues at stake. Each visitor or volunteer 
has personal memories, but as we have already seen following the arguments 
of Halbwachs, those memories are inseparable from the influences of the 
group to which the visitors belonged then or belong now. Fine-tuning the 
margin within which one can reminisce ‘freely’ is a question of ethics. It 
entails contemplations about the appropriateness of what can and cannot be 
said in order to give an authentic account and at the same time not isolate 
oneself from the group. It is especially difficult in cases when personal 
accounts are critical or differ from the collective ones in their evaluations 
and moods. Those thoughts bring me back to our previous discussion 
about margins and boundaries. If there is an imaginable margin between 
the collective and personal reminiscences, then Marin’s idea of a neutral 
place can be applicable here47. Visitors expect a kind of amusement from 
the Museum, and the Museum expects from the visitors certain reactions 
to the collection. This zone of mutual expectations is neutral by definition, 
like each zone of negotiations. At the same time, this is exactly the point 
where a very powerful tension between smoothed politeness and vigorous 
unpredictability appears. There is no line here but some vague space, within 
which the visitors stay in constant reciprocal movement between familiar 
and strange, personal and collective, authentic and imaginable. 
47   See our earlier discussion, p.107. 
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Hypothetically speaking, it must be quite surprising that an elderly person, 
who is reminiscing about some mundane facts of the past, finds him/herself 
trapped within an intense re-evaluation process. In practice it happens all the 
time and our examples show it beyond any doubts. Every recollection is then 
an ethical act, a statement of certain ethics. The three elderly persons in the 
last example are as it were unconsciously conscious about that. Each of them 
let us know what their personal experiences really were. Each of them took 
into consideration the possible feelings and views of the others and adjusted 
her/his comments in order to preserve dignity concerning their shared past, 
which is also often seen as a moral duty towards the younger generation. 
And finally, each of three of them made quite a step in re-evaluating their 
personal experiences so that they could be admissible in the present and at 
the same time still facilitate the authority of their knowledge about the past. 
Here we touch upon a very important issue, which has to do not only with 
the ethics of remembering but with the ethics of ageing as well. A quite 
widespread delusion about reminiscing is that it is always and exclusively 
linked to the past, which means that people reminisce for the sake of the 
past. A simple logical exercise however disrupts the supposition, because if 
all sweet reminiscences were simply connected to the past, then each time 
trip would have a bitter aftertaste. Reminiscing in that sense is not such a 
pleasant idea. This contradiction can be seen in Halbwachs’ description of 
the differences between remembering by adults and by the elderly: 
It seems fairly natural that adults, absorbed as they are with everyday preoccupations, 
are not interested in what from the past is now irrelevant to these preoccupations. Is it 
not the case that adults deform their memories of childhood precisely because they force 
them to enter into the framework of the present? But this is not the case with old people. 
These men and women are tired of action and hence turn away from the present so that 
they are in a most favourable position to evoke events of the past as they really appeared 
(1925/1992: 47).
The second way of reminiscing is, according to Halbwachs, a kind of 
aesthetical indulgence typical for elderly people. It does not have any active 
reference point in the present, except for the relatively passive ‘assigned’ role 
of the ‘guardians of traditions’, comparable to the order in primitive tribes. 
Halbwachs’ disagreement with Bergson and the shortcomings of his own 
approach are quite obvious here. Firstly, memories of past events can never 
give us a picture of the events as they have actually taken place. It does not 
happen exactly for the reason that Halbwachs already has given us earlier on: 
there are no abstract memories but only memories that enter the framework 
of the present. To this I can add that no event can be remembered in the way 
‘it appeared’, since the ‘rememberer’ himself has become a different person 
in time. 
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Secondly, Halbwachs’ understanding of the reasons why elderly people want 
to reminisce seems to me quite narrow. He clarifies this desire by the most 
obvious social function of ‘preserving the traces of … past’ but fails to see any 
active role the older generation can still fulfil. The life of the elderly is seen 
as passive and the only sphere of their activity lies in reviving memories of 
the past. Unfortunately this rather limited vision is still a very common way 
of thinking about older generations. However, what can be understandable 
as a wide-spread opinion in the beginning of the 20th century becomes quite 
dubious nowadays48.  
Thirdly, the idea that Halbwachs puts forward is that adults and elderly 
people are either reminiscing for the sake of the past or as a distraction from 
the present. If that were so, then a distinctive line could be drawn between 
the past and the present with a gap in-between. Memory is then given a 
function of connecting the past and the present. This kind of scheme seems 
to be very rigid. Following Bergson, I am convinced that there is no active 
process of remembering which is not rooted in now. Even in cases that seem 
to be untraceable regarding questions when and why certain memories have 
occurred, we can find the starting point that has provoked the ‘slope leading 
back’ by making the necessary effort. It does not matter how far in the past 
we can still go in our remembering, the trigger is always here and now. 
The inconsistency of Halbwachs’ description is based on the wrong direction 
he assigned to the reminiscence process: elderly people are not heading back 
to the past; it is the past that in its entire totality approaches them to serve 
their present needs (Deleuze, 1966/1988: 63). To resolve this inconsistency 
we can turn to Bergson again. The notion of the past continuously 
‘gnawing’ into the present will make a lot of difference if we apply it to the 
social understanding of remembering among the elderly as suggested by 
Halbwachs. The appeal coming from the present to the past, and then back to 
the present as described by both Bergson and Halbwachs, will finally give us 
a key to understanding the swinging mode of remembering and the complex 
issues of ethics of remembering, which are connected to it: 
For, that a recollection should reappear in consciousness, it is necessary that it should 
descend from the heights of pure memory down to the precise point where action	
is	 taking place. In other words, it is from the present that comes the appeal to which 
memory responds, and it is from the sensori-motor elements of present action that a 
memory borrows the warmth which gives it life (Bergson, 1912/2004: 197).
48   I shall elaborate on this topic in the chapter on ‘Ageing’.
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Swinging then is empowered by strong ethical demands, which remembering 
entails. It means reaching for the ‘heights’ in order to pick up the right 
memory, which will suit the present action. One should not underestimate 
the power of the statement. Remembering means acting, and action always 
serves the purpose of the present moment. Even if by acting a person tries to 
re-evaluate the past, for example in order to set the record straight, it is done 
because of ethical demands that are valid now, and this is in accordance with 
the present idea of how he or she wants to be remembered in future. 
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The description leaves no doubt that the title museum can be accepted only 
as conditional. The Museum does not exactly fit the notion of a conventional 
public space; neither does it satisfy the exoticism of the wonder rooms or 
the obsession with the past, which is so typical of les lieux de mémoire. As 
an unconventional place, it cannot be valued even in terms of functionality, 
unless the visitors come to fill it with a particular meaning of their lives, and 
by magic of natural vocation revive the faded shots of the Museum rooms.  
In the conclusions to the chapter on space a lot of attention was paid to the 
physical form which the Museum exhibition gradually acquired. The domestic 
environment that was reconstructed there is clearly a success, since most of 
the visitors are very appreciative about it, adding that it strongly reminds 
them of home. It is then understandable why the home theme recurrently 
appears in the visitor’s memories in all its diversity and ramifications. The 
influence of the physical surroundings is important, but in actual fact it is 
just one of the reasons for the visitors to revive their home-bound memories. 
As we have already noted, home has many more meanings than just the 
place where we live, and the divergent scale of the visitors’ memories makes 
that very clear. Instead of drawing conclusions about an already obvious 
thematic choice concerning memories that frequently can be heard in the 
Museum, let us therefore engage in reflection on something else, which may 
look obvious but does not have such a straightforward clarification.  
  
The main purpose of this chapter was to show how the remembering process 
occurs in the Reminiscence Museum in Rotterdam. On the basis of the given 
description I conclude that while visitors are involved in interaction and are 
‘catching up on’ their memories, they feel at home. By that I mean their gradually 
growing feeling of recognition, trust and security that is shown intensely by 
their continuously changing behaviour and in the expected and unexpected 
turns of the conversation. The physical environment plays an important 
role in shaping this feeling, but because the degree to which the exhibition’s 
appeal to look ‘familiar’ varies among the visitors, my supposition is that 
their feeling at home has something to do with certain specific features of 
remembering processes themselves. Why would somebody who has come to 
spend some time in just ‘another’ museum, not only stay there much longer 
than was planned, but also actively appropriate the place by filling it with 
personal remarks, additions and corrections. Why would a visitor go into so 
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much effort to remember the details of his or her life, which have not been 
evoked for years? Not only that though. Why would somebody choose to 
share intimate details of his or her personal past with strangers, so that at the 
end of the visit those ‘strangers’ are able to get a clear picture of the home 
where that visitor used to live or is living now? 
If read carefully, the description of remembering processes provides the 
answers to all these questions. Yet one should not expect an easy enumeration 
of clarifications here. There are a large number of factors that influence 
remembering processes but remain beyond the scope of this study. A new 
perspective opens up, with its alluring questions and ever moving horizons. 
Socio-psychological analysis supplied us with a thorough description in 
regard to the knowhow of the remembering process that takes place in the 
Museum. But in order to address the issues that are raised above we need 
a broader horizon, which can be found in a philosophical interpretation of 
remembering processes.  
The duration of memory and intervals of remembering
Memory is not one’s home, but it envelops that idea; it gives us the comfort of 
knowing what home is or can be, and it often sustains the feeling that we have 
one somewhere. Unlike the idea of home itself, memory does not know any 
boundaries and cannot withstand enclosure. It fills our life like all-penetrating 
air, without which we cannot live, but which cannot be touched or held. Yet 
we firmly consider ourselves to be the owners of our memory. This ownership 
is of a particular kind. Without comprehending the entire scope of its content, 
we still rely on memory in defining the values and goals of our lives. That is 
why this relationship can in a certain sense be seen as reversed, where it is not 
we that own our memories, but our memory that possesses us.
 
Bergson occasionally identifies memory and duration, but according to him 
duration underpins all forms of evolution. Those concepts should therefore 
be seen as contextual or metonymical only. Memory in turn is characterised 
by constant movement and change. The question is with what kind of 
movement memory is endowed. If we look back at the modes that describe 
remembering, then two observations regarding the ‘how’ of remembering 
can offer us a good starting point in answering this question. Firstly, 
remembering as it takes place in the Museum shows a recursive repetitive 
pattern of movement between the past and the present as well as within the 
past, i.e. between different planes of memory. Secondly, the so-called appeal 
for remembering always comes from the present. But the correlation between 
the present and the past is not that straightforward. One must give up the 
convenient idea of succession in order to understand what kind of movement 
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underlies the actualisation of the virtual images that makes remembering 
take place. In other words, we are talking about different movements here, 
the pattern of which does not lie on the surface of remembering processes 
and differs considerably from the habitual extensive representation: from the 
past to the present and on to the future.
One of the best elaborations of Bergson’s theory of memory and duration 
regarding its intrinsic multidirectional movements can be found in works 
by Deleuze. Reflecting on the Bergsonian representation of memory in the 
form of the famous cone, he states that ‘each actual present’ already implies 
‘the entire past in its most contracted state’ (Deleuze, 2008: 103)49.  Thus, the 
summit of the cone, wedging the present, is the most abbreviated version 
of the past, which does not precede but coexists with the present. Deleuze 
explains coexistence of the past and the present and their relation to the 
future by a scission of time into two dissymmetrical jets, dispelling any 
possible illusion about their successive relations50:
The ‘present’ that endures divides at each ‘instant’ into two directions, one oriented and 
dilated toward the past, the other contracted, contracting toward the future (Deleuze, 
1966/1988: 52).
The relations between the past and the present that are presented in such 
a way, shift the accent from their exterior respective positioning to integral 
existence. Neither the past nor the present can ultimately claim ownership of 
the remembering ‘know how’, but a connection is certainly here. The status 
of the present changes decisively. Because of the described scission a certain 
strain appears, which can also be called an interval between the past and the 
future. There, within this interval, the remembering happens. This strain, or 
interval, which we are accustomed to call the present, is essentially different 
from the past and that difference is in kind. 
The research material has shown certain specific types of repetitive movements 
which take place while the visitors are engaged with their memories. The 
sensation of what is happening reminds one of falling outside any movement, 
or we could say, of falling into this specific interval in-between. Imagine an 
enormous mixture of coloured beads in one pile. There will be no colour to 
distinguish because each different colour refers to a distinct vibration and 
movement. The coexistence of all these movements overloads our perception 
capacity, which grows numb and causes a sensation of colourlessness, or 
immobility. Bergson explains the sensation of immobility by pointing out the 
degree of memory contraction: 
49   Cited in Alia Al-Saij (2004: 208).
50   For a detailed discussion on the subject see Alia Al-Saij (2004).
230
By allowing us to grasp in a single intuition multiple moments of duration, it (memory, 
eb) frees us from the movement of the flow of things, that is to say, from the rhythm of 
necessity. The more of these moments memory can contract into one, the firmer is the 
hold which it gives to us on matter: so that the memory of a living being appears indeed 
to measure, above all, its powers of action upon things, and to be only the intellectual 
reverberation of this power (1912/2004: 303).
This is a very important statement that allows us to understand better why 
remembering practices are valued especially by older generations. Even if we 
are not capable of grasping duration as an indivisible process of change and 
becoming, some results of those changes and becomings could not remain 
unnoticed forever. The realisation that the stream of life is narrowing is not 
easy to digest, so it is not surprising that the moments of remembering, with 
their sensation of being ‘free from the movement’ and getting ‘a firmer hold 
on matter’ are appreciated that much by elderly people. Those moments 
are not without tension, since as we have already seen it takes a number of 
movements to get there. The swinging mode of remembering shows this in the 
most striking manner. This is also the mode that makes clear the amplitude of 
the changes one has gone through thanks to the re-evaluative and reflective 
character of remembering. That way the interval of remembering becomes 
more and more tense. 
Let me try and summarise the complex conjunction of movements and 
immobility that this specific present interval of remembering brings 
together. Each (artificially extracted) moment of duration is characterised by 
the scission described above, but not each of them is weighted by such a 
wide and intense appeal to the deeper plains of memory as happens during 
Museum visits. The focusing work starts immediately by a series of swinging 
movements in search of recollections that fit the appeal. This work begins at 
the memory planes that correspond with the most general and collectively 
shared images of the past because of their high degree of contraction. Those 
images can even be called ready-to-hand since, being evoked regularly, they 
have acquired an equipmental character of everyday remembering. In order 
to fetch a personal detail that corresponds to the appeal, the visitor has to 
widen up the search area by, using Bergson’s words, ‘increasing expansion of 
the memory as a whole, a circle large enough to include this detail from the 
past’(1912/2004: 322). It is still done by the resonating movement between 
then and now as a part of adjusting work, which overrides simple factual 
correspondences and opens yet another dimension where the good and the 
bad of the past are re-evaluated in accordance with today’s values. Only 
after that reciprocal tuning work, as the discursive analysis often shows, will 
a visitor arrive to the point of superposition of the two images. It feels like 
that perfect moment of immobility is freed from any movement, but it is in 
fact another scission, which takes the visitor further on to the future. 
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I must point out that the description takes much more time than the happening 
itself. That is why visitors experience it as the magic of metamorphosis, while 
they remain unconscious of the complexity and diversity of the changes that 
are taking place at the same time. Only sometimes do the visitors suddenly 
realise how far this leap into the past has actually taken them. The question 
will then be why the visitors do not feel lost instead of feeling at home. I 
think that the answer lies in the structure of the self that was suggested by 
Bergson, or more precisely the two aspects of the self. The movement that 
the visitors make, is from the socially accepted and schematised self to the 
ever changing self. There is no doubt about which aspect of the self Bergson 
considers to be the most important one, but we must also have no doubts 
about the visitors’ appreciation of finding that ‘vague’ self. In spite of all the 
delights of the collective, we are keen on the demarcation line that makes our 
own personality distinct and unique among many others. It does not mean 
that different aspects of the self succeed each other. As Deleuze puts it, all 
our different ‘selves’ in the different ‘regions of Being itself’ come together in 
their virtual coexistence (1966/1988: 60). 
Remembering which involves a personal effort and which is a remembering 
of an individual and not of a group, differs considerably from the collective 
form of reminiscing (group reminiscing, for example). Two different 
processes must be distinguished here. Following Halbwachs, I am convinced 
that remembering is a socially determined process in the sense that it occurs 
in a socially determined situation and bears traces of the group’s identity, 
to which one used to belong. At the same time each case of remembering 
is unique. It is exclusively fed on the memories of a singular person, whose 
recollections could and would never be identical to somebody else’s. This is 
probably the only sign that is given to us explicitly, in order to distinguish 
between the memories of a certain generation and the memories of a certain 
person who belongs to it. That also explains why the passage from the 
social to the true self causes so much tension and is accompanied by deep 
and sincere emotions. I call those sensations coming home. It is vague and 
distinct at the same time. Vague because it is moving and changing all the 
time, as Bergson would have it, yet also distinct because it contains the 
power of an energy core. Everything revolves around it, namely round the 
inner aspect of the self that ultimately is our home. This self reflects in the 
best way what Bergson calls duration. We can still make one more step and 
bring the social and the individual elements together. Middleton & Brown 
put it in the following way:
Our own duration is continually being incorporated, enveloped by the duration of 
others. At the same time, we are ourselves enveloping others in our particular duration. 
This process, or play, of mutual envelopment … is a better conception of the role that 
memory plays in the sustaining of our personal identities than the ‘forensic’ notion of 
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self. To be a self is to be caught up in, defined by, entangled with, this virtual play of 
mutually enveloping durations. Selfhood, then, is not a ‘thing’ that flows in duration, 
but the name we give to the shifting intersection of experiences, of which our present 
consciousness is only the ‘leading edge’ ( 2005: 231).
Going back to the self that reflects our duration, we dare to leave behind this 
‘leading edge’ of our personality, but we are not freed from the ‘enveloping 
durations’ of others; rather we make them a part of our self. Approaching 
our true self in such a way, we change our general understanding of the past, 
memory and remembering, regarding their place and their meaning in human 
life. In other words, we are on the way to an ontological understanding of 
memory. This change is necessary, since we are on the point of engaging with 
the third concept of this study, which will finally allow for an integral analysis 
of space, memory and age. Deleuze stresses this point in the following quote, 
which has a key meaning for this study, building on Bergson’s interpretation 
of multiple durations from The Creative Mind:
Psychological duration, our duration, is now only one case among others, among an 
infinity of others, ‘a certain well-defined tension, whose very definitiveness seems like a 
choice between an infinity of possible durations.’ We can see that … psychology is now 
only an opening onto ontology, a springboard for an ‘installation’ in Being (Deleuze, 
1966/1988: 76).
‘A true leap into Being’51
From whatever angle we choose to look at remembering processes, be it 
social, psychological, discursive or other, it invariably shows various types 
of changes and movements, which can be merged into the term becoming. 
Becoming represents an indivisible process and is in that sense compatible 
with duration but not identical with it. Becoming relates to duration as 
remembering relates to memory, being rather its function and the means of 
manifestation than its identity. Let me take one step further and as Deleuze 
suggests, consider duration to be an opening into the question of being. It is 
not my intention to give a complete description of Deleuze’s extension of 
Bergsonian metaphysics here (Bergson, 1946/2007), but any contemplation 
about memory and its meaning for ageing (and the elderly) placed within the 
framework of a concrete practical situation, would be incomplete without at 
least a short glance at it. 
First of all let me state that every understanding of Bergsonian ontology 
demands considering his method, i.e. intuition, and the notion of duration. 
Deleuze comments on intuition that it ‘is neither the feeling, an inspiration, nor 
51   Deleuze (1966/1988: 57).
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a disorderly sympathy, but a fully developed method’, ‘which primarily denotes 
an immediate knowledge’. Lawlor further adds that ‘we must first recognise 
the aim of intuition: it is the attempt to experience directly or immediately the 
flow of my own interior life, of ‘immediate consciousness’, of my own duration, 
and that means intuition is an intuition of memory’ (Lawlor, 2003: 63). Deleuze 
accentuates the ontological character of the Bergson’s theory of memory:
We have great difficulty in understanding a survival of the past in itself because we 
believe that the past is no longer, that it has ceased to be. We have thus confused Being 
with being-present. Nevertheless, the present is not; rather, it is pure becoming, always 
outside itself. It is not, but it acts. Its proper element is not being but the active or the 
useful. The past, on the other hand, has ceased to act or to be useful. But it has not ceased 
to be. Useless and inactive, impassive, it IS, in the full sense of the word: It is identical 
with being in itself (1966/1988: 55). 
While talking about the past, Bergson, according to Deleuze, brings forward 
the idea of being in itself as opposed to being outside itself, which belongs to the 
present. Deleuze interprets being present as infinite becoming, since the present 
moment is not but it does act by means of actualisation (reconstruction) of 
the virtual images. Past is ‘the form under which being is preserved in itself’ 
(1966/1988: 55). The past, presented in the form of the cone is nothing else than 
memory in its totality. In order to be we must constantly rely on that virtual 
supporting bearing, unless we desire to reconstruct our interior self and its 
relations to the world again and again. The beauty of it consists in the fact that 
we do not need to feel the weight of the still growing memory, since only a tiny 
part of it is actualised in the present in order to support our action and to change 
the totality of our memory again by welcoming and preserving the next portion 
of experience.  
Those thoughts on the definition of the past and the present in relation to 
memory allow me to introduce another elaboration on the ontological status 
of memory, which I consider to be a challenging way to enrich the Deleuzian 
approach and our own understanding of remembering as a way of being. 
In his work The Challenge of Bergsonism Lawlor states that ‘for Bergson, the 
priority of memory is so extreme that we must say that being is memory’ 
(2003: ix). Lawlor calls ‘the identification of being and memory’ a challenge 
to ontology and proceeds with an interesting elaboration on how Bergsonian 
ontology ‘measures up’ to ‘the standard Heidegger has set for ontology’ (2003: 
28). According to him the modern tradition ‘defines being as presentation 
to consciousness’ (2003: 44). Quite convincingly Lawlor further shows that 
being as understood by Bergson is not defined by the present (Lawlor makes 
this link because of the term presentation) and, what is even more interesting, 
not in terms of conscious. 
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Like Deleuze, Lawlor suggests that the best way to understand how Bergson 
interprets the relations between the past and the present is to bear in mind 
Bergson’s comparison with a cone, which has already been explained above. 
As we have seen, perception receives its conscious prolongation because the 
totality of unconscious experience in its constant rotating movement supplies 
it with the necessary information and at the same time, enriched with a 
new experience, reshapes the totality of the memory again. Two remarks 
are of importance here. Firstly, it is the past and not present, understood as 
the totality of all experiences, which ensures the continuity of being. And 
secondly, ontologically understood being is only partly conscious, since 
the totality of experiences remains unconscious to a large extent, till the 
need for action sends a request strong enough to awake the memories in a 
certain region of the cone in order to actualise them by translating them into 
appropriate actions. According to Lawlor the expansion of being into the 
region of the unconscious means that ‘Bergson is confronting us with a new 
philosophical idea of existence’. This is how Lawlor explains this new ontology:
For Bergson, in the psychological domain, consciousness is not ‘synonymous’ with 
existence (ref.). Thus, he limits the extension of the word ‘consciousness’ to the present, 
to the actually lived, to the active. And this limitation has the effect for Bergson of 
broadening the extension of the word ‘existence’. Existence then can be attributed not 
only to consciousness, that is, to what is active, but also to unconsciousness, that is, to 
what is inactive both in the sense of being no longer lived and past and in the sense of 
being not yet lived and future (2003: 40).
This turn in the understanding of existence on Bergsonian terms brings 
us straight to what can be called the ontology of Bergsonism. Being in the 
philosophy of Bergson is not defined via the present, and as Lawlor has 
shown, not (entirely) via consciousness. The essential question of being is 
inextricably connected to duration, which underlies the dynamic relation 
between the past, present and future and cannot be explained as a simple 
succession of ‘nows’. Bergson asks himself: ‘What is, for me, the present 
moment?’ And his answer is: the ‘essence of time’, which ‘goes by’:
Time already gone by is the past, and we call the present the instant in which it goes 
by. But there can be no question here of a mathematical instant. No doubt there is an 
ideal present – a pure conception, the indivisible limit which separates past from future. 
But the real, concrete, live present – that of which – I speak when I speak of my present 
perception – that present necessarily occupies a duration (1912/2004: 176).
In the pictorial description of Bergson, the present has one foot in the past 
and another in the future:
In my past, first, because ‘the moment in which I am speaking is already far from me’; 
in my future, next, because this moment is impending over the future: it is to the future 
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that I am tending, and could I fix this indivisible present, this infinitesimal element of 
the curve of time, it is the direction of the future that it would indicate (1912/2004: 177).
The described scission between the past and the future constitutes this privileged 
interval, which Bergson calls the present. Deleuze, as we have seen, picks up on 
this image and elaborates on it. The question of being is ‘broadened’ here because 
the past survives in the unconscious but, as Deleuze has shown, it would be 
incorrect to presume that while remaining unconscious it does not exist anymore. 
Being is in a sense defined by the capacity of forgetting and actualising only part 
of the experiences that are necessary to the present action. This interpretation not 
only defines the relations between the past and the present. It clearly localises 
the ontological priority within the past, while it at the same time binds the past 
and the present via a ceaseless becoming of duration, which is the essence of the 
Bergsonian being.  
Since the present ontologically speaking cannot be caught, since life is a continuous 
becoming where consciously52 we can only move from the past into the future, 
being itself can only be understood in this continuous transformation from the 
past into the future. For Deleuzian Bergson the present is a psychological concept, 
‘but the past is pure ontology; pure recollection has only ontological significance’ 
(Deleuze, 1966/1988: 56). Deleuze elaborates on the ontological status of memory 
showing the dynamics between the ontological and the psychological, which in 
terms of Bergson is rooted in the dynamics between the actual and the virtual:
 
According to Bergson, we first put ourselves back into the past in general: He describes 
in this way the leap into ontology. We really leap into being, into being-in-itself, into the 
being in itself of the past.  It is a case of leaving psychology altogether. It is a case of an 
immemorial or ontological Memory. It is only then, once the leap has been made, that 
recollection will gradually take on a psychological existence: ‘from the virtual it passes 
into the actual state…’. We have had to search at the place where it is, in impassive 
Being, and gradually we give it an embodiment, a ‘psychologization’ (1966/1988: 57). 
This description allows us to understand remembering as a mode of being. In 
other words, every time when we engage with the totality of our memory, we are crossing 
from psychology to ontology as if glancing into our being itself. It is partly a doubly 
unconscious act. Firstly, the totality of our memory is ‘preserved’ virtually, so that 
we are unconscious of it till a part of it is called to meet a perception. Secondly, 
while looking for the right memory in the right region of it, we are unconscious 
of the fact that we are placing ourselves in the sanctum sanctorum, i.e. in the being 
itself. Our memory and in extension our being bears everything that has ever 
happened to us, and it endures as long as we are. Thus, memory and being are 
in that respect inseparable. They are just as ever changing and limitless as the 
52   Not to mix up with the Freudian understanding. Bergson does not use the word ‘unconscious’ 
to denote a psychological reality outside consciousness, but to denote a nonpsychological 
reality – being as it is in itself.
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horizon. Thanks to Bergsonian ontology, we can see, that the closest that being and 
becoming can come together is in memory. 
Every leap into Being is intentional and cannot continue for a long period of time. 
As Bergson points out, any effort to grasp the pure flux of duration will amount 
to an enormous endeavour, because experiencing nothing besides duration will 
be close to the experience of death. The usually occurring remembering is only a 
glance into such an abyss, whereby people often remain unconscious of its depths. 
The experiences of people during the Museum visits are lively and animated. They 
certainly draw a lot of information from the past, but that happens in order to 
satisfy the needs of the present action. It is also evident that remembering has 
become one of the ways of life. The question that still remains open concerns the 
feeling of trust and confidence that they show, even when their memories come to 
them from the most unexpected corners of their past.
I presume that the answer lies in the continuity of our sense of ‘self’ or in 
understanding self as a pattern, which we shall dwell on in the next chapter. Every 
actualised image contains certain ‘constituents’ of our ‘self’. The image of our ‘self’ 
certainly changes, so the question will be how we place the dynamics of those 
changes and reconcile the experiences of our ‘selves’ in the now and in the past. As 
already quoted elsewhere, when trying to recall a certain period of our history or 
our ‘self’, we according to Bergson ‘detach ourselves from the present in order to 
replace ourselves, first in the past in general, then in a certain region of the past - a 
work of adjustment, something like the focussing of a camera’ (1912/2004: 171). 
Deleuze elaborates on this passage by giving us a clue of what we are confronted 
with concerning our always changing self-image and how we can finally place it 
and cope with it:
It is not the case of one region (lb: region of the past) containing particular elements of the past, 
particular recollections, in opposition to another region which contains other recollections. It 
is a case of there being distinct levels, each one of which contains the whole of our past, but 
in a more or less contracted state. It is in this sense that one can speak of the regions of Being 
itself, the ontological regions of the past ‘in general’, all coexisting, all ‘repeating’ one another 
(1966/1988: 61).
In other words the changes, which along with the whole experience are naturally 
virtualised in the totality of our past, are applied at every single level or every 
region of our memory, so that the existence of our ‘selves’ can better be seen as 
a constant shift instead of stability. And however paradoxical it may sound, the 
shifting itself offers us a better grasp on life than any illusion of immutability. The 
horizon metaphor can be helpful once again. If we knew that the horizon could be 
reached, then that would mean that there exists an absolute finiteness, which seems 
to be rather scary concept to me. The evasiveness of the horizon inspires hope, the 
possibility of change and a new opening. This is apparently what the visitors of the 
Museum unwittingly show to us, the way to cope with our ever-changing selves. 
237
This is especially important at a later age, when the scope of being can undoubtedly 
be felt, using the Bergsonian terminology, in degrees. The changes that an elderly 
person has undergone are enormous. I am speaking here about all imaginable 
measurable variables such as age, social positioning, physical capacities and 
mental abilities. Whether becoming older means that there are changes in kind as 
well remains an open question for now. Looking for the answers to that, we shall 
leave the ontological level of being and return to another dimension, which can be 
better called being-in-the-world. This dimension is relational. In our research this 
is bound to the concept of age, which is why it is also essentially temporal. But 
temporality is not exclusive here. Being-in-the-world brings temporal and spatial 
aspects together. It restores the parity of duration and extension. Ultimately, the 
issue who you are brings about another question, i.e. where you belong.
***
This chapter has been built around the question how remembering occurs at the 
Reminiscence Museum. Using our conclusions about the particularities of the 
Museum space, we started by defining the relation between the space of the Museum 
and the remembering practices which take place there. We have found that this 
particular place represents neither a usual museum facility, nor a commemorative 
site. We agreed to call it a specific place of and for memory, which is characterised 
by the particular constellation of its spatial and temporal features. In order to show 
how interactions take place during the Museum visits, we provided the reader 
with a generalised pattern of a Museum visit and subsequently enlivened it with 
examples of conversations and events that have actually occurred. While moving 
from the explicit to more implicit modes and mechanisms of remembering, we 
have seen that the appeal to past experiences originates in the present and that a 
durational approach towards memory in particular can explain how the past and 
the present melt into each other, creating an indivisible fabric of experiences.  In 
other words, memories are not mechanically inserted into the present to suit the 
purposes of the situation at hand, but they present a constant flux of experiences, 
out of which we choose those that eliminate the present and create the link with 
the future. Throughout the analysis we have seen how the theme of the Museum 
display, i.e. the theme of domestic and family life, shapes itself into the main theme 
of the visitor’s reminiscences as well. 
Finally, we have shown that because of the fundamental character which remembering 
processes play in our lives each time when remembering occurs, we are granted as it 
were a unique possibility to shift from the psychological to the ontological level and 
for an uncatchable moment glance at the magnitude of our being. 
Now it is time to move on and see what remembering in the place called the 
Reminiscence Museum can actually mean to the Museum visitors, most of whom 




Example – Outline – Timing Age: Anticlockwise – Timeless ageing or ageless time – Remembering 
(the) self– The self in remembering: continuity and change - The two aspects of the self (Bergson) - New 
extension –Nine lessons and a funny story – Enduring link – Empathic power of touch, sound and 
Bermuda Triangle: A touch –Humanitas practice revisited – A sound – Empathy as a sophisticated 
technique – Bermuda Triangle – On the same wavelength  
Rebecca’s afternoons
It was Wednesday afternoon when I saw her in the Museum for the first 
time. The weather was beautiful and most people preferred to stay out of 
doors. As a result it was relatively quiet in the Museum that day. I heard 
somebody in the washing corner and went to see what was happening there. 
In the room I saw a lady with a walking frame, who was looking at the 
collection of old irons. Her movements were swift but all the same a little 
bit awkward. Her voice fluctuated between a low and somewhat cunning 
whisper and a shrill tone a young woman can have. I asked her whether 
she recognised any of the irons and she replied willingly and affirmatively. 
Then her eye caught an embroidered girl’s dress. She told me that she liked 
needlework and that she used to be good at it herself. I invited her over 
to the sewing corner, where we have examples of similar embroidery. We 
spent some time there, talking about her exams at the domestic school, about 
her nervousness, which prevented her from performing at her best, and also 
about her daughter who had become a professional photographer. As usual 
the visit evolved along a general and predictable pattern, which took turns 
with spontaneous eruptions of personal stories. But what in the beginning 
seemed to become just another Museum tour with one of the clients from the 
Humanitas nursing home somehow grew into a warm relationship of trust 
and friendship.
Rebecca was 73 years old then, a widow with two daughters and three 
grandchildren. The awkwardness of her movements was caused by 
progressive Parkinson’s disease, which influenced her speech as well. She 
had been living alone, but because of the disease she had temporarily been 
placed in the Humanitas nursing home, which she did not like very much. 
The more important issue she would have to face shortly was of moving to 
one of the service or life-time apartments, since she was no longer able to 
take care of herself independently. 
Having heard that I was Russian she told me excitedly that her grandmother 
had been Russian too; she had lived there until the First World War. The 
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terrors of the Second World War were something she had experienced herself: 
she lost her two brothers and still could not think back without a feeling of 
horror about her mother wearing the yellow Jewish star. She had finished 
Domestic School and worked at people’s homes until her marriage. Her late 
husband had earned enough to provide for the family, so she was able to stay 
at home to take care of her children. She liked beautiful clothes and having a 
pleasant conversation; she was quite content living alone and told me with 
a charming sense of humour about the attention she still received from men 
from time to time, who were looking for a partner in a later life. 
Bit by bit she shared with me all those stories and facts during the 
conversations we had, which, starting from that spring afternoon turned 
into regular weekly encounters for the period of approximately two months. 
Neither of us wanted to miss them, but there was no feeling of obligation 
in our meetings. When at the end of the first visit she asked me when I 
was usually present in the Museum, I was not sure that I would see her 
again. I should not have doubted her. Either on Wednesday or on Thursday 
afternoon she came along, sometimes as if in a hurry, ‘just for 10 minutes’, 
and then she would stay for three quarters of an hour, or sometimes clearly 
taking her time to enjoy a nice chit-chat, telling me about her life then and 
now, creating from a mosaic of little bits and pieces a single unbroken landscape 
of her memory and life, as one of my acquaintances once put it. When a 
couple of weeks after our first meeting I came to the Museum a little bit later 
than usually, one of the volunteers smiled at me and said that my friend was 
already there, waiting for me, and that he had talked with her for a while in 
order to make her waiting more comfortable. I was touched twice: because 
she was there, waiting for me and because I was honoured by that simple 
definition of being called her friend.  
Our conversations turned into a mixture of the reminiscences about her 
youth and the events that occurred more recently. She took my attention 
very seriously and used every opportunity to teach me things (words, 
traditions) that were unknown for me, by simply repeating You must learn it! 
She moved between the different planes of her memory quite easily, at one 
moment telling me about her work at a certain lady’s house, and at another 
switching to a story about last night, when she had not been able to sleep 
and had gone to the kitchen to fetch a cup of tea, which had startled the 
nurses, who had not expected to see her there at that hour. From time to 
time she sounded critical, telling me that some of the nurses demanded to 
select the clothes the clients wanted to wear on the next day already on the 
evening before. Rebecca cared for her appearance, but the unpredictability of 
the Dutch weather prevented her from making the right choice in advance. 
The planning that was demanded from her made her uneasy but then, in her 
sharp-witted and humorous way, she told me that she had found a solution. 
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At about four o’clock every morning she would secretly switch her radio 
on and listen to the latest weather forecast. Whenever necessary she would 
change the clothes she had selected the previous evening and then return to 
bed again satisfied. 
Her stories fluctuated with her wavering voice and the logic of the connection 
between the various fragments was sometimes as awkward as the disobedient 
movements of her body. From a pleasant story about her granddaughter 
who came to visit her, she could switch to an account about her diminishing 
health and the growing restriction in her movements, which she was feeling 
more and more often now. Her joyful hope for a nice apartment in one of 
the central locations of Humanitas (because the shops are close by there and the 
children can visit her by bike) could be clouded by the realisation that a large 
part of her furniture would be left behind, since her new life-time flat would 
be smaller than the one she was occupying at that moment. The stories about 
her distant and her recent past became a colourful patchwork. Gradually 
I learned how to anticipate on the emotions that would make her uneasy 
by offering her another theme. She would pick that up gratefully, calming 
down, her body and expression relaxing, her voice returning back to normal 
and her face smiling at me again in its sharp-witted way. 
When she received the message that there was an apartment available for 
her we said our good-byes warmly, hoping to see each other again someday. 
Each occasion we saw each other was at the Museum. Rebecca came there 
because, as she explained to me, she did not like her room upstairs very 
much, while at the Museum she recognised lots of things. They were similar 
to those things that she still had in her possession, and the place made her 
feel at home. Indeed it became a kind of a home environment for both of us 
and we even had a couple of favourite places to sit. Our voices, the confident 
tone of the dialogue and our soft laughter never seemed to disturb any of 
the visitors who were walking around in the exhibition. On the contrary, not 
once did I catch curious glances from other people. Our tête-a-tête probably 
only added to the feeling of cosiness and domesticity that the Museum emits. 
But what those meetings actually meant to us went beyond a simple mutual 
feeling of comfort. There is no one-sentence explanation for that feeling. This 
entire chapter is written in an effort to understand what the Museum visits 
can mean to the elderly visitors and as a consequence for the professionals at 
Humanitas, for the staff members and all the other people who are in some 
way involved in the experiences of the visitors at the Museum.
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Outline
I called this part of the book Ageing for several reasons. At an individual level 
this project is about elderly people, or more precisely about the way they 
remember and value their past and their present and relate to the future. At an 
institutional level this study is about an organisation that works with elderly 
people and pursues the ambitious task of helping them to feel well. Just like 
memory, the concept of ageing has a lot of meanings and connotations, each of 
which offers very different possibilities to interpret the practical setting. The 
first association we have with ageing is naturally with gerontology. We can 
look at the example that has been described above, considering Rebecca’s age 
as a primary factor when interpreting her experiences. By doing that we shall 
be using a chronological approach, which, as J. Baars (1997; Baars & Visser, 
2007) puts it, is often specified in terms of ‘age structure’, ‘birth cohorts’, 
‘dependency ratio’, ‘age-cost profile’, ‘age-associated diseases’ and ‘tables in 
which ages are associated with particular characteristics, pretending to give a 
quick informative overview’ (Baars, 2009). Such analysis can probably provide 
us with some information about Rebecca’s belonging to a certain age-group, 
but will hardly tell us anything about her experience with age-related changes 
in general or about her attitude towards the Museum visits in particular. We can 
also look at the social conditions of Rebecca’s life, at her educational level, her 
financial situation and even at her gender, since she represents a large group 
of women within her generation, whose devotion to the socially expected and 
accepted role of wife and mother automatically is tied to an interpretation of 
her behaviour. Within the approach of social gerontology this kind of starting 
points would probably tell us that Rebecca’s dependence on the care system 
for the elderly ‘is socially created’ (King & Calasanti, 2006) and that from 
the point of view of gender, she represents a vulnerable group (Tronto, 1993; 
Estes, 2006). In spite of the importance of each of those possible approaches, 
they only indirectly address the research question within this study, namely 
the meanings of the remembering practices for the older generation. Another 
reason to hold back from this kind of approach is the possibility that all kinds 
of dualistic pitfalls will be revived, which we have tried to overcome.  
Our choice is based on a thorough description of the experiences that elderly 
visitors undergo in the Museum. In case of Rebecca it would mean that we 
are not trying to create an opposition between her diminishing health and 
her lively and creative spirit, or between her chronologically defined age and 
her actual manner of coping with the ageing process.  Our aim is rather to 
match the integral complexity of her experiences, by rendering a detailed 
phenomenological description of what has happened in the Museum and 
by adding to that description a socio-psychological and philosophical 
interpretation. Based on that approach we shall be able to address the issues 
of ageing and of remembering at the same time. 
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Our approach to ageing is defined along the lines of a recently developed 
field of studies which is called the theories of ageing (Bengston et al., 2009). 
Contemporary research into ageing is characterised by its interdisciplinary 
character and the tendency towards ‘theorizing as a process’ (Bengston et al., 
2009: 6). Those features match the choices we have made for our own study. 
We shall look at ageing from the perspective of memory studies, where the 
same shift, namely from substantivization to the action and process takes 
place (Bengston et al., 2009: 5; Brown, 2008: 267). 
Just like in the previous chapters we shall be moving between several levels 
of interpretation, which are characterised by various degrees of complexity. 
What will be different though is the order of our movement. In this part of 
the analysis I chose to start with an introduction of a few theories that link the 
concepts of ageing and time. Subsequently we shall move to a philosophical 
interpretation of ageing. The readers’ affinity with the philosophy of Bergson 
and his pivotal notion of duration enables us to choose for this reverse order, 
which will not only support the logic of the description in this chapter, 
but will also strengthen the structure of the entire book. Further down the 
process-bound interpretation of ageing will empower our discussion of the 
socio-psychological links between memory and aging, including the issues 
of selfhood in a later life. Finally it will allow us to return to the analysis 
of the practice, but this time armed with all enlightening power of the 
philosophical and theoretical insights that have been accumulated so far. 
Having gone through this circular description we shall not only achieve the 
goals of this chapter, but we shall also outline a much broader horizon, as 
defined in the beginning of this book. 
In a manner of speaking our story has evolved from space to time. I wanted 
to take the reader with me through the development of the project as it has 
taken place, in order to show the step-by-step process I experienced while 
searching for the significance of the observed phenomena. That is why we 
started with the chaotic cellar at Humanitas, making quite a journey before 
arriving at the description of how the remembering process occurs in the 
Museum. Still the story, which can be called a story in becoming, is not 




Among numerous studies on time (Adam, 2004), my interest remains with 
those that put notions of time and temporality into a perspective of social 
remembering and ageing. Baars remarks that, with a small exception, ‘explicit 
analysis of concepts of time that are inevitably used in the study of ageing 
has been scarce’ (Baars, 2009: 89). I can only add that the analysis of time and 
ageing in the perspective of process thinking has not attracted much attention 
of scholars working in the respective fields either. The ongoing interdisciplinary 
debate, which to some degree can be relevant to our study, envelopes (a) a 
critique of the chronological time, (b) discussion about the so-called subjective 
or ‘lived’ time and (c) theories of time as a socially constructed phenomenon53. 
We shall address each of those approaches in this section. 
(a) The notion of time as an objective measurement, which labels the person 
during his/her life-span as young, adult or old, has been a decisive criterion 
to define the aged within psychological, gerontological and other related 
disciplines. Dissatisfaction with such a rigid approach has led to the appearance 
of critical literature on the subject and has opened the possibility to look at the 
link between age and time in a new perspective. Already in 1986 Hendricks 
& Peters wrote that ‘time reckoning is dependent on the interaction of social 
and individual phenomena’ (Hendricks & Peters, 1986: 663). They showed 
that initially ‘time was linked to change’, where change reflected the ‘rhythms 
of the natural world’ and later on the rhythms of all environmental objects, 
‘both natural and created’ (1986: 664). Following this pattern we can say that 
our experience of time closely relates to how we conceive change. Historically 
speaking change was strongly linked to the sequential order of moments, which 
found its most sophisticated presentation in calendars and clocks. In spite of 
their indisputable efficiency, those innovations had a price tag:
The clock and calendar are inherently formal and mechanistic devices, devoid of the 
personalized meanings implicit in the time-reckoning symbols of earlier eras. The 
abstract and impersonal character of our temporal symbols disguises the fact that both 
the clock and calendar are merely artefacts of our desire to ‘keep track’, not things with 
a reality apart from our purposes (Hendricks & Peters, 1986: 667).
53   By making this choice I consciously leave aside the field of cognitive psychology, within 
which psychological time is given its due. For literature and overview see Van Der Meer (2007).
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The establishment of any straightforward connection between our experience 
of time and the changes in nature and environment could suffice in the early 
stages of human history. But gradually and inevitably it leads to the weakening 
of the intrinsic link between the individual time-reckoning and the formal 
numeric system, which conquers all spheres of individual and social life. 
This fact in itself does not necessarily entail negative connotations, except 
for cases whereby mechanistically understood time is uncritically applied to 
fields of knowledge that deal with the ever changing human nature. In that 
case the clash between the measurement strategy and interpretive methods 
of analysis is inevitable. 
In a number of his recent works Baars develops similar ideas, by analysing 
the non-reflective application of the objective time to the studies on ageing 
(Baars, 2007). He critically evaluates overemphasising the presence of 
chronologically determined measurements and the conclusions in the 
gerontological science that are based on them. As a result the idea of ‘time 
working as a regular cause’ is rightly deconstructed:
Generalizations about people with a certain calendar age actually presuppose a causal 
concept of time: because time has worked for a certain duration in aged people, certain 
inevitable effects should be reckoned with. Moreover, the effects are assumed to develop 
steadily and universally according to the rhythm of the clock. However, such a causal 
concept of time in ageing can never generate knowledge that might explain something 
of the differences that exist between human beings of the same age, nor allow us to 
understand that ageing is a generalizing concept that is actually composed of many 
specific processes (Baars, 2007: 18).
According to Baars, although abstract and empty, the chronological approach 
to age is still perpetuated in ‘dominating cultural narratives’, which reflect 
‘huge market interests, budgetary strategies, and generalizations about 
the aged’ (2007: 36). In order to withstand the power of time budgeting, 
especially within care institutions, it may be necessary to combine different 
temporal perspectives in understanding and interpreting ageing. The issues 
that are at stake here override the one-discipline debate and must be viewed 
in a broader context, where time and consequently ageing are approached as 
experiential and social phenomena. 
(b) Looking for the possibilities to understand time as a non-numeric and 
non-mechanistic phenomenon, Hendricks & Peters re-introduced the notion 
of ‘lived time’54, namely time as it is experienced by the individual. Change 
as a notion receives a very pronounced character of personal experiences, 
which are associated with 
54   The notion was introduced by E. Minkowsky in his similarly titled book Lived Time.
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(awareness) of some personal development or change during our ‘lived time’, we 
perceive time stretching out behind us, and accordingly we evaluate ourselves in terms 
of the magnitude of change we apprehend. It is through this assessment of ‘elapsed 
change’ that we acquire some sense of our personal rates of experience and create the 
basis for age identification (Hendricks & Peters, 1986: 670).
This interpretation has a great deal of potential, especially if we think about 
‘elapsed change’ in terms of memory. The authors connect the experience 
of the lived time with NOW as they call it, and by doing that they build 
their conclusions on a classical phenomenological understanding of the 
present. At the same time they show a clear bias towards process thinking, 
by introducing into the discussion the ideas of such different thinkers as 
James and Whitehead. One quote from Whitehead calls for re-introduction 
here: ‘What we perceive as present is a vivid fringe of memory tinged with 
anticipation. …The past and future meet and mingle in the ill-defined 
present’ (Whitehead, 1957/2004: 73)55. This citation clearly demands either 
a more profound definition of the present in terms of time experience, or 
a shift of emphasis from the present to the past melting into the future. It 
would seem that the authors have all the theoretical ‘constituents’ necessary 
in order to come to some break-through conclusions regarding the relation 
between ageing and time: understanding time as a flux, attention to our 
personal experience of time, the connection between time and memory and 
the intrinsic link between time and the current moment of life. It is however 
the social and not the philosophical domain, where they see new possibilities 
to understand ageing through the notion of time. Apart from some inspiring 
ideas, the fundamental connection between time and ageing is not elucidated. 
(c) The scope of approaches to the concept of social time extends from 
economic theories of time commodification, which was introduced by K. 
Marx, to debates about world-wide colonisation of the ‘standard’ calendar 
/ clock time, which is applied within politics, economy and science in every 
contemporary society, independent of its history or culture (Adam, 2004). 
Turning to the more recent research that scrutinises issues of ageing and 
time, the phenomenon of time acceleration seems to contain some key issues. 
We have already seen what kind of impact time acceleration has had on 
the development of the interdisciplinary field embracing memory studies56. 
Within social studies on time and society, reflections on time acceleration 
have created new fields for debate, some of which can provide us with new 
insights in ageing. Among them I would ponder on the ‘asynchronicity’ of 
different ‘tempos’ of the social processes, coexistence of contemporary and 
non-contemporary phenomena and changes in the expectances regarding 
‘time horizons’, which lead to a new understanding of simultaneity (as 
55   Cited in Hendricks & Peters (1986: 670). 
56   See the discussion on p. 139.
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well as non-simultaneity). Each of these contemporarily debated notions 
inevitably influences our interpretation of ageing. 
‘Asynchronicity’ is about the discrepancy in speed between the processes 
within coexisting social systems. Imagine for example the development within 
the field of domestic telecommunication, which the generation of the elderly 
Museum visitors have witnessed during their life. As children they learned to 
live in a world of developing telegraph, type-writing machines and telephone 
connections, which belonged to the public domain and were experienced from 
a distance in regard to the speed of personal life. Later on, using some effort, 
the generation in question managed to successfully synchronise their lives with 
the invasion of the radio, television and telephone into their private domains. 
But when the computer age broke out, that acceleration could no longer be 
synchronised, at least not by everybody. My dear old friend who belongs to the 
same generation as most of the Museum visitors, does not have a computer at 
home. She still trusts her old-fashioned agenda, which clearly takes time to be 
updated, because everything it contains is written by hand. And when her old 
telephone gave up, she politely but firmly refused to accept one of the ‘easy’ 
wireless telephone sets.  She saw a new set as an alien from the times and 
speeds where she did not belong and she did not care about taking her time to 
pick up the receiver when somebody phoned her.  
According to B. Giesen, asynchronicity appears as a natural response to the 
attempts of the tightly organised social systems to control the speed, pace 
and rhythm of each and every element constituting it. The demands of those 
systems are deterministic. They are characterised by a unification of goals, 
means and prescribed practices. A relational aspect is a plague for them, since 
it asks for flexibility and mobile margins. Reflecting on this, Giesen writes 
that ‘social life does not … operate according to the functionalist schedule – it 
operates by delays and omissions, fuzzy relationships and vague orientations, 
accelerations and flexibilities and it can avoid breakdowns only because it is 
not tightly but loosely coupled’ (Giesen, 2004: 31). Asynchronicity is the result 
of two inversely directed forces, where systems with performative goals 
try to impose their own pace on individuals. Asynchronicity as explained 
here, is interesting for us because it appears as a consequence of acceleration 
of time and clearly manifests itself as a paradox in regard to the attitude 
towards ageing:
 
The perception of, for example, accelerated change hints at a reference that nobody 
wants to accelerate… . Instead of accelerating the process of ageing we try to inhibit it 
and to extend the human life span, we increase the time in our lives spent on education 
and learning etc. Hence it is not only the increasing speed of social systems, but also the 
slowing down of maturation and ageing that amounts to the perception of acceleration 
(Giesen, 2004: 30).
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The parallel with growing attention for commemorative practices and the 
creation of sites of memory as a reaction to the disappearance of real things 
and sites is obvious. Both processes are based on a common phenomenon, 
namely the acceleration of time. Asynchronicity shows itself not only because 
of the lack of capacity to cope with acceleration, but most importantly because 
of the deliberate unwillingness to accept the shortening of the duration of 
one’s active life. What can work for a system (especially a bureaucratic one) 
does not automatically apply to human life. The speed of one’s life cannot be 
arbitrarily changed. The contradiction here is not smaller than when we try 
to ‘treat’ age on the basis of chronological timing. 
Deliberate slowing down of the pace of life leads to a new temporal pattern, 
which is characterised by the coexistence of phenomena ‘that are related to 
different historical periods or different stages of social evolution’ (Giesen, 
2004: 27). At an organisational level the non-contemporary phenomena are 
preserved within institutions such as libraries, archives and conventional 
museums. This kind of coexistence is artificial and independent from the 
processes of acceleration. Coexistence, which is caused by time acceleration 
and which can be observed in the particularities of contemporary ageing, 
manifests itself in certain (ritual) actions and in the preservation of 
generational identities. 
Doing things in an old-fashioned way, which for example may be expressed 
in taking time for unremarkable routine activities like drinking tea or 
enjoying the planning and purchasing of Christmas cards, which will be sent 
by post and not electronically because the paper feels warmer; or reflecting 
on something by telling a story from your past, – all that would at the same 
time mean living in a slow-motion mode, if looked at from the perspective of 
a younger person. Still, various modes coexist and their mutual acceptance 
today is a progressively pressing ethical matter, because the acceleration of 
time widens the gap without bridging it, while the different speeds cause a 
painful isolation of the coexisting but not-negotiating generations.  
One link between remembering and ageing can be termed generational 
identity57. The importance of the generational identity for ageing members 
is connected with the shared temporal schemes and the experience of time 
acceleration at a later age. When analysing the remembering modes of the 
Museum visits, we have already reflected on the tension between collective 
and personal reminiscences, which by conflicting or / and complementing 
each other, create a complex heterogeneous entity of generational semantics 
57   The term was introduced by K. Mannheim in (1952) and further worked out by a number 
of scholars, see e.g. Holmes  & Conway (1999)
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(Cortsem, 1999). The same processes can be seen if we reflect on the collective 
identity of the generation. According to M. Cortsem a sense of belonging 
plays an important role in forming a generational identity. The ‘We-sense’ 
(1999: 258) of a generation is based on a ‘double’ assumption: the assumption 
of sharing the same things, events and ideas and the assumption that this 
sense is shared by your generation. As a result, Cortsem suggests that there is 
a direct relation between the sense of a generation and the sense of ‘sharing a 
collective time – the sense that converts my time to our time or to the times of 
my generation’. The temporality of the generational identity is seen here to be 
more complex than just a linear representation of shared events or ‘mere time 
points’. The interrelation between the terms time and generation is also better 
understood if we talk about ‘the perspective of time’, which is applicable to 
both individuals and collectives (Cortsem, 1999: 258). 
Looking from the perspective of the mechanics of remembering processes, one 
can see that defined in terms of (non-chronological) time, generational identity 
leans heavily on generational memory. We must then think of generational 
time and identity in terms of duration, as opposed to isolated moments and 
stops. The generational perspective of time can be also seen as multidirectional, 
namely pointed at both the shared past and the expectedly shared future, 
which reminds us of the scission-like interpretation of the past, present and 
future by Deleuze, discussed in the previous chapter58. The persistence of 
generational identity helps us to understand the temporal particularity of 
contemporary life, which is characterised by the simultaneous existence of 
several generations. This coexistence is supported by the extension of our 
lifespan and the phenomenon of time acceleration. It inevitably leads to mutual 
penetration of various generational semantics (common events, common 
themes, common behaviour patterns), which in the case of communication 
between the old and the young frequently requires some mediation. In my 
opinion the Museum can play this transformative role and we shall reflect on 
these possibilities while analysing some more of the visits. 
Besides asynchronicity and the coexistence of temporarily different 
phenomena, time acceleration causes radical changes in the so-called 
time horizons, which is felt especially keenly by older generations. An 
explanation is the phenomenon of short-termism (Brose, 2004). Acceleration 
of time leads to shortening of the organisational or any system-like cycle. 
It becomes evident in ‘the limitation of structures in time and the erosion 
of long-term commitments’. The disappearance of long-term fixed contracts 
for example, has a direct influence on the length of the active working years, 
which in turn leads to a compression of time before the retirement date and 
58   See this volume, p. 229.
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consequently speeds up the social labelling of being old and dependent. This 
kind of acceleration however can hardly be welcomed. I agree with Brose, 
who writes that ‘(i)f we simplify our perspective on economic and cultural 
systems, we can say that economic systems functionally follow a more short-
term modus, and that cultural systems functionally tend to ‘complement’ or 
balance out the prevailing time scope through slowness and recourse to the 
past’ (Brose, 2004: 10). This insight offers us a number of important openings. 
There is a certain resistance against acceleration. In terms of time it means 
that placing yourself within the temporal perspective of the past seems to 
become more attractive and feels safer in comparison to the perspective 
of the future. That is why this retrospective view is more easily accepted 
than the unpredictability and uncertainty of tomorrow. In terms of ageing 
it would mean that the older generation can defend its important social 
function of preserving and maintaining the traditions. At the same time, as 
Brose rightly remarks, the signs of short-termism are to be seen in socio-
cultural developments as well. 
 
Brose notes that the ‘‘memory’ of societal systems’ appears to serve 
‘the function of latent pattern maintenance’. In other words, one of the 
social functions of memory is a decelerating faculty. Brose describes the 
manifestations of the need for time ‘anchoring’ in the following manner:
[T]here is not only still a (relatively) long-term time horizon in the cultural and 
institutional field; there are not only massive and widespread efforts to counter the 
increasing tendencies toward acceleration and shortening time scopes by ‘anchoring’ 
the present socio-cultural development in the different expressive forms of cultural 
heritage and its diffusion. Examples include the contemporary importance of making 
the present into a museum object (the museization of contemporary society) as well as the 
general tremendous increase in the number of museums, which make clear this need for 
‘anchoring’ in the cultural field (2004: 14). 
The total museization59, which Brose is talking about seems to become extreme 
and reminds us of Nora’s concern regarding the large number of emerging 
lieux de mémoire. One common feature between the growing scope of memory 
and the acceleration of time (and ageing) can be clearly defined now. Both 
temporal phenomena find resistance and efforts to assume control over them 
in spatial measures. The Reminiscence Museum in Rotterdam is no exception 
in that respect. Here we can see explicitly for the first time how the three 
initially determined concepts, space, memory and age, come together. 
59   Compare to the notion ‘museumified’ in Hetherington (2006).
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Brose takes us a step further by suggesting that acceleration and deceleration 
cause ‘an increasing simultaneity of events in the ‘world at reach’’ (2004: 5). 
Translating this idea into the concept of ageing, we find a confirmation of 
the already familiar idea of a broadening coexistence of different generations 
and generational semantics. Drawing upon the German philosopher E. 
Bloch, Brose explains non-simultaneity as a temporal condition under 
which ‘people are living together at the same time, but not in the same time’ 
(2004: 7). Thus, he comes to another insight, that ‘an increase in simultaneity 
necessarily provokes an increase in non-simultaneity’. He thereby emphasises 
the increase of the coexistence between different temporalities. It seems to us 
that the relations between different temporalities are more complex than the 
terms of simultaneity or non-simultaneity can explain. The phenomenon of 
non-simultaneity reminds us of the theory of relativity, where different time 
patterns can coexist in regard to different reference points. Only in our case 
the time pattern is understood as a socially constructed phenomenon. To 
exemplify this differently let me go back to my own experience. My elderly 
friend and I share the same floor in an apartment building. Using the term 
non-simultaneity, it is possible to say that we live ‘apart together’. Our 
temporalities are conditioned by differences in speed, generational semantics 
and time horizons and are therefore not the same, but we do live at the same 
time. In Bergson’s terms our durations can be seen as coexisting streams, 
which do not intersect60. But the actual interdependencies of our durations 
are much more complex than the explanation that non-simultaneity offers 
us. What is acceptable for the theory of relativity cannot be mechanically 
applied to social processes. Non-relational simultaneity will undoubtedly 
lead to the creation of isolated temporal islands, where the spaces that are 
inhabited by the older generation will be pushed to the periphery of almost 
everything. To let this happen or not is a question of ethics. Bridging the 
various simultaneities then becomes an urgent social and cultural issue. It 
would be wrong to think that it must be addressed for the sake of the older 
generation only. The resistance of the cultural system which Brose describes, 
reflects the needs of every group within society, and progressive short-
termism can be felt even more uncomfortably by the younger generation, 
since their relative time of active life disappears almost visually as in a sand 
glass. As we see the time horizons of different generations become more 
mobile and while our future horizon is shrinking, the horizon of the past 
broadens up and offers us a comfort of recognition, familiarity and slowing 
down. This paradoxical situation cannot be resolved unless we look at ageing 
as a process of indivisible change and becoming. But before we continue, let 
us briefly return to the Museum and look at how time and the changing 
speed of life are experienced there.
60   In actual fact the intersection does take place. The manner in which it happens will be 
discussed in the last section of this chapter.
252
Time does not stand still in the Museum, yet the Museum manages to dampen 
the acceleration of time. The unfolding of stories follows the natural speed 
of one’s life. This seemingly simple remark has an important meaning. The 
Museum has its own temporal frame, which is of a particular kind. Anybody 
who wants to understand what is going on in the Museum must synchronise 
his or her own time with the time of its visitors. It can literally mean slowing 
down: your pace, your speech and even your way of thinking, as if you have all 
at once been removed from the computer era to the times of stenography and 
type-writing. Personally, it was the most difficult practical adjustment that I had 
to make in order to enter into a dialogue with the visitors, instead of hovering 
about or jumping from one topic to the next. But the effort was rewarding, 
because when I did manage to slow down, time seemed to stretch out for me 
and I could see and hear the harmony of another life, where a moment ago 
there was just an indistinguishable stream of browsing on my part. 
The visitors themselves face the same dilemma, but it usually occurs at the 
very beginning and at the very end of the visits. How could we otherwise 
explain the repeatedly recurring situations when the visit was planned for 
a half an hour, but nobody notices how an hour and an half has passed by? 
The same paradox is explained in D. Draaisma’s book Why life speeds up as 
you get older (2001). He uses the example of the changed spatial perception, 
which almost everybody experiences at least once in a life: the streets and the 
houses where we grew up seem to have become smaller when we return to 
those places as adults. Looking for the answers within the spatial dimension 
makes little sense, since a simple effort will prove that the buildings, their 
lengths, widths and heights have not changed. Draaisma shows that the 
change is truly temporal and not spatial, and if we persist in explaining 
the one by means of another, then I expect we shall end up with a modern 
version of the Zeno-paradox. In the following elaboration Draaisma does not 
refer to Bergson directly, but the echoes of his ideas can be traced there:
An essential difference between time and space is that you can often return to the places 
you used to know but not to the time long past. In the streets of the past, you can no 
longer walk as a six-year-old. The passage of time you remember can no longer be tested 
against reality. Perhaps such a test is pointless anyway. Many estimates and judgments 
of time, such as ‘long ago’ or ‘old’, resist correction, just like the streets of yesterday. 
Perhaps that is because they are based on the particular yardstick: yourself (Draaisma, 
2001: 223).
Draaisma’s choice of the term ‘yardstick’ (the Dutch maat) supports the 
Bergsonian assertion that human beings have a natural inclination to think in 
terms of numeric multiplicities, which can be easily fixed in language. Draaisma 
deconstructs the term and inserts a priority of continuous change above anything 
that can be fixed and measured. The visitors of the Museum are indirectly asked 
to solve the same paradox, only in regard to their own life experiences.
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The particular strength of the Museum consists in its capacity to bring various 
temporal perspectives closer to each other and even create an opportunity for 
the visitors to relive experiences as if in a different time frame. It is however 
an illusion, which should not be exaggerated. It is true that the speed of the 
visitors’ lives has decisively changed. Slowing down the pace of one’s life 
means that each new step will cost more time, and at the end of the day it 
will seem that time has flown away. With an acceleration of the remembering 
process the visitors can reach for forgotten memories faster and deeper. They 
can touch things from the past, but even the most subtle sensation of the other 
life speed could never be identical to the one they experienced many years 
ago. Time is irreversible and so are the experiences of the visitors. What is 
happening in the Museum is new, different and it is in fact not directed to 
the past but to the future. Time understood in this particular way can be a 
promising starting point for a different interpretation of ageing. 
Timeless ageing or ageless time
In Creative Evolution Bergson writes:
The universe endures. The more we study the nature of time, the more we shall comprehend 
that duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the 
absolutely new. The systems marked off by science endure only because they are bound 
up inseparably with the rest of the universe (1911/2005: 14).
The ‘enduring’ universe is described as inventive, creative, elaborative and 
new. A simple question then would be why as soon as we are turning towards 
ageing, which is a universal process as well, the word choice changes so 
dramatically, and we start thinking in terms of diminishing, decreasing, 
fading and becoming obsolete. In fact ageing is one of the forms in which 
duration and the endurance of the universe are manifested. That is why it 
should not be treated separately from such a complex relational entity as the 
universe, where it belongs. 
Bergson’s definition and its consequences for the understanding of ageing 
raise a philosophical and at the same time ethical issue. Bergson intertwines 
them in a subtle way, suggesting that the universe comprises two opposite 
movements, ‘descent’ and ‘ascent’:
The first only unwinds a roll ready prepared. In principle, it might be accomplished 
almost instantaneously, like releasing a spring. But the ascending movement, which 
corresponds to an inner work of ripening or creating, endures essentially, and imposes 
its rhythm on the first, which is inseparable from it (1911/2005: 14).
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The two movements, so eloquently coined by Bergson, can be applied to 
our understanding of ageing. Let me suggest that the movement that 
Bergson calls descent here, can be associated with the chronologically bound 
approach towards ageing. It evokes an association with degradation and 
can be interpreted as a passage towards extinction. But as Bergson suggests 
descent is inseparably connected with ascent, a movement which stands for 
living and enduring. In our interpretation of ageing we shall be looking for a 
merge between those movements.  
Let us, using the idea about the two movements have a quick look at the 
organisational principles of Humanitas once again. On the one hand, as we 
know, Humanitas strives to instill its clients with a feeling of belonging. It offers 
people a home environment, which by definition presupposes enclosure. By 
rendering the notion of life-long homes convincing to its clients, Humanitas 
attracts people as it were into its centripetal movement and creates its own 
kind of ‘sanctuary of culture’. At the same time Humanitas remains a strikingly 
open organisation. Its ideology rejects ideas of exclusion or boundaries. By 
virtue of the centrifugal movement Humanitas destroys the familiar dull 
image of the care providing organisation and opens up the possibility for 
a critical discussion within the care sector for the elderly that can address 
the challenging issues of well-being and happiness in later life. There is no 
hierarchy or division between those movements since, if we separate them 
artificially, we would end up with a reductionist image of the organisation on 
the one hand, and with a kind of public demagogy on the other.  
In the following we shall combine Bergson’s philosophical vision with the 
practical approach at Humanitas, in order to formulate a different approach 
towards ageing. In Bergsonian philosophical thought, matter, or reality, 
which descends, and life and consciousness, which ascend (1911/2005: 401), 
form a complex evolutionary movement, which results in the on-going 
changes in the heterogeneous stream of duration. In my understanding the 
ethics of ageing should be seen as an entity of those two movements.
To understand this implication let me formulate three principles of Bergsonian 
(philosophical /evolutionary) thought, on which my proposition rests. The 
first one is anti-dogmatic and consists in surmounting conceptual immobility 
by movement. This principle is based on the method of philosophical 
intuition developed by Bergson, where intuition decisively differs from 
scientific intelligence61. Where intelligence starts with immobile concepts 
61   The definition of the method of philosophical intuition is based on ‘immediate consciousness’, 
see more on p. 232. Scientific intelligence is defined by Bergson in terms of reordering the 
concepts, which are analytically ‘cut(ting) out of reality according to the lines that must be 
followed in order to act conveniently upon it’ (1946/2007: p. 24). See also the discussion on p. 30. 
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and is occupied with recomposing its elements in order to arrive at the next 
(pseudo-new) juxtaposition of immobilities, ‘intuition starts from movement, 
positions it, or rather perceives it as reality itself, and sees in immobility only 
an abstract moment, a snapshot taken by our mind, of a mobility’ (1946/2007: 
22). Understood as a continuous flux, any knowledge, isolated by mind at 
some artificial point of duration, must be seen as limited, provisional and 
revisable. This is how the ethics of the anti-dogmatic principle manifests 
itself. Apart from movement, knowledge can keep its technical value, but 
its ethical standard will be lost in favour of easier utilitarian purposes and 
endangered by ready-made dogmatisation. This is exactly what took place 
in the story that Rebecca told me about being forced to select her clothing in 
advance. The nurses based their demand on the principals of efficiency and 
standardisation (the clients could be dressed faster in the mornings). What 
escaped their attention was not simply the changing nature of the Dutch 
weather, but the ever surprising nature of the human being, who resists a 
schematic ordering of his or her life. As we shall see shortly, dogmatisation 
is exactly what happens with the anatomized concept of age after it has been 
taken away from the vitality of the creative evolutionary movement. 
The second principle is anti-reductionist and restates the parity between 
process and system thinking. This principle is based on the famous 
cinematographical mechanism of thought, which is explained and criticised 
by Bergson at length (1911/2005). Its starting point is close to the first principle 
and is based on the habit of the common or scientific sense to isolate the 
object of thought (or interval) in order to look at it as a closed non-temporal 
system. The only difference between common and scientific thinking is that 
scientific sense, being much more sophisticated, can isolate impressively 
small intervals, but the result will be all the same:
[W]hat happens in the interval between the moments, science is no more concerned with 
that than are our common intelligence, our senses and our language: it does not bear on 
the interval, but only on the extremities. So the cinematographical method forces itself 
upon our science (1911/2005: 358).
Without reducing the importance of the results that science can acquire in 
paying attention to the ‘extremities’ or ‘ends’ of the intervals, we must still 
realise that the deeper insights will escape us forever. In other words, this 
is what the chronological approach towards ageing promotes by paying 
attention to the numeric indexation of age, and thus missing the entire point 
of the fluidity of its meaning. So when telling you that Rebecca is 73 years old I 
have not told you anything about Rebecca. The effort to recompose movement 
by using the analysed immobile constituents ends with what Bergson calls ‘an 
imitation of movement’, ‘an operation which is convenient from a practical 
standpoint but is theoretically absurd, pregnant with all the contradictions’. 
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Only by turning our attention to the interval or to the movement itself can 
we restore the balance in our thinking. Only then can we grasp the essence of 
change and becoming, which are essential for our approach towards ageing. 
‘No more inert states, no more dead things; nothing but the mobility of which 
the stability of life is made’ (1946/2007: 105). 
The third principle is that of perpetuity. Not perpetuity as a synonym of 
eternity, but as ‘uninterrupted continuity of unforeseeable novelty’. As 
already mentioned, the new in the evolutionary philosophy of Bergson does 
not equal a simple re-composition of familiar elements, although precisely 
that kind of new is the most desirable for intelligence. In order to distinguish 
between old new and new, Bergson introduces different kinds of clarity 
1946/2007: 22). Any recognisable new amuses the intellect by the clarity, 
which emits its light upon itself. Any intuitive new is in first instance obscure. 
It even seems to be ‘incomprehensible’, but supported by intuition it is finally 
accepted provisionally. Then it does its magic. What Bergson describes so 
subtly I would call a relational dissolving of obscurities. Novelty, which is 
not determined or chained into dogmas yet, emits its light ‘illuminating the 
whole region of thought’ (1946/2007: 23). It highlights old problems, making 
them disappear or dissolve and receives more and more light reflected back, 
thus being self-illuminated and becoming clearer. Think for example about the 
entirely new idea to found a museum within a care providing organisation. 
Quite incomprehensible in first instance, the idea of the museum elucidated 
certain aspects in the lives of the elderly clients, which were obscured and 
had not been addressed before. And only when it was put into practice, 
the Museum began to accumulate a deeper meaning of its own. Using the 
image of Bergson, the idea of the Museum, first obscure, received a reflection 
of the light, which it had initially projected, and by means of this light 
has become illuminated itself (1946/2007: 24). The ethical strength of this 
principle consists in the art of keeping an open mind while facing the most 
trying intellectual choices, which I personally call a sophisticated wisdom 
of tolerance. The ethical consequences of such an approach are immense. 
What within theoretical thought comes to an acceptance of different ideas, in 
practice boils down to a fundamental respect for differences.
Let me add that those three principles do not comprehensively cover the 
diversity of the evolutionary thought as it is presented in the works of 
Bergson, but they engage most powerfully with the theoretical context of this 
research. We started with two movements, descent and ascent, which Bergson 
sees intertwining and becoming one in their mutually complementing 
motion. Linking those movements to the understanding of ageing one by 
one would not differ very much from the wide-spread understanding of 
ageing, which is dualistic in its approach, mechanistic in its (all measuring) 
method and dubiously ethical in its conclusions and practical implications. 
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Descent would be translated into decline and a deterioration of the body, 
which inevitably leads to the fearsome anticipation of death, and ascent 
would be translated into some mystical raising of the spirit, especially 
disturbing in the face of the diminishing practical opportunities of life. In my 
opinion, the only possible way to translate those movements into the notion 
of ageing without doing any injustice to Bergson’s position and at the same 
time placing a high ethical standard in approaching and acting upon issues 
of ageing, is to embrace those movements as a whole. This will be consistent 
with the description given in the previous chapter, where in order to grasp 
various meanings of the remembering process, we looked at virtualisation 
and actualisation as confluent movements. Another parallel can be found 
in the chapter on the Museum space, where the merging of two movements 
has manifested itself in the self-organising space with its seeming chaos of 
continuous ramifications, through which a vital and creative idea of home as 
dwelling gradually reveals itself.  
Continuously struggling with a dualistic vision of the world, Bergson 
describes the changes of body – mind as an integrated evolutionary process, 
which, if understood properly, can have a revolutionising effect on the 
interpretation of ageing. On the basis of this understanding Bergson gives, 
in my opinion, a most remarkable philosophical description of ageing, the 
ethical standard of which is unlikely to be outdone: 
Like the universe as a whole, like each conscious being taken separately, the organism 
which lives is a thing that endures. Its past, in its entirety, is prolonged into its present, 
and abides there, actual and acting. How otherwise could we understand that it passes 
through distinct and well-marked phases, that it changes its age – in short, that it has a 
history? If I consider my body in particular, I find that, like my consciousness, it matures 
little by little from infancy to old age; like myself, it grows old. Indeed, maturity and old 
age are, properly speaking, attributes only of my body – it is only metaphorically that, 
I apply the same names to the corresponding changes of my conscious self (1911/2005: 
19).
To generalise what Bergson so eloquently expresses here, I would say that 
what colloquially is called ageing appears to be just a superficial, dualistic 
and wrong metaphorical translation of two inseparable processes, which 
can be called abidance and endurance. Those processes in fact represent two 
Bergsonian movements, which in combination with the already mentioned 
principles, can help us to overcome dualism in the interpretation of ageing. 
In my opinion, ageing is nothing else but becoming. There is no way one can 
separate the processes of biological destruction and evolutionary creation, 
if we are to understand and respect ageing in ourselves and in others. The 
anti-dogmatic principal teaches us that as soon as we choose to talk about 
ageing as an immobile concept based on the chosen date of birth, the 
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rest of the story can be more or less reduced to the formula of ‘perpetual 
perishing’ (Whitehead, 1978: 60)62. It is not only the choice of words here that 
makes me disagree. It is the substitution of a complex creative interaction 
for a linear calculable and therefore predictable development, which 
distinguishes between the philosophical and forensic approaches towards 
ageing. Voluntarily removed from universal duration, an immobile concept 
of age can provide us with mathematical details, on the basis of which we 
can create models and delude ourselves with the possibility to predict the 
future. But the problem as Bergson shows it, consists in the fact that only 
a descending movement can be ‘subject [ed] to a mathematical treatment’ 
(1911/2005: 24). Generalisations that are built on these models are widely 
used in social practices, where partial knowledge of what has already evolved 
is absolutized and extrapolated onto the future. Based on that, unjustifiable 
and even absurd conclusions are presented, as if by the awareness of a part 
you can get a grip on a whole. Those generalisations never take into account 
the uniqueness and creativity, which the ascending movement constantly 
introduces. As with memory, the ascending movement is not a consequence 
of ‘the moment immediately before’, but of ‘the whole of a very long history’, 
where ‘all the past of organism must be added to that moment’ (1911/2005: 
24). Taking this into consideration we can see every case of ageing as a 
continuous progression of diversity and creation. The social understanding 
of ageing as a ceaseless divergent movement must be even more obvious, 
since in spite of the collective and generational identities, the identity of 
every human being is ultimately unique and inimitable. Yet, the power of 
chronology and figures are dominant within the social practices, which 
means that the modern policies of ageing are directed not to the people as 
individuals but to age cohorts, among which 55+ers start massively looking 
for new, easy and comfortable living spaces, while 65ers must stop with their 
work, 70ers are advised to buy a Nintendo DS for brain training programs 
and 80ers must take residence next to or within organisations providing 
medical care. Those have become economically conditioned ideologies. Yet, 
all a person really needs is understanding and, if necessary, care (Letiche, 
2008) based on human ethics.
In his explanation of his anti-reductionist principle Bergson points out at which 
stages the translation of the two movements into organisational action reveals 
inconsistencies. 
Life in general and ageing in particular cannot be subject to calculation. 
Calculations are therefore usually made for extremities, leaving the essential 
interval out of focus. So when we are talking about people from a certain age 
group, we only make use of generalised results concerning a non-existent 
62   Cited in Sponheim (2001: 83).
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average person. This reductionist approach can clarify the professional advice 
that is given to an elderly person who is considering moving to a new home. 
The advice would be to get rid of almost all personal possessions because of the 
possibility of injury to which the ageing person will be increasingly exposed. 
This is a common way to create impersonal surroundings, which are safe in 
terms of accidents, germs and I might add of life all together. But let us stay clear 
of emotional naivety and look scientifically at such a hypothetical conversation 
between a professional and an elderly person seeking for advice. I am convinced 
that some useful indicators can be introduced, but as complementary sources 
for decision making only. The way to achieve this will be by starting with the 
idea that any general or statistical knowledge is provisional, that it can offer you 
a good starting point in the search for the best decision, but that the answers lie 
within the evolving life story of the person her/himself, in this fluid uncatchable 
interval of contact, where the duration of the other can reveal itself in all its 
recognisability and novelty. 
What else happens during the Museum visits, where in spite of the recognizable 
patterns neither the volunteers, nor the Museum or Humanitas staff can pretend 
having advance knowledge about a new visitor. If attention for the ‘interval’ of 
the other is possible in the Museum, then it must be possible at all systemic 
levels. The universality of the ethical position, with which the intertwining 
Bergsonian movements of descent and ascent are imbued, allows for that.
To promote these ethics is to learn to anticipate on the new, the unrepeatable and 
the irreversible. The third principal of perpetual novelty is based on the statement 
that not all is given. In the interpretation of ageing this will mean that neither the 
complex endurance of the organism nor the efforts to handle its abidance can 
be exclusively based or covered by the already familiar phenomena. But if by 
using intuition we can push ourselves towards listening to the inner rustle of the 
ceaseless movement of life, the sensation of the new, of understanding the other 
can be overwhelming. There is no mysticism in this proposition. We were in fact 
doing just that, while taking the time and listening to the stories that the visitors 
of the Museum were telling us. But the experience of Museum visits is even more 
instructive. As we have already seen, the remembering process is solidly rooted 
in the totality of the individual and collective memory. Thus, while remembering 
and therefore constantly creating something new, the person’s entire memory 
is brought to the front, used, complemented and rearranged in such a way that 
the memory and the personality undergo irreversible changes. Chronologically 
looking, speaking and thinking, somebody who entered the Museum at 66 
will be the same 66 years old person (in fact a number of minutes older, to be 
precise) when leaving the exhibition some time later. In that sense the visit gives 
nothing and takes nothing. But from philosophical and ethical points of view 
the visitor has changed irreversibly. This kind of change is not an exclusive 
characteristic or a consequence of the remembering process or the Museum visit, 
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but since memory plays a crucial role in the stabilising of our identity, every shift 
at the plane of memory is more enlightening to our understanding of ageing than 
any other example. The totality of the individual’s memory has brought about a 
unique experience in the same way as the entire evolutionary history brings about 
a progression of life, which in the everydayness of our activities we call ageing.  
At the end of the day I do not want to propose some utopian approach to the issues 
of ageing that is totally disconnected with scientific precision and the feasibility of 
social practice. In order to act, which ultimately is our aim, we are used to turn to 
our intellect, which ‘has been cast in the mould of action. Speculation is a luxury, 
while action is a necessity. Now, in order to act, we begin by proposing an end; 
we make a plan, then we go on to the detail of the mechanism which will bring 
it to pass’ (1911/2005: 50). The question then will be whether the combination 
of the two movements can give us any advantage in understanding and acting 
upon ageing. We can ask ourselves whether bringing up intuition and duration 
as a philosophical and methodological perspective for improved understanding 
of ageing can actually reduce the mechanistic approach to it, or would it make 
our approach even more complicated and vague, especially in the light of the 
predominating ‘tyranny of routinized time’ (Sponheim, 2001: 84). This is not a 
merely theoretical question for me. This is mainly a question of ethics, because in 
the core of the vortex of the fierce theoretical debates and races for the honourable 
title of ‘best practice’, hidden and modestly silent lies the wellbeing and happiness 
of a human being. 
It is obvious that being under the influence of both the fascinating philosophy 
of Bergson and the inspiring practices at Humanitas, I feel the need to 
reconceptualise again and propose to name the various issues on ageing as 
creative ageing. Taking the Museum as an example we shall see how Humanitas, 
which houses the entire spectrum of social practices, does its part of thinking 
and planning. But in the course of the process it every now and then retreats and 
comes to a standstill, in order to listen and let things happen. We shall see how 
this organisation is estranged from the ideas of ‘radical finalism’, which are so 
strongly criticised by Bergson, and how in parallel to the traditional calculable 
prediction, it dares to wait and reflect on results that evolve. Humanitas does 
not fight what is imminent. Any hypocrisy regarding ageing is alien to this 
organisation. ‘Humanitas’s care ethic involves affection and feeling’ (Letiche, 
2008: 189). Death, impairment and illness are not euphemisms there. The 
organisation takes them in its stride and looks for better solutions concerning 
the matters that can be influenced. It respects death by celebrating life.
Before we move on and look at the practice, let me try and bring together a 
number of fluid dimensions we have already covered. The ever unsettling 
core of creative ageing is constantly being reshaped by time, which has 
little to do with the chronological or mechanistic count down that is merely 
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63   Online Etymology Dictionary: http://www.etymonline.com/
inspired by numbers and calculable variables. The time that constitutes the 
essence of duration ‘is what hinders everything from being given at once’; 
it is ‘a vehicle of creation and choice’ and therefore, ‘indetermination itself’ 
(Bergson, 1946/2007: 75). In order to catch the uncatchable we try to dress this 
mirage in socially tinted garments and give it exciting names as acceleration 
of time, or asynchronicity, or short-termism, or simultaneity of non-simultaneities 
etc. Undoubtedly, for the purposes of practice and a scientific description, 
those insights can be both useful and original, but they still give us a feeling 
of only approximating the ever-escaping meaning of time. Ageing can be one 
of those ‘sexy’ terms as well, especially if it is accompanied by socially and 
culturally charged signifiers, such as meaningful or positive. That is why I chose 
to start with the ‘naked’ term ageing, looking first for its complex meaning. 
Only afterwards did I choose a signifier, which in my opinion complements 
its meaning without reducing it. 
If the core of creative ageing is time itself, then there is no difficulty in 
picturing ageing as duration and ceaseless becoming. The tension however, 
which is always present while we try to place ourselves within that duration 
and grasp the philosophical meaning of ageing, consists in its persistent 
social connotation. It would be clearer to talk about continuous becoming and 
change in a person’s life, instead of ageing. That is why, following Bergson, 
I have chosen the definition creative. It looks as if humankind has made sure 
to nail down and eternalise the least cheering semantics for the word age. 
One would be deeply surprised though, to find out that this pessimistic 
labelling took place in the beginning of the 14th century. Long before that, the 
‘ancestor’ of the word age used to have another meaning, namely vital force, 
life, long life, eternity63. Just compare it with the stars of Bergsonian thought: 
élan vital, duration, memory and time. The closeness is almost unbelievable. 
Looking into the etymology of words is in a sense an anti-Bergsonism.  But 
amazingly enough by using his own philosophical method of intuition, he 
came up with the same understanding, which has become one of the basic 
ideas of his philosophy. 
Finally if we want to virtualize creative ageing, then the image of a swirling 
powerful vortex would probably be the closest metaphor I could think of. Its 
engulfing and expulsing forces as a naturally recharging expanding mechanism, 
would satisfy my imagination. I can see its descending destructive movement, 
which at the same time thrusts at a new life. Following the urge of my intellect, 
I take a picture of it to understand it better, conscious of the restrictions that my 
operation imposes on reality. And when I think that I have understood it, I try 
and bring the shot back into the movement where it belongs. Seeing ageing in 
this way has nothing to do with impairment or deterioration. Understanding 
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ageing as an integral part of the universal process is not a frightening but a 
fascinating thing. This is the ethics that I am ready to fight for. 
There is one issue I have not dwelled on here, which is the question of the 
finitude of life, which logically arises within the discussion on ageing. We 
shall leave it outside this study, but I think that the analysis of the data will 
give us some insight, in order to understand how the older generation copes 
with this idea, in spite of the fact that the theme of death is hardly mentioned 
during Museum visits. As for now, I would like to finish this discussion by 
using one more striking quote from the Creative Evolution, which sets this 
issue into motion and modestly anticipates its evolving:
As the smallest grain of dust is bound up with our entire solar system, drawn along with 
it in that undivided movement of descent which is materiality itself, so all organized 
beings, from the humblest to the highest, from the first origins of life to the time in 
which we are, and in all places as in all times, do but evidence a single impulsion, the 
inverse of the movement of matter, and in itself indivisible. All the living hold together, 
and all yield to the same tremendous push. The animal takes its stand on the plant, man 
bestrides animality, and the whole of humanity, in space and in time, is one immense 
army galloping beside and before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge able 




The ageing of human beings can be called creative, because thanks to 
the uninterrupted flow of change, we are permanently forced to adjust 
ourselves to new developments in life. It is quite a tough job and as we get 
older, more sophistication and creativity are required from us to keep up 
with the developments we are confronted with. Ageing is not just about an 
approaching menace that makes us despair, but also about an expanding 
responsibility and sophistication of our response towards those changes. It 
is about a never ending exploration of oneself and the people around us, and 
at the same time it is a tireless search for new meanings in life. 
Looking for new meanings often starts with conducting an inventory of our 
traditional, familiar and most reliable values. Is it not exactly what takes 
place while visitors are making their tours, engaging in remembering and 
as it were miraculously enlivening the Museum’s sites? The analysis of the 
mechanics of the remembering process brought forth the idea of a ‘moving 
self’. By looking at their lives in a kind of historically abbreviated manner, the 
visitors come to realise how profoundly they have changed. Those changes 
most strongly express themselves in the form of a re-evaluation. This re-
evaluation is not only self-directed. The changes have a wider amplitude. In 
parallel to the discovery of the changing self the visitors also face generational 
changes. When placed within the context of re-evaluation, the notions then 
and now, I and we, can produce a strong tension. In order to become defused 
and settled, this tension calls for discussion, acceptance and adjustment. In 
view of this consideration we can come to understand the people who reject 
entering the Museum, since they are not ready for this kind of confrontation. 
After having accumulated a great number of impressions during a tour 
through the Museum, many visitors seem to find themselves at crossroads: 
everything that had been left behind and was brought back to life during the 
past hour contains a light and somewhat nostalgic sweetness of irrevocable 
loss, while what is still to come is shady and obscure. All the same the visitors 
do not appear to be stuck in-between times. Their search for meanings 
in later life is an on-going process. By means of a close –and I would add 
empathic– observation of elderly visitors, one can deduce that many of them 
are already anticipating on the answers to their quest. It can be understood 
from their behaviour, heard in their voices and felt by the influence they 
already have on your own life. 
***
In gerontological and psycho-gerontological literature (Webster & Haight, 
2002) the terms reminiscence and life review are most often used when the 
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remembering of the elderly is the focus of the discussion. In his thorough 
phenomenological study called Remembering, E. Casey (1987) chooses the 
term remembering as generic and subdivides it into such mnemonic modes 
as reminding, reminiscing and recognising, as well as body memory, place 
memory and commemoration. I share his views on this kind of hierarchy 
and use the term remembering, understanding it as the best reference term 
for the various phenomenological modes in which memory manifests itself. 
Remembering emphasises the mobile character of the memory and therefore 
has a strong affiliation with process thinking, which is indispensible when 
we describe the durational character of our memory. Our data analysis has 
shown that the Museum visits envelop just about every possible kind of 
remembering. We have looked at certain mechanics of remembering, which 
are specific to the Reminiscence Museum because they open new possibilities 
for the interpretation of its meanings. Oral reminiscence, a life review and 
an autobiographical story, which are all united by their narrative character, 
could perhaps be specified by a separate term, but to me the remembering 
covers these modes well enough; it can be understood as generic and usable 
for any of these modes. 
In contemporary literature the theoretical discussion on the meanings of 
remembering, especially regarding people at a later age, is connected to issues 
of identity64. The obvious tension, which almost every visitor of the Museum 
feels, can be examined from different angles. The most direct way would be 
to identify its connection with perception, i.e. to explain the tension that the 
visitor feels by pointing out the perceptible difference between what life was 
like before and what it has become now. Another way is to use certain types 
of socio-psychological self-reflection, by confronting yourself with issues of 
what one thought he/she was and what it appears he/she has become in 
present-day life. Finally one can assume a philosophical position and try to 
explain the tension that is experienced as a complex relationship between 
being and becoming. 
In order to understand what remembering processes bring about, we 
shall now first look at the interpretation of the selfhood within the studies 
of reminiscing. Then we shall enrich the insights which were obtained in 
practice-oriented studies by the philosophical interpretation of the self. In 
a final move we shall bring practical and philosophical insights together in 
order to elaborate on the possible interpretation of subjectivity as it manifests 
itself in the remembering practices of the older generation.
 
64   I shall use the terms identity and self as synonyms here, although a more subtle distinction 
can be made, see a.g. Johnson et al. (2005: 279).
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The self in remembering
The interpretation of the meaning of remembering practices at a later age 
has a history of its own. A decisive turn from the notion of remembering as a 
form of escapism to that of a fruitful and positive form of self-reflection at a 
later stage in life was made by Robert Butler in 1963 (Butler, 1963). Since the 
publication of his works the tone of the discussion has changed decisively. 
Remembering at a later age has become a subject relevant for a broad 
number of disciplines, where memories of the older generation are now 
treated with the respect they deserve. Yet, looking at the ongoing discussions 
and especially at the practical applications of the theoretical approaches that 
have been developed, we can conclude that not all the pitfalls that Butler 
warned about have been successfully overcome (Webster & Haight, 2002: 
xv-xvi). Butler’s most challenging and promising statement for our research 
concerns the capacity of the older generation to change:
Probably at no other time in life is there as potent a force towards self-awareness operating 
as in old age. Yet, the capacity to change, according to prevailing stereotype, decreases 
with age. ‘Learning capacity’ falters with time, and it is fair to say that the major portion 
of gerontological research throughout the country is concerned almost enthusiastically 
with measuring decline in various cognitive, perceptual, and psychomotor functions 
… Comparable attention toward studies of the individual, of growing wisdom, of the 
meaning of experience, is not ordinary (1963: 75). 
Since Butler’s publication the situation has certainly changed. Qualitative 
methods of research have provided rich data and new ramifications of the 
traditional disciplines. Narrative gerontology (Canyon et al., 2001) and 
also new interdisciplinary fields such as autobiographical memory, oral 
history, reminiscence (Webster & Haight, 2002) and memory studies have 
blossomed. For those who are concerned about the fact that Butler’s views 
in regard to the ability to change at a later age could be outdated, allow 
me to quote a modern French philosopher, who in her recent book gives us 
an original account of the manner in which our brain works and constantly 
develops. Catherine Malabou places the results of modern neuroscience next 
to philosophical notions, the most important of which is plasticity. It allows 
her to conclude that ‘we know for certain that the ability to learn, to acquire 
new skills and new memories, is maintained throughout life. And this is true 
in a different way from one individual to the next’ (2008: 6). 
All the same the various issues concerning adjustment to the changes 
of personality, which Butler tackled in his article, remain the focus of a 
continuing interdisciplinary discussion. The essential connection between 
the ideas of the gerontologist and psychiatrist Butler and the approach of this 
particular socio-psychological study lies in the interpretation of the meanings 
that remembering can have for the older generation. This interpretation 
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is based on understanding the self as a complex composition of ‘sameness 
and change’. My personal choice of terms would be continuity and change, 
as Sharon Kaufman (1987) has proposed, since I do not believe that being the 
same is actually possible. 
Two processes, namely continuity and change of the self, are often mixed 
up and therefore require some clarification. The continuity of the self is 
rooted in a person’s need to think about the self as a stable biological and 
social entity. This need is acquired from the beginning of life; it is socially 
determined and is worked at more or less permanently. The change of 
the self is a manifestation of ceaseless duration. It is a given fact; it can 
be partially influenced and is subject to constant adjustment. In temporal 
terms continuity is characterised by contemporaneity, i.e. by the coexistence 
of various temporal planes. Change on the other hand is characterised by 
progression, where various temporal planes melt into each other, constantly 
producing new temporal conditions. Continuity shows itself in the resistance 
to accept changes, especially ageing. This resistance becomes stronger when 
provoked by the acceleration of time, which we already discussed earlier, 
and by social and cultural processes, the speed of which seems to shorten the 
length of our lives. It is underlined by the negative attitude towards ageing 
(Coleman et al., 1998). Nobody wants to become old, but both physical and 
social changes are inexorable. It looks as if continuity is continuously being 
attacked by change. Yet both processes coexist, supporting and enriching 
each other. Both of them use remembering as their ally, since the self can only 
be because of what we remember. 
The self is often seen as a stable and to a large extent unchanged entity. In 
many contemporary works, even when sameness and change are named as 
mutually complementary processes, further interpretations and applications 
of the concept show us that the ‘sameness’ weighs heavier than the changing 
character of the self (Coleman, 2005). As a result the primarily functional 
meaning of remembering is seen rather as a reassurance of the already 
existing self-understanding than as a creation of a new insight. I agree with 
P. Coleman (2005) when he pleas for a cautious and tailor-made intervention 
in people’s lives regarding reminiscence practices, but unlike many 
gerontologists I am convinced that each time when a person is engaged in 
remembering processes, the ultimate goal is not to support whatever was 
already known or given, but to come to terms with the imminence of changes 
that remembering elucidates, sometimes in a swift and painful manner and 
sometimes softly and progressively. As was shown before, remembering is 
aimed at answering questions of today, not of yesterday. This understanding 
echoes the ideas of researches like the ones conducted by Sharon Kaufman 
and Robert Rubinstein, who work in the intersecting field of anthropology 
and gerontology. 
267
 In her book The Ageless Self: Sources of Meaning in Late Life Sharon Kaufman 
made an effort to work out the meanings of the self-narrative in later life. 
While talking to people and asking them to tell about their former and 
present experiences, she made some challenging discoveries. As she puts it,
they do not speak of being old as meaningful in itself; that is, they do not relate to ageing or 
chronological age as a category of experience or meaning. To the contrary, when old 
people talk about themselves, they express a sense of self that is ageless – an identity 
that maintains continuity despite the physical and social changes that come with old 
age (1987: 7).
What can this absence of a relation towards ageing mean? Does the notion 
of an ageless self mean going back to ‘the same self’, which has been already 
rejected as not ‘feasible’? Let me use one more quote before I can elaborate 
on the issue:
Identity is not frozen in a static moment of the past. Old people formulate and reformulate 
personal and cultural symbols of their past to create a meaningful, coherent sense of self, 
and in the process they create a viable present. In this way, the ageless self emerges: its 
definition is ongoing, continuous, and creative (1987: 14).
To understand Kaufman’s argument correctly, it is important to realise that 
ageless and unchangeable are not synonyms here. The fact that elderly people 
show no interest in the categorisation of ageing and its abstract meanings for 
their reflections on life makes perfect sense. In our constant effort towards self-
reflection we are all looking for a meaning in our lives and not for a meaning 
of our chronological age. Realisation of the process of ageing is clearly present 
in the contemplations that elderly people have. This realisation is exactly 
the moment for confrontation with changes that have already taken place, 
and also with the idea that those changes are continuous. In that sense the 
notion of the ageless self, which is ‘ongoing, continuous, and creative’ offers a 
deeper understanding of the way the older generation creates new meanings 
in life by adjusting and fine-tuning their selves in accordance with the already 
stated changes. The ageless self has nothing to do with chronology because 
the process of change is universal. The ageless self is not age-bound and at 
all ages remains a changing self, where continuity and change rather form 
relations of mutual stimulation than of antagonism. 
In the second quote Kaufman reflects on the influence that an ever-changing self 
has on the creation of a ‘viable present’. This functional aspect of the changing 
self is very close to my interpretation of the meanings which remembering 
processes can harvest at a later age. Remembering is only ‘etymologically’ 
connected with the past, but notionally and performatively it has everything to 
do with the present and even with the future. 
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Corresponding ideas are strongly promoted in the works of cultural 
anthropologist Robert Rubinstein, who sees the self as ‘changing over time, 
both in content and in structure’ (Rubinstein, 2002: 153). His approach to the 
self is culturally defined, and although his conclusions are mostly based on 
the American cultural situation, the patterns of attitude towards ageing and 
the aged are widely recognisable with respect to Western-European countries. 
The dilemma that the self of an older person faces is caused by the mismatch 
between ‘cultural demands’ and ‘culturally defined status and capacities’. 
Rubinstein states that ‘the aged person must manage a self that is increasingly 
threatened over time’ (2002: 156). His answer to this threat lies in the system 
of personal meaning, which consists of three components: ‘cultural ideas, 
personal biography, and the act of interpretation’. This system relies on various 
frameworks, where a phenomenon of reminiscence plays an important role in 
the meaning-giving process for the present-day self:
I argue here that reminiscence is a cultural product and that, for elders, one of its most 
important roles is an element of the present-day self. It is not that older people necessarily 
‘live in the past’ or take interaction-numbing trips ‘down memory lane’. Rather, it is that 
the past becomes important for present day identity in part due to the tension between 
the American (or Western) construction of the self (as ‘independent’, ‘active’, ‘of agency’, 
and ‘making choices’) and the cultural construction of old age (as ‘declining’, ‘close to 
death’, ‘inactive’, ‘sick’ and the like) (Rubinstein, 2002: 154).
The meaning that remembering has for elderly people is based on the 
continuing and changing character of the self and is important to the present-
day self. By placing this idea within a cultural context, Rubinstein sharpens 
his focus on the three characteristics of remembering: ethical, dialogical and 
narrative. The ethical power of remembering is used as an answer to the 
creeping marginalisation of the older generation. While the wellbeing of the 
elderly is explicitly proclaimed to be one of the ‘core cultural values’, the 
facts of life show quite a sombre picture of banishment and oblivion. 
The dialogical65 character of remembering is considered to be much broader 
than just a discursive dialogue. Rubinstein expands the notion considerably 
by including into it the ‘dialogue with objects and environments’. As he 
states, the relationship between objects and people overrides the notion of 
possession. Using his example, a house that has been sold cannot be erased 
from somebody’s memories, because the meaning of it has nothing to do 
with the question of ownership (Rubinstein, 2002: 155). The house that used 
to have the meaning of home, will continue to have that meaning in the 
memories, because its ‘symbolism’ has already become a part of the person’s 
self. While remembering, older people can address their sold or erased 
65   The dialogical type of remembering can be linked to the concept of dialogical self. See e.g. 
Hermans et al. (1992), Hermans (2001), McAdams (1996), Blackman (2005).
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66   The narrative type of remembering can be linked to the concepts of narrative self (Kunneman, 
1996) and storytelling (Kenyon et al., 2001).
homes as if they were still there. Thus, the dialogic character of remembering 
is not its exclusive feature; it appears to be mirroring the dialogical character 
of the self. 
The narrative66 bias towards various remembering modes among the older 
generation has already been mentioned. The most interesting aspect of 
narrative studies for this current research is the choice of themes that are 
selected in order to tell a story. Those themes are recurrent and can be 
generalised, as we have already seen when analysing the Museum visits. 
Accentuating the importance of the choice, Kaufman called recurrent themes 
the ‘building blocks of identity’ (1987: 26). Rubinstein’s case studies have 
showed beyond any doubt that the themes that the interviewed people chose 
as the headlines for their stories, actually presented the narrative aspect of 
the self, in fact the same aspect that Bergson linked to social life, and that 
is characterised by its ‘solidification’ in language. Researchers name family 
and friendship relationships, health and independence, work and hobbies 
among the most important themes (Coleman et al., 1998). Family and home 
take a prominent place as themes in almost each narrative-oriented research 
conducted among elderly people and thereby shape a steady supporting 
framework for this study.
The studies about dynamics of the self in later life are often empirically 
based. They contain a rich descriptive material and their conclusions could 
be directly applied to the situations where the data were collected in the first 
place. In order to address the same issues at a more fundamental level we 
need a broader theoretical framework, to which we shall turn now. 
The two aspects of the self (Bergson)
We have returned here to the key theoretical discussion, the purpose of which 
is to give meanings to remembering and the ageing process. Life understood 
as duration presupposes continuous change. Duration of one’s conscious life can 
be seen as synonymous to memory. The totality of memory, which embraces 
every single experience of life, ensures the continuity of the self, just like each 
new experience rearranges the totality of our memory and irrevocably changes 
the self. In this consistent process continuity and change are inseparable. To 
translate this Bergsonian philosophical understanding of the durational self 
into practice is not a simple one-step act. As soon as we turn to everyday life, an 
ever-changing self becomes a difficult concept to combine with the idea of the 
stable self. Contradictions between intentions and facts are glaring at us. This is 
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exactly why with age it becomes more and more difficult to adjust ourselves: we 
keep saying that we are the same persons, while in fact we are not any more. Still, 
the research among the older generation shows us that people do not give up 
that notion and hold on to their self stories. Once more Bergson’s interpretation 
of the two aspects of the self gives us insight and an understanding of this 
consistent discursive stability.
Bergson proposes to distinguish between the ‘true’ and the social aspects of 
the self67. The true self is inseparable from duration and is constantly rebuilt 
upon it. Bergson admits that catching the actual movement of duration is a 
difficult anti-rational task, since in our thinking process we are used to analyse 
and differentiate, freeze certain moments and measure durations. That is why 
the vague and ever-mutable true self is an uneasy concept to live and to deal 
with. Bergson continues: ‘(W)e are generally content with… the shadow of the 
self projected into homogeneous space’ (1913/2008: 128). This self must satisfy 
the socially imposed demands and because it is ‘much better adapted to the 
requirements of social life in general and language in particular, consciousness 
prefers it, and gradually loses sight of the fundamental self’ (1913/2008: 128).
In terms of our previous discussion I can say that the second aspect of the self, 
which Bergson calls a shadow of the fundamental one, refers to the external 
presentation of what has been earlier called continuity of the self. We are constantly 
exposed to a stream of new sensations. In order to ‘catch’ the duration one 
should keep this stream outside any analytic exercise. However, our disposition 
is to do exactly the opposite. We want to break the stream and separate it into 
various states, in order to make them usable within our social environment and 
expressible in our language. The more analytic work is applied and the more 
distinct the features become that the stream of consciousness acquired in the 
symbolic external representation of objects and states, the further its social twin 
removes itself from the real self. The intention to think in distinctions leads to 
generalised notions, which break free from the ‘perpetual state of becoming’ 
(1913/2008: 130). In order to preserve them we secure them by using language. 
To illustrate this point, Bergson gives us an instructive example of a feeling, 
which is rich, evasive, mobile and multilayered as long as rationality of analysis 
has not taken it apart in order to ‘solidify the sensation’ (1913/2008: 131). It 
seems to me that exactly the same process takes place when people are talking 
about ‘the same’ self, as if trying to solidify a certain generalised image of 
the analysed and discursively secured self. However, as we shall see shortly, 
even a reification in language does not offer absolute protection against the all 
penetrating change. A narrative bias towards the reflection on our own lives 
shows the tension between continuity and change among the older generation 
better than anything else.
67   See our discussion on p. 204.
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Bergsonian description of the two aspects of the self has nothing to do with 
splitting the personality, nor can it be seen in terms of the ‘good’ and the 
‘bad’ self. Only in the complex interrelation of both aspects can the true 
‘fundamental self’ be recovered. But unlike in the earlier supposition this 
requires a ‘vigorous effort of analysis’:
It is the same self which perceives distinct states at first, and which, by afterwards 
concentrating its attention, will see these states melt into one another like the crystals 
of snow-flake when touched for some time with the finger. And, in truth, for the sake 
of language, the self has everything to gain by not bringing back confusion where order 
reigns, and in not upsetting this ingenious arrangement of almost impersonal states 
by which it has ceased to form ‘a kingdom within a kingdom’. An inner life with well 
distinguished moments and with clearly characterized states will answer better the 
requirements of social life (1913/2008: 138-139).
In other words, while most researchers who are studying remembering 
practices among the older generation talk about the identity, it is the socially 
determined and more easily understandable aspect of the self that is the 
focus of their attention. This aspect of the self appears to be reconstructed 
repeatedly during various remembering practices and its function is mostly 
narrowed down to reassurance and support of the already known. Using 
the poignant language of Bergson, this approach ‘restricts itself to the study 
of what has taken place and leaves out what is going on’ (1913/2008: 139). 
In terms of continuity and change, as mentioned before, continuity receives 
clear priority. This approach is easier and that is why it is used as a logical 
start for research, but it must be pushed on towards the more obscure zone 
where continuity and change meet together. Without that taking place the 
ultimate goal would be ephemeral, i.e. to understand and where necessary 
help people at a later age to fully enjoy their lives. 
New extension
For this research the most relevant formulation of the self remains the self, 
understood as a complex relational entity that is subject to continuation 
and to change. The search for a meaning to later life is based upon that 
understanding. The most evident and often explicitly formulated answer to 
the question about the meaning of remembering is the re-establishing of self-
identity. Yet, as already has been shown, this is only the first step towards 
a much more challenging goal. The meaning of remembering at a later age 
does not exclusively consist of re-assurance of the self, but in admitting that 
there have been changes (Bluck & Levine, 1998), and in accepting a new self 
or even the idea of the ever changing self. The fact that in order to reach this 
goal everyone enthusiastically ‘goes back’, conducting an inventory of what 
kind of person he or she used to be, is not a contradiction, but rather a natural 
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way of bridging an otherwise incomprehensible and perhaps even shocking 
transformation. The experiences that are revived during remembering 
processes are not identical to what the same person experienced years ago. 
We all are subject to the ceaseless process of change, which is why strictly 
speaking there is no such thing as the same self. As with memory, because the 
self is in its essence nothing but memory, all of what we are or used to be 
has been preserved virtually. But this totality is not immune to change. Each 
new experience recasts the entire mould of our self. Nothing gets lost, but 
everything is transmuting. At the same time each remembering practice is 
inseparable from the present, retracing from the moment and the context in 
which the remembering takes place. It is orchestrated by the now, not by the 
then, and it serves the purpose of the ‘the present-day self’. 
We have already pointed out that each conclusion within process thinking 
almost inevitably offers a new opening. It looks like everything ‘falls into 
place’, and yet it seems like we can push our thinking a little bit further. 
There are a few issues which I would like to bring up here. One of them 
concerns the definition of the self as a kind of entity. Another addresses the 
research question of the study and is connected with our understanding of 
what the self is and how it presents itself. 
During our discussion about identity issues, we tried to make it clear that any 
definitional fixation of the self is reductionist. At the same time by rejecting an 
understanding of the self as something that can be characterised by stability, 
we inevitably create various kinds of tension. We risk trespassing on the 
sacred territory of interpretation of the subject as it appears within a number 
of philosophical traditions. And, more importantly, it would seem like we 
are leaving the elderly people who engage in remembering practices empty-
handed (no stable self, then who am I?) The issue of subjectivity is crucial here. 
When we came to the conclusion that the self is characterised by a complex 
intertwining of continuity and change, rather than that presenting it as a given 
entity we left the question of subjectivity outside the discussion, following 
the terms of the two different ontologies that we rely on in this study. If 
we reformulate our understanding of the self in those terms, then the self 
can also be defined as an approximation towards being or as a ceaseless 
becoming. In spite of the clear differences in their philosophical approaches, 
neither Heidegger nor Bergson share the charms of subject-object dualism. 
Moreover, each of them in their own manner criticises the view of the world, 
where a human being or his consciousness is reduced to a subject. 
We have seen how Bergson describes the two aspects of the self, which makes 
sense only if this definition is set against the ongoing flux of life or duration. 
The socially determined aspect of the self is closer to the traditionally 
understood subject here, but even then it is not immune to all-penetrating 
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change. Bergson shows that the social ‘self’ disguises itself by fixing some 
features and by creating familiar patterns. In doing this the social self 
succeeds in ignoring changes that occurred for some time. But when those 
changes cannot be concealed any longer, the transformation is revealed as if 
it were abrupt, and we seal this delusion by saying that he or she has become… 
while in fact he or she have never ceased becoming.  
The self, which Bergson sees as the real one, is elusive. We can intuitively 
recognise its presence, but it is fluid and changes continuously. To call it a 
subject has as little sense as to pretend that you can reach the horizon. It is not 
coincidental that in Creative Evolution, the discussion on character, personality 
and existence unfolds within the subsection on duration. In order to define 
what our character is, Bergson extends the boundaries of subjectivity into 
unconscious explaining that only a small part of our memories ‘smuggle 
themselves’ into the present. They ‘remind us of what we are dragging 
behind us unawares’ (1911/2005: 7). Exactly that point was treated by Lawlor 
in his elaboration on the Bergsonian understanding of existence, which we 
discussed in the previous chapter. The self that Bergson is talking about here 
is more complex than the one that is exclusively linked to the conscious: 
What are we, in fact, what is our character,	 if not the condensation of the history that 
we have lived from our birth-nay, even before our birth, since we bring with us prenatal 
dispositions? Doubtless we think with only a small part of our past, but it is with our 
entire past, including the original bent of our soul, that we desire, will and act. Our past, 
then, as a whole, is made manifest to us in its impulse; it is felt in the form of tendency, 
although a small part of it only is known in the form of idea (1911/2005: 8).
Based on this conclusion Bergson shows us that the self must be understood 
intuitively, ‘in its impulse’, and in terms of both the conscious as well as the 
unconscious. But what is even more important in this quote is that the totality 
of what our character is, must be felt as a ‘form of tendency’. Behind any 
definition of the character or personality the ongoing change is presupposed. 
Bergson writes that ‘our personality, which is being built up each instant 
with its accumulated experience, changes without ceasing’ (1911/2005: 10). 
In his definition of existence ‘for a conscious being’ he insists that ‘to exist 
is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating oneself 
endlessly’. And yet, there is a form of tendency in the manner in which we 
experience our self. Thus, without reviving the notion of the subject, Bergson 
introduces another way to understand subjectivity, which comprises the 
dynamics of constant change and yet does not promote a selfless humanity. 
As we have already seen, Heidegger approaches the issues of subjectivity 
from a very different ontological position. Not becoming but ‘the question of 
the truth of Being’ determines his theoretical stance. Heidegger criticises ‘the 
dominance of the modern metaphysics of subjectivity’ (1946/2008: 222), by 
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which he means the identification of the human being with a subject. What 
troubles him is how man’s ‘primordial belongingness to Being’ is ‘concealed 
beneath the dominance of subjectivity that presents itself as the public realm’. 
His appeal to man is ‘to find his way once again into the nearness of Being’ 
and to ‘learn to exist in the nameless’. This namelessness can be understood 
as subject-less but it is definitely not the same as human-less: 
Man is never first and foremost man on the hither side of the world, as a ‘subject’, 
whether this is taken as ‘I’ or ‘We’. Nor is he ever simply a mere subject which always 
simultaneously is related to objects, so that his essence lies in the subject-object relation. 
Rather, before all this, man in his essence is ek-sistent into the openness of Being, into 
the open region that clears the ‘between’ within which a ‘relation’ of subject to object can 
‘be’ (1946/2008: 252).
Man’s ek-sistense is explained by his unique ‘standing out’ position in relation 
to Being. It is important to understand that by disclosing the limitations of 
a subject, Heidegger does not demolish the question of selfhood but returns 
to it its lost dignity, which consists of caring and preserving Being. When 
he criticises traditional humanism, this is because it ‘underestimates man’s 
unique position in the clearing of Being’ (Krell, 2008: 215)68. Finally, when he 
says that ‘man is in thrownness’, he does not despise the human being but 
lets us grasp it in the complex dynamic relations to its own existence and to 
Being. 
Looking at the positions of Bergson and Heidegger in regard to selfhood, one 
can understand now why our discussion of identity has left the notion of the 
subject aside. Still the question remains what enables us to talk about the 
self, considering that it is partly unconscious, that it is changing all the time 
and that it is in ‘thrownness’ towards the truth of Being. The interpretation 
of subjectivity that is given in the recent book of Brown & Stenner called 
Psychology without foundations, cuts through the key issues of the discussion. 
In one of the chapters the authors draw on the understanding of subjectivity 
in the philosophical thought as presented by M. Foucault, whose objective 
during one of his major projects69 ‘has been to create a history of the different 
modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects’ (Foucault, 
2002: 326)70. Our suggestion here is following those authors to look at how 
Foucault’s approach towards the issues of subjectivity relates to the two 
ontologies that are pivotal for our study. In order to explain the originality of 
Foucault’s interpretation of subjectivity, Brown & Stenner concentrate on the 
fundamental difference between human being and subject:
68   Introduction to Letter on Humanism in Heidegger (2008).
69   The authors refer here to Foucault’s History of madness.
70   Cited in Brown & Stenner, (2009: 155).
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There is a gap – or as Heidegger would put it an ‘ontological difference’ – opened 
here between ‘human being’ and ‘subject’. We can grasp this as the difference between 
questions of what it is to be human, and the various historical and cultural renderings 
of humanness as particular kinds of ‘subjects’ that differ in kind to the entities that make 
up the rest of the natural world. This is the difference between asking ‘what is it to be 
human?’ and studying the historically specific means of what Ian Hacking calls ‘making 
up people’ – i.e. establishing what is relevant and meaningful about human conduct and 
how it ought to be best organized (2009: 155).
In order to illustrate how under modern historical and cultural conditions 
the creation of ‘particular kinds of ‘subjects’ occurs, let us point at the age-
bound inventions of the contemporary social and scientific discourse, like 
for example 65+-ers, or young old and old old, or  a more descriptive one like 
the cared-for. In each of those examples we are addressing not the human 
beings, but we are indicating the subjects, defined according to a socially 
and culturally agreed set of characteristics, such as their chronological age, 
economic independency, health vulnerability etc.  
Moreover, what interests us in the argument quoted above is the affinity 
between Foucault’s definition of subjectivity with the ontological positions 
taken by Bergson and Heidegger. The link with Heidegger is made explicit 
by explaining the historical framing of the subject. The Foucaultian project 
consists in studying ‘specific bodies of knowledge and techniques through 
which the abstract, universal question of humanness is posed and explored’. 
What Heidegger calls the ‘dominance of subjectivity’ Foucault aims to 
investigate in terms of ‘technologies of the self’ within specific cultural and 
historical conditions. This means that he directs his attention to the social 
aspect of the self if we put it in Bergson’s terms. This social aspect of the self 
as we know was strongly criticised by Heidegger in his lecture The Question 
concerning Technology. Once again the ‘ontological difference’ between the 
human being and the subject can be seen here: Bergson’s true self, which 
can be approached only intuitively, is closer to the human being, understood 
in terms of ‘revealing’ and ‘bringing-forth’ (Heidegger, 1953/2008: 319). 
This aspect of the self seems to be of less concern to Foucault. At the same 
time, as Foucault shows, the techniques of the normalisation of the human 
being in each epoch produce socially desirable subjects, which correspond 
to the Bergsonian social self and are characterised by enframing, an overall-
ordering where human being is reduced to standing-reserve, as Heidegger 
puts it. In Foucault’s analysis of the processes that reduce the humanness of 
the human to the subjectivity of the subject, we find elucidating insights for 
the interpretation of the self. 
The main strength in Foucault’s vision is his propensity to set the socially 
determined selves against the movement and change. For us Foucault’s most 
valuable definition of the self consists in rejecting the idea to conceive it as a 
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substance. He determines the self as ‘a form, and this form is not primarily or 
always identical to itself’ (Foucault, 2000: 290). Compare it with the insight 
which was given by Bergson, who defined our character as a form of tendency. 
Here, in these concise definitions, the answers to the questions that were 
posed above can be concealed. The self is not an entity, but we recognise it as 
a motive, or as a style71 of our existence:
Self is a form, a pattern, a type of ongoing relationship that a person has with herself 
or himself that is continuously varying – ‘not primarily or always identical to itself’. 
What is more this form is not singular. It is, Foucault states, variable across the settings 
where it is seen to matter (e.g. voting, fulfilling ones desires). If it is possible to speak of a 
subject at all then it must be done with reference to the ‘various forms’ subjectivity takes 
and the multiplicity of relationships and connections that pertain between these forms 
(Brown & Stenner: 168).
At the point where we merge the definition of the self as a pattern with our 
own understanding of it as an inseparable combination of continuity and 
change, we can finally rest our argument regarding the self, at least within 
this study. The self is not an entity but, being embedded in the totality of our 
memory, it can be recognised in the infinite diversity of forms and patterns. 
The self reveals itself in the multiplicity of relations, but remains ‘a synthesis’ 
of them all. That is why the elderly Museum visitors do not leave the 
exhibition empty-handed. The Museum is not a means for materialisation of 
their selves. It is rather a synthesizer, which helps the visitors to accumulate 
a tune that accompanies their lives, where the ever-changing self is revealed, 
brought-forth or, even better, brought home. 
             
Nine lessons and a funny story 
The discussion on various interpretations of the self was conducted as a quest 
after what remembering in the Museum could mean for its elderly visitors. 
In search for those answers we came to various interpretations of the self, 
concluding that our selves most probably feel at home where our memories are. 
But because we already pointed out to the reader that such a place does not 
exist, we have chosen to see the self, as well as our memory, as a ceaseless 
becoming. The self has been defined in terms of continuation and change; it 
cannot be understood as a substance, but rather as a form or a pattern of our 
lives. 
71   Style here is understood within the context of the discussion, which Brown & Stenner 
offer in the chapter ‘Deleuze and Life’: ‘Style is what makes for singularisation rather than 
individuation in our lives. It is a way of seeing concrete individual lives as having their own 
particular patterns of unfolding that are outside of a notion of bounded subjectivity, of the 
person as the author of their own existence. Rather we are the stylists of our own existence.’ 
(Brown & Stenner, 2009: 198).
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Let us leave the theoretical dimension now and have a look whether that 
interpretation can improve our understanding of what is taking place during 
a usual Museum visit.
The vital power of remembering in regard to the simple question who I am 
can be observed best during Museum visits where the representatives of at 
least two generations are present. Intergenerational groups can consist of 
family members, acquaintances or of clients accompanied by professionals. 
On average almost one out of two visits to the Reminiscence Museum is a 
family visit. Often the visiting group consists of an elderly mother or father 
accompanied by their children72. By children I mean adults whose ages vary 
between 45 and 60. Usually the representatives of both generations quite 
easily identify objects that refer to their past. They all react excitedly and 
enjoy this unusual reunion with the past. But there is no question about who 
is the authority among them. 
It is the authority of knowledge, or wisdom if you like, that I am talking 
about here. That power of authority is not given automatically at the 
beginning of the visit. It usually takes some time before the familiar –but for 
some time forgotten– allocation of roles has been restored. And when this 
eventually takes place, everybody who is present can witness a wonderful 
metamorphosis: the oldest members of the group speak and others pay heed 
to their observations and stories, which in many cases they have never heard 
before. It looks as if the natural order of things has been restored. The life-
long experience of the oldest is being put into words, often re-evaluated and 
shared with the younger ones. Personal lessons and experiences are retold 
and the broader context of the social and cultural circumstances of one’s life 
is pictured and passed on to the younger generation. This transmission is 
unique, because it is not about impersonal obligatory textbook knowledge, 
but about somebody’s personal and lived through experience, which is 
transmitted in the form of an open dialogue. 
One summer afternoon two ladies came to visit the Museum. The oldest 
lady had a walking stick. She was 75 years old. The youngest one was her 
daughter, who was 51 years old. I joined them shortly after they had started 
their tour. The daughter was still in charge of the conversation. She was 
looking around actively, searching for things that, as she told, she herself had 
donated for the exhibition. I smiled, recognising the desire that many visitors 
who have contributed to the Museum collection show when they visit the 
72   Grandchildren can also be seen regularly in the Museum during the family visits. Their 
reactions are left outside the description, since their behaviour and remarks are hardly based 
on remembering. How children learn and communicate with their grandparents in the 
Museum could be an interesting theme for a follow-up study.
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Museum. Looking for your own things gives people a feeling of belonging 
and triggers the possibility to extrapolate this feeling. Gradually they see the 
entire Museum as a place where their word counts and where they feel at 
home. I think that my interference somehow tipped the balance, because I 
immediately addressed the old lady with a couple of questions. She livened 
up visibly and we delved into the details of ironing skills.
The first lesson I was to receive was a mixture of practical, historical and 
cultural knowledge. Answering my question about heavy irons she said 
enthusiastically:
I still have… They are still working, you know, really heavy… But this one with electricity… but 
we used them at school, and then at the domestic school there were all electric cords and then you 
were all standing like that, ironing. 
The old lady’s daughter tried to add something about putting the irons on 
the stove, but her mother, who by that time was looking quite confident, 
interrupted her and continued her own line of explanation:
Used that too, and then later with the electric ones, I still have two of those. My mother had this 
one, this one, didn’t she? Ina took this one. This one I still have as well. These are some of the first 
electric ones. 
I had not clearly heard in what kind of school the lady had been educated, so 
I asked her again and received the following proud reply:
Domestic school…. For girls in those days it was a very good education, you see. … And the 
difference between Ingrid and my education is a difference like night and day. We were already 
sewing a coat when two years… laying the table and serving, very tidy all that.
I was being taught to recognise the gender differences in education and 
to understand the differences in the quality of domestic education 65 and 
40 years ago. But I also witnessed how the woman that I was talking with, 
transformed from the moment she recognised my genuine interest and 
realized that her expertise was actually being appreciated. 
It did not take long before the second lesson came about. Domestic work 
activities were definitely the main themes in the lady’s life. But her lesson 
contained more than just informative facts about how people used to deal 
with domestic challenges many years ago. The Museum has an extensive 
collection of old-fashioned washing machines, as a result of which the bridge 
between ironing and washing was crossed in a natural way. An impressive 
wooden washing machine immediately attracted the lady’s attention. She 
started talking at a normal speed, but gradually her speech became faster, 
and she ended up almost breathless: 
Yes, I used to have this one, but I also had a wooden… And that one I had in the beginning 
of my married life. I am 75 years old, my daughters are 51 and 50, the eldest. …I don’t see a 
washing pan. …Oh yes, indeed, a big washing pan like this I put on the stove with water…and 
the washing was boiled in it too. …And then my husband threw it in there and it stood on the 
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stove, soaking during the night and then in the mornings before he left for his work I would fill the 
wooden washing machine, but the spinning went a little bit different from this one, that flywheel 
was underneath, highly dangerous, because.. my boy, he died unfortunately when he was 40 years 
old, 4 years ago, but he was very, as quick as anything and before you knew it he was fiddling at 
that flywheel. …That ‘s why, highly dangerous.
I shared her feelings about the danger of the washing process, but her 
comment on that was surprisingly different from mine:
Ah, and yet there were few accidents. Just once in a while. My husband, he took it from the stove 
into the kitchen. And then he stumbled, I saw there something was loose in one of those coconut 
mats and then there was a big hole in it, and he had a couple of bruised ribs. 
The story about the weekly washing session showed much more reflection. 
It was interesting to see how the procedure which was already familiar to me 
from several other stories, here acquired some specific personal features. The 
mentioning of the boy and the potential danger of his playing dramatised the 
narrative, but at the moment when my comment could have strengthened her 
implicit negative attitude towards the hardships of formal domestic work, the 
lady retaliated, dismissing my incompetence and asserting the superiority 
of her own knowledge. Her example also showed that her feelings, which 
are no-doubt appropriate in relation to her children, sound quite different 
in regard to adults. If I would reformulate this encounter in my own words, 
then it would be not about the technicalities of washing in former days, but 
about the role of a caring and hardworking mother and wife, which was seen 
by her generation as a life-time vocation and not as a profession from which 
you could retire. 
The third lesson was in a sense a continuation of the previous one; this time 
the lady reacted to the sight of the old-fashioned wringer:
My son who was 40, he would have been 44 now, until he was 4, only then did I get a spinner. …
But not long ago my daughter said: I still remember that you only … they said then, fantasised: 
it is practically dry.  It wasn’t though. It wasn’t that dry. But later on, my son is, my youngest 
son is 40, and then I says: I don’t mind having a baby, but the horrible thing was always to dry 
things in my house, I find it awf(ul), and then I got a dryer.
A little bit later she returned to the theme again. That time it sounded more 
like the handing over of significant know how:
Then you don’t need to iron everything. At the domestic school you were taught… the edges have 
to be... But still what you’ve learned early, you always do well automatically later on. But to fold 
well… I have never put no sheets in the dryer, but what about the dryer, if you have many small 
children, immediately when it is dry, then fold it. But lots leave it in the dryer, and it wrinkles 
again, but it comes out beautifully even.  And you know, the towels come beautiful, but you used 
to have this kind of sweaters, also a kind of velvet and they come out very beautifully too.
The inclination to subsume domestic work within childcare can certainly 
be called a recurring theme in the reflections of the woman, whose life was 
devoted to housework and the raising of the next generation. I recognised 
in the old lady’s story some harmless manipulative thinking but also a 
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strong feeling, which most women of her generation considered to be an 
integral part of the perfect housewife’s image. What struck me most was 
the recurrent reference to her son, who had died four years before. There 
were no tears in her eyes, only some sadness in the voice, but the fact that 
she repeatedly brought his name into the conversation, supplying it with 
the same explanatory note, was remarkable. I think that without a clear 
recognition on her part the old lady was telling me how she was coping with 
a growing scope of changes in general and in particular with the dramatic 
loss of her son, an event that took place four years ago. Accepting a loss and 
letting it go was not a simple one-step action. By bringing her son’s name up 
again and again the old lady chose the way to say her farewells gradually. 
Her directness was surprising. When referring to her son she was mixing 
different temporal perspectives, repeating how old he was or is, bringing him 
closer and then letting go of him again. She had chosen a difficult way, but 
probably the only possible one that would allow her to continue living with 
the irreparable loss she had suffered. I would not call this combination of 
courage and spirit mundane in any way.
The fourth lesson was concise and powerfully clear:
Washing board. I had that too. And that stretching of cloths, exactly, the same way. What a rotten 
jobs all that. 
I must admit that the re-evaluative part of the ‘teaching’ was and still is one 
of the issues that I appreciate most. Having just learned that the old lady 
didn’t like to hear any criticism about the past from an outsider like myself, I 
found it amusing to witness how her own directness and common sense lead 
her to talk about it herself. My experience in the Museum has taught me not 
to anticipate the reactions that the visitors give. All the same, in anticipation 
of what could happen the next moment I often found it difficult to refrain 
from crying out the right answer. The fact is that a remark of mine would 
hardly elicit more than an ironic grin, while a remark of a visitor produces 
true emotion, often accompanied by genuine tears and laughter.  
The fifth lesson was of a different kind altogether. We had moved away 
from the washing corner and kitchen, which had been so fruitful with its 
reminiscences about domestic work. The old lady saw a puppet show in the 
baby room and immediately picked up a memory from the times when I 
suppose she had been engaged in volunteer work:
I had two of those for the children’s work in Katendrecht, and it was 60 gulden apiece, and they had 
an open day, en then somebody comes there, who is just like a rather bossy type, you know, for the 
children’s work and she puts them on the flea market, well, they were gone in no time. But we had lost 
them. I say: How can you do that? Made a very beautiful puppet doll, a friend, somebody who… they 
had from the little church had heads and so knitted, it was in the Libelle (women’s magazine, eb), 
you know, and a friend of mine she had dressed them all up, older and also very modern, you know 
that they were with a cap like that, with a tail like that, you know. Pause. Well, and then we had to 
play puppets. Then she lent them to the other club… I say: how could you get it into your mind?
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The story that the old lady told us here appeared rather unexpectedly and 
remained practically without any comment. It felt like an invitation that was 
not accepted. I was stunned by the level of indignation in her voice. And 
then it was over, just like that, almost as if nothing had been said at all. I 
must admit that I even contemplated not including this story in the account. 
But the following thought held me back. Somehow that story had become 
a turning point in the manner the old lady was gradually sinking back into 
the depth of her memories. Apart from her general ideas about appropriate 
and inappropriate behaviour, this lesson was not about what she was telling, 
but about how she was remembering. Being a mother and a wife in the 
best sense of the words, she carefully knitted her stories around her family, 
interweaving the names and the lives of her children in the repeating pattern 
of her narrative quite thoroughly and with love. As we have already seen, 
the Museum primarily evokes and stimulates memories of the family and of 
home life. But we have also seen that the awakening power of the Museum 
can be much stronger than that. And whenever sufficient time and effort 
are invested, deeper planes of memory can be activated, whereby different 
stories from other times will appear, often to the surprise of the remembering 
person too.  
It seemed as if the lady used the story about the puppets in order to return to 
a different time in her life. In the following episode the Museum helped her 
once again. In the hobby shed she noticed an old-fashioned oil feeder and 
then burst out in laughter. The story she remembered was simple, but she told 
it in rounds, each time adding a new detail, laughing, interrupting herself, 
imitating other people’s voices and behaviour, in short enjoying all possible 
forms of performance and attention. The transcription seems distorted for 
people who were not present at the time. That is why I decided to rephrase 
the story here, bringing back some chronological sequence into it. The lady 
remembered the time when she was still a young girl and had just started 
dating. She was wearing a new dress and to tease her one of the boys picked 
up an oil feeder and sprayed her dress with it. Of course he had not realised 
that the feeder was filled with oil. The whole thing was meant to be a joke, 
or ‘tomfoolery’ as the lady called it, but the fact was that her dress had been 
totally ruined. She spoke of how she was then given 35 gulden, which was a 
lot of money in those days, with which she bought two pieces of fabric to sew 
a new dress. The story sounded very funny, but it was the lady herself who 
laughed and enjoyed it most. Her daughter seemed to never have heard the 
story before, and at the end the lady suddenly said with some surprise in her 
voice: You see, a lot of memories are coming back, aren’t they?
 
The story warmed the lady up. She was much more animated, her laugh 
was more frequent and her voice resonated confidence and even a kind of 
challenge. Lessons six and seven followed when both women were standing 
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in front of the school corner. In a way it was a sort of competition, to show 
how sound their school knowledge still was. First they saw a blank map, so 
they quickly began to say the names of all the Dutch provinces. There was no 
pause in their reciting; it was a race against time and a possible error. Then 
they switched to another object and I lost track. Fortunately they both had to 
breathe. The daughter used that moment to comment:
Yes, but they were crammed in such a way that I can only say them very quickly, cannot slowly.
Her mother agreed with her and finally I could ask them what it was all 
about. The old lady laughed and replied:
Those are the books of the Bible. … We had to because of your father…
And the younger lady added:
You had to learn it for Bible lesson. He says that you have to do it in threes, so to say every word 
three times.
It was funny to see both women ‘working’ as a team in different directions 
simultaneously. First they treated the reciting as a game and acted in playful 
competition towards each other. Then they became quite proud that their 
memory had not betrayed them. Finally both of them became ironic about 
the fact that they had been obliged to learn by heart such a large amount 
of words, the meanings of which had in fact escaped them most of the 
time. To me the lesson was about old-fashioned versus modern methods of 
learning, between cramming and learning to look things up. The old lady 
wisely restricted herself from singling out one of the methods, realising that 
different types of knowledge require different learning methods. I would 
certainly not argue with that.  
The seventh lesson was about the same topic, but of all the so-called lessons 
it almost acquired the form of a lecture. The old lady told us about an 
explanation, with which she had tried to help her other daughter:
I said: you just read it once, I say, for curiosity’s sake. The second time you take the pencil. I say, 
what is important you copy in writing because that is important. The rest is to make it a little bit 
funny, I say. And then the third time you just look at what is important. 
It was a clear and instructive message how one had to learn things in order 
to remember them. 
An interesting point was that while talking about various learning strategies 
we moved to the present time without noticing it. The universality of the 
theme played an important role, but I think there was more to it. The old 
lady had evidently thought about learning strategies before and she relied 
on her own expertise on the matter. As a mother and a grandmother she had 
probably used her authority frequently, and she felt that she could still do 
that even now, so when the opportunity presented itself she applied it again, 
showing a combination of practical knowledge and experience, which can be 
used successfully even today. 
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At that point in the visit the scope of the dialogue had become boundless. 
The old lady no longer needed to be assisted with questions and her daughter 
could freely choose between looking around on her own or staying with her 
mother, who was evidently still able to surprise even her. 
The eighth lesson was delivered in the baby room, when the old lady saw an 
old-fashioned pot. She started without any introduction:
During the war, you know, then you didn’t have any pots any more, did you? You could not buy 
that any more. And then you had a tin canny and you made a fiddle out of it. And then it became 
terribly filthy of course. And I also had a sister that was one year old, that was sitting on the baby 
chair. And I was starving, and then we got that Swedish white bread (laughs) and my sister, I 
know… she was eating because she was hungry too, and then she dropped a piece of the broad into 
that pot, and I picked that up, and then famished as I was, it was so disgusting… .
And then a second later she added: 
And when you see these things then it all comes back to you.
Although the lady’s story referred to a difficult period in her life, it did not 
sound dramatic, but its details vividly recreated the broader context of the 
deprivation that her generation suffered during the war.
One observation can be helpful here. Generally speaking the visitors of the 
Museum do not talk much about their war experiences. During a visit there 
are usually just one or two references to that period, but if the visits take 
place in May, when Liberation Day is celebrated, the war stories are told and 
discussed more frequently. One of the volunteers of the Museum is a former 
professional soldier, which explains why the war theme is recurrent in his own 
reminiscences. It would be incorrect to say that the Museum mainly awakens 
the remembering of light and pleasurable events, which would of course 
exclude memories about the war. The stories that are told in the Museum 
can be dramatic without being connected to the war. By the same token the 
war stories that are told can be relatively light, like the one that the old lady 
told me, or on the other hand quite dramatic, showing never-healed wounds 
in somebody’s life. So the question about memories connected to difficult 
periods remains open; it could become a challenging subject for a separate 
research. For now I shall aim at formulating a provisional conclusion, which 
leans on the thematic bias of the exhibition. The Museum is mainly about 
home, family and domestic life. In other words it is about everything that 
constitutes an antipode to the destruction, murder and violence of war. I 
doubt that the visitors purposefully shut out their war memories, but by not 
recalling them they preserve the preciousness of life, as some of them did at 
the time when they had no other choice. 
In the meantime the old lady was looking a bit tired, but she did not want to 
give up. We went to the sewing room, where there was a large portrait of a 
nurse, dressed up in an old-fashioned costume. This attracted her attention, 
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so it was time for the ninth lesson. First she wanted to know who the woman 
in the portrait was. I did not know that and so the lady wanted to investigate 
what kind of regalia the nurse had pinned on. Her daughter looked a bit 
closer and supplied her mother with the necessary information: 
It is blue, white, red and there is also some blue inside as well. 
The information immediately had its effect:
Then she had the diplomas and she worked… because you had Red and White Cross. No, you had 
White Cross, Black Cross. And I myself in psychiatry. And it used to be a Black Cross. But there 
were the people just like here in nursing, in care, they used to be psychiatry. Just like transverse 
lesion, skull basis, encephalitis, multiple sclerosis and all that…
I did not catch all this the first time, so she repeated eagerly and in great 
detail what kind of nursing existed at the time when (again to my surprise) 
she had been working as a nurse. Without introducing or emphasising it, the 
old lady suddenly invited me to a part of her life that I had not been aware 
about. She had worked and she sounded proud about her knowledge and 
her profession. She had her own professional heroine as well. Looking at the 
portrait she was wondering whether it could be Florence Nightingale, the 
legendary English nurse, whom she held in high esteem. I was wondering 
whether she knew that her heroine had consciously rejected the role of a 
mother and wife in order to devote her life to nursing. She probably knew. 
I saw the faces of the two women in front of me: the one in the portrait, not 
Nightingale but another nurse who could have been just like her, and the 
face of the lady in front of me, whom I had got to know quite well by that 
time. I was thinking that both women had made their own choices in life, 
but in spite of their obvious differences, one striking similarity drew them 
closely together. Nursing and nurturing had been their vocation. They had 
chosen caring, protecting and preserving to be the leading patterns in their 
lives. And I somehow felt it was my turn to take it from there.
We chatted a little bit longer, but the old lady had become tired, both 
physically and emotionally. This was not surprising, considering the kind of 
tour she had been making in less than an hour. We said our goodbyes and 
they left hand in hand, the mother and the daughter, linked to each other a 
bit differently than an hour before.   
Enduring link
One can look at the experiences of the lady we just talked about as a row 
of spontaneous, disconnected and a-chronological memories, which were 
revived while she was looking at what was on display. If this were so, then 
one can wonder why at the end of the visit we are able to say that we can 
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73   Random House Unabridged Dictionary, 2006.
understand her character or point out what personality she possesses. Whose 
character or personality would we be talking about: the young mother and 
wife, the nurse, or the grandmother? The interpretation that Foucault gives 
of the self is priceless here. It is not the substantiated sameness that we see 
in each story that the lady tells us, but it is a pattern, an undertone in the 
unique style of her life, which manifests itself again and again in each of 
her actualised memories. She is not the same any more and the changes that 
become apparent to her are both challenging and trying, but the continuation 
of her life is apparent as well. It is built on both her descending biological 
existence and the ascending creative pattern of her ever developing self. There 
are no two identical selves, which is why there cannot be two identical visits 
to the Museum. 
If recognition and confirmation of a self-pattern is what the elderly are 
actually looking for during the Museum visits, then the generally positive, 
but all the same melancholic feelings that they show, explain the prevailing 
positive attitude to the Museum exhibition. 
In the very beginning of this book we talked about the fact that memory is 
a gift to which, unless we start losing it, not much attention is paid, because 
it is simply always here. Remembering then is even more precious to us, 
because it is one of the abilities that was generously given to us in order 
to study and nurture ourselves. If via remembering we actually learn to 
create, to improve and to accept ourselves then we can master our lives, 
giving a new meaning to it, regardless of age. At the same time we can give 
remembering its long-deserved place in the lives of the elderly, by seeing 
it not as a simple amusement or time-filling occupation, but as an essential 
constituent and condition for a good life. One of the most important 
meanings of remembering therefore can be called self-mastering. And when 
in later life we cannot enjoy remembering as a simple gift anymore, we start 
to respect it as a craft, which asks for a considerable effort from our side, but 
which is rewarding all the same. 
 
Describing the visit of the old lady I have selected the word lesson because of 
its semantics of transmission. When determined as a useful piece of practical 
wisdom acquired by experience or study73, the word lesson contains both the 
transformation of knowledge (or wisdom) and the mediated character of this 
transformation. The knowledge that the older generation hands over during 
Museum visits is not didactic as such, but the content level has practically no 
boundaries. The preferred form of communication is the dialogue. I see the 
elderly visitors act as teachers not due to their authority over the rest of us, but 
because of the powerful mastery that they still hold over their own lives. The 
purpose of their lives can be lost if we do not listen to them today. 
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The term wisdom, which is used in the definition of lesson, can be associated 
with self-mastery for yet another reason. In his already classical theory on 
psychological development E. Erikson defines old age as a stage in human life 
that is characterized by opposing dispositions towards integrity and despair, 
which in their totality can form a virtue like wisdom (Erikson et al., 1986). The 
remarkable strength of Erikson’s idea is that integrity and despair in later life 
do not in fact contradict each other. The aspiration to achieve some interior and 
exterior balance (compare to continuity) coincides with the fear of impairment 
and a loss of independence (change). The relations that are proposed there, 
are those of concession. According to Erikson, wisdom maintains ‘integrity 
of experience in spite of the decline of bodily and mental functions’ (Erikson 
et al., 1986: 37-38). We have already discussed the need to come to terms with 
imminent changes, while not losing the sense of self-continuation. In my 
understanding memory secures continuity of human interiority, but it does 
even more:   
What we call memory is then perhaps best characterised as a stretching of the skin 
of subjectivity back into the past, to allow it to bear the marks of past events and to 
reconfigure and rework these markings within the aesthetic consistency one lends to self 
(Brown & Stenner: 174).
Memory, understood as a stretching skin of subjectivity, is not just a plastic 
aesthetic image. It is a challenge and a resolution brought together in one. 
Wisdom of (one’s) living rests on it. When explicated in remembering 
practices, self-mastery becomes a prerequisite for exterior continuation, a 
foundation of our relations with the world. It is more than the self-knowledge 
of one man can contain, and its accumulative value is more powerful than 
the experience of one generation. 
Each generation gets the chance to safeguard and enrich what is conceived 
as wisdom. Each generation holds its invisible thread for some period in 
time, but there will be always a moment to pass it on. Two irreparable 
situations must be avoided. Firstly, that there is nobody left who will pass 
it on, and secondly that there is nobody on the other side to take it over. It 
is our responsibility to ensure this transmission, as it has already been for 
a long time in this world. My parents have transmitted the thread of their 
wisdom to me and I shall pass it on to my son, in order for this enduring 
link to last forever. It is simple and it is magnificent and insurmountable in 
its simplicity. This link is worth living and if necessary also worth fighting 
for. To me this is the most important lesson one can learn about the craft 
of ageing, when talking to the visitors of the Museum. This is what I call 
creative ageing, the ageing that ensures the continuation of life and thereby, 
as Bergson put it, will be ‘able to beat down every resistance and clear the 
most formidable obstacles, perhaps even death’ (1911/2005: 295).
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eMpathic power of touch, sounD anD BerMuDa triangle
A touch
During the first months of my work for the project I was repeatedly confronted 
with Professor H. Becker, who found my approach too therapeutic at that time. 
Later it became obvious to me that even having read his passionate book The 
Art of Living in Old Age, I was still an outsider, not only to Humanitas and 
Becker’s theoretical vision, but to the goings on within that organisation as 
well. The connotation, which the title of the book could awaken, was still 
concealed for me then. I thought in terms of treatment and handling and saw 
the Museum’s primary function as a place where patients with various types 
of dementia syndrome could be treated. In other words, I was eager to read 
about the art of living without linking it to the actual implementation in life.
On the 22nd of November 2006, a couple of months after my project had 
started, I went to one of the departments at the Humanitas nursing home 
and asked whether I could take a patient with me to visit the Museum. The 
Museum was not officially opened yet, but for the flexible yes-culture of 
Humanitas that kind of suggestion is never a problem. The people who were 
living in that department were suffering from both somatic and dementia 
problems. The department nurse looked around and then suggested that I 
could perhaps try and take Mr Sharp with me. Mr Sharp was 79 years old; 
he was sitting in wheel-chair and was suffering from aphasia. I introduced 
myself and asked him whether he would mind going to the Museum with 
me. He kind of nodded, I took it for a yes and we went downstairs. We started 
the round in the grocery shop. I asked him some questions and he did his best 
to remember things and to provide the right answers. His replies were never 
sentences, mostly one-worded, but the words were the ‘right’ ones.  Initially 
(at least this is what I thought then) his facial expression did not change 
very much. I made sure that he could see and hear me in front of him, while 
showing things and taking the time (too little as I understand now) before he 
could work out his answer. We were clearly two separate islands: one of us 
curious and investigative, actively gathering live material for a thesis, while 
the other was isolated within himself, vulnerable and simply complying 
with the intrusion. We moved to the sitting room and he suddenly showed 
a clear interest in the music that was playing on the old-fashioned radio. He 
was almost literally struck by the sound of recognition. From my side I was 
struck by the way the Museum could work. In the kitchen I put an old-fashioned 
coffee grinder into his hands. He did his best to turn the handle, but it was 
clearly too heavy for him. ‘Too heavy’, I registered… And then he reached 
out to me and touched my hand.
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Mr Sharp could not do very much. His touch was soft and non-intrusive. 
He could not hold his hand steadily, but moved it softly, which gave me 
the impression that he was stroking my hand. He smiled in a friendly and 
inviting manner, encouraging in fact. I did not realize at that moment what 
had happened but all at once everything had changed. Today I would say that 
it was he who awakened me that day, and not the reverse. I started looking 
at his face twice as often, in order to follow his gaze and anticipate on what 
he was recognising. He was not silent, as I had been thinking only moments 
ago. His eyes, his expression and the subtle motion of his lips, everything in 
his posture was talking to me all the time. Only I had not seen that at first, 
since I had been busy with my personal agenda. I followed his gaze and 
pushed his chair to an old bakelite telephone. When I put the heavy receiver 
in his hands he was clearly delighted. He touched the sturdy object and I 
saw this stroking motion again. We moved on and his look stopped me at 
the school corner. I took one of the old copybooks and anticipating his desire 
I placed it into his hands. He held on to the copybook tightly, constantly 
touching and stroking the old thing, with a shadow of a smile lightening his 
face. It took quite some time before I felt that we could move on again. The 
next stop he wished to make, which he made clear to me somehow, was in 
front of the wardrobe in the bedroom. Once again I followed his gaze and 
took a stiff collar from the shelf. That time he not only tried to show how you 
closed it, but also reached in the direction of his neck, where he wanted it to 
be placed. He did the showing, while I did the talking. We were a team. We 
were conversing. 
Then it was time for us to go back again. We were waiting together in front 
of the lift when he took my hand again, brought it to his face and let it lie 
on his cheek for some time. By softly stroking my hand he was saying thank 
you, and I, armed with all communicative power of language, did not know 
better than to stroke him back and to hold him tight. 
Humanitas practice revisited
In a sense it was the Museum that did its magic. But it was a live person, with 
his intuition, pain, desires and courage who woke me up from the therapeutic 
illusions and the one-sided view of the role that an empathic dialogue could 
play in understanding especially those who are restricted in their use of 
language or other means of communication. I am not ashamed of my initial 
assumptions and approach. I simply did not know any better. But I am 
definitely happy that I have come this far and that I shall – hopefully – never 
make ‘discursive’ assumptions without some thorough thinking and critical 
self-scrutiny. That was also the moment when I started to realise what change 
the practitioner and the thinker Hans Becker brought about with his decision 
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to found the Reminiscence Museum. He could not possibly have predicted 
the full range of the consequences. I suppose it was his intuition that led 
him. That uncatchable moment of ‘immediate knowledge’, which according 
to Bergson is experienced rarely, but is the only and also a quite exhausting 
way to catch a rustling of duration in the polyphonic flux of life. You certainly 
must have a talent for that. Something in the story of Becker’s acquaintance 
four years ago shifted his vision, opened a new horizon, and unlike most 
of us would do, he decided not to let it go. He caught it as an entrepreneur 
who saw an interesting opportunity. As a manager, he recomposed the idea 
according to his own organisational vision and as a thinker he simply let it 
be and evolve on its own. The story of the Reminiscence Museum shows 
a fascinating integration of self-evolving practical and theoretical thought. 
This unity is safeguarded by Becker’s respect for ever-changing life, the 
celebration of which he promotes in the most unusual forms, amongst which 
the foundation of the Reminiscence Museum can truly be called a gem. 
Becker’s entire theoretical vision and also its practical implementation is 
threaded with an emphatic approach. He is well-known for advocating a clear 
turn from cure to care, wellbeing and happiness, which is far from being just 
an attractive organisational motto. Becker is appalled by generalisations like 
we, the staff /personnel, versus they, the clients. During his daily work he 
continuously fights against any attempt of depersonalisation, whereby the 
colourful of the unique gets bleached into a standard grey. It goes without 
saying that Becker’s professional and individual credo can be defined as 
anything but impersonal or colourless. With his seemingly impossible 
standards, which cannot possibly be covered by a simple definition, he 
continuously dares and challenges the hour-glass approach, sterile forms of 
care, treatment, illness and even death. 
This line of thinking underpins the way in which the Museum display was 
made accessible to all the inhabitants of Humanitas, as well as their families, 
friends and visitors from outside. A straightforward proclamation that the 
Museum is accessible for handicapped people would go against the ethics 
of Humanitas. The Museum was created for everybody. In the language of 
the organisation it literally means that every body can enter and make use of 
the Museum. No distinction is made between its visitors. Everybody can 
see, hear and smell the same things, touch and try out the same objects, so 
there are no limitations or exclusions there. In a great number of instances 
we have witnessed how the Museum turned into somebody’s own place. 
Instead of creating a feeling of alienation and isolation, the Museum gives to 
almost everybody a feeling of alliance and solidarity, while at the same time 
highlighting and safeguarding the precious individual features of its visitors. 
290
I cannot deny that there is an obvious change in the behaviour of the Museum 
staff or other persons who are around, when visitors in wheel-chairs enter 
the Museum. Also a volunteer will always make sure that he or she is clearly 
audible to the visitors wearing hearing aids. A similar approach will be made 
towards the visitors who have difficulties with speaking. In such cases the 
listener will usually wait longer for a reaction, or if necessary he/she will 
make a suggestion of some sort. What I am talking about here would at a 
glance appear to be a simple adjustment, which is required by the situation 
at hand and is always tailor-made. Such a conclusion would be too simple 
and this kind of behaviour, which reflects personal integrity, originates in a 
natural manner from the ethics that prevail at Humanitas. But it is hardly 
representative for the manner, in which (health-)care organisations for the 
elderly are generally operating. 
The biggest difference between the mainstream approach towards the 
elderly and the way things are done at Humanitas brings me back to my own 
misuse of words. Humanitas works with people, not with patients. While 
at a glance there seems to be nothing wrong with the non-contextual word 
patient, it turns out to be heavily charged in widely spread examples, which 
the literature on nursing and healthcare reflects very clearly. J. Latimer for 
example, introduces a more profound understanding of how ‘transforming 
persons into patients and back into persons again’ (Latimer, 2008: 75) takes 
place, which she rightly describes as being very unsatisfactory. Her remarks 
concerning the ‘divisioning’ and ‘compartmentalizing’ within the health 
services can be very illustrative for discussions about the approach towards 
ageing, which is currently taking place at Humanitas. 
According to Latimer each person who has certain physical complaints, is first 
‘analysed’ by the care providing system. As a result of this analysis, his or her 
faculties are ‘divided into parts and aspects’. After that the transformation 
of the person into a patient is completed and the patient is further 
compartmentalized: he or she is given a ‘shelter’ within the care-providing 
organisation. Latimer connects the notion of compartmentalization to that of 
belonging. According to her belonging has advantages and disadvantages. 
She sees a disadvantage in the loss of freedom and an advantage in the 
likelihood that the treatment will be professional and successful. But that 
advantage has a high price. According to Latimer it makes the people in 
question lose the integrity of their identity, as a result of which they come to 
see themselves as patients, i.e. the carriers of a certain medical problem. If 
we translate this kind of compartmentalization to the care for the elderly, we 
can conclude that certain elderly clients are ‘reduced’ to somatic (Alzheimer, 
aphasic etc.) patients, who must be housed in a certain department of the 
nursing home. This kind of division is purely logistic and mechanistic, and 
the kind of housing that the clients are given has nothing to do with our 
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understanding of home. Let me point out here that the situation within the 
care department of any nursing home is even more complicated still than in 
a healthcare organisation, which is the primary focus of Latimer’s analysis. 
The question that could be asked after the usual diagnosis of a certain type 
of dementia syndrome has been conducted, is whether ageing itself must be 
considered and addressed as a diagnosis factor as well. 
I agree with Latimer when she says that ‘divisioning and compartmentalizing 
are practices of inclusion and exclusion’ (Latimer, 2008:84). Let us look 
specifically at the daily practice at the organisation where ageing is a priori 
excluded from the list of medical problems and therefore cannot be seen as 
a formal ground for any form of exclusion. The following example can be 
helpful. 
I once saw a client and a male nurse talking to each other. It was just an 
informal chat, with a lot of explicit and prickly humour and at the same time 
implicitly supportive trust and warmth. When the client had gone to drink 
a cup of tea with her friend downstairs I addressed the nurse and reflected 
on their obviously very good relationship. The nurse said simply: Of course. 
I saved her life, you know. We are very close. I started to think in terms of acute 
medical emergencies. In a sense it had indeed been acute, but not in the 
way I imagined it. The nurse told me that the client had been admitted into 
Humanitas a couple of years before. She was critically underweight at that 
time. Although she had a loving family, her physical complaints exhausted 
her. She lost all interest in life and wanted to die as quickly as possible. 
Obviously Humanitas was the wrong place for that. As I said before, the 
ethics of Humanitas does not include hiding from death, but its primary goal 
is to celebrate life. According to the nurse it had been a long and difficult 
fight, to first convince the client that physical impairments at a later age are 
insufficient reasons to give up on the rest. By convincing I of course do not 
mean long theoretical discussions with a dying client. The nurse managed 
to show her that her life was worth fighting for. For that he made use of his 
feelings and his professional integrity, without dividing himself into a person 
and a nurse. It took a lot of energy from both sides: from the client to listen 
and to believe again, and from the professional to convince, to challenge and 
to keep it up. When he told me that story, the image of the client whom I had 
just seen came back to me again: laughing, spirited, alive. Using the terms 
of Latimer I can only conclude that this particular client had evidently felt 
excluded before she came to Humanitas, and that Humanitas included her 
again by giving her a new home as well as a reason to live. 
The manner in which the admittance and allocation within the nursing 
home takes place at Humanitas was not the focus of my research. Still, the 
conversations with the people who live there, like my friend Rebecca for 
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example and my discussions with several staff members and volunteers, 
provided me with a basic understanding of those formalities. The ‘analysis’ 
of the person’s situation usually begins by gathering key information. The 
‘break’ in the usual question-answer scheme already starts then. There are 
certain questions and issues that differ from the usual questionnaires. As 
a result, the staff quite soon finds out about aspects not just regarding the 
medical condition of the clients, but also concerning their family situation, 
their characters, attachments and resentments. Once this information has 
become available to you, you cannot pretend to see a person reduced to a 
simple physical or mental problem. 
New residents are placed in certain departments according to a ‘divisioning’ 
principle, which serves to make the work of the personnel functional, but 
there is often a mixture of clients with differing needs, which stimulates 
their desire to help each other. As one of the clients told me once: I do not 
belong there (in that department) but I like it here. There are good people here, and 
sometimes if nurses are busy I can help. I do not mind. 
It is interesting that the word belonging is used here. Latimer suggested that 
belonging can be disadvantageous because of the loss of freedom, since 
the system takes you in its possession. According to me it is hard to say 
when we are not taken into possession by some system. At the same time 
the feeling of belonging can vary a lot. Using Latimer’s terminology we can 
say that Humanitas compartmentalizes its inhabitants, but I would not call it 
sheltering. Humanitas pursues and succeeds with a very ambitious task: to 
give people a new home. That is what my interlocutor was telling me about 
when he shared with me his feelings about staying in the nursing home. He 
had made his own choice and the organisation had complied. It was perhaps 
not ideal, but he felt in charge and not in the possession of the system. 
Humanitas does not fit in the usual pattern of divisioning and 
compartmentalizing in the way that care-giving institutions generally do, 
because care and cure do not exhaust its goals and because its inclusion 
ideology does not rob you of your personality or reduce you to a patient. 
The Museum space makes this approach quite noticeable. I have seen two 
people, who told their stories while they were visiting the Museum. My 
initial knowledge about them had made my expectations of their reactions 
more personal and indeed their visits became a rewarding experience for all 
of us. I have seen the same reaction from personnel, who come to visit the 
Museum together with inhabitants and clients of both Humanitas and other 
care organisations for the elderly. The emphatic approach at Humanitas 
benefits a lot from spontaneous and lively conversations. Notwithstanding 
the knowledge they already accumulated, an attentive nurse or guide can 
still be deeply and repeatedly surprised about new facts and behaviour 
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patterns that their clients show during Museum visits. It seems that the 
Museum enriches the process of knowing each other, complementing but 
never completing. The reminiscences of the people intertwine and even if 
an artificial division between professionals and clients was present in the 
beginning, it often dissolves during the vivid exchange of remembered 
events and experiences. 
Another frequently occurring metamorphosis that I have observed concerns 
the switching of roles, which a professional and a client play in their daily 
communication. The Museum feels like home to the older generation and 
as a museum to the younger one. Usually the professionals who come to 
the Museum are much younger than their clients. They do not possess the 
generational knowledge, which would allow them to tell stories about the 
things that surround them in the Museum. The authority of professionalism 
is then subtly carried over to the client. As we have already seen this does 
not happen at once. People who are used to keeping to themselves and have 
not been heard to talk for quite some time by their family or by professionals, 
do not willingly give up that protective shell. But the appeal of the Museum 
is too strong to withstand the temptation. The first reactions of recognition 
are spontaneous and the genuine interest of the personnel and volunteers 
at the Museum is invaluable at moments like these. It can stimulate further 
conversation and usually disarms the carefulness and potential distrust of 
the visitor. 
I remember a visit of an old lady. She was accompanied by a young nurse, 
who could easily have been the lady’s great granddaughter. The nurse was 
pushing the wheel-chair silently and the lady seemed to be asleep. One of 
the volunteers spotted them and came towards the lady with a question 
about old cigars. The lady reacted immediately, showing that she was far 
from asleep, but in fact rather bored. The nurse looked interested as well 
and listened carefully to the lady’s explanation about her husband who used 
to smoke but had to stop following the doctor’s recommendation. Then the 
lady saw something in a show-case. The wheel-chair had to be pushed closer. 
Suddenly a light of recognition brightened her face and she exclaimed: Gee! 
Linen buttons! All kinds! The enthusiasm in her recognition was so catching 
that we all laughed at once. From that moment on the lady kept talking 
and felt no need for any stimulating questions. She had definitely found an 
audience in the Museum. Her remarks were bright and funny and she made 
us laugh again and again. The surprise on the face of the young nurse was 
replaced by genuine amusement and fascination and she listened to each 
new comment attentively. And at the same time I was wondering about the 
power that had been hidden until that moment and that allowed that old 
lady, who was sitting in a wheel-chair and who was restricted in her vision 
and her hearing, to acquire this vital and catching authority during the 
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conversation and to invite us all into the sparkling world of her memories. 
One could certainly call it a lesson in the art of living. 
A sound
When visitors are not able to move or express themselves without assistance, 
the Museum still offers them a unique interactive opportunity. On Thursday 
morning, when the Museum is usually closed to the public, one of the 
volunteers, Jennie, takes a client from the nursing home downstairs and 
spends some time making a round and trying to build up a conversation. 
She belongs to the same generation as the largest group of the Museum 
visitors. Her devotion is remarkable. Nobody gave her that ‘assignment’. 
Her work can truly be called emergent. It was inspired by the creative spirit 
of the organisation and by her personal and in my opinion deeply humane 
sense of responsibility. The clients whom she brings to the Museum are not 
patients or elderly to her. They are just people who could use some help. 
And although some of them are very difficult to reach, I have never seen her 
giving up. 
I remember particularly well one of the mornings when I saw how Jennie was 
working. She had been in the Museum for some time already when I came 
in. The lady in the wheel-chair whom she had taken with her had not shown 
any interest in the visit until then. She could hardly move and her head lay 
against her breast most of the time, her eyes were closed as if she were asleep, 
her hands were tightly clenched. Quietly Jennie let me know that this had been 
going on without any visible change for quite some time. She did not sound 
desperate or disappointed, rather as if she were thinking aloud and looking for 
a new opening. At a certain point Jennie remembered a German song that she 
knew and she began to sing it, leaning closer to the lady. Suddenly and without 
opening her eyes the lady ‘sang’ back. It looked rather like they were emitting 
sounds together than actually recognizing the melody. It also seemed as if the 
closeness of somebody who was actively engaged in an activity had catalysed 
the lady’s reaction. And it was certainly the first time during the visit that a kind 
of a dialogue was taking place. 
We moved to the kitchen corner, through the study and then into the sewing 
corner without pausing. The lady once again seemed to be fast asleep. Jennie 
selected the washing corner intuitively, looking for a room with simple and 
potentially strong impressions, where the producing of a sound could be 
of help to remember things. She took the washing board and the brush and 
produced some rubbing sounds. The lady reacted without opening her eyes. 
It seemed that she tried to say something, but she was not articulating clearly 
enough to be understood, as if she were talking to herself, quickly and softly. 
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Jennie looked around, searching for something that could produce sounds. 
She turned at the handle of the mangle, the handle of the wringer. The 
lady did not show any interest in those sounds, her eyes were still closed. 
Somehow we knew that she was not asleep, but she still kept to her own 
world, not opening her eyes. Jennie exhaled: this is difficult. Then she took 
the cover of the washing machine. The sharp sound of metal made the lady 
mumble something and she opened her eyes. Jennie caught the movement 
and showed her the washing machine again. The woman began to speak, 
quickly and unclear. She started by repeating the words that Jennie had used 
and then tried to add something, but her speech was not always distinct. 
Jennie didn’t wait (very rightly I thought) and showed her the heavy irons. 
The woman was looking and saying something like: o yes, yes, irons. Jennie 
said that they were heavy and that you had to have strong muscles to use 
them. The muscles, repeated the lady, I don’t have the muscles. Jennie’s grip 
was very strong. Having attracted the attention of the old lady she went on 
and on, introducing new things, which kept the lady ‘awake’ and her eyes 
open. She showed her some soap but the smell didn’t make any difference. 
Then she showed the blue powder and told a story from her youth about 
putting too much blue to the water and making all her linen a little bit blue. I 
thought that she risked losing the lady’s attention there, but she did not. This 
personal touch was exactly right. 
From that moment on the lady remained engaged in the dialogue. It was in 
that same washing corner that I heard her laughing for the first time. She 
laughed briefly but very contagiously. She stopped abruptly, as if she had 
done her duty or as if her strength had run out. She mostly laughed when 
she could not add anything else or because she was glad she had recognized 
something. Keeping the conversation going, Jennie said something about 
general changes in life and the lady followed her very neatly, remarking: 
Incomprehensible! 
By now the lady was alert and her answers and reactions were immediate 
and precise. She recognised things relatively easily and wanted to share her 
knowledge with us. She was surprised and appreciative at the same time and 
looked at us with trust. I don’t think that she realized where she was at the 
time but she seemed to be absolutely natural in her reactions and ‘stories’. It 
looked like she felt at home. And Jennie radiated with joy. Indeed she had the 
right to feel proud, but it was not pride that I saw on her face. It was a soft 
reflection of the ‘awakening’ that she managed to catalyse by simply staying 
alert, not giving up, looking, listening and hearing, while consulting her own 
‘good sense’ and intuition. 
Before I go on, I would like to express my sincere and unlimited respect to the 
people who day after day make the miracles of the awakening in the Museum 
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come true. A division into professionals and volunteers does not really make 
much sense here. Knowing the rules and the mechanism of the human body 
can at best turn you into a theorist; knowing how to apply those rules and 
how to distinguish the mechanisms can make you a good practitioner. But 
only the capacity to recognise the uniqueness within individual human 
beings and to adjust the rules in accordance with their needs will raise you 
to the heights of humanity. Those heights are not exclusive. It only takes an 
empathic effort and a preparedness to listen and to keep a dialogue going on. 
And that for the rest of your life.
Empathy as a sophisticated technique
As simple as the example that was described above can sound, it is still far 
from being a widespread practice of working with elderly clients. What 
that example shows is an intersection of several professional and ethical 
issues. The volunteer in my example was not a professional care provider. 
Following her own intuition and experience, she showed will, courage and 
an empathic approach in order to catalyse a very simple and one could 
say usual conversation, as far as the Museum is concerned. Yet there had 
been nothing usual about the entire event, neither about the place where 
it occurred, nor about Jennie’s approach or about the appreciation of the 
woman who had not spoken in that way for months. In order to understand 
why this took place, it is worthwhile to look at the described event within 
the context of the ideology at Humanitas and our understanding of ageing.
At the core of our professional and ethical issues I see here an emphatic design 
of practice that has been systematically developed in dialogues at all levels 
of the organisation. The Museum is one of the most explicit representations 
of the empathic design and dialogical culture. In the philosophical vision at 
Humanitas (Becker, 2003), the notion of empathy has three key implications: 
empathy as a core feature of entrepreneurship, as an empathic design and an 
empathic way of working by the professionals and volunteers. The first one 
is about the empathic capacity of the manager cum entrepreneur. Together 
with creativity, resourcefulness, perseverance, leadership and the capacity 
to develop and carry out her or his ideas, an entrepreneur who is operating 
within the care sector must, according to Becker, fully rely on empathy and 
intuition. Empathy as a capacity to grasp the situation and the feelings of 
the other person is important in the work with the elderly and especially 
with clients of a nursing home (Becker, 2006). Common practice within the 
care sector for the elderly shows that empathy understood as a set of techniques 
can and must be learnt in order to become a sophisticated instrument in the 
hands of a thoughtful and client-oriented leadership. Let us have a closer 
look at what kind of empathy Becker is talking about here. 
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Usually empathic behaviour is expected foremost from the first-line 
professionals, who are working with the clients directly. The manager 
remains at a distance from the client, because of the entire structure of 
the organisation; this usually causes the fatal loss of any possible basis to 
feel with or like a client. When we look closely at the empathic approach 
that Becker advocates and implements in his everyday work, we can see 
clearly that empathic leadership is not about feeling like or being one with 
a client. Empathic leadership is about addressing the perspective of those 
persons, for whom your leadership can be of service. Becker categorically 
rejects enslavement by the organisation or by the organisation’s research 
methodology (e.g. market oriented questionnaires), which often only appear 
to be client-oriented. According to him people who are dominated by market 
forces are usually not able to see the possibilities for development, which is 
in fact one of the first tasks of leadership. His impressive example of the fifty 
clients at Humanitas ‘who left a nursing home after an average of five years 
for their own lifetime apartments’ but had never asked ‘for this enormous 
improvement in their lives’ (2006: 131) mirrors the dilemma, which caring 
and thoughtful entrepreneurship can face within the contemporary care 
sector for the elderly (see also Mol, 2008). One has to remain involved, close 
and personal, but never pretend to own the ultimate understanding of what 
the other person needs or desires. This rather unorthodox way of interpreting 
empathic leadership has much in common with today’s theoretical debate 
on empathy. While scientists like H. Alma &  A. Smaling (2006) theoretically 
criticise the ‘conception of empathy as psychic identification’, Becker fights 
the same approach in his practical entrepreneurial work by standing by his 
clients, ‘placing oneself imaginatively in another’s experiential world while 
feeling into her or his experiences’ (Alma & Smaling, 2006: 203-204), but not 
becoming one with them. This kind of empathy will not paralyse or stifle 
either the entrepreneur or the client. It allows for freedom to act to the one 
and trust to the other. 
The question remains how this empathic leadership can work – is it totally 
dependable on the personality of the manager? Alma & Smaling come up 
with a clue when analysing the empathic understanding of qualitative 
interviewing. They suggest that ‘empathy is a very sensitive mode of 
interpretive listening, which should be shown’ (Alma & Smaling, 2006: 203). 
Developing this idea I would say that empathic leadership has to possess the 
capacity to converse, i.e. to listen and to hear; in other words to constantly 
stay in dialogue at all levels of the organisation as well as outside it. Keeping 
the dialogue alive at the management level requires both talent and courage. 
Dialogue fortifies management and in many cases opens up boundaries 
where there seemed to be a deadlock only just before, so that each idea that 
looked like an utopia can find its translation into practice. Seeing ageing as 
the creation and celebration of life is a fine example of such an (as it were) 
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utopian idea. Yet, unless we should consider Humanitas itself to be a utopian 
project, ageing within this organisation is celebrated in the most tangible and 
even Epicurean way (Letiche, 2008). Emphatic leadership, with its intrinsic 
dialogic character, provides for, secures and guards this success. 
A detailed elaboration on the topic is given in a recent book written by H. 
Letiche, where the issues of leadership within the healthcare sector are the 
author’s primary focus. Letiche devotes a chapter to the description of the 
Humanitas case, whereby he shows how Becker ‘created an emergent narrative 
phrased in simple guiding principles about what he saw to be the possibilities 
for healing’ (Letiche, 2008: 185). Letiche places the case of Humanitas within 
a broader context of complexity theory. Defining the emergent character of 
healthcare, he argues that its contemporary state appeals for change and that 
this change can and must be empowered by dialogue. This dialogue-imbued 
line of thought forms a clear tangent with our own study. Letiche endows 
dialogue with at least two powerful meanings. The first meaning constitutes 
one of the core features of healthcare and ‘involves dialogical relationships 
of shared and interactive responsibility’. This meaning is essential to the 
human –and not system– and subject-oriented healthcare; at the content 
level it perfectly fits and furthermore strengthens Becker’s understanding of 
professional empathy:
I subscribe to the position that caregivers are responsible and must actively engage 
in that responsibility. Herein there is a dialogic social-philosophical assumption of 
mutuality and relationship. Pure individualism locates the sole focus of responsibility 
within the self and arrives at the cared-for as the key figure responsible for her or his 
healthcare. In a dialogical system, caregiver and cared-for are responsible to themselves, 
to one another, and to their human environment (Letiche, 2008: 5).
The practical dimension regarding the position of the self, which is opened 
up here, is a worthy addition to the discussion on the self, where the dynamic 
connection between self-responsibility and responsibility for the other are 
closely linked with what at Humanitas is referred to as art of living. In fact 
almost every example that was used in the study shows us how the dialogical 
relationships of responsibility operate.
Another meaning of the dialogue, which Letiche strongly promotes in his 
book, is essential to understand Becker’s empathic philosophy of leadership. 
Looking for the place that a dialogue can play in the development of 
healthcare, Letiche searches for the balancing force between ‘the unicity of 
emergence’ and ‘the autonomy of the person’. According to him it is possible 
to preserve autonomy without experiencing it as isolation and loneliness 
within the dynamic and ever changing world. Each person who is eager 
to deal with the tensions and changes of life, is involved in destructive 
and constructive processes of adjustment. A possible way to address this 
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is through joint engagement in an open dialogue within an environment. 
The environment that suits that purpose is however not always available. 
According to Letiche, ‘such a change process requires the creation of spaces 
of creativity where emergence can take place’ (Letiche, 2008: 162-163) and I 
would add dialogue as well. The next step is that ‘space for emergence and 
dialogue needs to be secured, enabling new forms to emerge from the old’ 
(2008: 163). 
However tempting this can be, I shall nevertheless refrain from using the 
terminology of the complexity theory any further. Let me state that I do agree 
with Letiche when he calls the Humanitas approach and practices emergent, 
but for the terminological sake of this book, I would prefer to stay with 
the term process when talking about the evolving ideology and practices at 
Humanitas. As for the dialogue, it seems to have acquired another meaning, 
whether we are talking in terms of emergence or in terms of process. This 
meaning of dialogue is essentially instrumental, and therefore it has a 
potential to be mastered and applied. 
A crucial link with empathic leadership is given in Letiche’s statement about 
the space of creativity and dialogue that ‘needs to be secured’. Dialogue itself 
as a natural mode of sociality has certain powers of self-sustainability. Within 
organisational structures however it is not self-evident. Dialogue can be non-
existent or ‘an empty husk’, and this is exactly the point where the choice has 
to be made for or against empathic leadership and dialogic environment. This 
choice is not only a strategic one. It determines the ethics of the organisational 
ideology and practices and it must be filled with meaning, which in Becker’s 
case is empathically-bound. The result is reached by a constant listening and 
negotiating at all levels of the organisation, which enriches the organisational 
dialogue, providing the leadership with a steady basis to rely on. Going back 
to my starting point, let me conclude that the empathic entrepreneurship 
and management of Humanitas is a multilayered phenomenon, which firstly 
is brought into practice with support of dialogic techniques that define the 
style of the organisational practices; secondly, it is rooted in meanings that 
are theoretically and practically generated from those dialogic practices; and 
thirdly, in the case of Humanitas, it benefits from the energy and talent of the 
entrepreneur himself. 
Emphatic leadership as a dynamic core of Humanitas influences all the 
practices and the design within the organisation. It is not surprising then 
that while describing the implementation of the Humanitas ideology, 
Becker often talks about the empathic design. According to him an empathic 
design helps to create a unique sphere where the clients, regardless of their 
characters, habits and attachments, can simply feel at home. At the same time 
an empathic design will strengthen the organisational narrative and level 
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the differentiation between professionals and clients, turning the traditional 
opposition into a non-traditional unity called extended family (Becker, 2006). 
The home-like empathic design of Humanitas starts with the ‘village square’, 
which is the central hall just behind the main entrance, where the traditional 
chit-chat space is never empty. It looks inviting because of its regularly changing 
art displays, adopted pets and ever luring smells of the restaurant and the bar. 
Let me take just that one example to show how empathic leadership can facilitate 
the empathic styling of the organisational surroundings. ‘The village square’ 
within Humanitas does not introduce anything new into the concept of a usual 
village square. It seems like you do not need any empathic effort to revive an 
image (already standardised by television and books) of a commonly used space, 
where all the latest news is discussed, where the happiest and the most dramatic 
moments of the community 
are performed and witnessed, 
where everybody’s life is 
everybody’s business and 
where at times you do not 
want to go to, but you do it 
anyway because you belong 
there. Neither Becker nor his 
team of advisers needed to 
do any research to realise all 
that. What they did use was 
insight, which most of us 
often possess without seeing 
or anticipating any added 
value in it. Combining a home-like concept with a facility, that is supposed to 
provide accommodation and care for the elderly, was not as simple at all. And 
I am not talking about the technical and financial feasibility of the project here. 
When convinced that an idea is right, I believe that Becker and his team could 
overcome any system-provoked resistance. The entire issue consisted in exactly 
matching two seemingly different worlds, while in actual fact they were not that 
different at all, but artificially split into healthcare and life, professionals and 
patients, accommodations and homes. My conviction is that restoring that unity 
is possible only by means of an empathic approach, where listening to yourself 
and to others can provide the leadership with insights, strong enough to build a 
home for everybody. What finally appeared as the result of an empathic design 
is described by Letiche in the following way:
Instead of designing the facilities around cure or needs of the medical professionals, all 
elements of the facility have been designed to focus on human pleasure, activity, and 
the highest possible quality of life. The life-space is designed to encourage sociability, 
relatedness, and personal contact (2008: 191-192).
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Everything at Humanitas, the facilities, apartments, nursing homes and 
public spaces are now threaded with an empathic design, but its most 
exquisite manifestation I still consider to be the Reminiscence Museum. 
Using the metaphor of Letiche, the Museum can be called a space of creativity. 
The Museum has brought a change into the entire organisation and it is the 
place where change occurs every time a new visitor enters it. These changes 
cannot be controlled, but the entire place, as Letiche suggests, is carefully 
safeguarded by the empathic leadership of Humanitas. 
A number of events and ideas together triggered the start of the project around 
the Museum. As with the village square, the idea of creating a room with old-
fashioned things where clients can reminisce and tell their stories seems to 
be quite worn-out. When Becker said ‘yes’ to the project, the traditional form 
of reminiscence practices was already being reshaped. As usual, he fought 
against any hint at the therapeutic value of the happening, defending the 
priority of care above cure, wellbeing above existence and happiness above 
satisfaction. In other words, the whole idea of the Museum was profoundly 
imbued with empathic thinking. What do the clients miss in their present 
housing and in their narrowing social surroundings? What could restore 
their authority and the attention of others? What would make them forget 
their pain and enjoy the visit? What would give them the pleasure of talking, 
long after the visit has taken place? Those questions were tested in the 
grinding mill of the management team, personnel, volunteers and clients, in 
fact everybody who was interested and willing to help. Empathic thinking 
empowered by dialogically sustained feedback led to the creation of the 
Museum, which itself became the result and an instrument of an empathic 
dialogical approach. Even before the visitors engage in conversations, the 
Museum addresses them in a very personal and specific way. It almost 
literally speaks to them. Only an empathic design could have provided such 
a strong connection between the visitors and a place that they have never 
seen before. But of course, as we have seen in the last examples, it takes more 
than just a place to keep a dialogue going. 
The final meaning of empathy for the Humanitas corporate narrative 
concerns the person-oriented approach in the work of Humanitas personnel 
and volunteers. While talking about the empathic design of his organisation, 
Becker emphasises that without the devoted work of all kinds of people 
within the organisation, the idea of such a design would have never survived 
(Becker, 2006). In that respect, the devotion of the team that takes care of 
the Museum and keeps it running is impressive. Their empathic approach is 
especially noticeable towards the visitors who cannot freely move or express 
themselves. The example of Jennie’s work is instructive here, but we have 
seen that this happens frequently at Humanitas and not only in the Museum 
premises.
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The empathic work of the care-providing personnel and volunteers at 
Humanitas is strongly influenced by its leadership, organisational narrative 
and empathic design. Still, in each individual case it is up to the staff members 
to decide how they will finally translate and fill in that notion and then put it 
into practice. Empathy cannot be measured in terms of norms or standards, it 
cannot be timed per client and it cannot be adjusted according to the client’s 
age either. In an empathic relationship the personality of the care-provider 
is at least as important as the personality of the client. Working within the 
context of Humanitas ideology, the care-providers and the volunteers learn 
at a glance the simple principle of empathic understanding: the clients are in 
their homes here; they are here to live and enjoy their lives, instead of being 
treated and manhandled. In one of his works J. Duyndam presents a very 
empathic definition of the purpose that care-providers can determine in their 
work and which perfectly match the style in which the clients are addressed 
at Humanitas:
The primary purpose of empathy is not to bring people to a better understanding of their 
situation; it is to support and to empower somebody’s self-experience, to prevent them 
from solitary drawing in their own feelings (Duyndam, 2002:141).
This definition has a very strong ethical aspect, which touches on fighting 
the clients’ loneliness and despair, the feelings with which they often arrive 
at the care providing organisation, or that they acquire while being treated 
there. The contradiction between an increase in medical treatment and a 
decrease in self-confidence shows that especially in care organisations for 
the elderly, it is not worthwhile and even cruel to try and treat ageing as 
if it were some kind of ailment or disorder. To understand that requires 
an elaborated empathic effort, in order to succeed in which both of them, 
the care giver and the client, must cooperate together if they are to achieve 
change. To reformulate the issue: it takes an emotional dialogic relationship 
between both parties to banish the phantom of fearful ageing and to find a 
new and inviting meaning to life. Duyndam catches and accentuates this 
emotional aspect in the following observation:
Care relations are concerned with the actual emotions of the client and the corresponding 
potential emotions of the care worker. The empathic help of the care worker includes – 
based on his own potential emotions – opening up, putting them in perspective, linking, 
and adding meaning with respect to the actual emotions of the client… The potentiality 
that the care worker contributes clearly includes the imaginative power with which he 
engages with the client’s actual emotions. It is precisely this imagination, with all its 
potentialities, that is able to force open the inner side of the client’s emotions, give room 
to his feelings, let them breath, add meaning, link them with other experiences (whether 
one’s own or not), put them in perspective and place them in a cultural context, or – to 
summarize all this in one word –empower his self-experience (2002: 148).
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What Duyndam explicitly mentions here is the role of emotions and imagination 
in the empathic work of the professionals, and to this category I would certainly 
add volunteers as well. What remains implicit, but is nevertheless inextricably 
included in his description, is the role of dialogue and interaction. 
Let us try to fully understand what Alma & Smaling (2006) actually mean 
by the final part of their statement: ‘empathy is a very sensitive mode of 
interpretive listening, which should be shown’ (cursive eb). Empathy is 
understood here as an intrinsically interpersonal and shared phenomenon. 
As Duyndam describes it, empathy that is kept to yourself is a kind 
of masochistic, parasitic or ‘gruesome’ feeling. Empathy that has only 
superficial attributes of the all-public compassion, is a farce. True empathy 
should be shown by making contact and it shows itself naturally in all kinds 
of discursive and non-discursive ways. True empathy is just as polyphonic 
as life stories are. It is a powerful dialogic and emotional means, which must 
be shown in order to make a difference, but that cannot be measured or 
standardised. 
An empathically inspired tuning between professionals and clients can 
take place everywhere, but the Museum disposes of additional stimulating 
and emotional incentives to generate it. The double dialogical power of the 
Museum, which was created in dialogue and which remains a party in any 
occurring dialogue, strengthens the interaction and mutual understanding 
of the visiting professionals and their clients in a natural way. The question 
that can be put forward here is whether the occurring dialogue offers equal 
opportunities to each of the visitors of the Museum. In all the examples 
presented in the previous chapter, the visitors could move and express 
themselves freely, therefore a question about parity or, using the term 
proposed by Smaling (2000), about symmetry, never really occurred. The 
description of the visitors’ reactions whose abilities to move and express 
themselves were limited, in first instance triggered a discussion about 
empathic approach and this logically brought us to the issue of symmetrical 
dialogical relations. 
If we look once again at the last example, where the volunteer did her best to 
bring the dialogue about and to keep it going, the notion of symmetry in the 
dialogical relations seems to be inappropriate. Yet, if we consider symmetry 
as a provisional and desirable dialogical condition, then it could be helpful 
and in fact illuminating for an improved insight in the empathic power, which 
dialogue can put into action. When introducing the notion of symmetry, 
Smaling is well aware of its conditional character. Still, he argues that ‘striving 
for symmetry is a realistic enterprise’ (2000: 58). He gives us several reasons 
why symmetry is worthwhile fighting for. Let us try and translate some of 
them into the concrete setting within the Museum, with a visiting client who 
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is using a wheel-chair and has difficulties with concentration and /or speech. 
Firstly, the symmetrical relations that Smaling talks about are communicative 
by nature and can never be absolute. He talks about ‘considerable restriction 
of the symmetry-condition’ regarding unavoidable differences in –to name 
just a few of them– gender, age, education, and I would also add health 
condition. When a volunteer or one of the Museum staff members is talking 
to such a client, then it would be ridiculous to count the number of words 
used or the time that each of the participants takes to formulate a statement. 
All the same, discursive asymmetry can become balanced if one takes into 
consideration all the communicative means, including body language, 
glances, mimics and gestures. As we have seen, it often takes just a sound or 
a touch to transmit a message and decisively transfer two monologues into 
one dialogue. 
Secondly, ‘communicative symmetry is defined as an equal distribution of 
chances to start, to continue or to finish a communicative act’. The question is 
whether during such a visit, both the visitor and the professional / volunteer 
have equal chances to influence the dialogue. In my opinion the chances 
cannot be the same, but all kinds of opportunities are available to both parties 
at the same time. It is also obvious that in practice asymmetry in the use and 
misuse of those opportunities occurs quite frequently, while the possibility 
to restrict this asymmetry depends heavily on the empathic attitude of the 
professionals or volunteers.
Thirdly, symmetry can be attained in dialogical relations by applying certain 
methods or techniques, which in the case of a Museum visit can be based 
on experience and summarized in simple adjustments: of the loudness 
of speech, of the position of the body while speaking to the visitor, of the 
speed in which one talks and of the pause during which an answer can be 
formulated.
Fourthly, according to Smaling the difference in opinions, styles and insights 
can be managed ‘by an ironic attitude’. This last suggestion for approximation 
to the dialogical symmetry I cannot translate into a Museum visit without 
some transformation. For obvious ethical reasons, irony understood in the 
usual sense or as an ‘honest pretence’ (2000: 61) would be inappropriate in 
a dialogue with visitors who cannot follow, appreciate or respond to it. My 
suggestion would be to replace ironic attitude by humour. Humour possesses 
various virtues, among which its healing energy and the restoration of parity 
are especially effective when both parties are striving for dialogical symmetry. 
I have experienced how humour works in practice. In the following example 
it was not just humour, but an impressive combination of professionalism 
and personal involvement, subtly glued together with a deep emotion and a 
sense of humour. 
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One of the professional staff members was accompanying a client of the 
Humanitas nursing home during his visit to the Museum. I saw them from 
a distance, and even before I could hear what they were talking about, I 
was struck by the way they were connected. Not much was said, but their 
dialogue was active and intense. She was asking him simple questions 
about the names of objects and their purpose and then always gave him 
time to think. When a word would not come automatically, she would help 
him softly and present the next question to him, without hurrying but also 
without an unnecessary pause. She would laugh openly when he was right 
or came with a much more sophisticated answer than a person normally 
would do and she teased him subtly when she thought that she was losing 
his attention. The client’s expression was changing continuously and she 
never missed a shadow of it. He was not really smiling, but he definitely 
had a humoristic attitude towards the surroundings and her questions. At 
one point, while she was giving him a compliment, she noticed that he was 
frowning, probably because he found her words to be a pack of nonsense, so 
she corrected herself with a smile, making fun of herself, and he nodded back, 
satisfied. A moment later she proposed an arm wrestling exercise, something 
they had obviously done before, and then I saw a genuine effort from his 
side, accompanied by the realisation of his physical limitation and humour, 
which he remarked upon to himself. The most striking feature of the visit 
was this light and inoffensive sense of humour they were both making use 
of: she in order to support and stimulate, he in order to come to terms with 
his condition and probably to seal the trust he had in their communication. 
Considering the circumstances of the visit I just described, it would probably 
sound as a surprising conclusion, but I think that that summer afternoon I 
witnessed one of the most exceptional examples of dialogical relationship, 
where communicative symmetry, though not granted in advance, was 
sincerely desired by both parties and approximated jointly as a result of all 
the interactive, emotional and empathic means that they had at their disposal. 
It would of course be ideal if each visitor of the Museum were accompanied 
by somebody who knows his or her personal situation, preferences, family 
circumstances and is also somehow related to the client. The remembering 
process can only benefit from relations of trust, even if it presents itself not 
as a life story, embellished with sparkling details, but in the form of words 
or names, trivial but not pronounced for some time already. In actual fact 
the degree of closeness between the professionals and their clients varies 
a lot and as we have seen, the success of their interaction to a great extent 
depends on the empathic capacity of the professionals and on their openness 
towards a dialogue. 
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Bermuda Triangle
The Museum is a stage where an attentive observer can notice various types 
of relationships between professionals and clients, depending on the needs 
and approach of the visitors and their hosts. In certain cases the Museum 
can act as a dialogical party, that helps to restore a reduced relational contact 
by offering to the clients a feeling of recognition, authority and trust. This is 
obvious in the examples where professionals or volunteers safeguard or re-
establish the often fragile connection between the client and the world, but 
it becomes even more visible in cases when another, more systematic, more 
traditional and in a sense anti-Humanitas approach of ‘handling’ the client 
manifests itself. More than once I have observed how a group of professionals 
and their clients who were visiting the Museum for the first time, literally 
split up into two groups: one flock of care-providers, excitedly talking to 
each other, loudly recognising and animatedly pointing out certain objects, 
and further  a quietly parked silent row of wheel-chairs with their clients. 
I do not want to judge the professionals or the excitement they can feel in 
the Museum. Indeed the Museum is a very special place, which appeals to 
several generations with an amazing consistency, simultaneously awakening 
all kinds of memories. But in this context I feel that the professionalism 
of those care-providers should keep them focused on their clients. Their 
knowledge of physiological processes and hygienic rules cannot be more 
important than their responsibility to care for their clients. In those cases 
when the professionals shared their excitement about the Museum with the 
clients instead of with their colleagues, very frequently a new opening for 
personal mutual understanding was created.
As frequently as I have seen ‘parked’ wheel-chairs in the Museum, I have also 
seen Museum volunteers walking towards them, turning them around and 
starting a tour with their occupants, telling stories in the meantime or trying 
to open up a conversation. That is one of the moments when in my opinion 
the Museum acquires an empathic power of its own. With the word museum 
I refer in this case to the complex relational totality of the place, including 
the people working there. The chances of building up a relationship of trust 
and understanding during a relatively brief Museum visit can of course be 
questioned, until we realise that the Museum itself can become a dialogical 
partner, since its stories, perhaps unknown to the professionals were only 
temporarily forgotten by those who experienced them.  
It was during an afternoon in spring when a group of clients from another 
nursing home came to visit the Museum. All five of them were sitting in 
wheel-chairs, but they were accompanied by just two professionals. Without 
elaborating on the logistics of such planning, let me point out to the credit 
of the professionals, that they did their best to attend to each of their clients, 
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but of course the restrictions were obvious. Inside the Museum they were 
immediately assisted by a few volunteers but still one or two of the visiting 
ladies had to wait alone for a while. One of them was apparently interested in 
the school accessories. So her wheel-chair had been carefully pushed towards 
the school corner. She had been sitting there alone for some time and when I 
first saw her it looked as if she was trying to reach for something. So I came 
up to her and asked whether I could help. She pointed to the atlas. I picked 
up the old-fashioned fat book and put it in front of her. I wanted to know 
what she was looking for, but her answer wasn’t very clear and I assumed 
that she had some difficulty with her speech. All the same the lady did not 
look lost. It seemed to me that the tangible presence of the atlas provided her 
with some reassurance. Carefully but with a steady hand she opened the atlas 
and started to turn the pages. I left her for a while, because she was totally 
absorbed in her activity, but I returned after a moment, provoked by my 
own curiosity. She was still looking at the atlas. That time I was determined 
to help, at least if that would be in my power. So I sat next to her on the 
school bench; with our eyes at the same level, our heads leaned towards 
the yellowed pages. For some time we turned the pages together. Then I 
asked my question again, and she said that she was looking for something 
but could not remember the name. That time she sounded very clear to me. 
I started to point at different places, giving her some names. Obviously, 
my line of thought was not very original, because I started with the Dutch 
names and then switched to the Indonesian ones. Suddenly and without any 
visible change, the lady said Florida! I was quite surprised and repeated the 
name; she nodded and I quickly opened the right page. She looked at the 
page and then at me again, and without any problem in expressing herself 
told me that somewhere close to Florida there was that place where many 
ships had disappeared. Almost without believing this I asked whether she 
meant the Bermuda Islands. She confirmed it, radiating confidence and 
satisfaction. I asked her how she had heard about the triangle and she told 
me that she had read a book about all those mysterious events. Thinking 
in terms of now I asked her when she had read it. She replied that it had 
been long ago, maybe 20 years back. Her excitement, the details of her story 
and her almost mystical fear for the place were so fresh and engaging, that I 
could hardly imagine that somebody would still become so excited about a 
20-years old piece of information. It was then that I realised that what I was 
actually witnessing represented a fascinating experience of somebody who 
was browsing through the different planes of her memory as if turning the 
pages of an atlas. The lady was caught in one of those planes for a moment 
because of the sight of the atlas and also because the remembering she had 
‘picked up’ still contained such an extraordinary excitement to her. She 
could have stayed there, feeling trapped within her own memories, within 
that mysterious triangle she feared and admired so much, if it were not for 
our conversation and the chance to share her memory with somebody else. 
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The possibility to talk about her exciting recollections somehow set her free, 
as if she had stepped on the Bermudas and then jumped back again, landing 
safely on the school corner in the Reminiscence Museum. 
It had taken her quite some time to unfold her memory and to ignite the 
remembering process, but our conversation altered her presence decisively. 
She then held my hand tightly and we spent the remainder of her visit 
together. She was showing me the place. She knew all the things that were 
there. It was she who decided on the topics of our conversation and it was she 
who patiently explained all kinds of things to me that I had not been aware 
of. She felt at home, where I was kindly invited as well. When the group to 
which the lady belonged was leaving again, she was genuinely surprised that 
I was not travelling with them. Our conversation and mutual understanding 
had been so natural, as if we had become tuned in to each other.
On the same wave length
If we look back at the visit I described above, using empathy as a mode for 
interpretive listening or as an imaginative power of the care-provider, it can 
partly explain the conditions under which empathic interaction takes place, 
but it still leaves us with the question of what is actually going on under those 
conditions between the parties that are involved. The issue that is at stake 
here brings us back to the discussion on subjectivity. In the definitions that 
are presented above, empathy is explained as an intersubjective phenomenon 
where the self of the care-giver is expected to acquire a certain imaginative 
or listening power and the self of the cared-for will be the recipient. The 
first difficulty arises because the proposed scheme does not support the 
interpretation of the self as a pattern, which shifts the entire discussion 
from the plain of intersubjectivity onto an ontological level, where being is 
understood as becoming. We shall dwell on the consequences of that shift in 
a moment. Another difficulty consists in the fact that the interpretations of 
empathy to which we just referred do not cover all aspects and conditions 
of the situation that was described in the previous paragraph. The Museum 
representative did listen and did use her imaginative power in order to start 
the conversation, but what took place afterwards was a joint effort, where the 
empathic design of the Museum exhibition played an important role as well. 
The complexity of that interaction cannot be explained by an enumeration 
of the initial conditions under which the dialogue took place. This is what 
Letiche was pointing at by saying that ‘mutuality and relationship’ are the 
basis for the dialogue between the cared-for and the care-giver, who are both 
responsible ‘to themselves, to one another, and to their human environment’.
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The question is then what actually enabled the two women, who had 
never seen each other before, to develop a relation of trust and mutual 
understanding within a half an hour at the Museum? In a broader sense the 
question that has to underlie the discussion on empathy will be whether it 
is possible to approximate or to follow what another person experiences or 
means at all. We can assume that the visitor and the Museum representative 
from our example created a temporary social framework within which an 
empathic dialogue became possible. While agreeing on the role that social 
frameworks can play in empowering empathic interaction, our analysis still 
remains at the level of conditions that can stimulate empathy, but it does 
not touch the essence of empathy as a process. What we are aiming at here 
is to understand how two ever-developing and changing selves can be 
synchronized for a couple of fleeting moments in such a manner that the 
fluctuations of the one can be closely followed by the other. We can probably 
answer this question if we look at empathy not as a result of intersubjective 
relations and not as an intentional technique used by the care-giver, but in 
terms of duration and becoming. 
Earlier on we articulated a Foucaultian understanding of the self. The self 
grasped as a form or pattern is a becoming self, the states of which ‘melt into 
each other’. Based on that definition we concluded that if we want to follow 
our own self-pattern, this will be quite a challenge. Furthermore it will require 
a certain self-mastery, let alone the ability to listen to and to understand the 
duration of another life. And yet only understanding the self in terms of a 
pattern and duration can make us understand what empathy as a process 
is about. If we want to rise empathy to an ontological level, then we must 
admit that it is not about conditions or techniques of interaction; empathy 
is about different streams of duration, which under certain conditions are 
brought together in such a way that they are able to envelope each other, 
even synchronize their rhythms for a moment, yet never becoming identical. 
Empathy is not duration; empathy is how different durations overlap, 
creating a tense and unique connection between various streams of life, 
which we call empathic attitude, empathic behaviour or empathic design. 
To decode the ‘mechanisms’ of empathy is not a simple task, since we shall 
be dealing with more than one duration each time.  If we want to start to 
understand what our ‘inner duration’ is, then Bergson’s helpful association 
would be to
(l)isten to a melody with your eyes closed, thinking of it alone, no longer juxtaposing 
on paper or an imaginary keyboard  notes which you thus preserved one for the other, 
which then agreed to become simultaneous and renounced their fluid continuity in 
time to congeal in space; you will rediscover, undivided and indivisible, the melody 
or portion of the melody that you have replaced within pure duration (1922/1999: 34).
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According to Bergson, listening to our own inner duration would involve an 
unusually tiresome effort. Just imagine what kind of exertion it would take 
to ‘hear’ the duration of another human being. Bergson presented another 
example, which has become classical already and in which the complexity of 
the merging between various fluxes is pictured almost graphically:
When we are seated on the bank of a river, the flowing of the water, the gliding of a boat 
or the flight of a bird, the ceaseless murmur in our life’s deeps are for us three separate 
things or only one, as we choose (1922/1999: 36).
Seen from the perspective of inner duration, the durations of the bird and 
the boat can be seen as outside movements. This is how we usually see them, 
by dividing the world around us into simultaneous fluxes. But what escapes 
our attention is that attention itself can be ‘one and several’ and that to see 
the outside movements becomes possible only because of our own duration, 
which has ‘the power to encompass itself’ (Deleuze, 1966/1988: 80). This 
unique human ability to encompass other durations within its own can be called 
the ontological condition of empathy. The ability to envelop durations of others 
rests on the idea that ‘psychological duration, our duration, is only one case 
among others, among the infinity of others’ (Deleuze, 1966/1988: 76):
[O]ne first installs oneself in it by an effort of intuition, one has the feeling of a certain 
well-defined tension, whose very definiteness seems like a choice between an infinity 
of possible durations. This being so one perceives any number of durations, all very 
different from one another (Bergson, 1946/2007: 156).
Thus, ontologically speaking, we feel the durations of others as a kind of tension, 
which becomes especially apparent when we intend to connect with the duration 
of another person. To put it in different words, we resonate the tension created by 
other durations and in that resonating strain for an uncatchable moment we can 
feel the fluctuation of another duration. As we have seen in the majority of our 
examples one of the important preconditions of such an empathic synchronising 
is to create a kind of space, where a person is prepared to open his or her stream 
of duration and let a portion of another stream come inside in a very particular 
and unique manner. What takes place next cannot be described in terms of 
merging or a coexistence. Our understanding of topological relations can be 
helpful here. A mutual enveloping of durations is not a sum of each single 
one of them. Also we cannot talk about it in terms of difference and identity, 
because both are analytic by nature and will fail to explain what the resulting 
sensation would be like. It would be better to describe it in synthetic terms, such 
as reverberation or novelty, as Bergson calls it, which as we have understood is 
inseparable from becoming and duration. In the case that empathic interaction 
actually has taken place, the entire setting is changed, including not only the 
durations of the participating human beings, but of the environment as well. 
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Empathy then can be understood as a particular overlapping between durations, 
which overrides the boundaries of inter-subjective relations. As Bergson’s example 
about the three fluxes shows, the durations which we fold into our own are 
not the durations of human beings only because ‘(t)he universe is made up of 
modifications, disturbances, changes of tension and of energy’, which represent 
‘a radical plurality of durations’ (Deleuze, 1966/1988: 76). This is a very 
important point, which can give us a final touch in the book-long discussion 
about the role, which the exhibition space and the objects on display fulfil in 
creating an empathic environment within Humanitas in general and within the 
Reminiscence Museum in particular. While analysing the relations that visitors 
establish with the space and the artefacts of the Museum, we made use of both 
the ontology of becoming and the ontology of being. In regard to empathy it 
would seem that the ontology of being provides the most appropriate basis, 
from which we can approach the relations between two human beings. And yet 
we have chosen the ontology of becoming, looking for a much more complex 
answer, which almost inevitably led to the topological problem of how one 
pattern of movement can envelope another pattern and keep moving at the 
same time. Now we are expanding our understanding of empathy by including 
into it the relations between human beings and objects, where bizarrely enough 
the ontology of being can help us to find some interesting interpretations. 
We have seen how the equipmental or ready-to-hand character of the objects 
is revived and the familiar links between the objects and their functions are 
re-established. Our conclusion was that the role of the Museum space, design 
and environment cannot be reduced to simple decorative purposes. From the 
position where we are now, we can deepen those conclusions by interpreting 
the process of remembering, which is facilitated by the artefacts, in terms of 
enfolding or enveloping durations as well. When the visitors of the Museum 
recognise something that is on display, they do nothing else but mutually 
(together with their company or the Museum staff) orient themselves towards 
the artefacts, trying to ‘unpack’ them, to establish the connection between their 
own durations and include into them the duration of an object they recognised. 
This does not occur immediately, because each empathic effort is not only about 
synchronisation of time, but takes time as well. A more superficial scanning 
activity, which has nothing to do with the engagement between different 
durations, would never have led to such eruptions of emotion, which can be 
witnessed in the Museum almost every day. Still the question remains why at 
the moment when two durations approximate and even envelope each other, 
the movement does not appear to be suppressed.   
A hypothesis suggested by Brown74, consists in interpretation of the 
interaction between two durations in terms of vibration or attunement. In 
order to elaborate on this we shall use the metaphor of resonance, which is 
explained by Macgregor Wise. In one of his works he reflects on the notions 
of home and identity, which are both important to our study as well (2000). 
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Wise suggests that it is repetition that underlies the possibility to create new 
identifications with space (homes, for example). Those identifications will in 
turn have ‘subject-effects’, i.e. will influence the identities of those who use 
or inhabit those spaces:
It is the pattern of sound, of light, of meaning that constructs the space. Patterns are 
the result of repetition … It is the rhythm (which is different from mere meter), which 
is the organization that fends off chaos. It is the rhythm, a sympathetic vibration or 
resonance, which opens up one milieu onto another. It is this rhythm, which is the basis of 
communication (the sympathetic vibration of divergent series of events; the photograph 
and its subject, the portrait and the family represented are unique, they have gone their 
separate ways, diverged, and yet they resonate (ref). Communication, then, is not the 
exchange of meaning or information (an intersubjective model of communication which 
Deleuze and Guattari reject (ref.), but a resonance (Macgregor Wise, 2000: 302).
The ‘rhythm, a sympathetic vibration or resonance’, is a subtle definition 
for the overlapping durations between the visitors of the Museum and the 
objects on display, which we are talking about here. Wise’s interpretation 
describes the mechanisms of the overlapping quite well. Firstly, it appears 
that there are some patterns in the design of the space which, as a refrain 
of a melody, lead to repetition. The analogy with the first stages of most 
Museum visits is obvious here. Those repetitions in its turn ‘fend off’ the less 
interesting parts of the exhibition, allowing for concentration on those that 
enable the visitor to feel ‘the sympathetic vibration’ of the artefacts, which 
are as it were revived because of the resonating rhythms between various 
durations. The examples with a photograph or a family portrait that Wise 
uses here, strikingly remind us of the Museum display. Following Wise it 
would be possible to understand empathic interaction to be broader than just 
a dialogue between human beings. We can talk about interaction between 
the human being and environment, which leaves intersubjectivity behind 
and can be understood in terms of resonance rather than an exchange. 
So far we have extrapolated upon the traditional understanding of empathy by 
including the diversity of our relations with the world. The empathic feeling, 
which most frequently accompanies visitors’ reactions, is a confirmation of 
the fact that the Museum space does have an empathic design, which mirrors 
the principles on which the entire Humanitas organisation was developed. 
The point that we have reached in our description now is quite exciting in 
itself, because the discussion on empathy has functioned as if it were the last 
piece of the puzzle in the multidimensional journey that we have made.  
74   I am grateful to prof. S. D. Brown for his inspiring insights on the issue of vibration and 
multiplicity of durations.
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In the introductory chapter we promised that the reliance on high-power 
theory would be repaid at the end of the book, where various lines of 
our study would come together in order to open new perspectives in 
understanding the practice which has been described and analysed here. 
This promise will partly be fulfilled in the last chapter, but some important 
remarks should be made now. When we returned to the analysis of the 
practices within Humanitas in the last subsection, we in a certain sense 
completed a full circle and reached the point where our discussion started. 
I assume that the reader agrees with me when I say that our ‘reading’ of 
that practice has changed irrevocably. Not only has our view of it become 
broader, but our understanding of the underlying processes has brought our 
thinking regarding the continuation and improvement of those practices 
to another level. We initially described Humanitas as an organisation 
with a borderless ideology. Now we can confirm that Humanitas practice 
is inherently based on empathic management, design and interaction. The 
founding, arranging and operating of the Reminiscence Museum perfectly 
reflect those organisational features. By now we not only know that the 
Museum is successful for its visitors, but thanks to the ontological and socio-
psychological elaborations on the data, we can also explain how and why it 
takes place. The empathic design, which has been adopted at the Museum, is 
rooted in one’s basic understanding of home environment, and in the case of 
the Reminiscence Museum it envelopes collective images of former domestic 
life, which the generation of the Museum visitors shares. Thus we can see at 
a practical level how, thanks to the Museum, the idea of an empathic design 
within Humanitas developed into a quality mark, which distinguishes this 
organisation from other care-providing institutions. But this is not the only 
conclusion we have reached with regard to the Humanitas practices. 
A probably even more important inference consists in the entirely different 
understanding of the relationships and interactions that are performed 
during the Museum visits. Our theoretical loops allowed us to see that the 
uniqueness of each visit is built upon the unpredictability and novelty of 
the processes which cross each other’s trajectories within the space of the 
Museum. There is no specific reason for the visitors to react to the artefacts 
on display in a certain way, since they usually do not have any previous 
relationship with them. Likewise there is no particular reason why those 
objects should end up in the Museum exhibition. And yet, the visitors, the 
staff and the objects on display are brought together for a couple of fleeting 
minutes. Various temporalities, each of which has its own history and 
pattern, cross in a very particular way and then part again, bearing within 
themselves traces of an empathic resonating movement which is already 
integrated in a life-long pattern. 
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Finally, the most important conclusion we can now make concerns a different 
way of thinking about how the spaces of ageing can be built. As the example 
of Humanitas shows, the environment, which can be characterised by an 
empathic design and subsequently can be accepted by the elderly as their 
home, must fold both people and things, allowing for interaction between 
them. This interaction is based on mutually encompassing rhythms of 
different durations and temporalities, which cohere in a very specific way. To 
create spaces where different forms of coherence among various durations 
can co-exist is not just a problem of design. Beside aesthetical issues there is 
the much more important ethical issue of creating an environment where the 





Introduction – Intersecting skeins – Intentions, paradoxes and convergences – Openings: Nostalgic 
heterotopias of ageing – Fluid models of care
One afternoon a family came to visit the Museum. The old fragile lady in 
the wheel-chair wore a fur coat. It was not cold, but she was shivering a bit 
and felt cold all the same. She was 93 years old; she had difficulties with 
her hearing, and her memory did not serve her well anymore. She was 
accompanied by her daughter and son-in-law, who had told her in advance 
that they were going to visit the Reminiscence Museum. She had obviously 
forgotten that even before they arrived at the Museum. When she looked 
around, she instantly knew where she really was. She kept saying ‘This is all 
yours!’, addressing her children partly with admiration, partly surprised. 
She named dozens of objects. She knew exactly what they were for and 
what they were called. She was excited, her voice was raised and she also 
felt warm again. She was laughing and said to her children ‘And this is 
all yours!’ again and again. Her daughter and son-in-law smiled back but 
did not try to correct her. At first they said nothing at all, but later on they 
actively confirmed her illusion (if it was an illusion at all). The old lady was 
convinced that she was at home. It was not her home though. That she also 
knew for sure. But because everything was so familiar and her children were 
there as well, she made the link effortlessly. It was their home. A home full of 
beautiful and exciting things that she knew and could recognise. At the end 
of the visit her daughter asked her whether she had liked it. The old lady did 
not hear the question, but somehow intuitively understood that she would 
be leaving soon. She looked disappointed. Her voice lowered and without 
realising that she was answering, she said ‘I found it wonderful. I found it 
wonderful, you know.’ Her daughter understood that her mother had not 
heard her, so she repeated her question. The lady listened, but still could not 
hear what her daughter was saying. She was anticipating the end of the visit 
and thought that she had heard the word ‘home’. So she said very softly ‘Are 
you going home? But you are at home?!’ The daughter made one last effort; 
she came to the other side of her mother’s wheelchair and repeated her 
question. Her mother finally heard her. Both were noticeably relieved. The 
daughter heaved a sigh and her mother said loudly and distinctively this 
time: ‘I liked it. I found it beautiful. I found it absolutely fantastic. Nothing 
rubbish. No rubbish. No. No, you know’.
***
Already at the very beginning of this research project, visits like the one 
described above inspired me to aim at an interdisciplinary theoretical 
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embedding of the research, where the space of the Museum, the remembering 
practices and the elderly visitors who are engaged in them form an intricate 
relationship of mutual influence and interdependency. Moreover, at the 
content level it seemed like each of the conceptual lines intersected one 
another within a common projection zone, which we correspondingly named 
the theme of domesticity, the home- and family-bound memories and the 
enduring link (between generations). The theme of home (caring for home, 
feeling at home, protecting home) simmered through all the descriptive 
chapters, forming a heterogeneous but pattern-like common basis for the 
three discussions. It feels like the right moment to reflect on that underlying 
uniting theme in order to see whether it can further enrich the interpretation 
of the practical setting that was presented so far. 
A couple of months after the project had started my initial interest in the notion 
home and the role it could play within the research about the Reminiscence 
Museum received an additional impulse. Humanitas was granted the 
opportunity to conduct another study, which was initiated by ZonMW, 
the Netherlands Organisation for Health Research and Development. This 
project was called ‘Aged and still making choices…?’ The research team was 
expected to investigate how elderly people make choices regarding their 
care and living conditions in later life. My involvement in the second project 
was incidental; at the time it did not seem to have direct relevance to my 
own research. Yet, when the preliminary conclusions of the second research 
became available (Maas et al., 2009), a few convergent lines between the two 
projects became evident. The first one concerns the process-bound way in 
which the representatives of the older generation make their choices, while 
the second refers to the specific features of the place that the older clients 
look for to spend the final (sometimes tens of) years of their lives.
The two conclusions were formulated as follows:
The elderly will be making choices continuously, both at home and in the nursing 
home. During the framing of the project we focused on the moments when elderly 
people make choices as they grow older. From the investigation it appears that this is 
about a continuous and never ending process, that often takes place in the form of self 
management, sometimes with assistance from known or unknown networks, and very 
incidentally with delegation to others …
…
The stories show that the clients choose to maintain and continue with their social 
network / life patterns. In other words they see a care- and living-centre as an extension 
of their existing world of relations, values and habits and they express a preference for a 
home on the basis of very subjective criteria (feelings, advice, impressions). The latter is 
somewhat different from just making a choice (2009: 133, 134). 
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There are various aspects in those statements that intersect, confirm and 
enrich the results of our own study. The most striking one is probably the 
process character of making choices. The authors show quite convincingly 
that the ‘moment’ for decision making is in fact infinitely stretched in time 
and space, and that it would be pretentious to think that someone can simply 
enumerate all the potential influences that people take into consideration 
before deciding to move from their homes. This idea takes us back to the 
discussion about the complex interplay between continuity and change, 
which threads our lives and becomes a real challenge at a later age. The idea 
of the present study, namely that remembering practices in a later age can 
help us to meet this challenge, to cope with changes and to make choices, 
feeds back the conclusions that are presented above. 
Another line of thought that is presented in the second research, deals with 
various factors that the older generation considers in order to make a choice. 
The questions were which kind of factors the people themselves consider 
to be most important and which kind of living conditions should meet 
their requirements. By asking those questions the researchers refer to the 
memories and reflexions of the clients. Compared to the conversations in the 
Museum those interviews are not spontaneous, but they do show the same 
constant interplay between socially influenced and personal preferences, 
which finally determine the choice making process. The main theme in the 
interviews and reflexions is the notion of home, which makes the project 
especially interesting for our own research. As the report points out, there 
are various dimensions to the notion of home, which the elderly clients 
consider while choosing their future homes and even afterwards, when they 
are already living in their new homes. The issues regarding independency, 
self-management, the continuation of social contacts, the proximity to family 
members and a familiar neighbourhood – each of these aspects determines 
their choices and yet, as the report states, looking for a home (and I would 
add feeling at home) is ‘somewhat different’ than simply making a choice. 
If we ask ourselves what reasons enabled the old lady from our example 
to suddenly feel at home in a place where she had never been before, then 
a simple enumeration of causes would not be satisfactory. The lady found 
herself in the space of the Museum, which is completely furnished with old-
fashioned objects from former domestic life. That was without any doubt 
a strong factor for her to associate the exhibition with home, but it was far 
from being the only one. She could talk freely, while reviving her memories 
about the things so familiar to her, and she had her children around her to 
listen and to react to her stories. All those factors together were important 
in forming her ‘illusion’, but not simply one by one, or one + one. It can be 
useful here to return to our topographic and topological approaches towards 
data analysis. By applying a topographic description to the lady’s reasoning, 
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we shall be able to inventory the factors which influenced her assumption 
of being at (her children’s) home. Such an analysis can give us an in-depth 
description of the external elements, which played a role during the visit, but 
it leaves the questions of its inner mechanisms out of the picture. The ‘why’s’ 
of the setting, or what we called the topology of the observed situation will 
remain concealed.  Topological analysis is not based on enumeration or on 
the sum of factors, and it does not follow the cause-effect logic either. It is 
similar to the process of mixing two colours, blue and yellow for example, 
whereby as a result we can distinguish a new quality, i.e. green, and not the 
sum of the initial components. The feeling of coming home or belonging to 
the place, which is repeatedly awakened during the visits, is exactly that 
kind of a new quality which visitors of the Museum experience as a result 
of their complex interaction with their company, the staff, the objects and 
the entire space of the Museum and the Humanitas organisation. This new 
quality is not a moment but rather an interval, a changing trajectory of the 
crossing lines or durations, which meet each other in a very particular way 
in that very particular space called the Reminiscence Museum. In order to 
understand what underlies that persistent feeling of home and belongingness 
at the Museum, it seems worthwhile to make this last effort and synchronise 
the story we developed so far, with the movement within that interval.
In the following description we shall look at the experiences of the elderly 
Museum visitors from two different angles. Firstly, we shall match the 
visitors’ bias towards their home-bound memories with the philosophical 
notion of dwelling, and secondly we shall give a more integral interpretation 
of the effects that the Museum as a phenomenon has on its visitors, the staff 
and the entire Humanitas organisation. We shall end the section by joining 
the various lines of this study, thus fulfilling the promise that was made in 
the introductory chapter. The last section is devoted to the new research 
perspectives that are enabled and inspired by the results of this study.
Intersecting skeins
Domesticity as a theme and home as a notion were introduced into the study 
at the very start. As we have seen, the Museum space gradually acquired 
the shape of a home. The visitors’ memories are usually connected to their 
homes and family lives. The most frequent themes of the conversations that 
take place in the Museum are about the visitors’ present concerns: their 
relations with their children, their homes and belongings, the fate of their 
generational knowledge and cultural heritage and the way they wish to be 
remembered. Considering all that, the theme of domesticity clearly does 
not cover the diversity of the topics that were initiated during the visits. At 
the same time the notion of home, while highlighting the main direction of 
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the visitors’ memories, remains very ambiguous. Home-bound memories, 
which are often facilitated by the Museum display, bring into the foreground 
the relations of the visitors with the surviving materiality of the past, but the 
changing character of the visitors’ lives seems to remain obscure. In actual 
fact the awakened feeling of home does not defer the acceptance of changes, 
but on the contrary encourages the visitors to face them in order to embrace 
and master the future. In other words the notion of home can be understood 
as a process as well. When shifting from a concept to a process it would be 
more precise to talk about dwelling instead of home. 
From a semantic point of view the word dwelling reflects the process character 
of this study. But it is the philosophical meaning of dwelling as interpreted 
by Heidegger that opens a new perspective in this research. The possibility 
to interpret remembering and ageing in terms of dwelling is rooted in the 
complex meaning of dwelling, which Heidegger elaborated in his essay 
Building, Dwelling, Thinking. Starting with the most explicit relation between 
dwelling and building as ‘end and means’ (Heidegger, 1971: 144) he deepens 
the analysis, unfolding the complexity of relations, which according to him 
is always initially given in the language, but is then concealed or ‘falls into 
oblivion in favour of foreground meanings’ (1971: 146). What correlates 
strikingly with the description of the remembering processes at a later age 
are the two modes of dwelling, which Heidegger discovered by means of an 
etymological analysis of the word building. One mode means ‘to cherish and 
protect, to preserve and care for, specifically to till the soil, to cultivate the 
vine. Such building only takes care - it tends the growth that ripens into its 
fruit of its own accord. Building in the sense of preserving and nurturing is 
not making anything’ (1971: 145). The second mode is closer to the modern 
understanding of building and means ‘constructing’, creating, producing. 
According to Heidegger both modes together form the complex meaning 
that we give to dwelling.
   
Here the interpretations of remembering and ageing on the one hand and 
dwelling on the other interrelate in a very evident and yet particular way. 
Remembering understood in a traditional way is about preserving, keeping 
safe, nurturing and even cultivating. Yet, as we have already seen it is also 
about reconstructing, re-evaluating and creating new meanings in life. Let us 
once again look at the exhibition at the Museum, which can be called a very 
special manifestation of such preservation and reconstruction. Humanitas 
started collecting objects for the Museum in order to create an interactive 
space, where the older generation could talk about the past, thereby enjoying 
the united effort of recollection, authority and knowledge. This abstract 
idea was influenced by the participation of a number of people who made 
its implementation tangible and concrete. The curator of the Museum, the 
staff and the people living in Humanitas, the team of the volunteers and 
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the visitors of the Museum all acted together by donating artefacts, making 
suggestions and offering their services, thus effectuating the idea of what 
and how should be preserved, nurtured and cultivated in the Museum. What 
struck the director of Humanitas four years ago, when he was listening to 
the spontaneous stories of his visitors, was the most direct manifestation of 
dwelling in its caring and preserving mode. The result of that united effort of 
preservation was difficult to foresee. The Museum has not become another 
commemorative or historical site for immortalisation of the past. It also does 
not pretend to show how certain material and cultural artefacts from the past 
should be preserved. It simply presents a multifaceted picture of various 
pasts, which does not have one owner or one author and which in some 
particular way appeals to a variety of people and even generations.  
When Heidegger speaks about dwelling as preserving, his explicit message 
is that preserving the world (or the fourfold in his terminology) takes place 
‘in things’. The amount of attention that materiality and things were given in 
the preceding description of the Museum space, of the remembering practices 
and of the empathic culture of Humanitas, was not accidental. We have seen 
things as gatherings and locations, which on the one hand anchored the 
visitors’ memories and on the other hand opened up possibilities for new 
meanings in later life. One of the key components of the Museum’s success 
is the remembering it evokes, which often starts even before the visitors have 
arrived at Humanitas. Those of them who decided to donate artefacts to the 
exhibition, were engaged in a sorting out process beforehand in order to 
decide what would be worthwhile for the Museum. If following A. Hecht, 
we agree that our homes are the ‘private museum(s) of memory’ (Hecht, 
2001: 123), then each of the visitors who wants to donate certain personal 
belongings, has to become the museum curator of his or her own life for a 
brief moment. As a result, a simple act of donation is in fact not that simple 
at all. By making the effort to preserve some of the old-fashioned objects 
of one’s former domestic life, and later on by engaging in remembering 
practices, the visitors of the Museum dwell. Let us look at that simple act in 
all its relational complexity. 
 
When elderly people bring their possessions to the Museum, they can be 
driven by various intentions. It can be the necessity to ‘clean up’ their houses 
(or sometimes the houses of relatives that have passed away), because soon 
they will be facing the dilemma’s resulting from lack of space. The generation 
in question often contemplates the decision to move to a service-flat or a care-
providing facility, which means that people have no other option than to sort 
out their personal possessions (think of Rebecca’s story). Sometimes going 
through their belongings, which were accumulated during their entire lives, 
becomes not only a physically tiresome but also an emotionally trying activity. 
Often this activity is deferred, because the confrontation with the totality of 
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your own memories can be even more threatening than the necessity to clear 
up the space. Finally, when the decision has been taken and the clearing up 
has started, another dilemma arises, namely the destiny of the belongings 
that cannot be taken along to another place. The decisions that people take at 
that point, depend on their personal preferences and situations. According to 
their owners, some of the belongings have a common historical, cultural or 
generational value, which still can have an educational function. Others are 
very personal; they are witnesses of important (often family-bound) events, 
they have scars and contain stories that have profoundly influenced the lives 
of their owners, so parting with them would feel like detaching them from 
an important part of yourself. 
The visitors and donators of the Museum go through those processes 
when they have to take important decisions in their lives. The complexity 
and dramatic nature of the feelings, relations and influences involved in 
those processes cannot be underestimated (Maas et al., 2009). The French 
anthropologist J.-S. Marcoux calls this process ‘casser maison’ and explains it 
as follows:
Elderly people moving from domesticity to care, usually into a smaller place, need to 
separate from many if not most of their belongings irrevocably. That is what is commonly 
described as ‘casser maison’. Things are then discarded for fear of lacking space. They are 
discarded on the advice of the residence authorities or on that of health-care workers, 
in order to reduce the amount of obstacles, in the hope of reducing the risk of a fall … 
Getting separated from one’s belongings, however, often equates with getting separated 
from all that appears to be stable and familiar, everything that could be accounted for 
and mastered; sometimes all that remains (Marcoux, 2001a: 80).  
Elaborating on several case studies, Marcoux shows what kind of 
unpredictable dramatic effects the necessity to move to another place 
can cause. Marcoux’s interest lies primarily in the sphere of the relations 
between the elderly people and their material possessions. He strikingly 
calls the necessity to sort out things the ‘dispossession process’ and the 
feeling that often underlies it the ‘fear of emptiness’ (Marcoux, 2001b: 216). 
There are various aspects here that are worth reflecting upon. To start the 
sorting out process means to start ‘an excavation of memory’. To make the 
right choice about which belongings must be taken along, ‘requires us to go 
into the details, to the heart of things for one cannot content oneself with an 
overview’ (Marcoux, 2001a: 78). This is not an easy task, because opening old 
albums, drawers and cases can have the same effect as opening Pandora’s 
box. Parting from everything that seemed to be ‘stable and familiar’, means 
accepting the changes that the person has undergone, which entails a very 
challenging process of self-change, which we described in our discussion 
on subjectivity. Another difficulty arises when choices have been made. The 
objects that will be taken to the new home, Marcoux calls metonymy, which 
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comprises the notion of house, but a more acute question concerns the rest 
of the belongings. This seemingly simple question turns out to touch upon 
the essential issues of moving to another place at a later age. An obvious 
step, like for example giving your own things to family members, is not that 
obvious anymore. During the Museum tours the visitors often tell with a 
kind of a sad regret that their children and grandchildren did not want to 
have the old-fashioned things in their houses. One can give enough reasons 
for this changing attitude, starting with the ideas of overconsumption and 
finishing with much more practical reasons, like the lack of space in modern 
houses. All the same, the older generation is often left to decide on its own 
which things can stay and which ones must go forever. 
Such a decision seems to be only a part of planning and logistics. The entire 
line of analysis within this study has taught us that each simple question 
turns into a juxtaposition of more complex issues if we look at it not as a 
given fact, but as a process. The act of giving things away may be seen as a 
single step, but the pattern according to which those things (each of which is 
an embodiment of its own duration) were brought together, cherished and 
taken care of, does not sustain such an abrupt ending. A life-long process 
does not end with a single act of clearing up. Not only do people resist such 
a rupture, but things too show a resistance against such acts of extinction. 
While ageing, people inevitably ask themselves how and whether at all 
they will be remembered, spoken of, idealised or even cursed afterwards. 
Continuation in almost every possible form is preferable to oblivion. Personal 
belongings, which will survive, can be seen as insurance tickets into future 
times, when their owners won’t be there anymore. All those contemplations 
suggest that the ultimate decision that must be taken by the elderly person 
who is moving to a new place, is not about the possessions themselves but 
about the way he or she wants to be remembered. While deciding on the destiny 
of their personal belongings, people project the future reminiscences of 
their new owners in advance. In a sense, by giving things away the older 
generation usurps the place in other people’s homes and memories, making 
sure that they will not disappear into oblivion. Yet this natural and touching 
strategy does not always work as expected, and people can be left in isolation, 
surrounded by all their possessions, which constitute their world and which 
will vanish together with their owners. 
It was one of the examples described by Marcoux, where the elderly person 
was left with possessions that nobody wanted to take over, which suddenly 
made me realize what the possibility to donate things, which Humanitas 
offered to people, could really mean: 
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I(i)t is the act of receiving that becomes an act of generosity; the donor falling, in a sense, 
at the mercy of his or her recipients. It is the recipient who is doing a favour by being 
willing to accept the belongings (Marcoux, 2001b: 229).  
The roles are turned around here. Donating things as an act of generosity is 
the most straightforward explanation of the meaning that the Museum can 
offer a priori to the people who bring personal belongings for the exhibition. 
The deeper meaning of donation, which is only rarely stated explicitly, is the 
appreciation of their donation, which comes not only in the form of a thank-
you-letter, but is also reflected in the positioning of their belongings in the 
displays and rooms of the Museum. This meaning is deeply appreciated, 
which can be seen during the visits of the donors of the artefacts, who bring 
their families, friends and acquaintances in order to actually show them 
their own things and accompany the visit with their personal stories and 
memories. 
But the Museum provides the visitors and especially the donors of the 
exhibition with something even more important than feelings of satisfaction 
and public appreciation. For many of them the Museum display is a 
legitimization of their life stories and a justification of the generational 
wisdom. When the visitors see the reconstructed image of past domestic life, 
the natural doubt (was it really so?) is defeated and the authority of knowledge 
is restored in its rights. As a result the Museum works as a revitalisation of 
the visitor’s present life and as an invitation into the future. The visitors who 
enjoy the Museum tour suddenly experience the almost forgotten feeling of 
being experts and knowing better than others. Many of them do not want to let 
that feeling go. They look for a way to stay associated with the Museum’s 
network and often offer their services as volunteers. 
Offering things, offering knowledge, offering services – all these forms of 
donation and participation represent a range of techniques, the purpose of 
which is to look for a meaningful life at a later age. This is how dwelling 
actually occurs. The process of dispossession turns into preserving and caring. 
The displacement of things and people is transformed into a challenging 
process of emplacement and nurturing. The detachment from familiar places 
and people changes into a process of building a new home, a new network. 
Dwelling understood in these terms is a trying life process, but it is also a 
rewarding one. 
In this new context the Heideggerian definition of dwelling as preserving 
and constructing allows for a parallel with the processes of continuity and 
change, which characterise remembering at a later age. The data analysis 
shows how multi-sided and multi-relational the remembering practices 
during Museum visits can be. It seems as if in every short story or comment 
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the visitor manages to bring together an entire world of relations, which 
constitutes a human life. While standing in the washing corner and looking 
at the old-fashioned washing machine or the wringer, those trustworthy 
companions of former domestic labour, the visitor can see his or her mother 
filling a heavy vessel with hot water, soaking the linen in it, lifting it to the 
oil-stove and leaving it there till the following morning. The visitor can 
almost literally smell the soapy steam and feel the tension in the arms, just 
like many years ago when he or she was helping mother to transport the 
washing through the wringer. Then he or she, as if awakened, can heave a 
sigh and think with relief that times have changed and that the hardships of 
domestic labour are gone forever. 
What regularly happens in the washing corner can be linked back to our 
previous discussion about the truth, understood in Heideggerian terms of 
unconcealment. On the one hand, the objects that are placed in the room are 
gatherings, which ‘enclose’ their stories in their belonging to the earth, as 
Heidegger puts it. On the other hand, ‘things appear in the world, and thus 
appearing, keep the world open’ (Barbaza, 2003: 64). Through this opening 
(i.e. the interaction which takes place between the objects and the visitors) 
the truth reveals itself. In order to understand how it takes place let us look 
once again at what the sight of the old-fashioned washing facilities gathers at 
the Museum. Heidegger calls it fourfold, where the earth, the sky, the divinities 
and the mortals come together. That highly poetical understanding of the 
world is presented by Heidegger in his later works. It is based on the world’s 
relational character and the role that things, understood as gatherings and 
locations, play in those relations. But ultimately it are the mortals who dwell 
in the world and by dwelling unite and preserve it as one entity. Allow me to 
stylize the description of the washing corner in Heidegger’s way. 
The bulky wooden washing machine, which used to stand outside the house or in the 
barn, still wears the warmth of the trees that were used to make it. The wood that 
was used to shape the vessel of the machine, still keeps the warmth of the earth, which 
fed and watered the trees, letting them grow on the earth and under the sky. The sky 
gave the trees water and warmth of the sun, the same water that then was used in the 
vessel of the machine, where the washing was done. The washing was already on the 
earth under the sky with the blessing of the birth, which came into the world because 
of the woman, the mother of the family, who carried the divine start of a new life. The 
hands of the woman carefully touched the warmth of the wood, cut through the silk 
of the water, completing the washing for her children, her husband, for the family, 
which was the purpose of her stay on the earth and under the sky. She, who in her 
every day labour brought the earth and the sky together was already blessed with the 
gift of giving birth and was prepared to die when the time would come. The woman 
dwelled by preserving, nurturing and giving new life to the world, under the sky, 
believing in it and being ready to die when the time comes. 
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This particular way of defining the relational character of dwelling in the 
world on the basis of remembering experiences that occur in the Museum, 
may seem to be a far cry from the actual manner in which the visitors react 
to the exhibition. But let us not be too hasty in reaching conclusions. Apart 
from the specific literary style, the description given above quite accurately 
reflects the memories of the Museum visitors, both at the content and at the 
emotional level. Poetically tinted reactions of the visitors are not unusual in 
the Museum, let alone an explicit emotional response, which can range from 
open and contagious laughter on the one hand to modest melancholy and 
unexpected tears on the other. While following the Museum conversations, 
we have seen that not everything that the visitor experiences there is made 
explicit, but the depth of the remembering, the re-evaluation and realization 
of the on-going changes of one’s life are clearly present. The Museum visits 
cause very particular shifts in the way the visitors see their former and future 
lives. The Museum almost literally facilitates the possibility to slow down the 
pace of time, in order to synchronise your own duration with those of others 
and to grasp the complexity of relations within this unique way of dwelling, 
which each of us calls my own life. As we have seen, there are various ways 
to cope with that overwhelming complexity. Some of the visitors open up 
slowly, self-protectively taking some time for adjustment before the deeper 
planes of memory are reached. Others take a jump into that depth as if they 
were waiting for the opportunity already for quite some time. In these and 
other cases however it is still impossible to predict what kind of turn the 
remembering will take at the next moment. The beauty of the observed data 
consists in the fact that in the Museum remembering occurs as a voluntarily 
process. The visitors are not interviewed there, so ultimately they themselves 
define what and when will be remembered and made explicit to their company. 
As a result, instead of a chronologically arranged and carefully orchestrated 
life review, one witnesses a number of syncopated interactions, which reminds 
us of a resonating pattern between various durations. If we would persist in 
trying to understand what is happening there by still artificially blocking the 
flow of life, we would in fact never leave the vicious circle of unexplained 
paradoxes. But when the stabilized instance of somebody’s life is brought 
back into duration, the continuation of dwelling is restored. An isolated 
narration does not make any sense if we persist in listening to it and looking 
at it beyond the context of the narrator’s life. Ultimately only the narrator 
himself can see and understand the logic of his interactions, but in the mean 
time the listener has already become part of the narrator’s world and vice 
versa. They are already related to each other and the listener’s reaction to the 
story already shapes the visitor’s future life. 
 
Dwelling, thus, is a polysemic notion. It brings together our personal ideas 
of home and the complex world around us, where this home must still be 
given a place. I say must be given, because we all often live with an idea of the 
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ideal home, which is a complex and subtle mixture of our experiences and 
our imagination75. We project this idea into our current dwellings, but there 
will always be something to dream of, while one is thinking about his or her 
ideal home. Memories, as we have seen, play a decisive role in shaping that 
image. When we talk about the understanding of home at a later age, the 
notion becomes even more complex. The questions that arise are whether 
there is still a possibility to look for an ideal home and whether the current 
dwelling is not actually that ideal home? 
What our journey through the project offers as a possible answer is that the 
meaning of home must be looked for in the process of living and not in the 
achievements of life. By means of dwelling, understood as preserving and 
constructing, we ultimately feel at home where we can actually dwell, in a 
luxurious mansion, in a modest flat or in a life-time apartment at Humanitas. 
In order to explain the diversity of various possibilities of dwelling, we may 
need to quickly look back at our discussion on the self and identity. The self, 
understood as a form or a pattern, already supplies us with a foundation on 
which our internal feeling of being at home (i.e. knowing who we are) abides. 
Each pattern is unique, but as we have also seen, this pattern develops not in 
autonomous isolation, but within the diversity of our relations with the world 
that we inhabit. At the same time the self must be taken care of. The act of 
caring finds its most direct manifestation in what we call the self-mastering. 
There is therefore an obvious coherence between understanding both the 
self and dwelling, in terms of preserving (caring) and constructing. This 
interplay logically brings us to the cross-section of various processes, which 
from the very beginning of this study formed the focus of our attention.
Intentions, paradoxes and convergences
Three questions: where, how and why remembering takes place – 
were identified at the beginning of this research. Those questions were 
correspondingly translated into the concepts of space, memory and age. Those 
concepts had a common conceptual projection, namely the theme of home. 
We saw the intersecting areas of those concepts as a juxtaposition, which 
acquired a strong spatial representation thanks to the premises and display 
of the Reminiscence Museum. Space, memory and age are not homogeneous 
concepts. The stability of the initial conceptual framework enabled me to 
start with the project, but in the end it was the process approach within the 
analysis that has led me to understand what, where and why was happening 
with the people who come to visit the Reminiscence Museum in Rotterdam. 
75   More about imagined homes see in Rubinstein (2005) and Watkins & Hosier (2005).
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While following the development of the Reminiscence Museum, we have 
seen that the creation of the location for the Museum was not a unidirectional 
process. Understanding space as a homogeneous concept, described in terms 
of extension and divisibility, can be very helpful at a certain stage, but not 
sufficiently to grasp the mobility and multilayered character of emplacement. 
A topological interpretation of the Museum space in rhizomic terms of folds 
and disturbances allows us to break up with the rigidness of immobility and 
shows the possibilities to see materiality in terms of relations and processes. 
When we turned to memory and looked at the remembering practices that 
occurred in the Museum, the heterogeneity and mobility of the processes that 
shaped remembering, manifested itself in various modes and actions. This 
time it was an explicit combination of movements in time and space, based on 
an undividable, all-threading duration. What takes place in the Museum can 
be described as a kind of evolving spatiality, soaked with remembering and 
at the same time producing a very special temporality, which accompanies 
the actualisation of past experiences. But this specific temporality appears 
not for the sake of the past. It is necessitated by the situation, which emerges 
during the Museum visits. At the same time it is supposed to counterbalance 
the on-going changes, which the visitors of the Museum acutely experience 
as the consequences of ageing. 
Finally, the concept of age was initially seen as a temporal notion, but 
the traditional understanding of age is bound to chronological time. The 
description shows that age can and must be seen in terms of mobility and 
change, in both measurable and qualitative terms. The spatiality of ageing 
manifests itself in social conditions, such as the economic positioning of 
the elderly in our society, or the quality of their lives in care-providing 
institutions. The temporality of ageing constitutes its essence and can 
be understood in terms of two inextricably connected processes, such as 
continuity and change.  
As a result, when we looked at the substantivised concepts of space, memory 
and age once again, we experienced the rigidness of their juxtaposition. The 
initial conceptualisation implicitly contained an effort to homogenize three 
highly heterogeneous notions and set them in a linear series of terms, which 
are both a-temporal and a-mobile. At the same time the entire description is 
directed to the emerging practices at Humanitas and deals with the evolving 
data of the Museum visits. In order to bring the movement back into the 
conceptual structure of the research, I have followed the process-bound 
practices that have been described in the previous chapters. This research 
has become a process-oriented study of emplacement, remembering and 
ageing. The verbalisation brings the dynamics of each concept and also the 
dynamics of their interaction into a renewed conceptual framework. As a 
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result the heterogeneity of the movements that we have seen should not be 
understood as purely spatial or purely temporal but rather as an intricate 
fusion of both. 
The ever-changing place of the Museum was the starting point for our 
journey. Material things that were brought or collected for the exhibition, 
were supposed to introduce some stability into the space, which still had 
to be shaped into the future museum. But as we have seen, the materiality 
of the Museum caused various shifts and folds in its space, filled it with 
polyphony of narratives and made it highly interactive and relational. As a 
result a paradox soon occurred whereby traditionally understood carriers 
of (at least visible) immobility were producing movement and change at 
various levels, physical, discursive and social – to name just a few. 
Then, when the visitors came to the Museum, one could get the feeling as if a 
second collecting of ‘artefacts’ was taking place. Most of the visitors belonged 
to the older generation. Many of them, based on their nostalgic feelings and 
a lack of active participation in life, felt ‘displaced’, almost in the same sense 
as the objects of the Museum exhibition. They were representatives of other 
times, of another century even. Following the accepted behaviour pattern 
within modern society, they had already decided or would soon have to 
decide when and how to move from their houses to care providing or care-
bound facilities, which would mean to leave behind not only the places 
that they called their homes, but also to part with most of their personal 
belongings. 
So the Museum first accumulated displaced things, which were old, left 
behind or deserted, and then it attracted people who could feel displaced as 
well. The anticipation of the effect that the Museum was expected to have 
on the visitors was straightforward: the visitors would see and recognise 
certain things from the past. By doing this they would find a new (almost 
forgotten) topic to talk about, which would fill their day, strengthen their 
social network and improve their self-esteem. But then a further paradox 
occurred. What at the surface seemed to be a story about the past, turned out 
to be the story about the visitor’s current life, about his or her worries, joys, 
problems and hopes. The stories only borrowed their shapes and plots from 
past experiences, while in fact focusing on the present concerns and in many 
respects on the future ones as well. 
When it became obvious that bridging the past and the present by 
remembering practices takes place in a natural way, another expectation was 
awakened, namely that remembering at a later age has a clearly stabilising 
function, especially in regard to the concept of selfhood. Here the importance 
of the artefacts and memories works in a united effort to preserve and keep 
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intact the sanctum sanctorum of the self, enabling the visitor to find that 
familiar self again or to become re-assured of at least having one. Then the 
final paradox manifested itself. Everything that the visitors saw, reacted to 
or spoke about in the Museum, led them and their interlocutors towards an 
absolutely different direction. Instead of stability, it was the changes in their 
lives, the shifts in their convictions and the adjustments in their values that 
appeared to be the focus of their attention. The awareness of how profound 
those changes were did not come as a discovery for them, but the Museum 
visit sharpened this implicit realisation. Their memories highlighted the 
scope of the changes, but paradoxically enough it was their memory once 
again that could still offer the feeling of continuity in life. I am not talking 
about chronological succession here. The uniqueness of every life evolves 
along a particular path with inimitable life-marks, which could be quite 
disordered in regard to their chronology. But in the end only a reference to 
those life-marks could tell us what the most meaningful moments of one’s 
life have been. The Museum visits are not directed towards the past. While 
elderly visitors are supposedly looking for stability and recognition, they 
are unavoidably becoming used to the idea of on-going transformation, so 
that at the end of the day each one of them becomes aware of the fact that 
the only stability that we are given, is the permanence of change. As the 
entire description has shown, this last realization is not an easy one and it 
does not come as an instantaneous revelation. Accepting the fact that the self 
is rather a pattern than an entity, which must be taken care of, is one of the 
important constituents of the craft of ageing. Only considering the interplay 
of continuity and change, can we approach such issues as ‘the art of living in 
old age’, the meaning of remembering at a later age or ‘a new possibility of 
dwelling’ for the older generation. 
***
This study is based on the practices at Humanitas. Within the context of the 
described project this organisation challenges such deplorable tendencies as 
the uprooting of homes and home possessions, the ignoring of personal and 
generational memories and an all-round ‘classification’ of people according 
to their chronological age. Each of those challenges can still become a 
theme for a separate book, since Humanitas continues its innovative 
work in all three directions. The connection of each of those themes with 
the practices of the Reminiscence Museum allowed me to combine those 
challenges in one narrative that has a rather complex structure. If we try 
and visualise this structure now, then we can best imagine a network of 
various convergent lines, which cross each other’s trajectories, split and then 
meet again somewhere on the horizon. In order to outline the theoretical 
and methodological grounds of this study, we first introduced three lines 
along which the analysis would be developed. To say it in just a few words, 
they covered the practical dimension of the Humanitas organisation, the 
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process philosophical approach to the analysis and the significance of the 
interpretation of being in later life in terms of dwelling. We explained that 
those three lines have no hierarchic relations and that they would thread the 
entire description simultaneously. That promise has been kept throughout 
the book. Another element, which has an affinity with the sequential 
structure, was introduced by three questions, each of which was treated 
consecutively in the descriptive chapters of the book. The questions were: 
where the remembering takes place, how it takes place and what it means to 
the elderly visitors. Two sets of lines / questions created an intricate network. 
Just to give one example, remember our discussion about the channelled 
memories. While trying to describe how that particular type of remembering 
took place, we combined our knowledge about the space and display of the 
Museum (the first question) with the durational approach towards memory 
(the second line), in order to better understand how the interaction between 
the exhibited artefacts and personal memories could give a new meaning 
to the elderly visitors of the Museum. Intersections between the theoretical 
themes and structural questions that we have mentioned here, thread the 
entire study. Some of the themes, which represent such fundamental issues 
as the ontologies of being and becoming, firmly underlie our discussion 
on memory (becoming), dwelling (being), ageing and empathy (being & 
becoming). Other themes, like for example the study-long discussion on 
the role of objects (things, artefacts) address more specific issues, but as the 
analysis in the current and previous chapter has shown, their outcomes 
cannot be missed in the final conclusions of the research.  
Bearing in mind this multilayered and multi-dimensional structure of the 
analysis, let me summarise the most important conclusions we have reached 
so far in the form of what I would call the convergent lines of this study.
1.	 Remembering at a later age is not an escapist practice, which is supposed 
to sedate the elderly, either as an amusement or as a pure therapeutic 
means. If memory in its totality constitutes what we are, then remember-
ing is one of the important ways to be(come) in this world. In that simple 
formula the ontologies of being and becoming meet each other. There is 
no possibility to postpone or to keep one’s remembering or one’s being 
pending. As processes they are switched ‘on’ continuously and that is 
why they can also be seen as conditions for human dwelling. It is also 
impossible to say that there is a point where our being stops and our be-
coming takes over. In the same way there is no point in trying to separate 
remembering from dwelling. Remembering at a later age contains and 
maintains dwelling in both its modes, in caring and in constructing. It 
fertilises dwelling and allows for new possibilities and meanings of later 
life. Dwelling in turn becomes not only the goal but also the art of living, 
the manner in which we take care of ourselves and of the world around 
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us. Thus, if we push any of the fundamental notions, which we relied 
on in this study, far enough, then there will be no space left for dualistic 
interpretations or oppositions. We shall rather be astonished by the mag-
nitude and integral complexity of the world we live in and accept the 
modesty of our own effort to explain it. 
Those insights are not just a theoretical exercise. They can have far-reach-
ing consequences for the organisational approach towards ageing. The 
issues of efficient housing and personal treatment are often the primary 
subjects in the debate on how the social spaces for the elderly should be 
organised and arranged. It seems to us that while being busy with orga-
nising those spaces, we have overlooked the essential issue of whether 
those spaces are suitable for dwelling. Heidegger’s notion of enframing 
as all-encompassing ordering is quite in place here. This entire study has 
shown that the older generation needs not only places where they can 
be sheltered, fed and treated. They need spaces where they can dwell by 
means of interaction, which is in fact much broader than discursive com-
munication. It turned out that remembering constitutes an essential part 
of dwelling, since it unites the processes of continuation and change, as 
a result of which the elderly can improve their well-being and self-care, 
which together can be called the art of living at a later age. When Hu-
manitas made the decision to found the Reminiscence Museum, it direct-
ly addressed the issues of a good and meaningful life at a later age; the 
connection of those issues with remembering was more or less concealed 
until then. The space that was opened up in the cellar of Humanitas, 
turned out to have an engaging power not only for the visitors’ memo-
ries but also for their self-esteem, self-confidence and the quality of their 
day-to-day lives. The Museum does not pretend to take away the misgiv-
ings about diminishing health or increasing losses as life proceeds, but it 
gives something in return that is much more important, i.e. a feeling of 
belonging and confidence, so that at the end of the day the visitor of the 
Museum / the client of the Humanitas nursing home / the inhabitant of 
a Humanitas life-long apartment, does not feel like a victim of ageing, 
but the master of his or her own life. Let there be no mistake about the 
fact that this is a remarkable achievement. 
2.	 The tangibility of the display at the Reminiscence Museum has deter-
mined our initial interest to the particular interaction between the visi-
tors and the artefacts of the exhibition. But the conclusions which were 
reached by making a topographic description of the Museum were quite 
unexpected. Very soon it became clear that the role of the objects and 
artefacts, which facilitate and empower the remembering process, can-
not be identified with the role of an anchor or just a reminder of past 
events. The ‘readiness-to-hand’, which artefacts used to possess, is over-
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ridden by the fact that the objects appear to have their own story to tell; 
they have become depositories of gathered stories and in that sense equal 
parties in the interaction that takes place. In other words, where a top-
ographic description was expected to realise our goals, we have been 
confronted with a much more sophisticated interaction, which had to 
be explained by means of topological analysis. The interplay between 
topographic and topological accounts can be followed through the three 
descriptive chapters. In the chapters on the Museum space and remem-
bering processes we have made the interplay between those approaches 
explicit: the data that are analysed there point directly at the artefacts, 
which further on require a matching topological interpretation.  In the 
chapter on ageing the topographic and topological approaches are inter-
twined in such a way that any division would seem to be artificial. We 
shall return to this issue in a moment. 
Our discussion about the role that personal or home possessions play in 
the lives of the elderly Museum visitors runs through the entire research. 
The reason for such an interest lies in the fact that we choose to see the 
material objects as an integral part of the complex interrelation within 
the world. Things themselves are not simple representatives of a stable 
part of the world; they have durations of their own, they change and can 
be characterised by a resonating pattern as any other duration. The en-
gagement between the artefacts of the Museum display and the visitors 
takes place at different levels simultaneously. By the simple fact of their 
presence in the Museum, the objects already influence the visitors’ re-
membering process. They appeal to the visitors by means of their ready-
to-hand functionality and channel the visitors’ memories into a certain 
pattern. The visitors in turn assimilate and dissimilate their memories 
with the objects that are on display, which can be very similar to the 
ones they used to have, but do not need to be identical to them. Both the 
objects and the visitors have their own stories to tell, which results in a 
quite specific kind of interaction. The point we are trying to make here 
is that in order to fully understand those complex relations, we need to 
look at them from an ontological point of view. If things have a duration 
of their own, then this duration is already part of the diversity of other 
durations, among which the durations of the visitors. The way those du-
rations approximate each other was what we tried to put into words in 
the chapter on ageing, while talking about empathy in general and em-
pathic design in particular. We agreed that the best way to interpret the 
interplay between durations is by means of resonance, which is why any 
further division into topography and topology was considered to be ex-
cessive. Both approaches meet each other at the ontological level, where 
the becoming and the being of things and visitors form a unique pattern, 
which we nevertheless can recognise almost in every Museum visit. 
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Those insights can turn out to be invaluable if, instead of aiming at cre-
ating efficient segregative facilities for the elderly, we strive to provide 
elderly people with a new home. We are talking about unorthodox social 
spaces for living (and not just ageing), where artefacts should be treated 
not as building blocks of our environment, but as an integral part of the 
story that this environment creates, in close co-operation with those, who 
choose to call such a space their home.
3.	 This study found inspiration in Bergson’s works on process philosophy. 
We started by describing the process character of the practice, and then 
step by step deepened and extrapolated the range of that reflection to-
wards the evolution of the Museum space, various modes of remember-
ing and our understanding of ageing. At the end of the analysis we pro-
posed another interpretation of empathy, which as we have seen can be 
understood in much broader terms than traditional inter-subjective rela-
tions. We witnessed how the process philosophical approach changed 
and enriched our initial observations in regard to the organisation of 
Humanitas. Just as Bergson suggested: the light of the initially new and 
obscure idea has been reflected, pouring its illuminative power over the 
idea itself and revealing how simple successes of Humanitas are embed-
ded in the complexity of its durational approach towards ageing. Instead 
of repeating those conclusions here I suggest looking at another aspect 
that is important to the study and at the same time is the cause and the 
consequence of our choice for process philosophy. The theoretical and 
methodological decision to analyse the practical setting, while relying on 
process philosophy, can be regarded as an ethically defined choice. The 
setting, which is analysed outside the durational approach, can provide 
us with certain schemes and clichés, but at the time, when we try to ap-
ply those conclusions to another setting, they will demand all kinds of 
conditioning and adjustments, since they will merely represent a couple 
of snap-shots of the live and ever-meandering reality. It does not mean 
that we must give up studying them, but that we must be well aware 
that the emphasis should be put on the changing character of the set-
ting and not on its conceptual fitting. The ethical strength of such an 
approach consists in admitting the provisional character of any research 
conclusion and in the effort to present those conclusions as processes as 
well. Thus, by calling Humanitas a process practice initially, we propose 
not to multiply certain successful forms of its activities, but to follow the 
pattern and style of its work, the core principle of which is the ability to 
change continuously. 
The process approach towards the evolving space of the Museum showed 
us the implicit ethical power of the donor-recipient relations, which in-
cludes both the generosity of accepting the objects and the possibility to 
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offer an exciting and meaningful activity in later life, by becoming one of 
the members among the Museum’s staff. 
The ethical issues regarding the remembering process were connected to 
the process of re-evaluation, which visitors often undergo in the Muse-
um. The beautiful part of it was the realisation that the ethics of remem-
bering does not consist of remembering the right or the wrong things. 
Neither is it linked to the so-called question of authenticity. Ethics of re-
membering is deeply rooted in the process character of our memory and 
shows how the elderly visitors cope with the changes that often abolish 
their former believes. The dignity and the loyalty to their past, which the 
visitors show at such moments, together with courage and humour in 
accepting the new values, is what I call here the ethics of remembering. 
Interpretation of ageing in terms of process thinking is essentially a ques-
tion of ethics. We agreed that ageing does not start at the chronological 
mark of 65 or any other measurable moment. Ageing is a continuous 
process, which we are dealing with from the moment we are born. What 
is more important is that while growing older, we realise that there is not 
one but in fact two movements, which we are involved in. Descending 
matter is inseparable from ascending novelty and creativity, which sug-
gests that a meaningful life is an ageless concept. This is not a simple 
way to be at a later age; it asks for wisdom in general and for the craft of 
ageing in particular, which in its turn can and should be stimulated and 
promoted by the care- and home-providing organisation. As we can see, 
ethical issues can be understood in terms of processes as well, because 
whatever subject we choose to talk about here, organisational ethics, eth-
ics of memory or ageing, we shall always be talking about people, their 
complex interactions with the world and their simple but powerful aspi-
ration to be happy.  
In the beginning of the book I used the metaphor of a memory canvas. Each 
of us weaves his or her own canvas during our lifetimes. Looking back at our 
analysis we can see that some of the threads that we are using have a unique 
colour and origin and some of them are shared collectively. In the beginning 
of our lives the capacity to remember seems to be just another generous gift 
of nature. By the time we have reached mid-life we have developed it into an 
art, and at the end of our path it is used and experienced as a sophisticated 
craft, the mastership of which we do not want to lose. As a result numerous 
inimitable canvases are created, but not in isolation from each other. Unique 
patterns interweave in unique ways so that the emerging canvas of life, 
which embraces all of them, is unpredictable, astonishing in its diversity and 
insurmountable in its endurance and duration. 
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Looking back at my impressions about the Museum in the beginning of the 
project I cannot help myself projecting the same metaphorical image onto the 
way the theoretical embedding of the research has taken place. The live and 
multifaceted setting that I was observing struck me by its evolving character 
and the diversity of the pieces it was being made of. The fabric of the Museum, 
understood as a phenomenon and not as just a place, did not have one single 
strict scheme or a pattern. At some point it reminded me of patchwork; at 
another a very distinctive pattern emerged out of combination of various 
pieces, and then this common scheme fell apart into smaller constellations 
of lines and patterns, surprising and promising in their uniqueness. In other 
words I was observing a live canvas that was being woven in front of my 
eyes, so in order to catch this movement I had in a sense to synchronise 
my writing with that weaving experience. The story that I told reflects this 
complex weaving process, where the three main themes hold the fabric of the 
entire narrative together like three vital threads. We could not have missed 
any of them if we were to meet the challenge of the setting. 
The convergent lines we have presented here, allow us to complete this 
study, but as the reader already knows, at the end of the day each conclusion 
is just a possibility for a new opening. 
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openings
In spite of the focus on the remembering practices within the Museum, I 
have always wondered what would happen afterwards, when people had 
left Humanitas and had returned back to their everyday lives. Would they 
still talk about the Museum, and if so, what they would feel and say? It is 
interesting that even without any specifically organised ‘follow-up’ research, 
the answers to those questions have been provided quite voluntarily on a 
wide number of occasions. If I try to summarise the experiences that visitors 
have shared with me, then I would say that a Museum visit has the effect of 
a catalyst. It causes an awakening, which continues for days even, after the 
visit to the Museum. A typical reaction would sound like: I could not sleep at 
night. All those memories kept coming over me in waves. I thought about things I 
would never imagined I could still remember, or I became really emotional and I 
knew I had to come back, together with my friends and my children. Listening to 
confessions like these has made me aware of new possible contexts, which 
this research adjoins and opens up at the same time. 
When in the beginning of the description, I proposed to consider the 
framework of the study in terms of a horizon, I had several reasons for that. I 
saw an evolving practice that challenged the traditional notions of boundaries; 
my choice went to process philosophy, which by definition does not accept 
enclosure, and the anticipated conclusions were supposed to serve as new 
openings. The horizon of the study was widely defined, so besides focusing 
on the main topic of the discussion, various adjoining themes and issues 
received attention as well. By the term adjoining I do not mean secondary 
or less important. The rhizomic understanding of spatial organisation, the 
spatiality of remembering practices, the durational approach to the ethics of 
ageing and an understanding of ageing in terms of duration and creation of 
life – all those themes are closely linked to the object of the study. At the same 
time they could and probably must be seen as conditions, under which this 
study has become an interdisciplinary research. 
Among the various ideas that accompanied the main flow of this study, there 
are a few that I personally see as promising openings into new projects. I 
would like to reflect now on some of these openings. 
Nostalgic heterotopias of ageing
A theme that reappeared at various stages of the study, can be formulated 
in the form of an open question: Are ageing and marginalisation synonyms? 
The question is directly linked to the notion of ageing, which was central 
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in the present study. Marginalisation is an interdisciplinary notion, which 
can be interpreted in philosophical, sociological, psychological or even 
geographical terms. My personal interest towards spatiality within various 
social contexts has already been made explicit. Not only do the remembering 
practices in a specific place such as the Reminiscence Museum demand 
particular attention towards the role of spatiality in remembering, but also 
the meanings of remembering at a later age appear to be closely connected to 
such spatially-bound notions as home, dwelling and self-positioning of the 
older generation within various frameworks. Marginalisation as a notion is 
linked to this study because of its association with boundaries. The preference 
that was given to openings instead of boundaries and to horizon instead of 
enclosure, can be further worked out in relation to marginalisation, both in 
terms of understanding what causes that process and what can be done in 
order to overcome its negative implications.  
From a sociological and socio-geographical perspective, marginalisation 
can be understood as the creation of boundaries within society, by means 
of which the older generation is forced out of its economically independent 
position and segregated into specially allotted organisational settings, 
like homes for the elderly or nursing homes. The marginalisation we are 
talking about here has distinctive spatial features and is connected to the 
practices of societal inclusion and exclusion. Elderly people reflect on that 
kind of practices very directly, calling it ‘locking up’ or even ‘imprisoning’. 
In order to resist the process, the first task then will be to fight those exterior 
forms of marginalisation by transferring the sterile atmosphere of the care-
oriented organisations into empathically-designed, lively, changing, home-
like dwellings. 
Spatial marginalisation of the elderly goes much deeper than the necessity 
to change their living conditions. The politics of exclusion take their toll 
much earlier, by forcing the older generation to retire and enjoy a deserved 
rest, even when such a desire has never been felt, let alone stated. The end 
of work employment, which to a certain extent can be seen as a positive 
change, often leads to a growing feeling of emptiness, which is difficult 
to fill for somebody who was used to taking his / her own decisions. The 
realisation that your decisions are hardly of interest to anybody anymore 
beside yourself, is disenchanting. It introduces / strengthens the feeling 
of societal marginalisation, irrespective of where the person lives, in his or 
her own home or in socially organised places for the retired. Thus, in order 
to resist that economic and public exclusion, a second challenge can be to 
create possibilities for active and meaningful participation of older people 
by offering them both volunteer and regular work. 
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An important fact we must realise is that marginalisation is not wholly 
an exterior phenomenon. The personal experience of getting old plays an 
important role in the interior marginalisation that the older generation goes 
through. Marginalisation understood in terms of interiority touches upon 
such notions as change and difference. Recent research has pointed out how 
important the awareness of the ongoing changes within one’s life can be. But 
awareness alone is only a first step towards a possible solution. The feeling 
of being marginalised occurs at a point when changes manifest themselves 
in such a way that the older person literally begins to notice differences in 
his or her own behaviour, attitude and style of communication, in all kinds 
of situations that he or she is involved in. The capacity to see differences 
occurring around yourself and within yourself is not the same thing and the 
consequences can vary greatly. Interior marginalisation can develop more 
slowly than external marginalisation, but in the end it will be those interior 
boundaries and limits that force an older person to feel lonely and isolated. 
Shame and despair of becoming different can lead to self-oblivion in the first 
place. The task of overcoming this kind of marginalisation can easily fail, 
especially if a person’s physical condition restricts the possibility of keeping 
in touch with other people. Yet, even then marginalisation can be withstood. 
Participation of family, friends, professionals – all kinds of networks to which 
the older person belongs, are essential at that point. And if the old networks 
do not exist anymore, then new ones can be created, with the effort of the 
person him-/herself and of those around him/her who care.  
The research that is presented in this book has shown what role, for example, 
remembering practices can play to build up totally new social contacts and 
networks. The most remarkable example is the team of volunteers that has 
been formed by the curator of the Reminiscence Museum, Inez van den 
Dobbelsteen-Becker. The devotion and altruism with which she participates 
in the entire project, has served as a binding power and a source of inspiration 
for the gradually growing team of volunteers. Their attitude is informal but 
at the same time responsible towards each other, the Museum visitors and 
the exhibition in general. This seems perfectly natural for everybody who 
observes the team members at work. Still, we are talking about very different 
people, who amongst all belong to the same generation as the visitors and 
also have their own unique stories to tell. They came to work at the Museum 
for different reasons. Some of them are friends or relatives who were looking 
for activities that could mean something to them in a personal way or give 
structure and purpose to their lives. Others were quite openly looking for new 
contacts, a possibility to meet other people and build up new relationships. 
I think that in a sense each of them has already gone through thoughts 
about change and marginalisation at an earlier stage. My sincere respect and 
admiration towards those people is based on their courage, which consists 
in the ability to make a new step, to take a decision, to try and test new 
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possibilities in life. By doing this they can –maybe unwittingly– succeed in 
tearing down artificial boundaries and frontiers for the elderly and reducing 
their feeling of marginalisation. I think it would be fair to say that without 
the anti-boundary ideology of Humanitas, their search for new meanings in 
life, the possibility to work and to become a part of a large team would have 
been more difficult to realise. But what I have learned most from them is that 
those people do not give up easily. 
My decision to give this example here is somewhat emotionally motivated, 
but it also shows that marginalisation can and must be approached from 
different angles, where the personal attitude of the elderly person (which can 
be called the art of living) is not less important than the necessary physical 
facilitation from the side of the organisation. By giving this example I also 
want to confront potential pessimism, which talking about marginalisation 
can evoke. Research into ageing and marginalisation must be based on 
empirical material, because the answers we are looking for often lie in the 
practice as we see it. At the same time the formulation of a new approach 
requires deeper analysis, whereby durational understanding of ageing and 
multidimensional interpretation of social spaces can be promising theoretical 
starting points. Let me sketch a possible horizon for such a study and show 
where the themes of this book can offer some interesting perspectives.  
Marginalisation is closely connected with issues of social positioning within 
society. The term marginalisation presupposes that we are living in spaces 
that can be defined as central or peripheral. According to this logic the centre 
represents the most active and powerful zone of the social space, while 
the periphery is assigned to secondary or less significant social practices. 
Because my own principle starting point is based on a rhizomic (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1988/2004) understanding of space, a collision of the two ideas is 
unavoidable. Rhizome does not allow for a hierarchic typology of spaces. 
It challenges not only the division into central and peripheral, but the 
notion of margins and boundaries as well. The possibility to see spaces as 
processes, as heterogeneous multiplicities and relational mappings instead 
of just measurable extensions, helps to preserve the dynamics of changes in 
societal positioning and at the same time allows for heterogeneity, where 
traditionally only hierarchic structures were permitted. The diversity of life 
can be celebrated by this approach, unless it remains restricted to a theoretical 
debate. I have already enumerated a number of practical tasks, which 
supposedly can help to resist the ideas and practices of marginalisation. But 
maybe the term itself must be questioned in the first place. Theoretically 
speaking rhizomic space excludes the possibility of marginalisation. The 
question then will be what kind of space the elderly people occupy and if it is 
not a margin of society, what kind of relational positioning it could be then?
342
One of the possible answers to this question is offered in the already 
mentioned lecture of Foucault called Of Other Spaces. In that lecture Foucault 
introduced the term heterotopia, which along with utopia represent sites 
‘that have a curious property of being in relation with all the other sites, but 
in such a way as to suspect, neutralise, or invert the set of relations that they 
happen to designate, mirror, or reflect’ (Foucault, 1967/1986: 24) He proposes 
to distinguish between at least two types of heterotopias, one of crisis and 
one of deviation. Interestingly enough when Foucault gives examples of 
heterotopias, he mentions retirement homes as well and positions them 
‘on the borderline between the heterotopias of crisis and the heterotopias 
of deviation, since, after all, old age is a crisis, but is also a deviation since, 
in our society where leisure is the rule, idleness is a sort of deviation’ 
(1967/1986: 25). I would not totally agree with the interpretation of age 
given here, but the idea to approach social spaces that are occupied by the 
elderly as spaces of alternative ordering seems to be remarkably elucidating. 
Using the characteristics of heterotopias as proposed by Foucault, we can 
say that the spaces that are occupied by the elderly, are real and imaginable 
(think about nostalgia) at the same time; they have specific functions (like 
care, for example), which change constantly; they are characterised by an 
‘accumulation of time’ (think of home possessions or life stories); and they 
can be closed or opened at the same time (think of autonomy and sociability). 
One of the best elaborations of the notion of heterotopia was given by 
Hetherington in his book The Badlands of Modernity. Hetherington defines 
heterotopias as ‘places of Otherness’, ‘the places of alternate ordering’, 
which means that ‘heterotopia organise a bit of a social world in a way 
different to that which surrounds them’ (1997: viii). Let me now use that 
concise theoretical background and see whether it can provide us with a 
new opening in regard to understanding ageing not only in temporal but 
also in spatial terms. An interesting point in using the term heterotopia in 
relation to ageing is that we can talk about processes, relations, novelty and 
ordering at the same time. Since the main emphasis is here placed on social 
spaces, the notion of order should not be that surprising. The issue that can 
be challenging for future research is the interplay between the processual 
and relational character of ageing on the one hand and its self- or alternative 
ordering nature on the other. The issues of ageing in relation to process and 
novelty were already addressed in this book, but the question of ordering 
can sound a bit controversial here. Let me give one example.
In my opinion, the self-ordering power of ageing, which is projected into the 
spaces where elderly people dwell, is closely connected with the changing 
speed of life at a later age, which we referred to earlier on as asynchronicity. 
I call this change of speed a self-organising phenomenon, because slowing 
down (or taking more time, in the colloquial language) occurs gradually and 
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in such a way that the person him- or herself notices the changes only when 
the differences with other persons become distinctive. The planning of one’s 
day, the length of the same activity, the intensity – everything is slowing 
down in a natural manner. Thus, an alternative ordering appears here, a kind 
of transitional space, with its own temporal pattern. It is not isolated though. 
All relational connections are there, the process of changing is taking place as 
always, but its velocity changes decisively. If this simple fact should be taken 
into account, then the consequences for the approach towards ageing could 
become immense. 
When my dear old neighbour slowly takes the staircases she is quite aware 
of the time and space it will cost her. And if at the same moment I, with 
spaces and speeds of my own, storm along up- or downstairs, she attentively 
stops her descent or ascent, pushes herself against the staircase railing or the 
wall and gives me all the space I need to accelerate. She has adjusted herself 
to the changes that her age implies and I take the courtesy of her respect 
and understanding almost for granted. It seems as if heterotopian spaces are 
much more open and flexible than the spaces which we usually inhabit. The 
boundaries are foremost introduced from outside those spaces, an aspect 
that should not be forgotten. The main problems occur because differences 
in speed will always prevail and moreover an acceleration of time in other 
spatial organisations will make these differences more and more difficult to 
bridge. 
I believe that solutions can be found to these situations, and that a new 
approach towards ageing and spatiality of ageing is required. The practices 
that have been described in this book can be already seen as an alternative to 
the traditional approach towards ageing. Thinking about particular spaces 
that the older generation occupies, we may ask ourselves how the elderly 
claim their own space within society. The direction of the claim is of great 
importance. If one takes a position outside the group of the elderly, then 
we shall be back in the practices of appointing spaces with their unhappy 
history of boundaries, exclusions and segregations. The question then is 
how the older generation can claim the right to its own space, which should 
not be seen as a margin or a periphery of society, but may be understood 
as an alternative space of the ‘Otherness’. When answering the research 
question of this book I have partly addressed that issue as well, but it evokes 
many more dimensions that can be taken into consideration. Remembering 
practices strengthen and sustain the process of self-positioning of the older 
generation. Memory is in that sense an inseparable part and constituent of 
dwelling, which by definition claims its place within spatiality. Remembering 
practices however should be seen in a much broader context. 
344
In the notion nostalgia space and remembering naturally come together. The 
word originates from the Greek nostos ‘homecoming’ and algos ‘pain, grief, 
distress’; it was introduced into our thinking in the 17th century by the Swiss 
physician Johannes Hofer. Initially it was considered to be a disease, but 
gradually it disappeared from scientific discourse, being understood rather 
as a form of sentimentality than a manifestation of deeper physiological, 
psychological or sociological processes (Pickering & Keightley, 2006). 
Till now the destiny of the term has been less successful than that of the 
reminiscing.  What Robert Butler initiated within studies on reminiscence 
practices in 1963 by publishing his famous article on life review, still has 
to occur within the research on nostalgia. The conference ‘Nostalgia and the 
Shapes of History’, which was held at the University of London in 2008, is a 
promising sign that the attitude towards nostalgia is gradually changing in 
the scientific world (Davies, 2009).
Nostalgia is quite often introduced within studies on consumerism 
(Goulding, 2001), which comes as no surprise considering how widely the 
commercial and media structures use, reuse and perhaps misuse nostalgic 
elements in their design for various products. To give just a few examples, 
foodstuff and especially luxury articles are frequently packaged in old-
fashioned boxes and wrapped up in paper with patterns that remind one 
of grand-mother’s time. One can easily buy a set of nostalgic tableware or 
equip an entire brand-new kitchen with appliances that are designed in retro 
style. The small shops that sell old knick-knacks are flourishing and all kinds 
of small regional museums that reconstruct the atmosphere of former labour 
and domestic life, are popping up. The tokens of this nostalgic epidemic 
are recognised and presented for discussion, but more attention is paid to 
consumer behaviour than to the cause and essence of the nostalgic feeling 
itself. 
If I try to sketch the way in which a careful and attentive approach towards 
nostalgia can be instructive for the study on ageing and marginalisation, 
then I would probably best start looking for the answers in our language, 
as Heidegger proposed. The meaning of experiencing pain at the thought 
about home could be a stimulating point of departure. The etymology of the 
word teaches us that the term nostalgia was initially directly linked to spatial 
terms like home, a place or location. Gradually the spatial component of the 
semantics has become more and more obscure and contemporary thinking 
came to definitions like ‘refusal to analyse, an escape into mere unexamined 
longing’ or ‘unconditioned desire’. The most intriguing, promising and basic 
meaning of nostalgia, namely its connection with the human appreciation 
and need of home, that ambiguous and yet inalienable space of dwelling, 
has somehow been lost. No wonder that nostalgia was not in favour with 
science for tens of years. It is quite remarkable that in 1987 the distinguished 
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phenomenologist Edward S. Casey published an article titled The world of 
nostalgia where he writes:
In being nostalgic, what we seem to miss, to lack or need, is a world as it was once 
established in a place. This world is revealed through the localism of place but is not 
reducible to locality per se. It is not therefore place’s particularity as such that is at issue 
in nostalgia; it is the way that this particularity bears up a lost world and exhibits it to 
our poignantly needful apprehension in the present (1987: 363-364).
Considering Casey’s interest in topics such as imagination, memory and 
place, it seems logical that at some point an ambiguous notion like nostalgia 
should attract his attention. The link between nostalgia and memories of a 
certain place are established here not via some abstract sentimental longing 
for the past, but as an astute reaction to the present, where a person misses 
something as essential as for example the feeling of being at home. 
If we take the idea of nostalgia from here, then the connection between the 
meanings of remembering at a later age as presented in this book acquires a 
more distinctive form. Further investigation can be carried out along several 
lines. 
Nostalgia can be linked to issues of dwelling, or better to say to the fact ‘that 
we human beings are no longer able to dwell on this earth’ and that ‘we search 
for a new possibility of dwelling out of a gnawing sense of homelessness’ 
(Barbaza, 2002: x). This line of analysis will require thorough attention to the 
imagined, remembered and actual living conditions of the older generation 
in the physical, social, psychological and philosophical senses. 
Nostalgia as a phenomenon is not a stable or momentary state or condition. 
The analysis of nostalgia, performed outside the durational or process 
thinking, will not surprise us with anything more than a banal account of a 
bittersweet feeling of lack and longing. My supposition is that nostalgia as a 
process phenomenon is caused by a break in continuity and by disregarding 
change. On the other hand, remembering can help and restore that connection, 
so that nostalgia and remembering can be looked at as the same process, 
where nostalgia signals a problem and remembering repairs it, at least up to 
some extent. 
Finally, nostalgic remembering can be seen as a means par excellence to 
create or recreate a new space in the present. I think this is precisely what 
is happening when the older generation actively engages in remembering 
practices. Empowered by remembering the elderly translate both the feeling 
that their own space is lacking and at the same time the idea of belonging to 
a certain social space into the practice of their lives. Subsequently a specific 
spatial organisation is originated, another kind of centre, which the older 
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generation can call their home. Following Foucault we can conceive it as a 
heterotopic space, a space of transition, a space of alternative ordering or 
otherness. In each case I would not call it a margin of society. As I pointed out 
before, rhizome does not sustain any margins; neither does my understanding 
of ethics.  
Fluid models of care 
While thinking about heterotopic spaces I cannot help asking myself 
what kind of social space Humanitas brings to life as an organisation, and 
what kind of space the Museum represents. If Humanitas can be seen as a 
heterotopia, a place of otherness, a place where the boundaries are taken 
away and an alternative ordering is applied, then one can talk here about a 
place that is different and which encourages change. Bearing that in mind 
another possible direction of research can be identified, namely what are the 
possibilities for alternative models within the care sector for the older generation? 
Defined in this manner the perspective is very broad, but the necessity to 
creatively and daringly look at organisations that are providing living and 
health-care conditions for the elderly, is quite pronounced. 
The range of approaches to such a research should be kept open, as well as 
the range and the scale of the organisations that can serve as models to study 
their specific practices and organisational narratives, or to distil various kinds 
of philosophies that underlie their activities. In this book we have studied the 
practices at just one organisation, so my example is defined and limited by 
this study. Humanitas is not the only organisation that can be scrutinised by 
the investigative eye of a researcher, since the goal of future research, as has 
been stated above, is to see and if necessary empower the diversity of various 
approaches within the care-providing organisations for older people. 
In the beginning of the book attention was paid to the ideology of Humanitas. 
The founding of the Museum seemed to be a logical continuation of that 
ideology. One of the initial questions was what kind of relation exists between 
the Museum and Humanitas, or in other words, whether we can talk about 
the Museum in terms of in or of Humanitas. Both assumptions underline 
metonymic relations of the whole versus a part. The first one shows foremost 
the spatial association, while the second one accentuates the prolongation 
of the Humanitas ideology into the Museum, as a part of the organisation. 
What I would like to do now is to turn that relationship round and to look at 
the Museum as a model for the care-providing sector, from which Humanitas 
can learn rather than manage. This flip-over opens up a new dimension in 
the practices we described. By doing this I would not in any way wish to 
reduce the importance of the work that Humanitas has done in founding, 
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facilitating and caring for the Museum. Rather, as often happens with an 
ingenious undertaking, the Museum has outgrown the initial intentions and 
can be considered ready to graciously return its debts, with interest. 
Some of principles on which the Museum has been founded could be 
translated into innovative or alternative modelling of the care for the elderly. 
One of the principles is based on the durational or process-bound practice, 
which means that movement and change have a priority in regard to 
stability and repetition. The example of the Museum demonstrates how an 
already familiar line of work was creatively translated into a new practice. 
The example also shows that it was not a one-step decision but a continuous 
process of adjustment and fine-tuning between ideas and experiences, which 
represent an on-going process without some fixed final destination, but with 
a clearly outlined desirable horizon. This preference for movement and 
change should not be seen as a form of absolutism. Any good practice that 
works and leads to positive results should be continued and maintained. 
The durational or process principle helps us to see the provisional character 
of stability and prepares everybody involved to accept changes that are 
inevitable. The Museum today is and is not the same Museum I have seen 
three years ago. It is a highly mobile space, and this mobility is one of the 
most important components of its success. 
Another principle is of participation. As it turned out from conversations I 
had with various people, the initiative to start the Museum originated with 
more than one ‘author’. The issue here is not who was the first to come up 
with the idea, but how many people actually took ownership and made 
it happen, quite selflessly. The model of the Museum works because of its 
uniting strength. The existence of the Museum is influenced by people 
from all organisational levels, from the very top to the visitors themselves, 
who formally speaking do not have any connection with Humanitas. The 
principle of participation also has another strong side, namely of reflection 
and self-reflection. The people who visit the Museum directly reflect on its 
various sides; the people who are working there are constantly engaged in 
self-reflection, which feeds their creativity and the need for change.  
The next principle is that of self-evolvement and self-organisation. The Museum 
shows beyond any doubt that a good initiative must be provided and 
supported with some physical and organisational space in order to evolve 
and become organised autonomously. Within Humanitas this principle is 
linked to one of its core-values, which is called self-management (eigen regie). 
But the conditions for such development should be possible in a broader 
range of practices. The principle of active participation, combined with 
regular (self)-reflection and dialogue, could offer sufficient security against 
possible extremes or lethargy.  
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The dialogical principle should be also accounted for in the modelling of 
the organisations that provide care for the elderly. The principle has been 
analysed thoroughly in the literature related to healthcare organisations and 
serious attention was paid to it in this book as well. The main strengths of 
the dialogical principle consist in its openness towards polyphony and its 
aspiration for dialogical symmetry. As we have seen, such conditions are not 
easy to achieve or to sustain, but dialogue itself continuously creates and 
challenges those possibilities. Another important dimension that dialogical 
principle entails is its double directedness to issues both inside and outside 
the care providing organisation. Dialogue enables not only participation, 
feedback and reflection within the organisation, but it also assists us to remain 
open in relation to differences, otherness and an alternative development.  
The last principle I would call the principle of relational disclosure. Here I have 
come back to what is perhaps my favourite theme of openness, which can 
be seen as an alternative to boundary-like thinking. The Museum presents 
a very intense concentration of interdependent relations, which are both 
spatially and temporally determined. Those are the relations between present 
and past experiences, between personal and collective histories, between 
well-known and well-forgotten values, between family members belonging 
to different generations, between visitors and volunteers. All these relations, 
which manifest themselves naturally during the Museum visits by means of 
remembering, narrating and conversing with each other, stretch the walls of 
the Museum and create new openings for its visitors, professionals and for 
the entire Humanitas organisation. Any model that is thoroughly projected 
and worked out, would remain just a theoretical model without this vivifying 
principle of disclosure. 
If models of care can be developed and performed along those principles, 
which as the practice of Humanitas has shown is indeed possible, then 
my general definition would borrow a term from the work of Mol & Law 
(1994). The model of care, which the Museum persistently promotes, can be 
called the model of fluidity. Mol & Law investigated certain types of social 
spaces, where stability and boundaries did not exclusively contribute to the 
recognition of spatial entity and its continual value. The Museum too can be 
characterised in various ways, but not for being a stable place or immune for 
change. At the same time it has the magic of an entity and the atmosphere 
of a domestic enclosure. This contradictory appearance allows me to call it a 
space of fluidity. 
Several principal features seem to ensure the continuation or fluidity of spaces 
like the Museum. Spaces of fluidity evolve where discontinuity threatens 
to destroy an on-going process. If one must leave his or her home where 
one has spent the largest part of one’s life, then the threat of physical and 
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psychological rupture is not just a theoretical possibility anymore. The care 
providing organisation can assist in restoring the broken links, on condition 
that the extreme points of the gap are not too distant from each other and still 
allow for a connection. The results of the already mentioned ZonMW project 
support this idea. The interviews with elderly clients showed amongst 
others that the misgivings and anxiety of relocation can in many cases be 
compensated by a vicinity of the clients’ children. 
Another feature of a fluid space is defined as ‘transformation without 
discontinuity’ (Mol & Law, 1994: 658). This feature can be closely associated 
with our previous discussion of continuity and change. What is suggested 
here is the way, in which change can empower continuity. Transformation 
without rupture sounds almost utopian here, but as practice shows, this often 
occurs in a natural way. The Museum for example restores intergenerational 
links not by erasing intergenerational differences, but by creating new 
possibilities for mutual understanding and interest. The flow of remembering 
helps to cope with transformation and at the same time prevents irreparable 
breaks. The ruptures, which the elderly generation experiences more and 
more often, such as the narrowing down of social networks, the loss of their 
homes and sometimes even physical independence, cannot be compensated 
exclusively by rules, restrictions and limitations, which at an organisational 
level have the appearance of protective and humane means, while in practice 
they unfortunately facilitate policies of oblivion and banishment. Looking at 
what happens in the Museum one can almost literally see how those gaps 
and breaks are gradually filled in and how new relations and connections 
appear, where irrevocable breakage seemed to have taken place. Fluidity 
of the Museum space, as well as of any space within a care providing 
organisation that is organised according to the same principles, can ensure 
flexibility of fragile relations and safeguard some of the weakest links in the 
lives of the elderly. 
As we can see, the Museum can become a productive starting point 
for a large number of research topics within the range of such themes as 
remembering, ageing or care providing organisations for elderly people. The 
Museum appears to possess the capacity to open up new horizons for its 
visitors and for its staff too. Its welcoming appearance allows me to compare 
the Museum with a classic Utopia. People come to the Museum in search 
of objects, experiences and even feelings. In that respect the limits to the 
Museum’s impact are unpredictable and unreachable. The relationship 
between the Museum and Humanitas is also of a very particular kind. At 
a glance it looks like a relationship of similitude, but it is certainly not the 
relationship of a part within a whole. It could better be called the relationship 
of adjusted reflection. Humanitas sees in the Museum its own extension, a 
kind of derivative of the organisational practice. The Museum returns the 
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image of what Humanitas, as well as any other organisation operating in the 
sector of care and wellbeing for the older generation, could become. That is 
why I call it adjusted reflection. The depth of that mirrored reflection is as 
infinite as Utopia. 
Does the comparison with Utopia mean that the Museum is a non- and good- 
place at the same time as L. Marin has proposed (1993: 407)? When I see the 
visitors coming to the Museum; when I see them absorbed in the worlds of 
their memories and their hopes for the future, then I get the feeling for a brief 
second that this is indeed their real home, which they have finally reached, 
and the rest of the world seems as distant as Utopia can be from everyday 
life. The thought itself is Utopian, but we should not be mistaken by that 
idyllic picture. The careful and calculating manner of clinging to a moment 
in the present or the past, is a direct avenue towards self-oblivion, while 
pushing frontiers ‘towards the extreme limit’ or an unknown horizon is a 
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saMenvatting
Van de Kunst van het Herinneren tot de Kunde van het Ouder Worden
Een Onderzoek in het Herinneringsmuseum van Humanitas, Rotterdam
Wij zijn ons allemaal bewust van de clichés die veronderstellen dat naarmate 
mensen ouder worden, ze veelal herkenbare gedragspatronen aannemen, 
zoals toenemende praatgraagheid, vergeetachtigheid of een neiging om aan 
het verleden terug te denken. Zolang deze gedragspatronen niet als afwijkend 
worden beschouwd schenken we er weinig aandacht aan. Daarentegen trekt 
juist afwijkend gedrag dat gebaseerd is op allerlei vormen van dementie, 
veel belangstelling binnen biomedische, geriatrische, neurologische en 
psychiatrische onderzoeken.  
Dit onderzoek richt zich op het herstellen van het evenwicht; het concentreert 
zich op een aantal herkenbare alledaagse interacties tussen en met ouderen, 
die we herinneringsactiviteiten noemen. 
Onder herinnering verstaan we het stilstaan bij zaken uit het verleden. 
Deze activiteit, die meestal niet erg opvalt, en gewoonlijk als normaal wordt 
afgedaan, wordt eerder als dagelijkse afleiding beschouwd dan als een 
intrinsiek onderdeel van een zinvol leven.
Dit onderzoek is gebaseerd op de veronderstelling dat het herinneringsproces 
op latere leeftijd een wezenlijk onderdeel van een goed leven kan vormen. 
Het had tot doel om na te gaan op welke wijze de oudere generatie terugkijkt 
naar het verleden en om beter te begrijpen wat het herinneren met zich 
meebrengt voor ouderen en ook voor de anderen die op dat moment bij hun 
leven en welzijn betrokken zijn. De bevindingen van het onderzoek bieden 
antwoorden op de centrale vraagstelling: wat is de betekenis van herinneren 
op latere leeftijd.
De benaderingswijze van dit onderzoek volgt een traditie die bekend staat 
als sociaal/collectief herinneren, welke op zijn beurt deel uitmaakt van een 
opkomend breed onderzoeksgebied, dat ‘memory studies’ genoemd wordt 
(zie bv. de tijdschriften Memory Studies, History & Memory en Representations). 
Sociaal/collectief herinneren is geworteld in de sociologische werken van 
Maurice Halbwachs en Pierre Nora. Hun bijzondere aandacht ging uit naar 
de vraag hoe individuele herinneringsactiviteiten gevormd en overgebracht 
worden door ‘collectieve structuren’. Deze kunnen vele vormen aannemen, 
zoals een reeks verhalen, formele vertelsels, goedgekeurde geschiedschrijving, 
monumenten, plaatselijke mythen, stadsontwerpen, enz.
363
Gedurende de afgelopen twee decennia is deze sociologische traditie van 
invloed geweest bij het herformuleren van de psychologische benaderingen van 
het geheugen. Douwe Draaisma, Harald Welzer, Henry Roediger en William 
Hirst hebben allen aangetoond hoe sociale structuren van directe invloed zijn 
op cognitieve processen van het herinneren. Maar het is in wat hier socio-
psychologie wordt genoemd (op het snijvlak van de sociale psychologie, culturele 
psychologie, maatschappelijke psychologie en psychosociaal onderzoek) waar 
de meest significante herformulering heeft plaatsgevonden. In het werk van 
James Wertsch en van David Middleton is een benadering ontwikkeld welke 
herinneren behandelt als een sociale handeling die plaatsvindt middels gesprek-
in-interactie (talk-in-interaction). Herinneren is een actiegericht sociale activiteit, 
waardoor versies van het verleden naar het heden worden gemobiliseerd 
teneinde sociale activiteiten te verrichten. Het onderhavige onderzoek bouwt 
voort op deze benaderingwijze, welke werd ontwikkeld in de verslaglegging 
van Middleton & Edwards (1990), Middleton & Brown (2005) en Brown (2008).
De initiator voor dit promotieonderzoek is de Stichting Humanitas geweest. 
Humanitas opereert in de zorg- en welzijnssector voor ouderen en staat bekend 
om haar voortdurend innovatieve aanpak. Teneinde de kwaliteit van de zorg 
die zij verleent verder te verbeteren heeft Humanitas de afgelopen jaren al 
diverse zelfreflectieve onderzoeken uitgevoerd. 
Drie jaar geleden is binnen Humanitas het idee ontwikkeld om een omgeving 
te creëren waar ouderen vrij en spontaan naar hun verleden zouden kunnen 
terugkijken. Deze plaats werd het Herinneringsmuseum genoemd. Tegelijkertijd 
is het onderzoeksproject van start gegaan waarover hier verslag wordt gedaan. 
In eerste instantie was het onderzoek gericht op het bestuderen van het 
herinneringsproces zoals dat zich tijdens de Museumbezoeken manifesteert. In 
tweede instantie zijn de bevindingen van het onderzoek binnen de Humanitas-
organisatie gepresenteerd. Zij kunnen ook van belang zijn voor andere 
zorgorganisaties die met ouderen werken.
De aaneensluiting van die twee doelstellingen kon om een aantal redenen goed 
worden verwezenlijkt. De belangstelling voor het Museum bleek groot te zijn, niet 
alleen binnen de Humanitas-organisatie, maar ook daarbuiten. Het Museum heeft 
meteen al veel bezoekers gehad en krijgt die nog steeds, ook vanuit het buitenland; 
dit biedt mogelijkheden om tot gevolgtrekkingen te komen die de reikwijdte van 
één afzonderlijke organisatie overschrijden. Verder toont de verslaglegging over 
dit onderwerp aan dat het herinneringsproces en specifieke aspecten daarvan bij 
mensen op latere leeftijd gekenmerkt worden door gemeenschappelijke patronen. 
Als gevolg daarvan kunnen bepaalde bevindingen van het onderzoek welke bij 
het Herinneringsmuseum zijn gedaan, vertaald worden naar situaties bij andere 
instellingen. Daaronder verstaan we in eerste instantie de diverse (gezondheids)
zorg- en welzijnsorganisaties voor ouderen. 
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Ten slotte past het oprichten van het Herinneringsmuseum goed binnen de 
bredere context van een zich snel ontwikkelend interdisciplinair gebied dat 
de naam reminiscentiewerk draagt en dat eveneens kan profiteren van de 
bevindingen van dit onderzoek. 
Zowel de onderzoeksvraag als de specifieke doelstellingen van het 
onderzoeksproject zijn van belang geweest voor het bepalen van de aard 
van dit onderzoek, dat beschouwd kan worden als kwalitatief empirisch en 
interdisciplinair.
De projectgegevens zijn op traditionele etnografische wijze verzameld. Ze 
bestaan uit opnamen van gesprekken die tijdens Museumbezoeken hebben 
plaatsgevonden, alsook uit waarnemingen, notities en reflecties die tijdens 
die bezoeken of achteraf zijn opgetekend. Van de opgenomen gesprekken 
zijn transcripties gemaakt; vervolgens zijn fragmenten ervan gebruikt voor 
analyse. De waarnemingen en bespiegelingen zijn in vorm van verslagen 
vastgelegd. Fragmenten ervan zijn ‘herverteld’ teneinde bepaalde aspecten 
van de discussie te illustreren. Mijn eigen betrokkenheid bij de opgenomen 
en beschreven gesprekken varieerde van actieve deelnemer tot professionele 
buitenstaander. 
De gegevens reflecteren uitsluitend spontane en vrijwillige herinneringen 
welke tijdens gesprek-in-interactie plaatsvonden; ze zijn dus niet op interviews 
gebaseerd. Dit onderscheid is van belang, want bij het volgen van de sociale 
herinneringsbenadering verdient primair onze aandacht gericht te worden op 
de manier waarop collectieve herinneringsactiviteiten worden voortgebracht 
en vervolgens door hun directe discursieve en materiële omgeving contextueel 
worden gevormd. Ook de gesprekken met de diverse museumvrijwilligers en 
stafmedewerkers van Humanitas waren informeel en spontaan. Het overgrote 
deel van die gesprekken heeft in het Museum plaatsgevonden. 
De behandeling van de getranscribeerde data is gepleegd volgens de 
Discourse and Conversational Analysis (D&CA) methode. De basisprincipes 
daarvan zijn 1. volgtijdelijk gestructureerd, 2. actiegericht, 3. contextueel 
opgebouwd, 4. retorisch georganiseerd. Er bestaat inmiddels binnen 
de socio-psychologie een flinke hoeveelheid materiaal betreffende de 
toepassing van D&CA op interacties zoals die ook in het onderhavige 
onderzoek zijn bestudeerd. Het algemene streven van de analyse was om 
een caleidoscoop aan ervaringen binnen het Herinneringsmuseum weer 
te geven. De waarneming van levensechte situaties bood zeer gevarieerd 
materiaal voor een fenomenologische beschrijving van de praktische gang 
van zaken binnen het Museum. De ervaringen die verwoord werden zijn zo 
nauwkeurig mogelijk vastgelegd en weergegeven in overeenstemming met 
de wijze waarop de museumbezoekers ze hebben gepresenteerd. 
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Een volgende stap was het vastleggen van de ervaring door contextueel 
interpretatieve analyse toe te passen, waarbij zowel discursieve als non-
discursieve aspecten van interacties werden geanalyseerd. Tezamen hebben 
beide rapportagevormen bijgedragen om de specifieke kenmerken van een 
situatie te bevatten en met name de vaker terugkerende ervaringen goed in 
focus te brengen, ten gevolge waarvan een pregnanter beeld geschetst kon 
worden van de situatie die zich voordeed.
Zoals reeds aangegeven  is dit een empirisch onderzoek, dat gebaseerd is op de 
gang van zaken bij Humanitas en in het bijzonder in het Herinneringsmuseum, 
welke door Humanitas is opgericht. De situaties en gebeurtenissen die zich 
voordeden waren uiteenlopend en veelal ook erg complex. Teneinde ze goed 
tot hun recht te laten komen doet men er verstandig aan om gebruik maken 
van theorieën die binnen diverse vakgebieden ontwikkeld zijn. Zij bieden de 
gelegenheid om een gelaagde theoretische aanpak toe te passen, waarvan de 
samenhang en integriteit een daadwerkelijke weerspiegeling geeft van de 
empirische situatie die werd onderzocht. 
Binnen de theoretische inbedding van het onderzoek onderscheiden we 
drie hoofdlijnen. 
De eerste theoretische lijn is gebaseerd op de ideologie van Humanitas. Hij 
is niet alleen geïnspireerd door de werkwijze binnen deze organisatie; hij 
weerspiegelt tevens het praktische kader van dit onderzoek. Het motto van 
Humanitas is levenskunst op leeftijd. Dat biedt een conceptueel uitgangspunt 
voor onderzoek en tevens een opening voor nieuwe interpretaties en 
ontwikkelingen van de praktische inkleding van de zorg welk wordt 
verleend. 
De tweede theoretische lijn is gebaseerd op het procesmatige karakter van de 
activiteiten waarbij Humanitas op alle niveaus van haar dagelijkse praktijk 
betrokken is. Teneinde deze lijn te ontvouwen worden twee stappen gezet: 
eerst worden bepaalde gegevens bestudeerd middels sociaalpsychologische 
analyse. Vervolgens worden ze tegen een meer fundamentele filosofische 
gedachtelijn geplaatst, namelijk de filosofie van het worden, met als centraal 
begrip de duur (la durée). De combinatie van deze twee stappen heeft ons 
in staat gesteld om de complexiteit te bevatten die we procespraktijk hebben 
genoemd. 
Evenals de twee andere lijnen is de derde theoretische lijn geworteld in 
de manier van werken bij Humanitas en ook het Herinneringsmuseum. In 
algemene termen betreft deze lijn begrippen als ergens bij horen en zich thuis 
voelen. Deze lijn wordt ontvouwd langs een reeds bekend meerfasen-patroon. 
Allereerst beschrijven we het Museum. Vervolgens gaan we over tot een 
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analyse van de ervaringen van de bezoekers binnen het Museum zelf; en dan 
breder, binnen de locatie / ruimte waar ze hun oude dag doorbrengen. Ten 
slotte richten wij ons op het filosofische begrip van het zijn in de pregnante 
betekenis van het woord, namelijk het zijn in een bepaalde plaats, of het zijn 
als een vorm van wonen. 
Die drie lijnen zijn niet scherp afgebakend; ze ontwikkelen zich gelijktijdig en 
vullen elkaar onderling aan. Aan het eind van het onderzoek worden de drie 
lijnen samengevoegd teneinde te tonen hoe deze drievoudige theoretische 
benadering ons begrip van de praktijksituatie heeft verrijkt en welke nieuwe 
perspectieven voor ontwikkeling worden geboden. 
Het beschrijvende deel van het onderzoek is gestructureerd rond de 
volgende vragen: waar hebben de gebeurtenissen plaatsgevonden, hoe 
vond het herinneringsproces plaats en wat betekende dat terugkijken voor 
de bezoekers van het Museum?
In het eerste descriptieve deel komt de ruimtelijke inrichting van het 
Herinneringsmuseum aan de orde. Aandacht wordt geschonken aan de 
materiële aspecten van het Museum en met name aan de betekenis die 
huislijke bezittingen voor de mensen hebben. Tevens wordt het ruimtelijke 
karakter van het herinneren aan de orde gesteld. De totstandkoming van het 
Museum is als evolutie beschreven, d.w.z. als een doorlopend proces. Het 
begrip ruimte wordt er beschouwd als een open, veranderend en relationeel 
fenomeen. Aan het eind van het hoofdstuk wordt een overzicht gegeven 
van de functionele kenmerken van het Museum. Zij worden beschouwd als 
basisvoorwaarden voor een spontaan en vrijwillig herinneringsproces van 
de bezoekers in het Museum. 
De discussie betreffende de Museumruimte wordt in het volgende hoofdstuk 
voortgezet, waarbij de vraag centraal komt te staan of de plaats die we 
beschrijven past bij de definitie van een museum en welke alternatieven er 
zouden kunnen zijn. Daarna richten we ons op de specifieke kenmerken van 
het Museum die het terugkijken betreffen. De initiële beschrijving van de 
expliciete vormen van herinnering wordt gevolgd door meer complexe en 
veelal impliciete mechanismen van het herinneringproces. 
De theoretische achtergrond van de analyse wordt gevormd door de 
procesfilosofie en het begrip duur. De verhandeling over het algemene 
belang en het interdisciplinaire karakter van het herinneren wordt gevolgd 
door contextuele interpretatieve technieken teneinde de gegevens welke 
verzameld zijn nader te kunnen analyseren. De sociale en psychologische 
aspecten van het herinneringsproces worden verklaard met behulp van 
een keur van theoretische benaderingen, maar het is de samenhang van 
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de procesfilosofie alsook sociale en psychologische interpretaties die 
ons in staat stelt om een beter inzicht te krijgen hoe het ruimtegebonden 
herinneringsproces plaatsvindt. 
Aan het einde van het hoofdstuk worden hier nog twee aspecten aan 
toegevoegd, te weten de mechanismen van het herinneringproces en de 
terugkerende thema’s in de interacties tussen de bezoekers. Ten slotte stellen 
we de ethiek van het herinneren aan de orde, hetgeen tegelijkertijd de 
inleiding vormt voor de discussie in het volgende hoofdstuk. 
Het derde hoofdstuk behandelt het snijvlak tussen enkele theoretische en 
praktische standpunten betreffende het herinneren en het ouder worden. 
We concentreren ons hier op de bezoekers van het Museum die tot de 
oudere generatie behoren. Het doel van het hoofdstuk is om de functie van 
het herinneringproces voor ouderen aan te duiden, en om te zien hoe die 
bevindingen teruggekoppeld kunnen worden aan de praktijk. Teneinde 
deze vraag te beantwoorden hebben we enkele specifieke kenmerken 
van de identiteit op latere leeftijd onder de loep genomen. Tevens hebben 
we een relatie gelegd tussen de geneigdheid van ouderen om over hun 
verleden te peinzen en hun behoefte om hun kennis en ervaring met de 
jongere generatie te delen. De beschrijving van specifieke kenmerken van 
de identiteit van mensen op latere leeftijd heeft ons teruggevoerd naar de 
ideologie en werkbenadering binnen Humanitas. Overigens bezien we die 
werkbenadering met gebruik van het theoretische en filosofische inzicht dat 
we inmiddels al in de voorafgaande analyse hebben opgedaan. 
Het laatste hoofdstuk behelst de conclusies die getrokken kunnen worden 
op basis van de diverse ervaringen en bevindingen welke in de loop van het 
onderzoek zijn opgetekend en uitgewerkt. De voornaamste zijn:
1.	 Het op latere leeftijd terugkijken is geen simpel tijdverdrijf en evenmin 
een ontsnappingstactiek voor ouderen die in hun verleden gevangen 
worden gehouden. Het herinneringsproces wordt weliswaar door het 
verleden geïnspireerd, maar in wezen is het gericht op de behoeften en 
uitdagingen van het leven van vandaag. De belangrijkste daarvan zijn 
het versterken van het sociale netwerk, het zoeken naar nieuwe mogeli-
jkheden om een zinvol leven te leiden en het bestrijden van eenzaamheid 
en sociaal isolement. De telkens terugkerende behoefte bij ouderen om te 
herinneren kan een probaat middel zijn om hun gevoel van eigenwaarde 
te herstellen. Daarmee wordt tevens het gevoel versterkt dat zij deel uit-
maken van een grotere groep.
2.	 Het herinneringproces op latere leeftijd is een van de componenten voor 
een zinvol leven; het ondersteunt twee identiteitsgebonden processen 
tegelijkertijd, te weten continuïteit en verandering. Omdat ons geheugen 
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reconstructief en procesgebonden is kunnen ouderen de unieke patronen 
en stijl van hun leven herkennen, onafhankelijk van hun leeftijd. Evenzo 
helpt het terugkijken hen te leren hoe zij veranderingen beter kunnen 
accepteren en hoe zij kunnen omgaan met het constante proces van her-
ziening en aanpassing, waaraan zij onophoudelijk worden blootgesteld. 
3.	 Het herinneringsproces op latere leeftijd kan de persoonlijke banden tus-
sen de generaties versterken, hetgeen tenminste twee belangrijke gevol-
gen heeft. Ten eerste moedigt het de ouderen aan om actief te blijven 
middels het delen van hun levenservaringen met de jeugd, inclusief hun 
persoonlijk en cultureel specifiek inzicht. Ten tweede verbetert het de 
communicatie en het onderlinge begrip tussen de generaties binnen een 
familie. Als gevolg daarvan worden voorwaarden geschapen voor meer 
tolerantie en respect tijdens het contact tussen mensen van verschillende 
generaties binnen onze maatschappij.
4.	 Het herinneringsproces is gebaseerd op interactie. Deze is breder dan 
een intersubjectief proces. Interacties die leiden tot een spontaan en vri-
jwillig terugkijken worden beïnvloed door verschillen in de omgeving, 
ruimte en materiële objecten, die trouwens elk ook de rol van interac-
tieve partner kunnen spelen. Deze conclusie heeft belangrijke gevolgen 
voor de manier waarop zorg- en welzijnsorganisaties voor ouderen van 
dagen ingericht kunnen worden. De verantwoordelijke organisaties 
doen er goed aan om bij het creëren van goede levensomstandigheden 
en zorg voor de ouderen rekening te houden met het recht om terug te 
kunnen kijken naar het verleden. Verder hoeft de woonomgeving van de 
ouderen ons niet te herinneren aan een therapeutische inrichting, maar 
verdient het de voorkeur dat hij allereerst een huislijke sfeer uitstraalt. 
Dit betekent dat iedere bewoner voldoende ruimte dient te hebben om 
zich met persoonlijke en gekoesterde voorwerpen te kunnen omringen, 
die de behoefte om terug te kijken en om herinneringen met anderen te 
delen zal bevorderen. 
De conclusies en aanbevelingen van het onderzoek kunnen zowel theoretisch 
als praktisch toegepast worden. Zij bieden mogelijkheden voor verder 





Letter to my son
Dear Robbie, 
Among all the people who inspired and supported the process of writing 
this book you remained the most devoted and precious fan of mine. Between 
the age of 6 and 10 you’ve been asked to show a kind of patience and 
understanding that is scarce even among adults. You adjusted yourself to 
the fact that your mother was working at home the entire week and also 
during weekends. You also managed to wait at least ten minutes longer 
before asking once again when we could do things together. Very soon you 
learned the three divine names Hans, Steve and Hugo, who never seized to 
surprise me (and even you from time to time) with their unpredictability and 
the originality of their actions and thoughts: Hans with his fascinating vision 
and craving for life, Steve with the brilliance and generosity of his thoughts 
and Hugo with his sharp and rare talent to confront and combine non-fitting 
pieces of complex intellectual puzzles, without whom this enormous change 
in my life would never have taken place. 
You were excited when I took you to the Memory Museum for the first 
time, and soon you got to know the place very well, especially the charming 
children’s corner where we spent some time playing together. Each of my 
dear colleagues among the volunteers and the staff of the Museum who have 
met you once, still enquires after your progress at school. Many times you 
have heard from me about the devotion with which Inez and all volunteers 
have worked for the Museum project. You have met them yourself and were 
immediately indulged by sweets and attention (thank you, Freya). You knew 
that your mother had university colleagues as well. So you were taking in 
by my stories about Ineke, Arie and Dorothé and eventually started mixing 
up their images, but never in doubt whether they were ‘leuke mensen’76  and 
how much your mother appreciated knowing them.  
Within the mosaic of all the names with which I generously garnished our 
evening meals I am sure you were able to detect a few that were especially 
dear to me. Topsy was that lady who was unreachable by telephone, who 
fed me with her experience and knowledge about Humanitas and who when 
necessary stood up for me so that I felt safe and protected as if by my own 
mother. You personally know and appreciate the friendship of Robert (the big 
one) who so often sacrificed himself by playing football with you and your 
76   nice people
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friends, allowing me thus a couple of extra free hours to work. I could not 
have done without both of you, especially when transcribing the recordings 
of the Museum conversations. Hopefully you won’t forget how we laughed 
about the almost undecipherable passages and how proud you were when 
you managed to get to the sense of a phrase before we did. 
There are also names that I probably hardly mentioned at home, but I want 
you to know them as well. Ilja’s advice to look for my own path within 
the Dutch intellectual world inspired me from the very beginning. Adri’s 
reflections and humour warmed me up after that wonderful day we spent 
together at Humanitas. All my university colleagues who wished me well 
and who asked me about the progress of my work – I shall always carry the 
warmth of their support with me. You personally met almost all the tutors 
and members of my cohort from the PhD programme at home. Knowing 
those people remains the most precious personal and intellectual gain of the 
past few years for me. 
Another informal group you have met was my ‘women’s club’, dear friends 
who without intruding but nevertheless insistently asked me about my work 
and shared the ups and downs of my moods. You became a bit unhappy 
when Willemijn and Paul generously invited me to work in their wonderful 
house in Meerssen where I could spent a couple of weeks finishing one of 
the chapters, but you knew how important it was for me and how much I 
appreciated this warm gesture. You were aware of all distant and close friends 
who always believed in me. You have learnt that my Russian ‘connection’ is 
impossible to split into family and friends and that all of them, Vitaly and 
Marina, Vera and Igor, Natasha and Sergei and especially your grandfather 
and Galia are our secret weapons, whose love is one of the precious pieces 
of inheritance you have enjoyed from the day you were born. What you are 
probably less aware of is the influence of my mother’s love, which invisibly 
but constantly led me through those years. 
My dear son, there are many more people whom I would like to thank 
personally, but this letter is for you when you are able to read it yourself. 
You have helped me with every step during those trying years and when I 
was not able to be there for you in the way we both would have liked your 
father has taken over, not by replacing me but by nurturing you and keeping 
my place warm. I could never have come so far without his unconditional 
devotion and loyalty.
Just remember… 
Your mother, April, 2010
372
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Elena Bendien (1964) is a researcher at the Huma-
nitas Foundation in Rotterdam, associated with the 
University for Humanistics in Utrecht, the Nether-
lands. She received her first PhD in linguistics at 
the State Pedagogical University of Rostov-on-Don, 
Russian Federation. For seven years she worked as 
a senior university lecturer, combining teaching, 
research work and the administrative tasks which 
went with her position as deputy faculty dean. 
Having moved to the Netherlands in 1999 she deve-
loped her interest in the field of social, organisatio-
nal and cultural psychology. 
Elena is currently focusing on process philosophy as applied to social scien-
ces. She is especially keen on qualitative research based on ethnography and 
discourse and conversational analysis. Her research project at the Humanitas 
Foundation, which forms the basis for this book, took place in 2006 – 2010. 
Elena’s main professional fields of interests are: memory studies, ageing 
studies, the meaning of remembering at a later age, the role of the material 
culture in remembering processes, social aspects of (informal) care, identity 
issues in later life, new forms of non-therapeutic care and intercultural and 
gender diversity of ageing societies within a globalised world. Her aim is to 
continue working in those fields of interest, whereby the outcome of care-
fully focused theoretical and practical investigation can be used for client-
oriented staff training and structural improvement of client conditions at 
care institutions. 
Her dream is that her son Robbie, who is 10 years old now, will age heal-
thily and happily in a world where being elderly will be looked upon with 
honour. 


